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Abstract
This thesis is about French foreign policy and how it has been constrained or 
enabled by the European Union (EU). It applies “Europeanization” theory to French 
policy in East Asia, testing the extent to which three dimensions of the Europeanization 
process (policy convergence, national projection and identity reconstruction) are evident 
and mutually compatible. The extent to which EU membership and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) make a difference to French policy and vice versa, 
is evaluated over the period covering the second term of President F rancis  Mitterrand 
(1988-95) and the first term of President Jacques Chirac (1995-2002).
France is a core country in the European Union and has taken part in European 
foreign policy (EFP) projects since the founding of European Political Cooperation in 
1973. At the same time, its foreign policy is distinguished by a tradition of national 
independence and power projection. This thesis studies the interaction of French 
national policy with collective European foreign policy (EFP), and French interaction 
with the preferences, statements and actions of the Commission, the Council, the 
Member States and the European Parliament concerning East Asia. Most studies argue 
that if there is any “Europeanization” taking place, it is limited only to the bottom-up 
national projection variant that seeks to amplify French policies as “European”, ie. to 
“Gallicise” European foreign policy. This study examines the record of French and EU 
interactions with China, Japan and Vietnam in the areas of economic exchanges, 
political-security relations and human rights to establish if there has been a trend of 
converging “European” policies and collective European conceptions of interest and 
identity. It concludes that the utility and impact of EU institutions and the CFSP on 
French foreign policy behaviour is more significant than is commonly imagined or 
admitted, and that the foreign policies of EU member states tend over the long term 
towards convergence.
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Preface
My academic interest in French foreign policy was sparked by a stint as First Secretary 
in the Singapore Embassy in Paris, from 1995-1998. French foreign policy and its 
interaction with European foreign policy-making, was both a fascinating and confusing 
subject. This thesis is the result of several years of observation, research and inquiry 
growing out of the fascination that professional experience in Paris spawned.
The thesis builds on an earlier 30,000-word dissertation, “French Foreign Policy and 
China, 1988-2000: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy and its limits”, 
which I wrote when reading for the degree of M.Phil in European Politics and Society at 
St Antony’s College, Oxford University (1999-2001). That dissertation underscored the 
national peculiarity of French policy over Europeanization.
The theoretical framework in Chapter Two on Europeanization, and Chapter Four on 
China draw on parts of the earlier dissertation; but have been significantly revamped 
and re-written with subsequent research and insights. Chapter Three on foreign policy 
objectives and the relationship between French policy and European Foreign Policy is 
new. Chapters Five and Six, on Japan and Vietnam respectively, are also based on new 
research and interviews. With the benefit of additional research and reflection since 
2001, and the luxury of comparison between three countries instead of a single case 
study, this thesis privileges the view that the foreign policies of EU member states tend 
over the long term towards policy convergence Europeanization.
Note on names:
Throughout the main text of this dissertation, Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese names 
are reproduced in the normal East Asian order; that is, surname first and given name 
second. Thus Jiang Zemin, Yoshida Shigeru, Hashimoto Ryutaro and Ho Chi Minh.
An exception is made for Japanese names cited in the footnotes and interviews, which 
are presented in the usual Western order of given name followed by surname.
Chinese names are rendered in the hanyu piny in system (eg. Mao Zedong and not Mao 
Tse-tung), except for the familiar forms of non-mainland Chinese names (eg. Chiang 
Kai-shek, Lee Kuan Yew.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
This thesis is about French policy in East Asia: whether and how it has been 
constrained or enabled by the European Union in the 1990s. As a subject on its own, 
French foreign policy is a complex and fascinating study - intimately associated with 
Charles de Gaulle - of a defeated global power regaining self-respect, military power 
and diplomatic weight in world affairs after liberation from the national desastre of 
Nazi invasion and occupation from June 1940 to June 1944.1 France is one of just a 
handful of EU states (together with Britain and perhaps Germany) with the diplomatic, 
economic and military wherewithal to play an appreciable role in world affairs without 
the “cover” of the EU. Yet French foreign policy is also closely linked with European 
construction, building European foreign policy and acting via Europe.
This study focuses on the interaction of French national policy with collective 
European foreign policy (EFP) in one area of the world -  East Asia. The research 
question is salient in the light of France’s 1993 definition of Asia as the “new frontier” 
of French diplomacy, and the EU’s 1994 “New Asia Strategy”.2 This thesis will 
examine the impact of EU membership and European institutions such as European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) and its successors the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on French policy. 
How have over 30 years of participation in EU foreign policy coordination structures 
and practices affected French policy? Since 1970 and the start of foreign policy 
coordination under European Political Cooperation (EPC), France has been one of the 
long-term participants in European Foreign Policy. Most studies of the effect of the 
European Union on a member state’s foreign policy have concentrated on the difference 
made to new (or sometimes potential) members. Studies such as those on Spain, 
Portugal and Greece have highlighted the constraints and acquis politiques - such as the
1 The definitive (if slightly dated) study on postwar French foreign policy and the effects o f the Nazi 
trauma on French defence and foreign policy thinking is Alfred Grosser’s Affaires Exterieures: La 
Politique de la France 1944-1989, Paris: Flammarion, 1989.
2 Commission o f the European Communities (henceforth European Commission), “Towards a New Asia 
Strategy”, COM (94)427, Brussels, July 1994.
11
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Introduction
recognition of Israel by Spain in 1986 -  that new member states had to accept. By 
contrast, it has been implicitly assumed that “old” member states, such as France and 
the other five signatories to the 1957 Rome Treaties, have not had to make significant 
adjustments since they were present at the creation of the EC and could directly 
influence the evolution and direction of EU policies and institutions from the beginning.
The Research Question
The central objective of this thesis is to assess the impact of EU membership on 
French foreign policy in East Asia in the 1990s. This thesis will examine the impact of 
EU membership and European institutions such as the Commission, Council, European 
Parliament and CFSP/ESDP on French foreign policy. France is a core country and 
founding member of the European Union, and a middle power in the international 
system. It projects its diplomatic influence unilaterally as well as through the European 
Union. French foreign policy is distinguished by a tradition of national independence 
and power projection. While the French approach to Community policies (trade and 
economic policies under Pillar I of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty) has generally been 
cooperative, the French record under EPC/CFSP (Pillar II) has been mixed. The 
dominant scholarship on French foreign policy, exemplified by Stanley Hoffmann, 
portrays it as nationalistic and independent. France under de Gaulle twice blocked EC 
enlargement to include Britain, in 1963 and 1967. In 1965, he triggered the “empty 
chair” crisis in opposition to majority voting that resulted in the Luxembourg 
Compromise. French foreign policy is usually cast as action springing from narrow 
national interests rather than collective “European” interests and positions.4 French 
criticisms of the American hyper-puissance, and rancorous quarrels with the US, other 
EU Member States and candidate countries in 2002-3 over intervention in Iraq, have 
reinforced the view that French policy under President Chirac today remains 
unashamedly Gaullist.5
3 See chapters on Spain and Portugal in Christopher Hill (ed), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, 
London: Routledge, 1996; K. Hanf and B. Soedentorp, “Small States and the Europeanization o f public 
policy”, in Hanf and Soedentorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration, London: Longman, 1998.
4 See Stanley Hoffmann “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f the Nation-State and the Case o f Western 
Europe”, Dcedalus, Summer 1966; “The European Community and 1992”, Foreign Affairs 68/4 (Fall 
1992); and “La France dans le Monde 1979-2000”, in Politique Etrangere, 2/2000, pp.307-317. See also 
Alistair Cole, French Politics and Society, London: Prentice Hall, 1998, p.260; Stanley Hoffman, 
“Conclusions”, in G. Ross, S. Hoffman and S. Malzacher (eds), The Mitterrand Experiment, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987.
5 Hubert Wdrine, “De Futility de la France”, Interview in Politique Internationale, 78, 1998, pp.41-64; 
“France’s foreign policy: ever awkward, sometimes risky”, Economist 1 February 2003; “Jacques Chirac:
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Despite this persistent tradition of independence and unilateralism, the influence 
of “Europe” on French foreign policy thinking is more considerable than commonly 
thought. In the 1950s, an institutionalised long-term cooperative relationship with 
Germany through European integration offered a means to compensate for the loss of 
French national greatness and empire. Yet, the memory of Nazi defeat and occupation 
led de Gaulle to insist on “national independence” in the 1960s. The tension between 
the two strategies has remained a key and recurrent theme in post-war French foreign 
policy.6 Under CFSP cooperation, the French Foreign Ministry (Quai d’Orsay) today 
takes part in the exchange of diplomats with other EU foreign ministries, information 
sharing, and joint reporting in third countries. French policy makers have been subject 
to socialisation pressures arising from very frequent and regular consultations with other 
national diplomats and EU officials. Many scholars argue that these intense and 
repeated contacts have socialised national diplomacies into becoming more “European” 
and taking a “coordination reflex” in foreign policy-making.7 Few would however 
describe France as a “Europeanised state” or “province” subscribing to multi-level 
governance within the European Union, as Germany has often been portrayed.8 At best, 
French policy is often portrayed as traditional and selfish national interest in substance, 
albeit cloaked in the language and form of collective European interest.
Why “East Asia” and how is it defined?
East Asia is significant because it contains two of the world’s most important 
economic, demographic, military and diplomatic powers (China and Japan); the 
developing world’s most successful regional organisation (ASEAN) comprising 10 
states with European colonial histories, and with which the EU has had an extensive
Can Gaullism work today”, Economist, 29 March 2003; “France’s diplomacy: Cocorico? Or have the 
chickens come home to roost?” Economist, 19 April 2003.
6 See Anand Menon, “France and the IGC o f 1996”, in Journal o f  European Public Policy [hereafter 
JEPP], 3/2, June 1996, pp.231-252. Stanley Hoffmann argues that a stable relationship with Germany and 
combating national decline were the two constant preoccupations o f French foreign policy in the 20th 
century. See his “France: Two Obsessions for One Century”, in Robert A. Pastor (ed), A Century’s 
Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World, New York: Perseus Books, 1999, pp.63-90; and “La 
France dans le Monde 1979-2000” Politique Etrangere 2/2000.
7 Studies on socialization pressures and the “coordination reflex” include Simon Nuttall, European 
Political Cooperation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Jakob Ohrgaard, “Less than 
Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics o f  
Intergovernmental Integration”, Millennium 26/1, 1997; and Kenneth Glarbo, “Wide-awake Diplomacy: 
Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy o f the European Union”, in JEPP 6/4, 1999.
8 See Philippe Moreau Defarges, “La France, province de l’Union europeenne?”, in Politique Etrangere 
1/96 (spring 96), pp.37-48; and Klaus H Goetz, “Integration policy in a Europeanised state: Germany and 
the Intergovernmental Conference”, in JEPP 3/1, March 1996, pp.23-44.
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bloc-to-bloc relationship since the 1970s; and four Newly Industrialising Economies 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) which are all among the EU’s top 20 
trading partners. Since 1996, the EU deepened its relations with countries in the East 
Asian region (ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) through the launch of a historic 
inter-regional dialogue (ASEM) that includes biennial leaders’ summits, cultural, 
educational, business and official exchanges.
“East Asia” as a region and term are contested concepts. In the West, the term is 
often understood as succeeding the older Eurocentric idea of the “Far East”, which 
includes the countries geographically farthest from Europe on the Eurasian landmass - 
China, Korea and Japan. Yet it sometimes includes Southeast Asia (itself a modem, 
externally-imposed name and somewhat new geographical concept at the end of the 
Second World War).9 The historian Fernand Braudel, in his classic work on 
civilizations, grouped under the category “Maritime Far East” Indochina, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Korea and Japan.10 In this thesis “East Asia” will refer to both Northeast 
and Southeast Asia, ie. the region which includes Greater China (including Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macao), Japan and Korea, and the 10 ASEAN countries. This 
definition encompasses all the states sharing what Lucian Pye called an “East Asian 
Confucianist” political culture (including Vietnam and Singapore), as well as non- 
Confucian states (eg. Cambodia, Philippines, Myanmar/Burma, Malaysia and 
Indonesia) exhibiting “Southeast Asian” political culture.11 I thus include all the Asian 
member states in ASEM, plus Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. Excluded from this 
definition are Australasia, South Asia, and the Russian Far East.
Is there a French Policy in Asia?
Some scholars argue that French actions and activities in Asia are too incoherent 
and short-term to merit being called a ‘policy’. F rancis Godement argued that by the 
middle of the 1990s, France had fallen on the margins of significant Western actors in 
Asia. Notwithstanding Paris’ important diplomatic role in two Paris Peace Conference
9 Philippe Richer, “Introduction: A propos d’un angle complexe”, in Philippe Richer (ed.) Crises en Asie 
du Sud-est, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999:13, pp. 13-10. The term “Southeast Asia,” used from 1923 
by Heine-Geldem in his monograph Suddstasien was popularised when the Allies created in 1943 the 
“Southeast Asia Allied Command” under Admiral Louis Mountbatten. See also Donald K. Emmerson, 
“’Southeast Asia’: What’s in a Name?”, in Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies, XV, 1984.
10 Fernand Braudel, Grammaire des Civilisations, 1963, repr. Paris: Flammarion, 1993, pp.297-318.
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(1973 and 1989) and the financial and military contributions made by France towards
the UN mandate in Cambodia, France was hamstrung by a reputation of being unable or
10unwilling to determine developments or sustain any major activities in Asia. 
Godement felt that France’s role in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict was 
confined to that of ‘hotelier’. Worse, relations with most countries in the Asia-Pacific 
nose-dived after Chirac’s resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995.13 In 
stark contrast to the lively postcolonial debates on Paris’ Africa policy and the 
controversies over French commitments in the Middle East and its alleged pro- 
Arabism14, there was little debate and even less of a comprehensive policy towards 
Asia. Meanwhile, the UK and Germany had adopted documents detailing their Asia 
policies, and the EU had adopted the Commission’s ‘New Asia Strategy’ paper, as well 
as papers on China, Japan and Korea.15
I would argue that France did in fact have a committed and coherent policy of 
actively engaging East Asian countries in a comprehensive partnership. France was 
active on many fronts in East Asia in the 1990s: on human rights (esp. in China, 
Vietnam), on economic matters (first Japan and the NIEs, then ASEAN and China), on 
the diplomatic front (ASEM, Paris peace conference on Cambodia, and the 1997 coup), 
and even on the military (cooperation with Taiwan and Singapore) and intellectual 
fronts (Council on Asia-Europe Cooperation, “Asian values” dialogue with Malaysia 
and Singapore). Explaining French policy as being driven primarily by mercantilist 
ambitions in the region’s rapidly growing markets (at least until the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997-98)16 is thus too reductionist an account. It does not capture a complex 
relationship that included major disagreements and debates over human rights, strategic 
arms sales, and the appropriate security role of France and EU states in East Asia. This
11 Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f  Political Authority, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1985
12 Francis Godement, “Une politique ffanfaise pour I’Asie-Pacifique?”, Politique Etrangere, 4/95, 
Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality”, in The Pacific 
Review, 7/3, 1994, p.964.
13 Godement 95:964
14 See eg. Rachel Utley, “'Not to do less but to do better...’: French military policy in Africa”, 
International Affairs 78/1, 2002, pp. 129-146, and Godement 95:964
15 See eg. Godement 95:969, Nesshover 1999; and David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, 
London: Contemporary China Institute, SOAS, 1996.
16 Godement, “Une politique ffa^aise pour l’Asie-Pacifique?”; Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: 
Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality”, in The Pacific Review, 7/3, 1994; and Miguel Neves Santos, 
“Towards a Common China Policy for the EU: a Portuguese Perspective”, in Richard Grant (ed), The 
European Union and China, London: Routledge/RIIA, 1995.
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thesis proposes that a more accurate understanding of French (and EU) objectives and 
policies in East Asia necessitates analyzing the multiple facets and inter-relationship of 
the economic, political and human rights objectives of the East Asian region to French 
and EU interests.
This thesis seeks to answer the following key questions:
a) What were French national interests (both perceived and objective) in East Asia 
in the period under study?
b) What were EU interests in East Asia? In the event of a conflict of interests, 
how was France affected by common European policies on international issues?
c) To what extent did France adapt its national foreign policy to EU institutions, 
and other member states’ national foreign policies? In other words, how and to 
what extent is French foreign policy being Europeanized?
Choice o f Case Studies and Periodisation
The four main targets of French policy in Asia are China, India, Japan and 
ASEAN. To answer the questions above, three East Asian case studies are covered in 
this thesis: China, Japan and Vietnam. China and Japan are obvious choices because of 
their economic and political importance to Europe. The EU has clearly defined 
political-economic interests in China and Japan: both countries were identified as 
cornerstones of the EU’s 1994 “New Asia Strategy”.17 Despite human rights 
disagreements - heightened by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre - China is an increasingly 
important focus in European foreign policy. China is important to EU interests because 
of its rising economic power, strategic position in the Asia-Pacific, and diplomatic 
importance as permanent member in the UN Security Council. Japan is the EU’s largest 
economic partner outside of Europe and North America. It is also a significant member 
of important Western fora such as the G7 and OECD. Among ASEAN countries, 
Vietnam was chosen because of its historical relationship with France, to test the extent 
to which France-Vietnam relations have been affected by foreign policy 
Europeanization.
China, Japan and Vietnam are significant and representative of French and EU 
interests in upgrading political-economic ties in East Asia. France’s economics-
16
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oriented East Asia policy was launched by Prime Minister Edouard Bahadur’s 
government in 1993 (based on the “German model”) and formally defined by President 
Chirac in 1995. Vietnam is a former French colony with which France tries to maintain 
privileged ties. France often spearheads EU policies towards ASEAN’s Indochinese 
states. The EU has since the 1991 Paris Peace Conference invested substantial political 
and economic resources in Vietnam’s doi moi liberalisation reforms and the 
reconstruction of Cambodia. EU leaders and officials meet regularly with their Chinese, 
Japanese and Vietnamese counterparts at ASEAN and EU-related fora, ARF and under 
the aegis of ASEM,
Admittedly, the choice of China and Japan lends a bias towards Northeast rather 
than Southeast Asia. Generalisations about French policy from these two case studies 
may be more valid for the larger and more powerful states of East Asia. Other 
significant countries in the region that were not chosen as case studies -  Indonesia, the 
four NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), Thailand, 
Myanmar/Burma, Malaysia - however appear frequently in the discussions on China, 
Japan and Vietnam in chapters 4-6 as joint targets of French and European policies 
(economic, political, strategic and human rights) in the region. The choice of Vietnam 
as the third case study attempts to compensate for this geographical and power bias by 
including a Southeast Asian state of comparatively low economic, diplomatic and 
political clout (albeit, like Cambodia and Laos, one with a long history of relations with 
France).
These three countries are members of a region increasingly referred to as “East 
1 8Asia”. EU leaders and officials meet regularly with their East Asian counterparts at 
fora such as the ASEAN-EU dialogue, the ARF and since 1996, under the aegis of 
ASEM. The case studies assess French policy interacting with three very different 
targets in East Asia: a politically powerful and economically rising state, an
17 European Commission, “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, COM (94)427, Brussels, July 1994. The EU’s 
first comprehensive strategy papers on China and Japan were unveiled in July 1995.
18 COM (94)427 defined “Asia” as three regions comprising: the 8 countries and economies o f East Asia 
(China, Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Mongolia), the 10 countries o f Southeast 
Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and 
Burma, all members o f ASEAN since 1998), and the 8 countries o f South Asia (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan). A fourth region, Australasia (centred 
on Australia, New Zealand) was grouped under “Asia” by the EU in its COM (2001)469 final, 4 
September 2001.
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economically powerful state well integrated into Western fora, and a poor and until 
recently isolated state with which France has colonial ties.
The 1990s decade under study is compelling for three reasons. At the 
international systemic level, it straddles the end of the Cold War and the rise of a more 
assertive and self-confident European Union in world affairs in the early 1990s. Second, 
the period witnessed the emergence of human rights as a prominent, controversial and 
often divisive issue in international relations. At the domestic and third level, the 1990s 
covers the second term (1988-1995) of Socialist President F rancis Mitterrand and the 
first term (1995-2002) of Gaullist President Jacques Chirac.
In the first four years (1988-1992) of Mitterrand’s second term, foreign policy 
initiatives emanated from the Elysee Palace (Presidential office). During this period, 
Mitterrand’s foreign policy agenda was dominated by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and other Commmunist regimes in central and eastern Europe, German reunification, 
the bicentennial of the French Revolution and human rights, and the Gulf War.19 Aside 
from Paris’ involvement in the resolution of the Third Indochinese War, East Asia was 
not a high priority until relations with China deteriorated to the point of confrontation 
over human rights and French arms sales to Taiwan. The second phase started in 1993 
when the Gaullist Prime Minister Balladur used his strong electoral mandate to make an 
economic push into East Asia, and normalize France-China relations. After formal 
normalization in 1994 and the election of Gaullist President Jacques Chirac in 1995, 
East Asia rose slowly but steadily in significance on the French radar. Japan, ASEAN, 
China and South Korea were targeted for French commercial expansion, in tandem with 
German, British and Commission policies. Relations with China in particular rapidly 
warmed and even caused a split in EU ranks in 1997 over the appropriate EU approach 
to human rights and trade in China. Over the same period, relations with Vietnam were 
far more constant. Regular high-level visits were made in connection with the French 
diplomatic role in the resolution of the Third Indochinese War and the signing of the 
Paris Peace in 1991. Mitterrand and Chirac made state visits to Vietnam in 1992 and 
1997 respectively. French relations with Japan were cordial but not especially warm.
19 Hubert Wdrine, Les Mondes de Franqois Mitterrand: A I ’Elysee 1981-1995, Paris: Fayard, 1996, is an 
illuminating and detailed insider account by Mitterrand’s foreign policy adviser.
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They nose-dived in 1995 over French nuclear tests in the South Pacific but have 
stabilized with increased defence and sectoral cooperation, regular high-level visits 
between both sides kick-started by Chirac in 1996, and increasingly institutionalised 
links between the EU and Japan.
National Policy vs European Policy
A case can be made for France pursuing national goals in East Asia up to and 
including the 1990s. France helped China breach US-led diplomatic isolation and a 
Western trade embargo when it recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1964, and broke the EU consensus in April 1997 by refusing to support a hitherto 
routine collective EU position for a resolution in China’s human rights situation at the 
Committee on Human Rights (which took place shortly before President Chirac’s 
commercially important state visit to Chinq). France also went against general opinion 
in the EU, Japan and most Asian capitals when it resumed nuclear testing in the South 
Pacific in 1995. On the other hand, French policy in East Asia can be read as actions 
supporting or consolidating agreed collective EU policy. (EU interests and policies, for 
useful analysis, are taken to mean objectives and declarations made in the name of the 
EU interest by EU institutions such as the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council.) The EC had established relations with China in 1975 and in 1995 a common 
policy on China was defined.
This leads us to the main puzzle of this thesis. The French may have been a 
founding member of the EC in 1957, but they also seem to have had to adapt to 
unanticipated convergence pressures of the overarching structure of European foreign 
policy, consisting of (i) national policies, (ii) CFSP and (iii) Community policies.20 
Incremental policy coordination, common positions, declarations and increasingly, 
common policies and actions place convergence pressures on member states. Policies 
in France’s traditional spheres of influence have undergone significant adaptation 
towards multilateral approaches. This is obvious even in the Middle East and in Africa, 
two old French colonial backyards.21 Among multilateral approaches, the EU has
20 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role”, 
in Journal o f  Common Market Studies [hereafter JCMS], 31/1, 1993, pp.306-328.
21 B. Kodmani-Darwish, “La France et le Moyen-Orient: entre nostalgie et realisme”, in Politique 
Etrangere 4/95; Politique Etrangere; Rachel Utley, “'Not to do less but to do better...’: French militaiy 
policy in Africa”, International Affairs 78/1, 2002, pp.129-146.
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usually been the favoured vehicle for the pursuit of French interests in these regions and 
in third countries, in preference to the UN, OECD or ad hoc groupings of states. This 
trend is no less true for French policy in Asia.
While East Asia is a region of growing interest for French and European foreign 
policy, the countries in this region could be considered “least likely” target countries for 
a coherent EU region-to-region approach. This is because European Foreign Policy is 
more institutionalised in the EU’s immediate and near-abroad priority areas and issue- 
areas, in particular Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean/Middle East, and 
external trade (especially negotiations with other trade powers and in WTO). The 
European Union’s involvement in these geographic and issue areas has been the subject 
of numerous analyses. Parallel to this literature on the EU’s policies in the near-abroad 
are in-depth studies on French policies in these same areas, with little cognisance -  
aside from trade relations - of the effect of Europe on French national policies.22 In 
effect, habits of cooperation, consultation and coordination on the EU’s policy in the 
East Asian region are relatively new and not well established.
Approaches to understanding French Foreign Policy
The dominant academic approach to French policy is to explain it as a medium 
power with Gaullist great-power ambitions, reflexes and clear foreign policy goals of 
security and independence 23 These works, together with institutional analyses24 explain 
French foreign policy as the product of a rational state with a clear sense of its 
“national interests” (more on this in Chapter Three). Recent empirical studies on 
European foreign policies (both collective and those of individual European member 
states) in East Asia have largely approached the subject matter from a national foreign 
policy perspective. Does participation in EU foreign policy make a difference to the
22 Marianna P. Sullivan, France's Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations, Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978. Exceptions include Christoph Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face h 
Pekin (1989-1997): vers une strategic commune?”, Politique Etrangere 1/99; and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, 
“Sino-Westem European Relations: Distant Neighbours or Distant Rivals?”, in China Review, 
Autumn/Winter 1995, pp.42-44.
23 Jean Doise and Maurice Vai'sse, Politique etrangere de la France: diplomatie et outil militaire, Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale, 1992; Frederic Bozo, Politique Etrangere de la France depuis 1945, Paris, 1998; 
Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea o f  France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; Alfred Grosser, Affaires Exterieures, op cit.
24 Marie-Christine Kessler, La Politique Etrangere de la France: Acteurs et Processus, Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 1999.
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foreign policy of EU member states? No, according to the dominant view, exemplified 
by Stanley Hoffmann. Foreign policies are the domain of sovereign states and the EU
can never have a foreign policy, properly speaking, as it is made up of a collection of
* #states. As such, individual states within the EU can at best be constrained by EU 
structures (cf. regime theory), but will never allow these structures to set their policy. 
The “Gaullist” approach posits that member states such as France (and the UK) with a 
strong attachment to an independent foreign policy will resist pressures to conform to 
European institutions.
As the “Gaullist” approach is increasingly inadequate in explaining the actions 
and policies of France, even in its domaines reserves (traditional colonial spheres of 
influence), other works emphasise the input and impact of EU foreign policy making 
mechanisms. According to this second view, French foreign-policy making has been 
fundamentally altered by Europe. There is a coordination reflex among EU foreign 
policy-making elites, and this is set to increase over time with the further 
institutionalisation of foreign policy coordination with CFSP since 1992 and ESDP 
since 1998.26
A third approach is to ignore the member states’ foreign policies altogether and 
to study the role of the EU in different regions of the world. This approach assumes that 
member states’ foreign policy interests are increasingly subsumed by and expressed 
through the EU. Hazel Smith, for example, argues that the EU has been a significant 
unmistakable actor in international relations for several decades and is recognized by 
other actors as such. European Foreign Policy is thus its own animal, distinct from and
25 Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete?”, op cit; Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in 
Terms?”, in JCMS, 21, 1983, pp.149-170.
26 Franfoise de La Serre, “France: The Impact o f Francois Mitterrand”, in Hill (ed), The Actors in 
Europe’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1996; Christian Lequesne, Paris-Bruxelles: Comment se 
fa it la politique europeenne de la France, Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, 1993; Margaret Blunden, “France”, in Manners and Whitman 2000. Also Ohrgaard, “Less 
than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics o f  
Intergovernmental Integration”.
27 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy, 2002; Christopher Piening, Global Europe: The 
European Union in World Affairs, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1997; Regelsberger et al (eds), 
Foreign Policy o f  the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Riener, 1997; David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, London: Contemporary China Institute, 
SOAS, 1996; Richard Grant (ed), The European Union and China: A European Strategy fo r  the Twenty- 
First Century?, London: Routledge/RIIA, 1995; H Maull, G Segal, and J Wanandi, (eds), Europe and the 
Asia Pacific, London: Routledge, 1998; and G.A. Richards and Colin Kirkpatrick, “Reorienting
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far from being merely a summation of individual Member States’ foreign policies
9  Qthrough a complex system of inter-governmental negotiation.
“Europeanization ” as an Approach
The “Europeanization” approach used in this thesis (see Chapter Two for a 
survey of Europeanization literature) is a merged/shared sovereignty conceptualisation 
of European Foreign Policy. It is derivative of the second and third approaches above.
To answer the question of how much French foreign policy has been affected by 
the EU, this thesis proposes three concepts of Europeanization29 applicable to national 
foreign policy: (i) a top-down process of policy convergence; (ii) a bottom-up and 
sideways process involving the export of national preferences and models, national 
projection; and (iii) the socialization of interests and identities, identity 
reconstruction. The first concept of Europeanization is used predominantly in the 
literature to explain the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in 
response to the demands of the EU. This concept predicts cross-national policy 
convergence between EU states after a sustained period of structural and procedural 
adaptation. A second Europeanization concept refers to the bottom-up projection of 
national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level. 
Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity and interest 
convergence so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to take root 
alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape them.
Interregional Cooperation in the Global Political Economy: Europe’s East Asian Policy”, in JCMS, 37/4, 
December 1999, pp.683-710.
28 Simon J Nuttall,, European Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
29 On the burgeoning literature on Europeanization in domestic politics and policy making, see Cowles, 
Caporaso and Risse (eds), Transforming Europe : Europeanization and domestic change, Cornell 
University Press, 2001; Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson, “Introduction: Approaches to 
Europeanization”, in Harmsen and Wilson (eds), Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and Citizenship, 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000; Alistair Cole and Helen Drake, “The Europeanization o f the French Polity: 
continuity, change and adaptation”, JEPP, 7/1, 2000; Hussein Kassim, B Guy Peters and Vincent Wright, 
(eds), The National Coordination o f  EU Policy, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000; Vincent Wright, “The 
National Co-ordination o f European Policy-making: Negotiating the Quagmire”, in Jeremy Richardson 
(ed), European Union: Power and Policy-making, London and New York: Routledge, 1996; Yves Meny, 
Pierre Muller and Jean-Louis Quermonne (eds), Adjusting to Europe: The Impact o f  the European Union 
on National Institutions and Policies, London: Routledge, 1996; and Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of  
Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case o f France”, JCMS 32/1, 1994.
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The three aspects of Europeanization and their expected indicators (summarized 
in Table 1.1) will be used as a guide in the three country studies in chapters 4-6.
Table 1.1 Three Dimensions of Europeanization in National Foreign Policy
Aspects of 
Europeanization
National foreign policy indicators
I Adaptation and Policy 
Convergence
a) Increasing salience of European political 
agenda
b) Adherence to common objectives
c) Common Policy outputs taking priority over 
national domaines reserves
II National Projection a) State attempts to increase national influence in 
the world
b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of 
other member states
c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella
III Identity reconstruction a) Emergence of norms among policy-making 
elites
b) Shared definitions of European and national 
interests
The “EU” will be taken as represented by its key actors: the Commission, the 
General Affairs Council (GAC), and the European Parliament (EP). The objectives and 
declarations made by these EU institutions will be taken as representative of the EU, eg. 
“New Asia Strategy” paper proposed by the Commission in spring 1994 and approved 
by the Council in July. The European Parliament has also played an important role 
(especially in foreign aid and human rights) and has since 1987 called into question 
continued EU development assistance and political cooperation with particular Asian 
countries (especially China, Myanmar and Indonesia) in view of their human rights 
records.30
Sources
Existing analyses do not systematically test how the European dimension has or 
might have shaped France’s national foreign policy. As little in-depth research has 
been done on French policy in Asia in the period under study31, much of the empirical
30 Council o f the European Union, Annual Report on Human Rights 2002, pp. 45-47, 126-131.
31 An exception is Ren6 Dorient’s “Un septennat de politique asiatique: quel bilan pour la France?”, 
Politique Etrangere, 1/2002, 2002. Other articles tend to focus on French relations with China or 
Vietnam, eg. Christoph Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face & Pekin (1989-1997): vers une strategic 
commune?”, Politique Etrangere 1/99, pp.91-106; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Paris-P6kin: Un dialogue sans 
complexes?”, Politique Internationale 75, Spring 1997; Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations:
23
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Introduction
material contained in this thesis is based on primary sources found in French newspaper 
archives, political memoirs and policy speeches by French and other EU personalities 
on Asia. Many French positions and intra-EU politics on the making of its Asia policy 
are potentially sensitive and hence unpublished. Consequently, interviews with French 
officials, academics, foreign diplomats and other actors based in Paris, Brussels, 
Singapore and Vietnam were necessary. Where anonymity was requested, the 
organizational affiliation rather than the person has been identified in the text. Most 
official EU (Commission and EP, but not GAC) documents are disseminated and freely 
available on the EU’s website. Official French positions expressed in documents and 
speeches - chiefly from the President’s office (Elysee), National Assembly, Senate, 
Prime Minister’s Office (Matignon) and Foreign Ministry (Quai d’Orsay) - are available 
on the Quai d’Orsay website. Also invaluable were news reports and analyses in Le 
Monde and Le Figaro, and articles in the journals Politique Etrangere, Politique 
Internationale, Notes et Etudes, and La Revue Internationale et Strategique.
Plan of the Thesis
Chapters 2-3 set out the context in which French and EU policy operate. 
Chapter 2 first surveys the burgeoning literature on Europeanization and groups the 
literature into five schools of thought: adaptation, national projection, identity 
reconstruction/socialisation, modernisation and policy isophormism. Most of the work 
on Europeanization - the transformation and adaptation variously applied to the politics, 
policy and process of EU member states - focuses almost exclusively on the domestic 
impact of EU, ie. the impact on national institutions and domestic politics. Second, it 
asks if the phenomenon of Europeanization - which is so often understood as a process 
of transformation in domestic politics and institutions - can be applied to EU member 
states’ foreign policies and what a national “foreign” policy means in the structure of 
policy-making in Europe. The third objective of this chapter is to establish an 
operational definition of Europeanization for the case studies in chapters 4-6, using the 
parameters of convergence, projection and socialization by which this process in a 
member state’s foreign policy can be understood and studied.
Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality”, The Pacific Review, 7/3, 1994; Fran^oise Mengin, “Relations 
France-Chine, quel anniversaire s’agit-il de c^lebrer?”, in Relations Internationales et Strategiques, 14, 
6t6 1994:29-34; and Tran Van Tong, “La France et le Vietnam: pour une approche nouvelle”, 
Commentaire, it6  1994, 18/66, pp.287-296.
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Chapter 3 addresses the first two of the three key questions raised at the 
beginning of this chapter by identifying and pinning down French foreign policy goals 
and objectives from those of the EU in East Asia. This chapter provides a background 
overview of French and European interests in East Asia after French decolonisation in 
the 1950s, with a focus on the motivations and objectives around and since 1989 (Berlin 
Wall and Tiananmen) and 1991 (Maastricht and CFSP). The first section looks at 
French objectives in three domains: economic, politico-security and human rights 
interests, through the lens of national (French) foreign policy. The second section looks 
at these same domains but through the lens of the EU (chiefly the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament. This chapter contends that national and collective EU 
foreign polices in East Asia are intimately related in a dialectical process of continuous, 
iterative adjustment and cannot be neatly differentiated. Increasingly, the definition of 
“interests” takes place as much in Brussels and in other EU capitals, as in Paris. An 
understanding of the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of Europeanization is thus 
necessary to make sense of the evolution in French policy in the region.
Chapter 4 shows how the French conception of the national interest vis-a-vis 
China evolved between the presidencies of Mitterrand and Chirac. It argues that a 
change in perception is a more satisfactory explanation for the French policy change 
towards China and Asia in the 1990s, as compared to the mainstream account of France 
pursuing national over community interests in order to increase its economic presence 
in China. We see France moving towards EU norms and standards of behaviour in its 
political relations with China. Gaullist-style rhetoric on French grandeur and a special 
relationship with China still figured prominently. However, the discourse was 
broadened to stress China and Europe as great powers with common interests and goals. 
In trade and investment relations, it is the “German model” emphasising economic 
interests which is emulated by France and then institutionalised as EU policy. French 
trade policy towards China was Europeanized in terms of policy learning and emulative 
transfer from another EU member state.
Chapter 5 argues that Paris’ conflictual relations with Tokyo up to 1991 were 
mediated by the EU, first as a “cover” for French economic protectionism, then as a 
source of top-down pressure for policy change towards Japan. As a key member of the 
G7, OECD and IMF, and observer in security fora like the OSCE, Japan is often
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regarded and treated more as a member of the “West” rather than an Asian state. 
Influenced by Europeanization pressures from the Commission and other EU member 
states, France changed its hostile policy towards Japan and converged its actions with 
the EU mainstrem in viewing Japan as a valuable partner with similar “civilian power” 
capabilities and goals, eg. economic diplomacy via trade and aid, promoting liberal 
democracy and human rights (albeit differing on the priority of economic or political 
rights), and balancing relations with the US and other great powers (such as Russia and 
China).
Chapter 6 delves into the supposed special relationship between France and 
Vietnam. This serves as a counter-factual test case to Asian countries - such as China, 
Japan, India, Indonesia, Myanmar and the Koreas - which are targeted by the 
Commission or Council for clear and declared policy objectives and even 
comprehensive EU strategies. France is expected as a former colonial power to keep its 
privileged relations with Vietnam out of the EU policy process. Indeed, it managed to 
build a kind of special relationship with Hanoi in the decade between 1979 and 1989 
when newly reunified Vietnam was an ostracised state. But even in what might be 
expected to be a French domaine reserve, Paris in the 1990s increasingly framed its 
expectations, objectives and policies towards Vietnam within the context the EU 
(though playing the role of EU initiator).
The Argument
France in many ways prefers an EU with weak institutions. However, French 
foreign policy after de Gaulle has clearly become less nationalist and more “European”. 
This development is partially explained by constructivist accounts of the impact of EU 
norms and values and the internalisation of community interests among foreign policy 
elites. French policy discourse today is replete with the ideas of collective EU 
objectives and common actions. A notion of shared European goals increasingly 
informs and shapes preferences, as well as the discourse on “national interests” 
emanating from Paris. At the annual Conference of French Ambassadors in 1994, then- 
Foreign Minister Alan Juppe made a clear pitch for Europeanising French foreign 
policy:
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It is necessary that all our embassies in non-EU countries take European policy 
into account. The external action of the Union is sometimes perceived as 
offending our national policy or competing with it....This is an erroneous 
impression, at best a reaction which should be corrected. It is your role, as 
ambassadors of France, both to assert the identity of the European Union and to 
explain the specific positions defended by France within the institutions thereof. 
It is without reservations therefore, that you will endeavour, wherever you are, 
to affirm the political identity of the Union.
The structure of French foreign policy making is thus significant. The preferred 
and most important structure is obviously the EU. Evidently, the French are not 
abandoning national foreign policy autonomy altogether; but they are defending and 
promoting French interests within the institutions of the EU. French foreign policies are 
increasingly being defined in the context of EU foreign policy structures where French 
interests meet with those of other member states’ and collective positions have to be 
negotiated. Even in security policy, that other bastion of Gaullist sovereignty, Paris’ co­
leadership with London since the end of 1998 towards a joint European defence 
capability is symptomatic of an increasing French willingness to pool resources in 
collective EU initiatives, even in sensitive areas impinging on national sovereignty.33
A second theme running though this thesis is that French elites are redefining 
their interests according to accepted collective EU norms, goals and shared principles. 
Recent neo-functionalist and constructivist contributions to the study of EFP seem to 
suggest that policy convergence is deepening. These approaches argue that “prolonged 
participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign 
policy cultures along similar lines.” The main agents for convergence include elite 
socialisation, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalised “imperative of
, , 3 4concertation.
This thesis recognises that French elites often prefer to work outside of EU 
structures in East Asia and that French resources may still be sufficient to underpin 
coherent national policies towards individual countries (especially those in which
32 Cited in Fran9oise de La Serre, “France: The impact o f Francis Mitterrand”, in Christopher Hill (ed), 
The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1996, pp.36-37. See also Henrik Larsen, 
“Discourse Analysis and Foreign Policy: The Impact of the Concepts o f Europe, Nation/State, Security 
and the Nature o f International Relations on French and British Policies towards Europe in the 1980s” , 
Ph.D Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1993.
33 Stanley Hoffmann, “Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?”, JCMS, 38/2, 2000:189-98.
34 See M.E. Smith, “Conforming to Europe”, p.614 and K. Glarbo, “Reconstructing Europe”, p.650.
27
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Introduction
France has strong historical ties, as in Indochina). It argues however that national 
resources are increasingly inadequate for a consistent, comprehensive policy towards 
whole geographic regions. Indeed, French capabilities are increasingly inadequate even 
to meet national objectives in large countries such as China and Japan.
While EU institutions as independent variables on national foreign policy 
behaviour are not critical on every issue, they are often significant and need to be 
studied in order the better to appreciate the motivations and formulation of French 
national foreign policy. That such changes have occurred at all in the foreign policy of 
a state traditionally “verbally favourable to a CFSP and politically ambivalent, because 
of a strong attachment to an independent security and above all foreign policy”35, 
indicates the power of institutions and the unintended effects of French participation in 
EFP. Studies on the participation of other member states in EFP may well show more 
evidence of the creeping influence of EU membership on other national foreign 
policies. An understanding of at least the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of 
Europeanization, and possibly also those of changing identities, is thus necessary to 
make sense of the evolution in French policy in East Asia since foreign policy 
cooperation between the member states was farther institutionalised in the 1990s.
35 Stanley Hoffmann, “Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?”, JCMS, 38/2, 2000, p. 193.
36 Building on Manners and Whitman 2001; Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, 
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001; and Christopher Hill’s The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, 1996 and 
European Political Cooperation and National Foreign Policies, 1983.
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Chapter Two 
Europeanization Theory and Foreign Policy
Chapter One suggested that the impact of European Union institutions should be 
taken into account in the study of French foreign policy, a subject long dominated by 
Gaullist approaches portraying it as independent and resistant to change. Building on 
that idea, this chapter seeks to develop an operational theory of Europeanization in order 
to better understand the extent of the influence, opportunities and constraints on French 
choices afforded by the European Union.
“Europeanization” is a relatively new and ill-defined concept in the scholarly 
literature of European Studies/International Relations. It often refers to the political and 
policy changes caused by the impact of membership in the European Union on the 
member states. Europeanization theorists draw on ideas found in institutionalism as 
well as in rationalisation and globalisation theories. Ben Rosamund defines 
Europeanization as an “institutionally thick form of rationalisation within the global 
economy.”1 Borrowing from institutionalist theory’s hypothesis that international 
institutions have “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”, various 
Europeanization scholars argue that sustained membership and participation in the EU 
leads to the convergence of national policy-making, both in style and content.
Like globalisation theory, there is much debate over the nature, causes and 
effects of Europeanization, and precious little agreement on what exactly
1 See Ben Rosamund’s Theories o f  European Integration, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 179-18; and 
“Europeanization and Globalization”, in Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson (eds), Europeanization: 
Institutions, Identities and Citizenship, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000.
2 Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two approaches” in International Institutions and State 
Power, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p. 161.
3 Alistair Cole and Helen Drake, “The Europeanization o f the French Polity: continuity, change and 
adaptation”, Journal o f European Public Policy, 7/1, 2000; Hussein Kassim, B Guy Peters and Vincent 
Wright, (eds), The National Coordination ofE U  Policy, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000; Vincent Wright, “The 
National Co-ordination of European Policy-making: Negotiating the Quagmire”, in Jeremy Richardson 
(ed), European Union: Power and Policy-making, London: Routledge, 1996; Yves Meny, Pierre Muller 
and Jean-Louis Quermonne (eds), Adjusting to Europe: The Impact o f  the European Union on National 
Institutions and Policies, London: Routledge, 1996; and Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization o f Domestic 
Politics and Institutions: The Case o f France”, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 32/1, 1994; K. Hanf 
and B. Soedentorp (eds), “Small States and the Europeanization o f public policy”, in Adapting to 
European Integration, London: Longman, 1998,
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Europeanization is. What are the forces behind this process and can it be observed in 
the EU member states? If so, what are the markers by which we can identify this 
process and compare it across countries and issue case studies? The first aim of this 
chapter is to survey the burgeoning literature on Europeanization, the transformation 
and adaptation variously applied to the politics, policy and process of EU member 
states, and to identify the main strands of argument in the literature. Most of the recent 
Europeanization literature focuses almost exclusively on the domestic impact of EU, ie. 
the impact on national institutions and domestic politics. The key processes at work 
seem to be the adaptation and transformation of national structures, politics and policies. 
Second, this chapter seeks to establish an operational definition of “Europeanization”. 
It asks if the phenomenon - so often understood as a process of transformation in 
domestic politics and institutions - can be applied to EU member states’ foreign 
policies. The third objective of this chapter is to propose parameters by which this 
process in a member state’s foreign policy can be understood and studied.
I Literature Review; Five Meanings of Europeanization
Alistair Cole and Helen Drake identify four different usages of the concept 
(“Europeanization” as: an independent variable, emulative policy transfer, smokescreen, 
and imaginary constraint). The two strongest definitions are (i) as a constraining, 
independent variable - where the EU imposes policy orientations on national 
governments - eg in public services and industrial policy, and (ii) as a source of policy 
transfer and learning - where states look to other EU member states for policy ideas. 
The other two uses of Europeanization - as “smokescreen” and imaginary constraint - 
paradoxically empower EU governments by giving them manoeuvring room to make 
politically difficult domestic reforms under the cover of the EU. For example, French 
governments used the European Monetary Union convergence criteria to justify 
domestically sensitive reforms to pension and welfare schemes. These uses focus on the 
manipulation of Europeanization in political discourse.4 Harmsen and Wilson identify 
as many as eight distinct, if partially overlapping, senses of the term “Europeanization” 
in current usage. Most of these senses are dependent variables, or effects, of other 
phenomena, such as European integration, democratisation or modernisation.5 The
4 Cole and Drake, “The Europeanization o f the French Polity”, pp.39-41.
5 See Cole and Drake, “The Europeanization o f the French Polity”; and Harmsen and Wilson, 
“Approaches to Europeanization”, in Harmsen and Wilson (eds), Europeanization, pp. 13-18.
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concept of Europeanization is thus beset by different uses of the term and ambiguities 
about independent and dependent variables. I would group these different usages and 
varied meanings of the concept “Europeanization” into a taxonomy of five categories.
(A) National Adaptation
One of the oldest and most widely received conceptions of Europeanization is by 
Robert Ladrech, who defines Europeanization in terms of national adaptation to EU 
membership:
An incremental process reorienting the, direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.6
This “reorientation” or national adaptation school of Europeanization 
championed by Ladrech suggests that Europeanization is a top-down process 
introducing change from the supranational/European level to the national level in 
decision-making politics. This school understands Europeanization as a process in 
which “Europe, and especially the EU, becomes an increasingly more relevant and 
important point of political reference for the actors at the level of the member-states.”7 
It is not however (to use neo-functionalist language on integration and convergence) a 
Haasian process that follows a self-perpetuating integrationist logic, where political 
actors in Europe “shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national
o
states,” and where the end result is a supranational state. In other words, 
Europeanization as understood by Ladrech is a process in which the state is reactive, 
and where the state adapts and makes adjustments in its domestic politics and policy in 
compliance with the constraints and requirements of European institutions. 
Similarly, Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soedentorp, 
have all understood Europeanization as an incremental process of adjustment and 
adaptation reorienting Member States’ politics and policies towards the EU.9
6 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization o f Domestic Politics and Institutions: The case o f France”, Journal o f  
Common Market Studies (hereafter JCMS) 32/1, 1994, p.69. Italics added.
7 Hanf and Soedentorp, “Small States and the Europeanization of public policy”, p. 1.
8 Ernst Haas, “International Integration: The European and Universal Process”, International 
Organisation, Autumn 1961.
9 Mazey and Richardson, “EU policy-making: a garbage can or an anticipatory and consensual policy 
style?” in Meny, Muller and Quermonne (eds), Adjusting to Europe; the Impact o f  the European Union 
on National Institutions and Policies, London: Routledge, 1996, pp.44-45; Hanf and Soedentorp, “Small 
States and the Europeanization o f public policy”, pp. 1-9.
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Christian Lequesne’s detailed study of the iterative process of French EU policy­
making and the interaction between Paris and Brussels also makes an argument for the 
national (in this case, French government’s) reorientation of domestic politics and 
structures.10 Focusing on the institutions of the EU and joint policy-making in the EU 
framework between Brussels and the national governments, Lequesne and writers like 
Alain Guyomarch have suggested an incremental “iterative process” of Europeanization 
in the national administrations as governments adapt their mechanisms and practices of 
policy-making in politics, administration and law.11 Incrementalism and “muddling 
through” are the main processes in this model of Europeanization. Adaptations are ad 
hoc and there is no thought-out, coherent plan. Moreover, the extent and nature of the 
EU influence depends on endogenous factors in the member-states which affect their 
capacity to adapt.12 National institutions may clash with, or conform to, European 
integration; in particular, their capacity to accommodate, refract or resist pressures for 
change are key to understanding distinct national and sectoral trajectories of 
Europeanization.13
(B) National Projection
In contrast to the national adaptation school of Europeanization, a bottom-up 
understanding of Europeanization is also common currency. In this conception, which I 
will call the “national projection” school, nation-states are the primary actors and 
agents of change rather than passive subjects. Alan Milward argues that the early 
construction of the EU was achieved by, and contributed towards, the post-war 
construction of European nation-states. European integration was viewed as a means 
and vehicle for the achievement of nationally defined goals.14 For Simon Bulmer and 
Martin Burch, Europeanization is a process of “seeking to export domestic policy 
models, ideas and details to the EU.”15 In the place of a reactive state being constrained
10 Christian Lequesne, Paris-Bruxelles: Comment se fa it la politique europeenne de la France, Paris: 
Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993.
11 Alain Guyomarch, “The Europeanization o f Policy-Making”, in Guyomarch et al (eds), Developments 
in French Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 116-136; Guyomarch, Machin, and Ritchie (eds), 
France in the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1998; also Keeler and Schain (eds), Chirac’s 
Challenge: Liberalization, Europeanization and Malaise in France, New York: St Martin's, 1996.
12 Hanf and Soedentorp, Adapting to European Integration, p. 188.
13 Goetz and Hix (eds), Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems, 
London: Frank Cass, 2001.
14 Alan Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation-State, London: Routledge, 2000.
15Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, The Europeanization o f  Central Government: The UK and Germany 
in Historical Institutionalist Perspective, Oslo: ARENA Working Paper 99/30, 1999, p.6.
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to change its policy-making processes, this notion of Europeanization sees the state as 
being pro-active in projecting its preferences, policy ideas and models to the European 
Union. This conception of Europeanization shares many similarities with rational- 
choice, interest-based accounts of national preferences and national elites using the EU 
as an instrument to further national interests.16 It especially strikes a chord with Gaullist 
accounts of French “leadership” in EFP and Europe as a “power multiplier” for French 
diplomacy.
The “national projection” school of Europeanization at first glance provides a 
countervailing antithesis to the national adaptation/policy convergence school. The 
latter fails to appreciate the roles played by member states themselves -  especially the 
larger and more powerful ones, in fashioning EU structures and policies. These states, in 
“projecting” their national policies and policy styles onto the larger European structure, 
“Europeanise” their previously national priorities and strategies and create a dialectical
1 7relationship. By exporting their preferences and models onto EU institutions, they in 
effect generalize previously national policies onto a larger European stage. This has 
several benefits. First, the state increases its international influence. Second, the state 
potentially reduces the risks and costs of pursuing a controversial or negative policy (eg 
sanctions) against an extra-European power. As some scholars have noted, even small 
states within the European Union may pursue integration as a way of “formalizing,
• i  oregulating and perhaps limiting the consequences of interdependence.” At any rate, a 
strong European presence in the world is potentially beneficial to all in increasing 
individual member states’ international influence.19 Other scholars have argued that 
Germany “Europeanised” its low-deficit, fiscally disciplined macro-economic policies 
into the EMU convergence criteria, that the UK Europeanised its sanctions on Argentina 
during the Falklands conflict in 1982, and that France projected its institutions into the 
early EC and its predecessor, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
9 0Community. These examples also suggest that foreign policy-making is as susceptible
16 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmental ist Approach”, JCMS 31/3, 1993.
17 See Guyomarch et al, France in the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1998.
18 Alan Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation-State, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 19.
19 Elffiede Regelsberger et al (eds), Foreign Policy o f  the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and 
Beyond, Boulder and London: Lynne Riener, 1997, p.4.
20 Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1992; Machin, “Introduction”, in Hall, Hayward and Machin (eds), Developments in French Politics, 
revised ed., London: Macmillan, 1994, p.l
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to Europeanization as domestic policy, politics and processes, ie. foreign policy is not a 
special case immune to Europeanization pressures on member states.
(C) Identity Reconstruction
A third meaning of Europeanization refers to the reconstruction of identities in 
contemporary Europe. This usage is predominantly employed by anthropologists and 
social constructivists. Bomeman and Fowler define Europeanization “as a strategy of 
self-representation and a device of power” which is “fundamentally reorganizing 
territoriality and peoplehood, the two principles of group identification that have shaped
91 •the modem European order.” Studies of this type of Europeanization have focused on 
the redefinition and negotiation of identities within EU institutions such as the European
99Commission and the European Parliament. They envisage a teleological movement: 
the fading away of Member States’ monopoly on the loyalties of their citizens over the 
long term, to the benefit of European attitudes and objectives. This meaning of 
Europeanization is akin to neo-functionalist theory in stressing a gradual transfer of 
identity and affective affiliation towards a new supranational Europe.23 The identity 
reconstruction thesis finds echos in the old Deutschian idea of political communities. 
Europeanization here is transnationalism and cultural integration.
Elite socialization is a phenomenon frequently associated with national officials 
attached to the Commission and other EU institutions in Brussels. Research undertaken 
in recent years by Jakob 0hrgaard, M.E. Smith and Kenneth Glarbo suggest that 
officials are increasingly thinking in “European” rather than “national” terms. Irene 
Bellier’s anthropological study of European Commission officials suggests that these 
officials were exhibiting traits of cultural ‘hybridisation’ whereby their ‘national being’ 
was becoming a ‘European being’.24 Most scholars agree that intense and repeated 
contacts have socialised not only EU officials, but also national officials working in EU 
institutions. Even national diplomacies are becoming more “European” and displaying
21 J. Bomeman and N. Fowler, “Europeanization”, in Annual Review o f  Anthropology, 26, 1997, p.487, as 
quoted in Harmsen and Wilson, p. 17.
22 See I. Bellier and T.M. Wilson, “Building, Imagining and Experiencing Europe: Institutions and 
Identities in the European Union”, in An Anthropology o f the European Union, Oxford: Berg, 2000.
23 Ernst Haas, “International Integration: The European and Universal Process”.
24 Irene Bellier, “A Europeanised Elite? An Anthropology o f EC officials”, in Harmsen and Wilson (eds), 
Europeanization, pp. 149-150.
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7 <a “coordination reflex” in foreign policy-making. Hill and Wallace point out the 
potential transformational effects of elite socialization within this complex network:
From the perspective of a diplomat in the foreign ministry of a member state, 
styles of operating and communication have been transformed. The COREU 
telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the 
beginning of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies: all 
these have moved the conduct of foreign policy away from the old nation-state 
sovereignty model towards a collective endeavor, a form of high-level 
networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential.26
Whether or not national officials have indeed been “localized” or “captured” by 
EU interests to think “European” rather than “national”, most studies indicate that 
officials in Brussels work with both the national and the European interest in mind. In 
their study of the impact of the EU on Irish officials, Laffan and Tannam note that 
“public officials are no longer just agents of the Irish state; they are participants in an 
evolving polity which provides opportunities for political action but also imposes
• 77constraints on their freedom of action.” Research in this school suggests convergence 
as “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients 
their foreign policy cultures along similar lines.” The main agents for convergence 
include elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalised
n o
“imperative of concertation.”
(D) Modernization
A fourth meaning of Europeanization is the political, economic and social 
modernization set in motion by prospective membership in the European Union. This 
sense of Europeanization is often applied to economically less developed states on the 
geographical “periphery” of Western Europe as they are being brought into the “core” 
through EU membership. This modernisation meaning of Europeanization is common in
25 Via the COREU (correspondence europeenne) telex network, working groups in Brussels, policy 
coordination in New York and other capitals among European embassies, ‘Gymnich” meetings between 
foreign ministers, etc. Aside from Nuttall, see Kenneth Glarbo, “Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union”, in JCMC 6/4, 1999; and Jakob 
Ohrgaard, “Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political Cooperation and 
the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration”, Millennium 26/1, 1997.
26 Hill and Wallace, “Introduction: Actors and Actions”, in Christopher Hill (ed), The Actors in Europe’s 
Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1996, p.6.
27 Bridgid Laffan and Etain Tannam, “Ireland: The Rewards o f Pragmatism”, in Hanf and Soedentorp 
(eds), Adapting to European Integration, p.69.
28 M.E. Smith, “Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact o f EU Foreign Policy Co-operation”, JEPP 
7/4, October 2000, p .614 and K. Glarbo, “Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy o f the European Union”, in JEPP 6/4, 1999, p.650.
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works on Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Similarly, the term is also taken to 
mean “joining Europe” and applied to the candidate Central and Eastern European 
countries in the context of EU enlargement. This applies to the adoption of a West 
European state model and involves the firm anchoring of democratic institutions and 
market economies. Agh has however suggested a variation of the concept of 
Europeanization as describing a successfully completed process of transition in which 
some or all of the candidate countries become fully integrated into the entire range of
*JA
West European integration and Trans-Atlantic cooperation.
(E) Policy Isophormisn
Policy isophormism is a fifth and final meaning of Europeanization. Arising as
a logical by-product of advanced policy adaptation and convergence (School A) and
socialization (School C), this variant is concerned with the degree of convergence in
substantive policy areas. Claudio Radaelli has suggested that the Europeanization of
policy has two dimensions. On one hand there is the “direct” Europeanization of
various areas of public policy to the extent that regulatory competence has passed from
the member states to the European Union. On the other hand, there has been an
“indirect” Europeanization where member states begin to emulate one another regarding
 ^1particular policy choices or policy frameworks. Advocates of this school of 
Europeanization as isomorphism draw on the work of Dimaggio and Powell from the 
1980s, arguing that over time, particular organizational forms or policy choices come to 
be perceived as ‘legitimate’ by the actors concerned, to the exclusion of other choices. 
Radaelli, Lodge and others currently argue that in the present context, the type of 
intensive transnational cooperation fostered by European integration may lead to the
29 See B. O’Leary, “Towards Europeanisation and Realignment?: The Irish General Election, February 
1987”, in West European Politics 10/3, 1987, pp.455-465; K. Featherstone, “’Europeanization’ and the 
Centre-Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s”, in South European Politics and Society, 2/1, 1998, 
pp.23-39; David Corkill, The Development o f  the Portuguese Economy: A Case o f  Europeanization, 
London and New York: Routledge, 1999; Kostas A. Lavdas, The Europeanization o f  Greece: Interest 
Politics and the Crisis o f  Integration, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
30 A. Agh, The Politics o f  Central Europe, London: Sage, 1998, pp.42-45; and “Europeanization o f  
Policy-making in East Central Europe: The Hungarian Approach to EU accession”, Journal o f  European 
Public Policy (JEPP) 6/5, 1999, pp.839-854. For Agh, Europeanization is a positive condition contrasted 
with three less desirable ones: ‘Germanization’, ‘Turkization’, and ‘Yugoslavization’.
31 Claudio Radaelli, “How does Europeanization Produce Domestic Policy Change?: Corporate Tax 
Policy in Italy and the United Kingdom”, Comparative Political Studies, 30/5, 1997, pp.553-575. See also 
his “Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy”, in An 
International Journal o f  Policy and Administration, 13/1, 1997, pp.25-43; and M. Lodge, “Isomorphism 
o f National Policies? The ‘Europeanization’ o f German Competition and Public Procurement Law”, in 
West European Politics, 23/1, 2000, pp,89-107.
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emergence of such shared senses of legitimate (and illegitimate) choices. However this 
is a contested phenomenon and the empirical evidence has been at best inconclusive.32
Table 2.1 Five Schools of Thought on Europeanization
Schools of Thought on 
Europeanization
Direction of Change /  
Related Processes
Major proponents
National Adaptation
(A)
Top-down/Globalisation, 
policy convergence
Ladrech (94), Kassim (2000), Cole 
and Drake (2000), Lequesne (94)
National Projection
(B)
Bottom-up and sideways/
Policy projection, Policy 
learning, Policy transfer
Bulmer and Burch (99) Moravcsik 
(93), Guyomarch, Machin & Ritchie 
(98)
Identity Reconstruction
(Q
Top-dow n/Elite socialization M.E. Smith (2000), Hill & Wallace
(96), Nuttall (92,2000), 0hrgaard
(97), Zielonka (98), de Schoutheete 
(86)
Modernisation
(D)
Top-down/Democratisation, 
Economic Development, 
‘Westernisation’
Agh (95, 98, 99), Corkill (99), 
K. Feathers tone (98)
Policy Isophormism
(E)
Top-down and sideways/Policy 
learning, emulation and transfer
Radaelli (1997, 2000), Lodge (2000)
II Conceptualising National and European Foreign Policy 
Definitional Starting Points
Before assessing the applicability of Europeanization in foreign policy, it is first 
necessary to define what we mean by foreign policy in the context of an EU member 
state which takes part in a complex European foreign policy-making mechanism. The 
notion of a “foreign policy” is problematic as it often carries with it the conceptual 
assumptions of the state-centred view of world politics. Although the international 
system is populated by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in 
international relations still conceives of foreign policy as essentially the domaine 
reserve of sovereign governments and therefore exclusive to states. One of the most 
comprehensive definitions of “foreign policy” in the international relations literature, by 
KJ Holsti, characterises foreign policy as “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to 
solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another 
state or states, in nonstate actors, in the international economy, or in the physical
32 Harmsen and Wilson, p. 15.
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environment of the world”. For David Allen, the essence of foreign policy is often 
understood as the definition of national ends, objectives or interests, and the pursuit of 
these interests. Foreign policy is therefore seen as “an attempt to design, manage and 
control the external activities of a state so as to protect and advance agreed and 
reconciled objectives.”34
The main problem with using either notion of “foreign policy” is that the EU is 
not a unified state actor with identifiable “European interests”. Despite habits of policy 
consultation and coordination through EPC since 1970, the EU is still a “flexible and 
disaggregated series of patterns, arrangements and institutions which express a 
collective yet pluralistic identity, and of which others are increasingly aware”.35 If in 
this essay we use a working definition of foreign policy as “actions and ideas designed 
by policy makers of an international actor (rather than state actor) to promote a change 
in the attitudes of other actors or in the environment”, we will be justified in 
characterizing the EU as a significant international actor which not only makes foreign 
policy, but also exerts a significant influence on world politics, whether in interactions 
with other states, regional or international organizations from ASEAN to the UN , or
■ j o
international regimes like the WTO.
“EU foreign policy” (EFP) is thus a much more encompassing concept than the 
narrow focus of intergovernmental politico-diplomatic activities under the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established by the Maastricht Treaty 
and succeeded European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1993. As the EU is not a single 
unified actor, “EU foreign policy”39 (EFP) will be understood in this essay as the sum 
and interaction of the “three strands” of what Christopher Hill calls Europe’s “external
33 K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1992, p.82.
34 David Allen, “Who speaks for Europe?”, in Petersen, John and Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign 
Policy fo r Europe?, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp.43-44.
35 David Allen and Michael Smith, “Western Europe’s Presence in the International Arena”, in Review o f  
International Studies, 16, 1990, p.23.
36 John Peterson, Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership, New York and London, 1996.
37 David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels, European Political Cooperation: Towards a 
Foreign Policy fo r Western Europe, London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982.
38 See Youri Devuyst, “The European Community and the Conclusion o f the Uruguay Round”, in 
Rhodes, Carolyn and Mazey, Sonia (eds) The State o f  the European Union: Building a European Polity?, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Riener, 1995.
39 This term is adapted from Roy H. Ginsberg’s “European foreign policy” in his article, “Conceptualising 
the European Union as an international Actor: Narrowing the Capability-Expectations Gap”, in Journal o f  
Common Market Studies, 37/3, Sep 1999, pp.429-454.
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relations system”, comprising: (a) the national foreign policies of the member states,
(b) EC external trade relations, and (c) the CFSP.40 National foreign policies have of 
course always existed side by side with, sometimes in competition to collective EC/EU 
policies, eg on issues as diverse as dealing with the US, Russia, the Middle East, nuclear 
disarmament, UN reform and WTO negotiations. On the economic front, the record of 
Community policies (mainly economic and trade policies) has generally been a success 
while the record of politico-security policies under EPC/CFSP has been mixed. 
Whatever the record in each area, it is clearly perceived that “‘Europe’ does act in 
various issue areas....Europeans also act variously as individuals, groups and nations, 
and are sometimes taken by outsiders to be representative of Europe as a whole”.41
State-centric and European- Idealist conceptions of European Foreign Policy
Although the case for the EU’s actomess is persuasive, the lack of a coherent 
“European” foreign policy has often been attributed to the absence of a centralized 
decision-making state-like executive. EFP decisions are often arrived at as compromises 
between national foreign policies of member states. As such, European foreign policy 
as a subject of enquiry up till the end of the 1990s tended to be either dismissed out of 
hand by realists as non-existent, or idealised teleologically as an inevitable end-product 
of European integration, quite divorced from the realities of persistent (and often 
divergent) national foreign policies. Within European foreign policy studies, one school 
sees Member States as the principal actors while another emphasises the role of 
supranational institutions (eg. the Commission) and the emergence of a “European 
interest”- a kind of pan-European national interest. Neither school has developed good 
causal theories of EU foreign policy because they tend to be highly normative and to 
advocate positions on what the EU should be rather than what the EU is actually doing 
in world politics.
The study of the foreign policy of EU member states is thus split into two rival 
camps. In one camp is the traditional approach, focusing on the foreign policy of 
individual member states as rational, selfish and purposive actors -  let us call this the 
“state-centric” school. Such has been the dominance of this approach in the study of
40 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap”, pp.321-324.
4,Christopher Hill, “Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP”, 
in Jan Zielonka (ed), Paradoxes o f  European Foreign Policy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1998, p.36.
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French and British foreign policies that in the case of France, it has resulted in the 
overwhelming “Gaullist” paradigm covered in chapter one.42 The “hard” position in 
this tradition claims that states are the only essential and salient actors. Any study of EU 
foreign policy is thus unproductive as the “real” Europe is the one of state governments. 
As Hedley Bull claimed in 1983, “‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and 
does not seem likely to become one.”43 Bull felt that only an independent European 
nuclear deterrent and military power (represented by a West European military alliance 
led by France and Britain) would give Europe a real capability in foreign affairs. Of 
course, Bull’s assessment was coloured by the escalating Cold War tensions of the 
1980s between the USSR and Reagan’s USA, but Bull’s prognosis for a European 
military capability independent of the US and NATO is still shared by many states 
(chiefly France and to a lesser extent Britain)44 and individuals today.
Not all scholars in the state-centric tradition dismiss the EU as a serious 
international actor because of its lack of state-like qualities, nor do they agree with 
Bull’s military-security conclusion. Neorealist intergovemmentalists privilege the 
centrality of the state while acknowledging the EU’s influence, albeit only as a forum in 
which governments meet periodically to negotiate new contracts that enhance their 
interests and power. Miles concludes that the EU merely represents an advanced forum 
for negotiations at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs).45 The “Harvard approach” of 
liberal intergovemmentalism, represented by Andrew Moravcsik, believes that the 
member states can raise the common interest in EU policy-making. It has a materialist 
and rationalist bias in its stress on “interstate bargain”, deals and side-payments between 
Member States’ governments who at certain times come to common agreements when 
their preferences converge. In this conception, decisions at the European level are
42 Stanley Hoffmann 66, 99, 2000; Alfred Grosser, Affaires Exterieures: La Politique de la France 1944- 
1989, Paris: Flammarion, 1989; Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea o f  France: French Security Policy and the 
Gaullist Legacy, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993; Roy MacRidis, “France: the Quest for Rank”, in Foreign 
Policy in World Politics, 8th ed., Englewoods Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992; Frederic Bozo, Politique 
Etrangere de la France depuis 1945, Paris, 1998.
43 Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, in JCMS 21, 1983, p. 151.
44 See Louis Gautier, “L’Europe de la defense au portant, in Politique Etrangere, 2/99 (Summer 1999), 
and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on 
European Defence”, Anglo-French Summit, London, 25 November 1999.
45 L. Miles, “Integration Theory and Enlargement o f the European Union”, in Rhodes and Mazey (eds), 
The State o f  the European Union, Vol. 3: Building a European Polity?, Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1995.
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viewed as “conventional statecraft” between sovereign states- the key actors in all EU 
activities.46
In the other camp - which I will call “European-idealist”47 - is the perspective 
which treats European Foreign Policy as a given, ie. as a foreign policy that already 
exists, has a consistent personality that makes an impact on world politics, and is taken
AO # f
seriously by other actors. While this approach does not deny the continued importance 
of individual Member States’ foreign policies and accepts that EFP will not supplant 
national foreign policies any time soon - especially in defence and security matters - it 
often presumes that EFP’s scope will expand eventually to subsume national policies in 
almost all other functional areas.49 Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith in 1994 made the 
bold prediction that the essentially “multilayered character” of the new Europe would 
mean that “differentiated as to function, and maybe implicitly acknowledging 
suzerainty-like hierarchies, they will develop kinds of diplomatic relations and foreign 
policies that we best anticipate by reading about ‘proto diplomacy’ in Der Derian’s On 
Diplomacy (1987) and by searching even further away in time and space -  among the 
empires of antiquity, the Chinese and Indian diplomatic traditions.. .”.50
The European-idealist perspective downplays the realist emphasis on state 
power and national interests, and privileges instead the role of supranational European 
institutions in building a common “European” identity, and a distinctive moral presence 
in world politics. Franfois Duchene, the first major spokesman in this school, 
envisaged the EU as a “civilian power”, a kind of “soft power” which wields civilian 
instruments on behalf of a collectivity which has renounced the use of force among its
46Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and Conventional 
Statecraft”, in Hoffmann and Keohane (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and 
Institutional Change, 1991, pp. 1-40.
47 Some o f the writers cited may object to being labeled idealist, and may think o f themselves as 
progressive realists instead. Here, I am using “European- idealist” in the sense of believing in, arguing 
for and advocating a coherent and powerful European actor in international politics in place o f a Europe 
o f nation states.
48 See Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy, London: Pluto, 2002; Simon Nuttall’s European 
Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. and European Political Cooperation, Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1992; Carlsnaes and Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in 
Europe, London: Sage, 1994; Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis, London: Macmillan Press, 1998; 
Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001; Hazel Smith, 
European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and what it does, London: Pluto Press, 2002.
49 See Michael E. Smith, “Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact o f EU Foreign Policy Co­
operation”, Journal o f  European Public Policy, 7/4, October 2000, pp.613-631.
50 Carlsnaes and Smith, p.271.
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members and encourages others to do likewise.51 Taking as their starting point 
Duchene’s premise that the EU should and can become a “civilian power” and a model 
of reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world, European-idealists posit that 
EU foreign policy should focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and 
security cooperation. Many have advocated the German model of using economic 
leverage focusing on issues such as environmental concerns and open trading rather 
than military power as the way forward for the EU after the Cold War. Karen Smith 
lists propaganda, diplomacy and economic instruments as three of the four instruments 
(excluding military) that the EU could and should exploit as a civilian power. Taking 
the goal of pedagogy a step farther, Romano Prodi has advocated a role for Europe as a 
civilizing force in world politics, and for Europe “to lead and set an example to other 
peoples and races”. Acknowledging that the European Union may never possess a 
common defence policy, Richard Rosecrance has suggested that the EU has 
unparalleled foreign policy strengths as an “attractive power” at the pivotal point 
between overlapping international clubs.54
Attempts since the early 1980s to bridge this divide have focused almost entirely 
on comparing individual member-states’ foreign policies, albeit within the framework of 
the EPC/CFSP.55 Manners and Whitman argue that there is something “distinctive “ 
about the foreign policies of EU member states. These states’ foreign policies are made 
under opportunities and constraints qualitatively different from that of the US, hence a 
distinctive foreign policy analysis method to study EU member states’ foreign policies 
is necessary.56 It clearly matters if a state is a member of the EU or not; relations 
between that state and the EU (and its member states and its policies, eg. the Common 
Agricultural Policy) can pass overnight from being “foreign” to domestic policy.
51 Franfois Duchene, “The European Community and the uncertainties o f Interdependence”, in Max 
Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the 
European Community, London: Macmillan, 1973. On soft power, see Keohane and Nye, “Power and 
Interdependence in the Information Age”, in Foreign Affairs Sep-Oct 1998, pp.81-94.
52 Hans Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers:”, Foreign Affairs, 69 (1990-91), pp.91- 
106; Karen E Smith,. “The Instruments o f European Union Foreign Policy”, in Zielonka (ed), Paradoxes 
o f  European Foreign Policy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998.
53 Romano Prodi, Europe As I See It, Oxford: Blackwell/Polity Press, 2000, p.34. .
54 Richard Rosecrance, “EU: A New Type o f International Actor”, in Jan Zielonka, ed., Paradoxes o f  
European Foreign Policy, London: Kluwer Law International, 1998.
55 Hill 1983 and 1996; Peterson and Sjursen 1998.
56 Manners and Whitman, p.3.
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Foreign Policy Analysis and Europeanization
Instead of getting bogged down in the debate of whether foreign policy can 
really exist for the EU as a non-state actor, and how to identify and evaluate a debatable 
“policy”, it may be more fruitful to conceptualise EFP in terms of a process, and of the 
EU’s actomess, presence and impact in international affairs (going back to Holsti’s 
definition of ideas or actions aimed at making changes in the environment). In this 
regard, the two concepts indispensable to the study of European foreign policy are
cn
actomess and presence. Sjosted argued that the EU is an international actor in its own 
rights because it is an entity, which (a) is delimited from others, and from its 
environment; (b) is autonomous in the sense of making its own laws and decisions; and
(c) possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level.58 The 
second concept is that of Western Europe’s presence in international affairs. Although 
the precise qualities (and indeed composition!) of “Western Europe” have remained 
obstinately resistant to definition or analysis and EFP is produced in a messy manner, 
the reality is that there is a cohesive European impact on international relations.59 The 
EU has a “variable and multi-dimensional presence” in international relations. The two 
concepts are inextricably linked, as “actomess” is at least partly defined by presence in 
an issue-area or domain of activity. Thus the EU is an actor in issues ranging from 
China’s WTO membership, to the NPT and Human Rights charter, NATO expansion, 
and the plight of refugees from wars in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East. The EU is 
present and active both as an actor in itself and through its member states at both 
bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations on these issues.
A decision-making model of EFP could be used as a heuristic device to capture 
the process of EFP decision-making in the EU.60 John Peterson has advocated a foreign 
policy analysis (FPA) approach to studying European foreign policy, that is, the study 
of policy-making with attention paid to the relationship between the decision-making 
process and policy outcome.61 As part of a larger movement in international relations 
which rejects the search for general “macro-theories” like those of the idealist and
57 See Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap”.
58 G Sjostedt., The External Role o f  the European Community, Famborough: Saxon House, 1977.
59 David Allen and Michael Smith, “Western Europe’s Presence in the International Arena”, in Review o f  
International Studies, 16, 1990, pp. 19-37.
60 Roy H. Ginsberg, “Narrowing the Capability-Expectations Gap”, pp.433-435, which presents an agent- 
structure model inspired by David Easton’s classic work on governmental decision-making.
61 John Peterson, “Decision-making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for Analysis” Journal 
o f  European Public Policy, 2(1), 1995, pp. 69-93.
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realist schools, in favour of middle-range theories, Peterson’s FPA approach finds 
echoes in Simon Nuttall’s historical institutionalist account of EPC and Christopher 
Hill’s 1996 study of the actors (national actors and the Commission) in Europe’s foreign 
policy. A policy-making approach could be useful in conceptualising EU foreign policy 
because EFP is not a coherent policy in the EU, but a multi-faceted, multi-level process 
with multiple decision-makers at the national, supranational and sub-national levels.
Europeanization theorists argue that over time, there has been a “dissipation of 
the national” in favour of the, European. For example, Kassim argues that the French 
state has recognized that it has limited autonomy in many policy areas, and accepted a 
considerable degree of Europeanization in economic, fiscal and trade policy.62 EMU is 
the clearest example of this trend.
Ben Tonra defines Europeanization in foreign policy as “ ...a  transformation in 
the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which 
professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of 
norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy 
making”.63 This “transformation” usually translates as adaptation to EU norms and 
standards. In the 2000 volume edited by Manners and Whitman on the foreign policies 
of the 15 EU member states, “Europeanization” was equated by many scholars to mean 
“adaptation” (School A) although the editors did not specifically use the term in this 
context.64 It did however characterize Europeanization as an “incremental process 
orienting Member States’ politics and policies towards the EU”.65 Manners and 
Whitman conclude that “member states conduct all but the most limited foreign policy 
objectives inside an EU context”.66 If this generalization is true, then the foreign 
policies of EU states must, with the cumulative weight of the acquis of 
EPC/CFSP/CESDP -  to name but one of the three arenas of each member state’s 
participation in EFP -  increasingly show some discernible impact on the foreign
62 See Hussein Kassim “French Autonomy and the European Union”, in Modern and Contemporary 
France 5(2), 1997, p.167; and Martin Marcussen et al, “Constructing Europe?”, pp.614-615.
63 Ben Tonra, “Denmark and Ireland”, in Manners and Whitman, (eds), The Foreign Policies o f  European 
Union Member States, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p.229.
64 Manners and Whitman, p.245.
65 Manners and Whitman, p.245.
66 Ibid., p.271.
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policies of these states. I would argue that the logical extension of the Manners and 
Whitman thesis is foreign policy convergence (both in substance and in process) over 
the long term, although the process may suffer periodic setbacks and reversals.
Ill Applying Europeanization Theory to National Foreign Policy
Is French foreign policy too Gaullist to be Europeanised? Stanley Hoffmann, 
observing the reassertion of nationalist sentiment in the EC by de Gaulle’s France in the
A 71960s, made the realist claim that states remained the basic units in world politics, and 
that France today remains fiercely jealous and protective of its foreign policy 
independence.68 Intergovemmentalists like Hoffmann privilege the role of national 
governments in defining their national interests independently of the EU, and then 
bringing these interests to the table for negotiation. Andrew Moravcsik, the chief 
scholar arguing for liberal intergovemmentalists, argues that “the primary source of 
(European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative 
power each brings to Brussels”.69 The key actors are governmental elites and the 
motivation for integration is the preservation of executive capacity at the national level, 
not its erosion:
The EC provides information to governments that is not generally 
available...National leaders undermine potential opposition by reaching 
bargains in Brussels first and presenting domestic groups with an ‘up or down’ 
choice...Greater domestic agenda-setting power in the hands of national 
political leaders increases the ability of governments to reach agreements by 
strengthening the ability of governments to gain domestic ratification for7 ncompromises or tactical issue linkages.
67 Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The fate o f the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe”, Dcedalus, summer 1966.
68 See Hoffmann’s “La France dans le Monde 1979-2000”, in Politique Etrangere, 2/2000, 2000, pp.307- 
317; and “France: Two Obsessions for One Century”, in Robert Pastor (ed), A Century’s Journey: How 
the Great Powers Shape the World, New York: Perseus Books, 1999.
69 Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and Conventional 
Statecraft”, in Hoffmann and Keohane (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and 
Institutional Change, 1991, p.75. Intergovemmentalism is thus in many regards in line with rationalistic 
institutionalism, the second major approach to the study o f international institutions, which stresses the 
importance o f states as the main actors. See Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two 
approaches” in International Institutions and State Power, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989
70 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovemmentalist Approach”, JCMS, 31/3, 1993, p.515.
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Noting the emergence of “two cultures” competing for control of the European 
foreign policy-making process, David Allen opined that the culture of Commission 
control had been set back by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which privileged Council 
control. The EPC had been devised essentially along the lines of the Gaullist Fouchet 
Plan, to prevent Brussels from becoming a foreign policy centre and to keep foreign 
policy as a national competence within the Council. Even so, the “Brusselsisation”71 
(steady enhancement of Brussels based decision-making bodies) of foreign policy 
shows no sign of abating, and France has not been immune to this process.
Europeanization theory (especially School C) privileges the role played by 
European institutions in changing the interests, politics and policy-making of its 
member states over time into a more convergent whole. In this sense, it shares insights 
and assumptions with sociological institutionalism, which suggests that “the EU’s 
common policies, or acquis politiques, have encouraged new conceptions of interest and
79identity among its member states”. Sociological institutionalists believe that 
institutions play more than a cost-minimising, information and utility-maximising 
coordinating role in ensuring reciprocal cooperation for the collective good. The 
“sociological institutions” in EFP are found in the form of unwritten rules, norms and 
practices, found in both Pillar I and CFSP and include the “Gymnich formula” (foreign 
ministers’ informal retreat held every six months or so by each Presidency), and the 
premium placed on consultation and consensus. Sociological studies from the late 
1990s indicate that EPC/CFSP institutions have a strong “socialization” effect; elites 
involved even in the inter-governmental bargaining process of EPC/CFSP show 
surprising signs of internalising supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to
73their national capitals. Quai d’Orsay officials note that CFSP is today an essential 
component of French foreign policy formulation. Between 1974 and 1999, over 74 
“Gymnich” meetings were held at foreign minister level, ie. an average rate of three 
times yearly. At the official level, the intense activity of some 30 CFSP Working
71 David Allen, “Who speaks for Europe?”, in Petersen and Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for 
Europe?, 1998, pp.41-58.
72 Michael E. Smith, “Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact o f EU foreign policy co-operation”, 
JEPP 7/4, October 2000, p.628.
73 Jakob Ohrgaard, “Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political 
Cooperation and the Dynamics o f Intergovernmental Integration”, Millennium 26/1, 1997; Irene Bellier, 
“A Europeanised Elite? An Anthropology o f EC officials”, in Harmsen and Wilson (eds), 
Europeanization, pp. 149-150.
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Groups in Brussels had become an “integral part of French foreign policy”.74 EU policy 
on Asia was coordinated across the three-Pillar structure established by the Maastricht 
agreement. The French Permanent Representation in Brussels noted that the EU had 
“amplified” French interest in areas of little traditional French influence in Asia (eg.
nc
Nepal, Sri Lanka). The process of formulating CFSP - if not always the results - was 
becoming Europeanised.
How far does the Europeanization perspective explain recent French foreign 
policy? We are thus faced with a dichotomy. The Europeanization perspective portrays 
France as a member state subject to the strains, constraints, opportunities and influences 
of EU membership as a “member of the club” and obliged to behave and play a certain 
role in the EFP regime. In contrast, the intergovernmental perspective (with its realist 
and liberal variants) views France as an independent power driven by its national 
interests, a state that shapes, influences and sets the pace of European foreign policy, 
and determines its level of cooperation according to its interests in the issue at hand. 
The two paradigms and their major characteristics are summarized in Table 2.2.
74 Interview with CFSP Director, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, September 1999.
75 Interviews with French Ambassador to the Western European Union, Brussels, 27 March 2003; and 
Commercial Counsellor, French Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels, 28 March 2003. On EU 
policy towards Asia, officials from the 15 EU Member States meet twice a month to discuss Commercial 
policy (Pillar I) in the “Article 133 committee”; Asia Directors from the national capitals meet once a 
month for Pillar II (CFSP) discussions; the Justice and Home Affairs (Pillar III) committee meets twice 
every 6 months. Asia is sometimes also discussed in the COPs (comite politique et securitaire) which 
meets twice a week (Tuesday and Friday). For details on the working groups and committees that report 
to the Council on Ministers, see Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics o f  the European Union, 1999, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 150-152.
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Table 2.2 Europeanization versus Intergovernmentalism in the study of National 
Foreign Policy______________________ _____________________________________
Europeanization
Theory
Intergovernmental^ 
- Realist variant
>m
- Liberal variant
Central
variables
K nowledge/learning/roles Power D om estic Interests
Role o f  
Institutions
Strong (Sch.A)
Medium to Weak (Sch.B)
Weak Weak
Meta-
theoretical
orientation
Sociological (Sch.C, A) 
Rationalistic (Sch.B, D)
Rationalistic Rationalistic
Behavioural
model
Role-player Concerned with 
relative gains
Concerned with 
relative gains
Main actors European elites, member 
states (Sch.B), institutions, 
IOs, interest groups
State Governm ent elites, 
domestic interests
Actors’
Preferences
Socialised and negotiated
(A,CAE)
Exogenously given 
and fixed
Dynamic, rising from  
processes in national 
polities
Of course, the table above exaggerates the differences between the two 
perspectives. The supranational-intergovernmental divide has narrowed considerably 
today as member states adjust to the increasing Brusselisation of foreign policy making. 
Britain and France, the two most “independent” member states in the EU, increasingly 
accept that they can no longer assure their own national defence nor pursue an
7independent global role today. Brian White argues that even Britain, the member state 
traditionally most opposed to European supranational integration and in favour of 
intergovernmental decision-making in the EU, shows characteristics of moving towards 
foreign policy decision-making at the European level.77
To recapitulate, the five major meanings of Europeanization are: a top-down 
process of national adaptation (School A), a bottom-up and sideways process of national 
projection (B), the multidirectional processes of socialization (C) and modernization
(D), and policy isophormism (E). The five schools are not mutually exclusive but share 
many overlapping assumptions about causes, effects and processes. For example, the 
top-down school of national adaptation (School A) would accept that member states 
play critical roles in forging “European” policies (School B) in the first place. The
76 Christopher Hill, “The Actors Involved: National Perspectives”, in Elfriede Regelsberger et al (eds), 
Foreign Policy o f  the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Riener, 1997, pp.92-93.
77 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, ch.6.
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notion of Europeanization thus lacks paradigmatic consistency. Unlike major schools of 
integration theory such as neo-functionalism or intergovemmentalism. Europeanization 
does not put forward a series of inter-related premises concerning the dynamic or the 
end-state of the European integration process. Europeanization is a concept which can 
be criticized as lacking “core tenets, common to all or most usages of the term, which 
might serve as the basis for constructing a common paradigmatically defined research 
agenda.”78
The growing currency of Europeanization in recent years could be attributed to 
the concept’s utility in two areas. First, it evokes parallel and interconnected processes 
of change at both the national and European levels. The concept recognizes and captures 
more accurately than the paradigmatic theories the significant changes that are taking 
place at the national level, fostering at the same time convergence and diversification at 
various levels of European polities and societies. Second, the concept has a strong 
focus on the interrelationship of institutions and identities. It shows how institutional 
change and development may affect identities and interests, as well as how changing 
identities may create pressures for new institutional forms and modes of behaviour.
The wide range of usages of the term Europeanization in the literature touches 
on most aspects of political, societal and economic change in Europe today and can be 
applied to foreign policy analysis. This thesis proposes that three of the five schools of 
the Europeanization concept outlined in the literature survey at the beginning of this 
chapter, could be useful in understanding the changes taking place in policy-making in a 
long-time EU member-state. The dominant usage of Europeanization in the literature is 
as a dependent variable. For Ladrech, Kassim and other scholars, it is national 
adaptation to pressures arising from European integration. For Harmsen and Wilson, it 
is an effect on national institutions, identities and citizenship. The primary usage of the 
Europeanization concept - that of capturing the top-down adaptation of national 
structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU -  is of course critical in 
testing if national policy-making has indeed been affected by EU membership, and in 
what ways. Europeanization scholars may debate the institutional forms and distinctive 
national responses to EU pressures. Some may note that Europeanization as adaptation
78 Harmsen and Wilson, “Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization”, in Harmsen and Wilson (eds), 
Europeanization, p. 19.
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70has actually increased divergence within the EU. Over the longer term however, a 
sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation would necessarily result in 
cross-national policy convergence between EU states. Convergence in policy style and 
content is expected as EU institutions prescribe roles and constrain activities. Coupled 
with the second and third processes of national projection and identity reconstruction, 
the overall picture expected is one of converging rather than diverging policy outputs, 
whatever the differences between national structures, preferences and policy inputs.
The second process, that of the projection of national ideas, preferences and 
models from the national to the supranational level, can be expected of states which 
command larger resources, strong domestic pressures or dogged commitment to change 
or forge a certain EU policy. National preferences are expected to be projected onto the 
European structure by the more powerful member states which seek to structure EU 
institutions and policies according to their interests. This was the case of CAP for 
France and industrial competition for Germany.
Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense of identity and interest convergence 
so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to take root does not mean 
that the European will simply supplant the national over time. National identities and 
interests in Europe have evolved and grown over centuries and will not go away after 
just a few decades of European integration. However, European identity shapes and is 
increasingly incorporated into national identities.
We could measure the degree to which a state’s foreign policy has been 
Europeanized over time according to three criteria:
a) National adaptation/Policy convergence
- Has convergence and/or adaptation of national policy with EU norms and 
directives taken place?
- Is convergence in substantive policy areas visible in the “direct” 
Europeanization of public policy where regulatory competence has passed from 
national capitals to Brussels; or the “indirect” Europeanization where member 
states learn from one another through transnational cooperation and policy 
transfer?
79 Mazey and Richardson, “EU policy-making: a garbage can or an anticipatory and consensual policy 
style?” op cit.
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- Have national institutional structures and policy-making processes been adapted 
in response to European integration?
b) Projection of national policy onto EU structures (“National projection”)
Has the state pushed for its national foreign policy goals to be adopted as EU 
goals/policy?
- Has the state benefited from the ‘cover’ of the EU?
- How indispensable is the EU to the achievement of national foreign policy 
goals?
c) Internalisation o f ‘Europe’ in national identities (“Identity reconstruction”)
- Has there been a reshaping or hybridisation of identities which relativises 
national identities and privileges a European identity?
- What kinds of European norms have arisen among national officials and how do 
they apply to foreign policy?
The key Europeanization argument tested in this thesis is that membership in the 
European Union has had an important impact on French foreign policy and that this 
impact is increasing in salience. As a top-down process, Europeanization is “the process 
of change caused by participation over time in foreign policy-making at the European
OA
level” . As a bottom-up process, it is the projection of national preferences, ideas and 
policy models into Europe. A third aspect is the redefinition of national interests and 
identity in the context of “Europe”. Europeanization is thus a bi-directional process that 
leads to a negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity 
between the national and the supranational levels.
Conclusions
“Europeanization” in this thesis is understood as a process of foreign policy 
convergence. It is a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives 
emanating from actors (EU institutions, statesmen, etc) in Brussels, as well as policy 
ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen). Europeanization is 
thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top- 
down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up
80 White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, p. 118.
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projection). Identity reconstruction (towards a “European” identity) is a closely related 
effect observable over time.
At times, this convergence could be a raising of the common interest, eg. 
encouraging the development and consolidation of democracy and human rights abroad 
by trading and having full political/diplomatic relations with governments that respect 
minimum human rights standards. At other times, it is the lowest common denominator 
decision/preference that prevails and becomes EU policy. This could be the case in 
legitimising one member state’s interests by raising EU protectionist barriers against 
other trading countries/groups of states.
The resulting EU foreign policy is the end product of not only a series of 
negotiations between governments, EU (Commission, Council and Parliament) officials 
and Member State representatives, but also a process o f policy learning and emulation 
between individual member states.
Does the Europeanization hypothesis on convergent pan-European conceptions 
of interest and identity stand up in the national foreign policies of member states over 
the last decade? This thesis will study the case of French foreign policy towards three 
countries in a region of growing economic and political interests to Europe in an attempt 
to answer this question. The overlapping and inter-related forces of Europeanization 
(policy convergence, national projection and identity reconstruction) and their expected 
indicators will be used as a guide in the case studies in chapters four to six. But before 
we look at individual case studies, the next chapter will examine the broad context of 
French objectives and involvement in East Asia in the 1990s, and compare that with EU 
objectives and policies in the East Asia. This will provide us with a preliminary idea of 
the relationship between the two: ie. whether and to what extent French policy in East 
Asia is being “Europeanised”, the EU’s Asia policy is being “Gallicised”, or both 
processes are happening simultaneously and interests are being re-shaped in the context 
of EFP.
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Chapter Three 
French and EU objectives in East Asia: 
which affects which?
Chapter One discussed the predominant view of French foreign policy as 
Gaullist, based on national interest, national independence, security and a quest for 
rank. It asked whether such an approach was applicable in Asia, a region of the world 
where France ceased to play an important role after 1954, but in which successive 
Presidents since de Gaulle have tried to project French prestige, if not power, despite 
low levels of French economic, political and cultural presence. Chapter Two noted that 
the Gaullist approach exaggerates the policy autonomy of large EU Member States such 
as France, and suggested Europeanization theory as a credible alternative to this 
perspective. In the three senses of top-down policy convergence (Europeanization from 
above), bottom-up policy projection (“Gallicisation” of European foreign policy), or 
identity socialization (the blurring of distinctions between the “national” and the 
“European”), Europeanization theory may help to focus on the effects of the European 
Union on national foreign policies of Member States and vice versa.
Although East Asia is a region of growing interest for French and European 
foreign policy, the Member States’ national policies towards countries in this region 
might be considered the “least likely” candidates for Europeanization theory.1 In effect, 
habits of cooperation, consultation and coordination on the EU’s policy in the East 
Asian region are relatively new and not well established. European Foreign Policy is 
more institutionalised in the EU’s immediate and near-abroad geographical and issue- 
areas, in particular Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean/Middle East, and 
external trade (especially negotiations with other trade powers and in WTO). The 
European Union’s policies in these areas have been the subject of numerous analyses.2
1 Ref. the three foreign policy Europeanizations of policy convergence, national projection and identity 
reconstruction, in chapter 2, Part III.
2 See Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe: the EU Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge 
UP, 1998; Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, Eastward Enlargement o f  the European Union, London: 
RIIA, 1997; Karen Smith, The Making o f  EU Foreign Policy: The case o f  Eastern Europe, London: 
Macmillan, 1999; S. Stavridis et al (eds), The Foreign Policies o f  the European Union’s Mediterranean 
Countries and Applicant Countries in the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1999; R. Gomez, “The EU’s 
Mediterranean Policy: Common Foreign Policy by the back door?”, in Peterson and Sjursen (eds), A 
Common Foreign Policy fo r  Europe?, 1998; Soren Dosenrode, and Andres Stubjaer, The European 
Union and the Middle East, London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001; Youri Devuyst, “The European
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Parallel to this literature on the EU’s policies in the near-abroad are in-depth studies on 
French policies in these same areas, with little cognisance -  aside from trade relations - 
of Europe's effect on French national policies.
While economic motives have been an important driving force behind French 
and EU policies in the rapidly growing markets of the greater China area, the NIEs and 
Southeast Asia (at least until the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98)4, the economic 
accounts of French/EU relations with East Asia are by themselves inadequate. They 
obscure a complex relationship that includes contestation over human rights, French 
arms sales and military cooperation with Taiwan and Singapore, and the appropriate 
security role the EU (as a whole or represented by individual Member States) plays in 
East Asia. A more accurate understanding of French (and EU) policies in East Asia 
necessitates analysing the multiple facets and inter-relationship of their economic, 
political and human rights objectives.
Interests and Objectives
The concept of the national or state interest, once thought to be the self-evident 
“general and continuing ends for which a nations acts”5, is today often discredited as a 
vague and subjective idea with little conceptual clarity or value. Clearly pinning down 
the idea of national interest in concrete terms and using it in the analysis of foreign 
policy poses real problems as what politicians and statesmen declare to be the state’s 
“national interests” are often the shifting, sectoral interests of particular segments (eg. 
the military-industrial complex, the ruling elite, class or party) of their national polity. 
“National interests” as determinants of state behaviour are “not as self-evident or 
objective” as once assumed. 6
Community and the Conclusion o f the Uruguay Round”, in Rhodes and Mazey (eds) The State o f  the 
European Union, 1995.
3 Exceptions include Christoph Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face a Pekin (1989-1997): Vers une Strategie 
Commune?”, in Politique Etrangere 1/99, 1999, pp.91-106 and Herve Dejean de la Batie, , La politique 
chinoise de I ’Union europeenne: en progres, mais peut mieux faire, pp. 1-26, on IFRI’s Centre Asie 
website, http://www.ifri.Org/f/Centre%20asie/articles/hdb-ue-chine.htm. accessed 9 May 2002.
4 See Franpois Godement, “Une politique fran?aise pour l’Asie-Pacifique?”, Politique_Etrangere, 4/95; 
Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality”, in The Pacific 
Review, 7/3, 1994, pp.341-348; Miguel Santos Neves, “Towards a Common China Policy for the EU: a 
Portuguese Perspective”, in Richard Grant, (ed), The European Union and China, 1995.
5 The Brookings Institute, Major Problems o f  United States Foreign Policy 1953-54, 1955, pp.373-5.
6 See Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, 2nd ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p.33 and 
Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003, p.43.
54
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Three / French & EU Objectives
Nonetheless, I would argue that that the idea of French interests in particular 
regions of the world is still a useful analytical concept. French statesmen invoke 
“national interests” with surprising frequency, coherence and consistency as a tool for 
political action. For example, the quest for a strong French cultural and political 
presence in East Asia has been expressed by French leaders over many decades, from de 
Gaulle in Phnom Penh (1966), to Chirac in Singapore (1996). Their references to such 
national goals or interests are usually a means of justification, rationalisation and 
mobilisation. James Rosenau concedes that the continued use of the concept in political 
action and foreign policy renders it a datum requiring analysis.7
These interests may not be immutable or always consistently rank ordered. But 
an analysis of a state’s foreign policy should include the representations of its interests 
by its foreign policy makers, though carefully distinguishing between aspirational and 
actual interests. The concept of “interest” in foreign policy is useful for comparing 
aspirations with actual policies; offering a criterion for the evaluation of foreign policy;
Q
and providing a yardstick for the evaluation of aspirations.
Some general aspirational interests as defined by national political elites in Paris 
have been quite explicit. These include the goal of tripling the French share in Asian 
trade in a decade, announced in Chirac’s 1996 speech in Singapore ahead of the 
inaugural ASEM summit in Bangkok. Other foreign policy goals have been more 
implicit and need to be inferred from the available evidence. The search to build up 
strategic influence in the region, for example, is unmistakable in areas such as the 
French campaign since 1994 for a separate seat in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
eagerness in selling or developing sophisticated weaponry (to Japan, Taiwan, or 
Singapore), and defence dialogue/cooperation (with South Korea, Japan, China, 
Malaysia and Singapore).
7 James Rosenau, “The National Interest”, in The Scientific Study o f  Foreign Policy, revised and enlarged 
ed., London: France Pinter, 1979, p.293.
8 Following Joseph Frankel, National Interest, London: Macmillan, 1970, pp.28-9.
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Comparing foreign policy objectives
Instead of using the concept of interests, which carries the assumptions of deep- 
seated motives or a “stake in which a given unit has in a problem”9, this thesis will as 
far as possible employ the term “objectives.” Objectives are more easily identifiable 
short-term goals that foreign policy actors set for themselves. These goals could change 
periodically with the main actors (eg. companies, governments, NGOs), individual 
personalities involved (it makes a difference whether the French president is enthused 
about a foreign policy issue or not), or changes of governments. For example, 
Mitterrand’s stress on human rights objectives in East Asia between 1989 and 1992 
were swiftly abandoned with the election of a right-wing government in 1993 under 
Prime Minister Balladur.
Before examining the empirical record in the next three chapters, this chapter 
will trace an overview of French and EU engagement with the key states and 
international organizations in the region, focusing in particular on the aims and 
objectives expressed in the aspiration or rationalisation of French and EU actions and 
statements. It aims for a broad understanding of French and European policies in the 
region, with a focus on the motivations and objectives around and since 1989-91 (Berlin 
Wall/Tiananmen and Maastricht/CFSP).
Part I looks at French economic, political-strategic and human rights objectives 
in East Asia from a national perspective, while Part II examines the same objectives in 
the region, but through the lens of the EU. By analysing the consistency, coherence and 
communication between the two sets of objectives, we should arrive at some tentative 
conclusions on levels of interaction between “French” and “European” interests, as well 
as whether there is a causal relationship between the two.
I French Objectives in East Asia
France played a much reduced role in East Asia after the humiliation of Dien 
Bien Phu up to the 1980s. Pressing concerns in Algeria and Europe, combined with 
French weakness in Asia, rendered it unable to influence major events in the region, or
9 Hill 2003:119.
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to halt the decline of the French language. In the three decades up to the Tiananmen 
massacre in 1989, Asia occupied a low rung in French priorities, dependent on the 
personal interest accorded to the region by French presidents and prime ministers. In 
contrast, Europe, Africa and the Middle East were continually regarded in Paris as the 
areas of priority. Without the benefit of a long-term French vision for the region, the 
approach to Asia has been dominated by successive French Presidents, without this 
domination translating into permanent or coherent policies. While de Gaulle maintained 
a close watch on developments in China and criticised American strategies in the 
second Indochinese War (such as American escalation and the spread of hostilities to 
Laos and Cambodia), France did not play a substantive role in Asia in the 1960s and
i t
1970s beyond symbolism and rhetoric. Under the 5 Republic (from 1958), de Gaulle’s 
France made three then-newsworthy “gestures” in Asia: the diplomatic recognition of 
Communist China in 1964,10 de Gaulle’s 1966 Phnom Penh speech calling for the 
unilateral withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam11, and withdrawal from the Armistice 
Commission of Panmunjon at the same time France left the NATO command. 
Although each of these three gestures was made in the context of French-US relations
1 *7rather than French interest in Asia per se , the Gaullist tradition of the grande geste, 
symbols and “special relationships” has continued to inform the discourse and practice 
of French policy in East Asia.
Georges Pompidou’s presidency (1968-74) witnessed the start of an economic 
dialogue with China and the first French state visit to Beijing. But it was Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing (1974-81) who raised Asia up the ladder of French diplomatic and 
intellectual priorities. Giscard d’Estaing launched a serious political dialogue with India 
and took a high-profile position on Cambodian representation at the UN after the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, on the side of ASEAN, China and the US 
against the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The French role in the resolution of the 
Cambodian conflict leading up to the 1991 peace accords was in many respects a 
rentree politique for French prestige and involvement in Asian political affairs.13
10 There was bipartisan support for early diplomatic recognition o f Communist China and Mitterrand had 
written a tract in support o f French recognition, “La Chine aux ddfis” in 1961. See Le Point, 9 May 1983.
11 For a detailed account o f French interests in Indochina during the American military build-up from 
1963 to 1973, see Marianna P. Sullivan, France’s Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American 
Relations, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.
12 See Francis Godement, “Une politique fran^aise pour I’Asie-Pacifique?”, p.962.
13 Godement 95:962.
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Mitterrand’s presidency (1981-95) incorporated several Gaullist principles - national 
independence, the balance of military blocs around the world -  together with European 
construction, the right of people to self-determination, and the development of poor 
countries.14 Mitterrand combined a “penchant marque” for consultations with 
Vietnamese leaders, with the Gaullist symbolism of “grand state visits to China”, 
including a homage to Confucius at the ancient philosopher’s birthplace.15 Symbols 
aside, the Mitterrand era was however noteworthy for neglecting substantial ties with 
East Asia. President Mitterrand himself acknowledged the “quasi-absence” of French 
influence in the region.16 Mitterrand neglected even to visit Japan during his first term 
(1981-88), although he made overtures to Japan and ASEAN during his second term on 
account of the new economic dynamism in East Asia.
The Tiananmen massacre and the end of the Cold War, both in 1989, jolted the 
French into a realisation of the opportunities afforded by international systemic changes 
and catalysed a major re-assessment of French priorities in East Asia. One dimension 
was an emotional and normative French reaction, with French leaders trumpeting a 
national mission of promoting human rights on the bicentennial of the French 
Revolution. After years of neglecting human rights, France extolled itself as a beacon 
of human rights and universal values, with President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister 
Roland Dumas appropriating the myths and values of 1789. Another dimension was an 
opportunistic push to increase French political, strategic and economic stakes in the 
region, first through Taiwan, then building on its good relations with the ASEAN states, 
bolstered by Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN in 1995. The moral dimension was de­
emphasised from 1993 so that relations with East Asian countries -  and with China in 
particular - returned to the original Gaullist underpinnings of pragmatism, dialogue 
between great powers and civilisations, joint statements in favour of a multipolar world, 
and respect for ideological differences.
14 Francois Mitterrand, Reflexions sur la politique exterieure de la France: introduction a vingt-cinq 
discours (1981-85), Paris: Fayard, 1986, p.3.
15 Godement 95:962.
16 Mitterrand, Reflexions sur la politique exterieure, p. 17. Hubert Vedrine, Les Mondes de Franqois 
Mitterrand: A I'Elysee 1981-1995, Paris: Fayard, 1996, a detailed “inside account” o f Mitterrand’s 
foreign policies towards different world regions, does not contain a single chapter on East Asia and 
mentions the region’s countries and leaders only in passing.
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The Chirac presidency (1995- ) is the first one with a comprehensive policy on 
East Asia. It is also distinctive in having the first French president who enjoys personal 
and direct contacts with many Asian leaders and appreciates the region’s history and 
cultures. Only de Gaulle before him had such close relations (in particular with Chiang
|  n
Kai-shek). The policy shift raising Asia’s importance in French policy had begun
during the Mitterrand presidency and was launched by Prime Minister Edouard
Bahadur’s government in 1993 (based on the pragmatic trade-oriented “German 
1 8model”) . This policy shift was further elaborated and upgraded by President Chirac 
into a programmatic policy in which East Asia was defined as the nouvelle frontiere of 
French diplomacy. Alain Juppe as Foreign Minister defended the French shift from a 
pro-Taiwan to a pro-China policy as a realistic, pragmatic pursuit of long-term French 
interests in China given its international political and economic significance.19
a) Economic objectives
Although economic interests are today undisputed as an important driving force 
behind French policies in East Asia, it is noteworthy that the region only recently (in the 
1990s) became a major focus of French trade and investments. French economic 
initiatives in Asia tend to shadow policies spearheaded by Germany (Europe’s largest 
trader), the UK (Europe’s largest investor) and the European Commission. Unlike 
German and Italian businesses, French small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are 
almost completely absent from the region. The successful French companies in East 
Asia operate in a small number of specific sectors (eg. luxury goods, aerospace and 
armaments, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure building, oil, finance) dominated by 
industrial giants. France was slow in learning to collaborate with Japan, Asia’s
economic superpower, and slow to penetrate the Chinese market after its opening in
1979. As of 1999, the total stock of French FDI in Japan, the most important economy 
in Asia and the second largest in the world, accounted for under 2% of total French FDI 
in the world, while that in China, the world’s largest recipient of international FDI in
2001-2, was less than in Singapore (Table 3.1). French FDI is overwhelmingly
17 Godement 95: 963; see also Lin Hua, Chiang Kai-shek, de Gaulle contre Ho Chi Minh, 1945-46, Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1994.
18 Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face a Pekin”, in Politique Etrangere 1/99.
19 Juppe, “Diplomatie Fran?aise: le deuxieme souffle”, Politique Internationale 61, 1993, pp.24-25.
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concentrated in Western Europe and North America (almost 70%), with the total stock
00in East Asia trailing that in Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
Table 3.1: The principal destinations of French FDI in Asia in € million
(up to December 1999)
Capital 
€ million
Loans 
€ million
Total 
€ million
Percentage of total French 
FDI
Japan 5204 105 5309 1.9%
Singapore 2358 79 2437 0.9%
China 1106 152 1258 0.5%
South Korea 796 99 895 0.3%
Hong Kong 715 59 774 0.3%
Thailand 333 182 515 0.2%
India 392 9 401 0.1%
Vietnam 210 53 263 0.1%
Indonesia 226 3 229 0.1%
Source: Rene Dorient, “Un septennat de politique asiatique: quel bilan pour la France?”,
Politique Etrangere, 1/2002, 2002, p. 188.
While this lag is being redressed by recent high-volume French investments, eg.
Renault in Japan (Chapter Five), French economic officials see the low French FDI
levels in Asia as an urgent challenge for the long-term effects on trade competitiveness
0 1and French economic presence in the region. Seven out of the 25 “priority countries”
identified by the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI) as critical to
maintain the current French share of world exports (5.2%) in 2010, are found in Asia.
French exports have long under-performed and thus fall well short of the 5.2% target in
00all the Asian markets. The only area in East Asia where France is still a major player 
is Indochina, where it retains special economic, political and cultural relations. At the 
end of 1992 after Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, French companies were the 
third largest investors in the country, after Taiwan and Hong Kong.23 Vietnam has a
20 MINEFI (French Ministry o f Economy, Finance and Industry), “Evolution des Investissements franfais 
k l’etranger”, last updated 18 June 2001, on www.commerce-exterieur.gouv.fr/pgtabimplantations.htm: 
and MINEFI, “Contexte international des investissements directs Strangers”, on www.commerce- 
exterieur.gouv.fr/rapport2001/panorama/pages/invest.htm. accessed 1 September 2003.
21 Interview with Bertrand de Cordoue, Director (Asia), Department o f External Economic Relations 
(DREE), French Ministry o f Finance, Paris, 9 April 2003; and Mme Olivia Calvet-Soubiran, Japan Desk, 
Paris Chamber o f  Commerce and Industry (CCIP), 15 April 2003.
22 The seven Asian target countries are China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Malaysia and Thailand. 
MINEFI, “Conference de 1’exportation”, 27 May 2003, on www.commerce-exterieur.gouv.fr.
23 Oxford Analytica, “Vietnam: Economic Orientation”, 17 February 1993.
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large force of cheap labour and 600 million barrels of proven oil reserves.24 France 
today remains the country’s largest Western trading partner and non-Asian aid giver, 
and thus its consistent support for Vietnam’s access to IMF funds, membership in 
ASEAN and the WTO can be viewed from the expected utility to French interests in 
Indochina.
In contrast, Germany is the most successful EU player in the larger and older 
Asian growth markets. It recognized the significance of new Asian markets early on 
when EC trade with East Asia overtook EC-US trade for the first time at the beginning 
of the 1990s. After Tiananmen, it was Germany among EU and other Western countries 
which most systematically and successfully depoliticised economic relations with 
China, a key and rapidly growing market (see chapter four). Germany took the lead in 
formulating its “Asian policy” in October 1993. This policy’s central ideas were “to 
strengthen economic relations with the largest growth region in the world”,25 restore 
high level visits to Beijing and stop applying pressure on human rights. The success of 
the “German model” prompted other EU member states, in particular Britain then 
France (each had seething issues with Beijing, over Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
respectively) to rethink their post-Tiananmen policies and to delink trade from politics
* \ / r
and human rights issues.
The aim of “catching up with the Germans” -  never far beneath the surface -  has 
resulted in a series of emulatory policies emanating from the French Finance and 
Foreign Ministries, and supported by the Presidency and the Prime Minister’s office. 
Regular inter-ministerial meetings on Asia started in 1993. In mid-1994, French 
Industry and External Trade Minister Gerard Longuet visited Beijing, Hong Kong and 
Singapore to launch “Ten Initiatives for Asia”, a series of proposals to encourage 
French trade, investment and joint ventures with Asian companies. While the launch of 
the “Ten Initiatives” is dismissed by some as a Department of External Economic 
Relations (DREE) manoeuvre to stave off administrative reforms aimed at merging 
DREE into the Quai d’Orsay (French MFA), a number of coordinating agencies linking
24 Stratfor report, “Vietnam looks to France for Economic boost”, 14 February 2002, on 
www.stratfor.com.
25 “German Asian Policy”, Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Peking, 1993, p.5, as cited in 
Yahuda and Zhang, “Europe and China”, in Maull et al, Europe and the Asia Pacific, p. 194.
26 Cabestan, “Sino-Western European Relations”, pp.42-43.
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private and public organizations jumped onto the bandwagon to promote French 
economic interests in Asia. A French Business Centre (FBC) was set up in Singapore, a 
Centre Fran9ais du Commerce Exterieure (CFCE) in Paris, and French Business
97Associations (FBAs) throughout Asia. This characteristic of French economic policy, 
policy learning from other EU states, is symptomatic of the policy convergence and 
identity reconstruction (Europeanization I and III) of French policy in East Asia. In 
1995, Foreign Minister Herve de Charette announced that Asia would receive special 
attention as the “nouvelle frontiere ” of French diplomacy. French leaders’ visits to 
China began to take on a pattern of political dialogue on international developments, 
accompanied by announcements of contract signatures. President Chirac has played an 
active role in promoting French exports and industries in East Asia, often portraying this 
as beneficial for France and Europe (in the case of pan-European companies like 
Airbus). Chirac made explicit the French goal of recovering French market share in his 
“Singapore speech” in 1996: to exponentially increase the French share of the Asian 
market from 2% to 6% within ten years - in other words, to match the German level of 
trade in Asia (and China in particular).28
An often debilitating characteristic of French economic strategies in East Asia is 
an over-reliance on big contracts signed with East Asian governments and supported by 
high-level French officials. This strategy has often been hamstrung by politics and the 
competing demands of high-tech French military industries -  whose markets are mainly 
in the more developed economies of Taiwan, South Korea and ASEAN - and the 
demands of aerospace, infrastructure and communications industries, whose prime 
markets are in the less-developed economies of China and Vietnam.29
The dilemma of France caught between Beijing and Taipei is a case in point. In 
1991, French trade with Taiwan ($2.5 billion) was slightly more than trade with China 
($2.4 billion). Competing military and commercial groups in France had lobbied the 
French government hard over their respective interests in Taiwan and China. The pro- 
Taiwan military and industrial circles had succeeded in persuading Mitterrand to agree
27 Godement 95:960.
28 Le Monde, 28 February and 1 March 1996. Conversations with Quai d’Orsay officials, Paris, March 
1996 and Chinese Embassy in Paris, September 2000 confirmed the French determination to match the 
German presence in the China market.
29 Godement 95.
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to the sale of frigates and Mirage fighter jets, and were hoping to win lucrative contracts 
to build metro systems and to supply high-speed inter-city trains to Taiwan under its 
$300 billion twenty-year development plan. The Association for the Promotion of 
Economic and Cultural Exchanges with Taiwan (ASPECT) office had been upgraded to 
the “Taipei Representaive” in 1993, and the French government made available a 
mansion in the expensive 7th arrondisement of Paris for Taiwan’s new representation.30
b) Political and security objectives
A political and security presence in East Asia is important in defending France’s 
UNSC status and claims to being a global power with global responsibilities. To this 
end, France has worked steadily after the Cold War to increase its political and military 
cooperation with states in the region. As a permanent member of the Security Council, 
France (and Britain, the other EU Member State with global pretensions) would 
immediately become embroiled in any UN response to any crisis threatening East Asian 
peace and security. To shirk these responsibilities would undermine its credentials as a 
global power.
France has important naval assets based in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean. 
In fact, the combined tonnage of the French Indian Ocean and Pacific fleets (around 
60,000 tonnes and 5-7 frigates, see Table 3.2) in 1996 was comparable to the Malaysian 
Navy’s. France and the UK also occupy seats on the Korean Energy Development 
Organisation (KEDO) with the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and the EU, set 
up in 1996 to avert nuclear proliferation in the Korea peninsula. While Britain has 
security arrangements with Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and Australia through 
the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), France has steadily built up its security 
presence through commitments and cooperation activities with key countries in the 
region.
30 Interview with H.E. Mr Chiou Jong-Nan, Taipei Representative to France, Paris, 17 April 2003. Also 
Fran^oise Mengin, “The Prospects for France-Taiwan Relations”, Issues and Studies, 28/3 March 1992.
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Table 3.2: French Force Deployment in the Indian and Pacific Oceans
Bases Personnel Air Forces Naval forces Ground forces
Djibouti 3,430 6 Mirage F-1C 
(+4 in store)
1 C-160 transport a/c 
3 SA-310 helicopters
3 landing boats 
1 tug boat
1 Marine infantry 
regiment 
1 Foreign Legion 
regiment 
36 ERC-90 
5 155 mm artillery
Le Reunion- 
Mayotte-Terres 
australes/ 
antarctiques
4,130 2 C-160 transport a/c 
2 AS-555 helicopters
4 patrol boats
1 amphibious ship
2 landing craft
1 Marine infantry 
regiment
1 support battalion 
1 Foreign Legion 
company
Indian Ocean 
Command
1,210 1-2 Atlantic 2 MR a/c 2 frigates
(+2 destroyers/ frigates 
in reserve)
1 AOR (HQ afloat)
2 support ships
1 nuclear-powered sub
New Caledonia 
(HQ Noumea)
3,680 2 C-160 transport a/c 
2 AS-555 helicopters 
6 SA-330 helicopters 
2 Guardian MR a/c
3 patrol boats 
1 amphibious ship 
1 hydrograhic ship
1 Marine infantry 
regiment 
14 AML
5 105mm artillery
French Polynesia 
(HQ Papeete)
3,850 2 CN-235
3 Guardian MR a/c
3 AS-332 helicopters
3 patrol boats 
1 amphibious ship 
1 landing craft
1 hydrograhic ship
2 supply tenders
1 Marine infantry 
regiments 
1 Foreign Legion 
battalion
Pacific Ocean 
Command
3 frigates
Total 16,300 6 (+4) combat a/c 
6-7 MR a/c
7 transport a/c 
16 helicopters
5-7 frigates 
10 patrol boats 
3 amphibious ships 
6 landing craft 
9 support ships plus 
reinforcement and 
occasional patrols
4 Marine infantry 
regiments
3 Foreign Legion 
units
36 ERC 10 
14 AML
5 155 mm artillery 
5 105mm artillery
■Cev: a/c=aircrafit, AML= armoured reconnaissance vehicle with 90 mm gun, AOR=
command and replenishment ship, ERC=improved armoured reconnaissance vehicle with 90 mm 
gun, MR=maritime reconnaissance.
Source: Stares and Regaud, “Europe’s Role in Asia-Pacific Security”, Survival 39/4, 1999, p. 127.
Besides Taiwan, France has established close defence links with Singapore.31 A 
bilateral accord was signed in 1997 which allowed an Advanced Jet Training (AJT) 
school of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) to base a squadron of 18 A-4 
Skyhawks with 200 military personnel in Cazaux Air Base, southwestern France. This 
was the first time the French government had permitted a non-NATO country to base
31 Singapore is respected in military circles as a key state in Southeast Asia for its capabilities in 
developing, producing and exporting arms, as well as having a dense network o f defence relations within 
the region as well as with extra-regional military powers. See Bates and Mak, Arms Transparency and 
Security in Southeast Asia, SIPRI Research Report No. 13, New York: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 
1997, pp.53-59.
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• 32troops on French soil since the end of NATO’s military presence in France in 1966. 
East Asia represents a lucrative arms market and it was the only one that registered 
growth during the global contraction in the industry after 1989. Japan, China, Taiwan 
and South Korea alone represent 82% of the region’s arms market.33 France and other 
major European arms manufacturers (Britain, Germany and Sweden) have been active 
in this competitive market and have offered themselves as serious alternatives to the US 
and Russia as arms suppliers.34
During the US-Japan FSX fighter controversy, French aerospace company 
Dassault offered to help Japan build the FSX based on the Rafale fighter.35 From a 
strategic perspective,* the 1989-92 sale of French frigates and fighter jets to Taiwan has 
increased France’s profile and stake in one of the security flash-points in East Asia. In 
January 1994, French relations with China were normalized and a joint France-China 
communique was issued, committing France to recognise one China and to refrain from 
selling new arms to Taiwan. However, France continues to sell weapons to many East 
Asian countries. Just two months after normalization, the French sold Exocet, Crotale 
and Mistral missiles, torpedoes, anti-submarine sensors and electronic warfare 
equipment to Taiwan, justifying the sales as legitimate as agreement was made before 
1994.36
Aside from arms sales and new defence relationships in East Asia, France has 
used its status as one of the UNSC “Permanent Five” and its influence in the EU to raise 
its national diplomatico-strategic profile and presence in East Asia. France established 
a bilateral high-level strategic dialogue involving defence ministers and senior officials 
with Japan in 1994, and with China and South Korea in 1996.37 France has skilfully 
pushed for institutionalising dialogue with China under the EU framework. Responding 
to Singapore’s October 1994 proposal for a regular APEC-style meeting of leaders from
32 Le Monde, 10 February 1998 and 23 March 1999; and International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), The Military Balance 2001-2002, Oxford UP, 2001, pp. 56, 208. The total RSAF presence 
(including pilots, support crew, technicians and families) is estimated to be 600.
33 SIPRI2002.
34 Green 95:148.
35 Green 95:149 and p. 180 n.65. See also Michael Chinworth, “The Technology Factor in US-Japan 
Security Relations”, in Green and Cronin (eds), The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, New  
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp.286-310.
36 See David Shambaugh, “Europe and China”, pp.20-21.
37“European Defence and Euro-Asia Security Relations,” Speech by Alain Richard, French Minister o f  
Defence, Paris, 19 February 1999. Strategic talks with Japan began in 1994, and South Korea, in 1996.
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Asia and Europe, the French immediately supported the proposal as a means, inter alia, 
of further institutionalising regular cooperative contacts with the leaders of China.38 
Despite an initial lukewarm response from the British and German governments, France 
used the offices of former President of the European Commission F rancis Xavier- 
Ortoli and the French presidency of the EU in the first half of 1995 to push the idea in 
EU circles. It managed to use EU institutions to build a coalition of support from the 
other member states and the Commission to launch the first ASEM summit in March 
1996, just 17 months after the idea was first broached in Paris.
France has leveraged on its historical ties with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as 
a bridgehead for French interests in Southeast Asia. Mitterrand made the first state visit 
by a major Western to Vietnam in February 1993 during a time when the US still called 
for an international embargo on Vietnam. French interests in shoring its position in the 
Indochinese region explains keen French interest in encouraging the integration of 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in regional and international organizations like ASEAN, 
ASEM, APEC, the Francophonie, and the WTO. These historical ties have conferred 
on France an influence, both on its own and through the EU, on developments in 
Indochina and the wider Southeast Asian region. For the 7th Francophonie summit in 
Hanoi in 1997, France donated generous aid to Vietnam to build an International 
Conference Centre (costing FF45million), refurbish public buildings, set up bilingual 
schools, and to train translators.39 France played an important diplomatic role in the 
resolution of the Third Indochina War and was an active mediator in the stand-off 
between Co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and Ranarriddh after Hun Sen launched a coup 
d’etat against First Prime Minister Ranarriddh in 1997.
Finally, presidential leadership and personality has been a significant factor in 
French relations with Asia in the 1990s. President Chirac has invested much time and 
effort cultivating personal ties with East Asian leaders. He is known to have very good 
and long-standing relations with many East Asian leaders since he was Prime Minister 
(1974-76 and 1986-88) and Mayor of Paris (1977-1995). Chirac has visited Japan on 
some 50 occasions, and has met with Singapore’s founding prime minister Lee Kuan 
Yew practically every year since the 1980s, and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir
38See Michael Leifer, “Europe and Southeast Asia”, in Maull et al, Europe and the Asia Pacific”, p. 199; 
and Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capabilities-Expectation Gap?”, p.32.
39 Le Figaro, 14 November 1997; Le Monde, 13 November 1997
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Mohamed since the early 1990s. In 1998, the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir 
Mohamed was Chirac’s guest of honour at the Bastille Day parade on the Champs 
Elysees. Chirac was also known to get along well with Chinese leaders Jiang Jemin and 
Zhu Rongji. Chirac even invited Jiang and his wife to his private estate in the Correze 
in 2001, a gesture usually reserved by French presidents for very few close leaders, and 
comparable to the invitations of Reagan and Bush to their ranches. The warm reception 
accorded to Jiang caused some consternation in French public opinion and incited much 
criticism.40 In addition, the “Asia hands” in the Quai d’Orsay have found themselves in 
favour with Chirac for their specialist knowledge of eg. China, India and Japan. They 
have often been rapidly promoted to positions of high foreign policy decision power as 
Diplomatic Advisors in the Elysee, in the Foreign and Defence Ministries, in the Quai 
as well as important ambassadorial positions in New York, Washington and Berlin 41
c) Human Rights
French policy-makers often declare that France has a “historic heritage” as the 
“cradle of human rights”, with a special role in promoting these rights. Some French 
scholars and statesmen have gone so far as to claim that the 1789 French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen has served as the main inspiration behind 
contemporary efforts to enshrine an international human rights regime. French 
philosophers, diplomats, statesmen and lawyers have been closely involved in the 
development of the international human rights regime. The French legal specialist and 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Rene Cassin is widely recognised - together with Eleanor 
Roosevelt - as one of the two “guiding lights” behind the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), which closely followed the model established by the French 
Declaration while substituting “human” for the more ambiguous “Man” throughout the 
text.42
40 Liberation, 22 October 1999; Le Canard Enchaine, 27 October 1999; “Une complaisance coupable”, 
La Croix, 27 October 1999; “Polemique sur une visite d’Etat, Le Figaro, 29 October 1999.
41 See “Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, conseiller diplomatique de Jacques Chirac et fidele complice de 
Villepin”, in Le Figaro, 17 April 2003; “La droite reprend la haute main sur les nominations dans 
l'administration”, Agence France Presse, 9 August 2002; and “A I'Elys^e, une structure hterarchisee et 
des contacts personnels”, Le Monde 1 May 1996.
42 Lynn Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights: A brief documentary history, Boston: Bedford 
Books, 1996, p.3. See also Eric Pateyron, La contribution frangaise a la Declaration universelle des 
droits de I’homme, Paris: La Documentation Franfaise, 1999.
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Yet the empirical record shows scant priority given to human rights in French 
foreign policy. Despite French statesmen stressing that French political and diplomatic 
interests should be pursued in compliance with moral interests,43 most observers note 
the overwhelming evidence of a hard-nosed realpolitik approach to human rights in 
French policy. The state most like the US in viewing itself as a universal model of 
human rights, the defence of human rights abroad was in practice a low-priority issue 
for France. It has had a long history of tolerating and often supporting repressive 
regimes in Africa and Indochina, not to mention a notorious official “torture bureau” in 
its military establishment in the 1954-62 Algerian War, and the French secret services’ 
sabotage and sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace’s anti-nuclear ship in 
Auckland Harbour.44 As Brewin observed in 1986, human rights were basic but never 
central to the foreign policies of major European governments 45
I would argue that despite its reputation for double standards, France did make 
serious attempts at promoting human rights in its foreign policy, especially during the 
Mitterrand presidency. In the 1980s French foreign policy discourse started to contain 
normative references to the defence of human and citizenship rights, democracy and the 
rule of law.46 In 1982, France joined the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 
submitting an inter-state complaint against Turkey at the European Committee of 
Human Rights, claiming that human rights were being violated by Turkey’s military 
regime, against the European Convention on Human Rights.47 In 1984, a Consultative 
Committee for Human Rights was set up to advise the government on the promotion of 
human rights in the world, in particular through international organisations. Mitterrand 
made Bernard Kouchner, the high-profile founder of the NGO Medecins sans 
Frontieres, a senior minister in charge of humanitarian action at the start of his second 
presidential mandate, in 1988. The French government often intervened on behalf of
43 Marie-Christine Kessler, La Politique Etrangere de la France, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999, 
pp. 160-61 notes that as early as 1963, the Jeanneney commission had recommended that ethics should be 
linked with French aid and cooperation policy towards developing countries.
44 David Forsythe, “Comparative Foreign Policy and Human Rights”, in Peter Baehr et al (eds.), 
Innovation and Inspiration: Fifty Years o f  the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, Amsterdam: 
Royal Academy o f Arts and Sciences, 1999, p. 127; Richard Sears, The Rainbow Warrior Affair, London: 
Unwin, 1986.
45 Christopher Brewin, “Europe”, in R.J. Vincent, (ed), Foreign Policy and Human Rights, Cambridge: 
RIIA/Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 190.
46 Mitterrand, Reflexions sur la Politique Exterieure de la France, p.3.
47 Peter R. Baehr, The Role o f Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1996, pp.29, 72. Turkey agreed to three reports in 1986 to ensure the prohibition o f torture practices.
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individual victims of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, and sometimes sanctions
j.L
were applied or other measures taken which included the world of sport. At the 40 
anniversary of the UDHR in 1988, President Mitterrand paid tribute to NGOs and 
expressed support for the promotion of democracy and human rights:
I do not forget the daily, stubborn activities of non-governmental organisations, 
who report on, protest and denounce violations of human rights, and give 
support to the victims of such violations. Without then, the traces of the victims 
would disappear for ever, their rights ridiculed in secret. France will support the 
consolidation of these activities, the clarification of their position, and protect 
their members'actions and witnesses.48
In East Asia as in the Soviet Union, the French government’s interest in human 
rights was incidental and largely confined to individual cases. The French government, 
like most Western governments, by and large ignored domestic interest groups’ 
demands to pressure foreign governments on gross human rights violations and abuses 
in Asia, notably China’s Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and Khmer 
Rouge pogroms in Cambodia after the Maoists took power in 1975.49 In Asia, where 
most of the worst authoritarian regimes were communist, left-leaning intellectuals and 
politicians in France tended to ignore the excesses of these regimes out of an idealised 
empathy with the ultimate goal of a communist society.50 The neglect of human rights 
in Asia was only ended in 1989. France under Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Roland 
Dumas took a vociferous leading position and used the EC to project and Europeanize 
its condemnation of the Chinese government in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
massacre.
The promotion of Third World solidarity and human rights (in particular 
economic and social rights) was a major plank of Mitterrand’s Socialist governments. In 
1989, political and civil rights moved to the centre of French attention because of the 
end of the Cold War, the 200 anniversary of the French Revolution, and the dramatic 
events in China and Eastern Europe. The most high-profile French human rights policy
48 Speech by President Mitterrand at celebration o f 40th anniversary of the UDHR, Paris, 10 December 
1988, cited in Baehr 96:125.
49 See Andrew J Nathan, “China and the International Human Rights Regime”, in Economy, Elizabeth 
and Oksenberg, Michel (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1999, p .148.
50 On the French Left’s avoidance o f criticising communist regimes, see Jean-Fran?ois Revel, La Grande 
Parade: Essai sur la survie de I ’utopie socialiste, Paris: Plon, 2000; and especially St6phane Courtois’ 
controversial bestseller, Le livre noir du communisme, Paris: Laffont, 1997, which estimated at 85 million 
(two-thirds in Asia) the number of people killed by Communist regimes since 1917.
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was in reaction to Tiananmen. Mitterrand’s denunciation of the Chinese government on 
4 June 1989 was scathing: “a regime which is reduced to opening fire on its youth to 
survive has no future.”51 Along with the US and other Western democracies, France 
imposed sanctions to “freeze” relations and reduce French diplomatic representation in 
China. Roland Dumas announced on 7 June that French unilateral measures would 
include a “suspension of all political visits to China.” France also played “the leading 
role” in cobbling together a list of 10 collective EC sanctions at the EC’s June 1989
tViMadrid summit, with the 10 (on banning high technology military sales and transfer)
CO
added on French insistence. The Madrid sanctions were reinforced on 15 July when 
they obtained the agreement of Canada, the US and Japan at the G7 summit hosted by 
France.54 Encouraged by human rights activists in France, Paris also offered political 
asylum to the dissident student leaders, gave them a special profile in the bicentennial 
Bastille Day parade,55 and allowed them to set up the Federation for Democracy in 
China, in Paris.56
In relation to other countries in Asia, Dumas and Mitterrand also promoted 
human rights. During his February 1993 state visit to Vietnam, Mitterrand declared to 
his hosts that “democracy and development must always go together” while Dumas 
gave his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Manh Cam a list of 20 detainees about whom 
he demanded information.57 From mid-1993, the principled Mitterrand-Dumas 
approach had passed its peak. It was abandoned, ostensibly to promote economic 
exchange, in favour of a more conciliatory position that implicitly accepted Asian 
arguments that human rights could be culturally relative. The French position shifted 
with the election of a conservative government headed by Prime Minister Bahadur in 
mid-1993, and the normalization of France-China relations in 1994 after four years of 
confrontation over Tiananmen and Taiwan. The policy shift was reinforced by President 
Chirac’s philosophical-semantic approach from 1995 and was most evident in the case 
of China.
51 Cited in Richard Arzt, “Le pari chinois de Chirac”, in L ’Express, 4 April 1996 and Andrew Nathan et al 
(eds), The Tiananmen Papers, 2001, p.397.
52 Le Quotidien de Paris, 8 June 1989. See also Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 2nd ed., 
Boulder: Westview, 2003, pp. 107-114 and Ch.6 on “responding to Tiananmen”.
53 Franfoise Mengin, “The Prospects for France-Taiwan Relations”, p.48.
54 Dumas, “Situation en Chine”, op cit.
55 Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 117.
56 Mengin, “The Prospects for France-Taiwan Relations”, pp.51-52.
57 Oxford Analytica, “Vietnam: Economic Orientation”, 17 February 1993.
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Chirac’s approach to human rights, in comparison to Mitterrand’s, is more 
circumspect. Chirac has publicly admitted that the French record was not 
“irreproachable” and that France, the patrie of human rights, had room for 
improvement.58 France in April 1997 broke ranks with the EU’s CFSP practice since 
1990 of sponsoring the human rights resolution on China at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (CHR), one month ahead of Chirac’s state visit to China. As the French 
were so instrumental in the European position of 1989, their policy reversal in 1997 was 
stunning. Their defection was motivated essentially by national interests in improving 
France-China economic and political relations. The French sought to preserve a 
semblance of European unity despite this split. They defended their action as serving the 
larger “European interest” by creating change in China through dialogue rather than 
ritually criticizing it at the CHR, a method which they claimed had failed to move the 
Chinese leadership.
II The European Union’s Objectives in East Asia
As seen in Part I, France does not deploy only its national resources in its 
dealings with countries in East Asia. It leverages on international clubs and 
organisations such as the G7, and of course the EU. European foreign policy (EFP) can 
be understood as an overarching structure in which individual Member States’ national 
foreign policies operate. Part II focuses on the EU’s objectives in East Asia, tracing the 
coherence, consistency and commitment of the EU and its constituent Member States 
(especially France) to these declared objectives through different stages in the evolution 
of the EC/EU and the expansion of its interests and presence in East Asia. Following 
European decolonisation in Asia in the quarter-century after 1945, the EC’s 
relationships with East Asian countries in the 1970s were at best “secondary 
relationships” and “derivative” of the Cold War.59
58 Message du President de la Ripublique, in La Declaration universelle des droits de I ’homme: 
Colloques des 14, 15 et 16 septembre 1998 a la Sorbonne, Paris: Documentation Fran^aise, 1999, p. 16.
59 Borrowing from Michael Yahuda, “China and Europe: The Significance o f a Secondary Relationship”, 
in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994 and David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, London: Contemporary China 
Institute, SOAS, 1996, p.2.
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Based on EU documents and statements by key EU spokesmen, the EU has had 
three fundamental and enduring objectives in East Asia since the 1980s.60 First and 
most clearly, this has been to raise the economic (and corresponding political) presence 
of the EU. Second and more controversially, the promotion of human rights and 
democracy. Thirdly, to contribute to regional peace and stability.
The strategic objective of building an anti-Soviet united front via political 
cooperation with ASEAN, China and Japan, grew in importance during the 1970s, when 
communists took power in all the Indochinese countries in 1975 and Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia in 1979. Henry Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” speech which taunted Europe 
for its external weakness, the October 1973 Yom Kippur war and the subsequent OPEC 
oil embargo fed feelings that the EC was impotent in the face of global challenges and 
that European Political Cooperation (EPC) had to advance quickly from procedure to 
substance. The Declaration on European identity in December 1973 was an attempt to 
respond to these challenges by defining Europe’s place in the world in relation to the 
great powers and other international organisations. In their Declaration, the EC-9 
recognised the “major role played by China in international affairs” and resolved “to 
intensify their relations with the Chinese government and to promote exchanges in 
various fields as well as contacts between European and Chinese leaders”.61 China on
fOthe other hand attempted to develop an anti-Soviet international united front . China 
and ASEAN envisaged a strong and united Europe as a useful counterweight against the 
Soviet Union. The main Chinese political interest lay in encouraging “the emergence of 
the EC as an independent centre in world affairs with a view to reducing the leverage of 
the superpowers in international affairs.”63 In 1975, China became the first communist 
country to recognize the EC. An EC-China dialogue was established and several trade 
agreements were signed from 1978. A President of the European Commission, Roy
60 European Commission’s “New Asia Strategy”: COM (94)314 and COM (2001)461 final. See also 
Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders; and Peter Ferdinand, “Economic and Diplomatic Interactions 
between the EU and China”, in Grant (ed), The European Union and China.
61 Para 17 o f “Declaration on European Identity by the Nine Foreign Ministers”, Copenhagen, 14 
December 1973, in Hill and Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, London: Routledge, 
2000, pp.92-96.
62 An exaggerated perception o f the EC’s defence capabilities and strong Chinese insistence on the need 
for Western unity against Soviet aggressiveness led to Alexander Haig dubbing China the “16th member 
of NATO” and being “more European than the Europeans”. See Yahuda, “China and Europe”, pp.268- 
69, and Gerald Segal, “Europe, China and the Soviet Threat”, in Shaw Yu-ming, Europe and China in the 
Twentieth Century, Taipei: Institute o f International Relations, 1986.
63 Yahuda, p.272.
72
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Three / French & EU Objectives
Jenkins, visited China for the first time in 1979. The first EC-ASEAN meeting at 
ministerial level was held in Brussels in 1979. In 1980, the convergence of views on 
Soviet expansionism led to a strongly worded EC-ASEAN Joint Statement issued from 
Kuala Lumpur which condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.64
The EC/EU’s bloc-to-bloc relations with ASEAN are its most institutionalised 
relations in East Asia and were until the mid-1990s hailed as a “success story” and a 
“paradigm” of inter-regional cooperation and dialogue. Since the establishment of the 
EC in 1958 and ASEAN in 1967, the European Commission has been most keen in 
putting relations between the EC and ASEAN on a multilateral footing to break the 
monopoly of exclusive country-to-country contact between newly-independent 
Southeast Asian states and former European colonial powers.65 Supported politically by 
European heavyweights like German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the EC 
became ASEAN’s first dialogue partner in 1972. Contact was at its most dense on the 
economic level, and the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980 established 
a broad framework to cover technical assistance and commercial and economic 
cooperation. At the political level, ASEAN represented a grouping of anti-communist 
friendly pro-Western states in the prevailing Cold War environment. In European eyes, 
the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam in 1975 increased the importance of 
the ASEAN states as a bulwark against communism in Indochina. Soviet naval 
expansion in the Pacific, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, all in 1979, further galvanised the EC-ASEAN relationship.66 While the 
1980 Cooperation Agreement offered a flexible and non-controversial basis for the 
relationship, by the end of the decade, Asian economic dynamism had fed feelings in 
Europe that Asia was a source of economic threat rather than partnership. With the end 
of the Cold War in 1989 and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in 1991, 
important strategic questions were raised about the nature of the EU’s engagement with 
ASEAN and the region of Asia more generally.
64 Soedjati Dijiwandono, “Europe and Southeast Asia”, in Maull, Europe and the Asia Pacific, London: 
Routledge, 1998, pp.206-207.
65 See articles in Edwards and Regelsberger (eds), Europe’s Global Links: The European Community and 
Inter-regional Cooperation, London: Pinter, 1990 by Manfred Mols, “Cooperation with ASEAN: A 
Success Story”; and Simon Nuttall, “The Commission: Protagonists o f inter-regional cooperation”, 
pp. 143-160. See also Anthony Forster, “The European Union in South-East Asia” Continuity and Change 
in Turbulent Times, International Affairs, 75/4, 1999.
66 Forster 99:745.
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The transformation of the EC into the EU equipped with a common foreign and 
security policy in 1993 reduced the difference between economic and political 
instruments of the EU, which opened up the potential of a more integrated approach to 
the EU’s external policy. The Commission’s recommendation for a second-generation 
EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement incorporated the EU’s new priorities. These 
included new economic agenda items like ‘fair trade’, social legislation and labour 
standard, and political items like the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. Human rights abuses in East Timor and a massacre in Dili in 
November 1991 further soured the relationship, with Netherlands cancelling aid to 
Indonesia that year and Portugal (supported by the European Parliament) leading EU 
opposition to renewing the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. The defence of ‘European 
values’ (including human rights, democracy and environmental issues) championed 
notably by the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states, became a cornerstone of the 
EU’s ‘new agenda’.67
“New Asia Strategy”
Some writers have scorned the idea of a credible EU policy in international
/ o
politics, or even the existence of an EU policy at all. The EU’s presence in East Asia 
has certainly had a much shorter vintage than the centuries-old colonial histories of 
Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands, and still cannot match the breadth and depth of 
Britain or France. Indeed it has been argued that the EU has thus far failed to surmount 
individual national policies of the significant European colonial powers in Asia in the
th20 century -  Britain, France and the Netherlands -  in order to pursue a common and 
coherent strategy.69 What exists of EU policy in Asia has long been dominated by Pillar 
I issues related to economic matters. The Commission’s 1994 “Towards a New Asia 
Strategy” (NAS) paper noted as its principal objective that “the main thrust of the 
present and future policy in Asia is related to economic matters.” The NAS emphasized 
the rapid economic changes that had taken place in the region over the previous
67 Foster 99: 750 and Donnelly 98:109-110.
68 See Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, in Journal o f  Common Market 
Studies, 21, 1983, pp.149-170. Ignacio Ramonet concludes in ‘Lemons d’un non-guerre’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March 1998, ‘I'Europe n ’existe pas. Sa politique exterieure et de securite commune est un 
fantome. See also Andrew Clapham, “Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and 
How is it Manifested in Multilateral Fora?” in Philip Alston (ed), The European Union and Human 
Rights, Oxford UP, 1999, p.627 and fh.l.
69 See Miguel Santos Neves, “Towards a Common China Policy for the EU: a Portuguese Perspective”, in 
Grant, (ed), The European Union and China, London: Routledge/RIIA, 1995.
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decades, and the need to ensure a proactive and effective EU presence in the region in 
light of Asia’s growing economic weight:
The rise of Asia is dramatically changing the world balance of economic power. 
By the year 2000, the World Bank estimates that half the growth in the global 
economy will come from East and Southeast Asia alone. This growth will 
ensure that by the year 2000 one billion Asians will have significant consumer 
spending power and of these, 400 million will have average disposable incomes 
as high, if not higher, than their European or US counterparts. The European 
Union needs therefore to accord Asia a higher priority than is at present the
70case.
The Commission’s NAS reflected EU elites’ view that Europe should play a 
greater role in the affairs of the post-cold war world, and its objectives were based on an 
optimistic long-term view of Asia’s rise in international economic and politics. It 
reckoned that “the establishment of an important presence in Asia will allow Europe at 
the beginning of the XXIst century to ensure that its interests are taken fully into 
account in this key region.” The NAS thus set as a major objective the deepening of 
political and economic relations with Asian countries “to contribute to stability in Asia 
by promoting international co-operation and understanding”. At the same time, it 
recognized the problems of poverty and committed itself to continue EU aid “to 
promote the economic development of the less prosperous countries and regions”. 
Finally, the NAS also committed the EU “to contribute to the development and 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Asia.” The EU in the 1990s concluded agreements with 
several of the key players in the region. These include an EC-Japan Joint Declaration in 
1991, annual summits with Japan and China, and summit-level meetings between EU 
and East Asian leaders under the umbrella of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).
a) The EU’s Economic objectives
EU objectives in East Asia have been overwhelmingly Community-related since 
the 1970s (aside from during the 1979-89 Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia). They 
were particularly oriented towards trade and investment relations with Japan and the 
Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs), and development aid for the other countries 
and ASEAN. Although 1991 was a watershed year when EC-Asia trade overtook
70 See Executive Summary, COM (94) 314 final.
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71transatlantic trade for the first time, Europe’s ability to compete with the US and Japan 
in the dynamic growth areas of East Asia were relatively weak. Western Europe was 
preoccupied with Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) following the 
collapse of communism, and with building a new kind of European political order that 
would respond to the new realities after the Cold War. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
major criticism made about European companies in East Asia was that commitment was 
lacking from the top, and that in comparison to American companies, European 
companies had a much smaller pool of talented Asians to draw from. Establishing and 
cultivating good business relationships provided European companies with a key
• • 77business challenge and imperative. Bemoaning this gap, the CEO of French utilities 
company Lyonnaise des Eaux Jerome Monod observed that “Asia is the region where 
European companies need to invest their best human resources.”73
As External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten noted in 1998, Asia accounted 
for 24.1% of the EU’s external trade: more than the countries of the Mediterranean, 
Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet Union combined.74 The ASEM countries 
were the largest source (24.8%) of EU imports in 1999, ahead of NAFTA (Appendix 1). 
The Commission’s 1994 NAS paper put forward several strategies by which European 
companies could raise their presence in these markets. The EU’s enhanced economic 
engagement in East Asia had antecedents in the EU’s attempts to promote and 
institutionalise privileged economic relations with China and ASEAN in the 1980s. 
Simon Nuttall has argued however, that the EU lacked the instruments to implement 
comprehensively the “new Asia policy” of 1994; as such, existing policies were
ne
developed in lieu of the implementation of a global strategy.
To take one example, the European Community as a whole witnessed a rapid
7/
expansion of relations with China in the 1980s. Economic relations between China
71 Harms G. Hilpert, “Economic Interactions”, in Maull, Europe and the Asia Pacific, London: Routledge, 
1998, p.57.
72 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, “The economic setting”, in Maull, Europe and the Asia Pacific, p.77.
73 Jerome Monod, “How Europe can succeed in Asia”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 February 96.
74 Chris Patten 2000, “Europe and Asia: A closer partnership in the new millennium”, p .l. EU investment 
in Asia continued to grow despite the Asian crisis: €7.8 billion in 1998 for ASEAN countries, up 13% on 
1997.
75 Simon Nuttall, “European and Asian Policies”, in Maull, Europe and the Asia Pacific, p. 175.
76 A good account o f this period is found in Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe, 
London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990, ch.9 and 10.
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and the Community as a whole were institutionalised with the establishment of three 
important accords: the 1978 EC-China Trade Agreement, the 1979 Textiles Agreement 
and the 1980 Trade Preference Agreement. The Community’s unilateral decision to 
include China in a preferential agreement with effect from 1 January 1980 granted full 
exemption from customs duty for all industrial goods and partial exemption for certain 
processed agricultural products exported to developed countries. The EC-China Joint 
committee created by the 1978 bilateral agreement and affirmed in the 1985 EC-China 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, quickly became the most institutionalised 
component of the EC’s interactions with China, with the Commission playing the role
77of intermediary. Since 1985, the Commission has been the engine in developing 
various forms of economic cooperation. The member states have entrusted the External 
Trade Commissioner to conduct economic negotiations with China at the EU level in 
order collectively to exercise greater bargaining power. In July 1995, the Trade 
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan unveiled the EU’s new initiative, “A Long-term policy 
for China” which emphasised commerce but placed less emphasis on political,
7 Q
diplomatic or strategic relations.
Mirroring the EU’s increasing economic links with China after 1975 is the 
history of its interactions with Vietnam from 1990. Diplomatic relations between the 
EU and Vietnam were normalized in November 1990. A series of cooperation 
agreements were signed with Vietnam. A first EC-Vietnam Textile and Clothing 
Agreement was signed in December 1992 and entered into force on 1 January 1998. A 
new Agreement, providing increasing access to the EU market, was concluded in 
November 1997. A third Agreement to allow further increases in Vietnam’s access to 
the EU textile and clothing market was signed in October 2000. An EC-Vietnam 
Framework Cooperation Agreement was signed in July 1995. A “third generation” 
agreement, it contains a Human Rights article, and also provides for Most Favoured 
Nation treatment. Vietnam formally acceded to the EC-ASEAN Cooperation 
Agreement on 1 May 1999.79 The EU is a very important economic partner for Vietnam 
and supports its doi moi (economic renovation) policy. It absorbs about 22% of
77 It organizes meetings o f European and Chinese experts such as the Sino-EC business weeks.
78 See David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, London: Contemporary China Institute, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 1996.
79 “The EU’s relations with Vietnam: Overview”, European Commission website,
http://.europ.eu.int/comm./external relations/Vietnam/intro/index.htm. consulted 16 February 2002.
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Vietnam’s exports, and is Vietnam’s second largest trading partner after Japan. 
However, the EU supplies only 12% of Vietnam’s imports, far behind its Asian trading 
partners. In 1998, the EU’s trade deficit with Vietnam was over €1.5 billion.
Potential political impediments like the EC-ASEAN impasse over EC 
conditionalities in a second-generation cooperation agreement and the 1997-98 Asian 
economic crisis have not prevented an impressive trade and economic growth between 
the two regions. In the early 1990s, ASEAN was a more important trading partner to 
Western Europe than Central and Eastern Europe. Japan and China are today the EU’s 
2nd and 4th largest trading partners in the world. In the 1998 and 1999 Asian economic 
crisis, Chinese exports to the EU and US compensated for falling exports to Asian 
countries by rising 16% and 18% respectively. The EU overtook Japan to become 
China’s second largest export market in 1999. The EU imported almost €50 billion and 
exported €20 billion worth of goods. China thus enjoyed a trade surplus of €30 billion 
in 1999 (Appendix 1). Meanwhile, European companies invested US$4.5 billion in 
China that year, making the EU the largest foreign direct investor in China.81 The EU’s 
relations with Japan are governed by the 1991 “Joint Declaration on Relations between 
the European Community and its Member states and Japan”.82 As the EU’s second- 
largest export market and a major investor in the EU, the EU’s relations with Japan go 
beyond the purely economic, with an increasing cooperation on global and regional 
issues. This was expressed in the new “10-year Action Plan” adopted at the 2000 EU- 
Japan summit.83
b) The E U ’s political and security objectives
In the late 1980s and 1990s, western Europe’s relations with China and other 
East Asian countries changed from being derivatives of the Cold War and broader 
relations with the superpowers, and developed an “independent dynamic” of their
80 European Commission, “Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN relations”, COM (96)314, Brussels, 
1996 and “Investing in Asia’s Dynamism: European Union Direct Investments in Asia”, Luxembourg: 
OOPEC/UNCTAD, 1996.
81 European Commission, “The EU’s relations with China- An Overview”, on
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/china/intro/index.htm. consulted 8 April 2001.
82 European Commission, “Bilateral Trade Relations” with Japan, July 2001, on
http://europa.eu.int/comm./trade/bilateral/iapan.
83 COM (2001) 469, p. 13.
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own. The EU recognized from the 1990s that it had to engage politically the emerging 
powers of Asia as their economic power translated to geopolitical and military power. 
However, the dominant view of Europe’s role in Asian security is represented by 
Michael Leifer’s assessment that “Europe’s ability to contribute directly and in a 
substantive sense to Asian security has become decreasingly possible because there is 
no military presence to speak of; nor are there any defence planning arrangements 
which may be taken off the shelf for a collective response to crisis.” F rancis Heisbourg 
notes that the EU retains a presence in various parts of Asia. However, in political 
terms, the European Union as such “hardly exists as such in East Asia.”85 From a 
military standpoint, the 135,000 personnel of the United States’ Pacific Fleet and 
permanent deployment of nearly 80,000 US troops based in South Korea, Japan and 
Southeast Asia indeed dwarfs the European presence.86 The UK and France are in fact 
the only European countries that either permanently station or periodically deploy 
troops in the region.
The contrary view, expressed by Paul Stares and Nicolas Regaud, is that 
“Europe’s involvement in Asia-Pacific security has been growing, not diminishing, in
On
recent years.” They argue that since over one-quarter of total EU trade is conducted 
with East Asia and that the EU exports as much to the region as does the US, Europe 
has substantial economic interests worth protecting. European powers — whether 
individually or collectively -  could conceivably ignore a serious breach of peace in the 
Asia-Pacific. The EU has made an active contribution to peace and security in the 
region, eg. in its assistance for the establishment of democratic government in 
Cambodia and East Timor, support for refugees in and out of Afghanistan, support for 
inter-Korean dialogue and contributions to KEDO. The EU has also participated since 
1994 (in the form of the Presidency and a Commission representative) at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF). In a similar vein, Shin and Segal argue that “For Europe, 
defending a stable Pacific Asia that remains open and connected to the world economy 
is a vital interest and one worth defending with military power. The Europeans would
84 Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, p.2.
85 Heisbourg in Maull 98:230.
86 IISS, The Military Balance 2001-2002, pp. 172 and 195-199
87 Stares and Regaud, “Europe’s Role in Asia-Pacific Security”, Survival 39/4, Winter 1997-98, pp. 117- 
139.
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be foolish to free-ride on the US’ willingness to defend an open and stable global
DO
trading system if a challenge arises in Asia”.
While Europe’s involvement in East Asian security has been growing since the 
end of the Cold War, the EU does not usually speak with one voice. It normally acts 
through specific member states that pull in wider EU funding and support for (usually) 
their ex-colonies or areas of particular interest. This was the case for the French push 
behind EU support for Cambodia’s reconstruction in 1992-93, and French and British 
calls for an EU contribution (on top of their own national contributions) to KEDO. 
However the UK’s role in the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), French 
nuclear tests in the South Pacific in 1995-96 (against protests from both Asian and EU 
countries), and the presence of French military assets in their “overseas territories” in 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans are clear cases of unilateral national capabilities taking 
precedence abroad. Moreover, the repeated French and British demarches for separate 
seats on the ASEAN Regional Forum since 1994, rather than a single seat for the EU, 
do not augur well for a collective European voice in East Asian security.
Since the NAS in 1994, political dialogue with key partners in Asia has 
developed considerably, with new biennial Summit dialogues in the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) from 1996, and annual summit dialogues with China (since 1995), 
India (2000), Japan, and the ongoing EU-ASEAN dialogue. The EU’s contacts with 
ASEAN under the EC-ASEAN dialogue, and now with all the East Asian countries 
under ASEM, can be seen as “a means to regulate contact with other international
oq f
actors”. The EU’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana acknowledged the 
utility of multilateral dialogues like ASEM in complementing bilateral dialogues such 
as the EU-ASEAN, EU-China and EU-Japan dialogues: “strong regional frameworks, 
such as the ASEAN, or the ASEM process, are gaining ground as the natural 
interlocutors for a more comprehensive and global dialogue....We should use these 
meetings to provide a new impetus across the full range of issues where we have shared 
concerns and interests.”90 The Commission is also increasing its presence in the region 
(Table 3.3) in line with its 2001 goals of developing its External Service, which had 128
88 Stares and Regaud in Survival 39/1, 1997, p. 125.
89 Forster 99:744.
90 “Future Relations between the European Union and Asia”, fourth ASEF Asia-Europe Lecture by Javier 
Solana, High Representative for the EU CFSP, Singapore, 26 July 2000.
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Delegations around the world at the beginning of 2003.91 From only one EC Delegation 
in Asia (Tokyo) in 1974, the Community’s diplomatic network in the region has grown 
to 17 Delegations in 2003.92
Table 3.3: Delegations of the European Commission in Asia, 1974-2003
Year opened EC Delegations opened in Asia No. of Delegations in Asia
1974 Tokyo 1
1979 Bangkok 2
1981 Canberra 3
1982 Dhaka 4
1983 New Delhi 5
1985 Islamabad 6
1988 Beijing, Jakarta 8
1990 Seoul 9
1991 Manila 10
1995 Colombo 11
1996 Hanoi 12
2002 Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kathmandu 15
2003 Singapore, Kuala Lumpur 17
Sources: Compiled from Georg Wiessala, The European Union and Asian Countries, 2002, p.22; 
and European Commission, “European Commission Delegations in Asia”, on 
http://europa.eu.int/extemal_relations/asia/delegations.htm. accessed 27 August 2003.
The EU’s support for ASEM’s creation could be seen as a consequence of three 
strategic concerns: a need to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War period by 
extending structured contact to new interlocutors beyond ASEAN; a need to restate the 
EU’s credentials as a stakeholder in the region, thus legitimising European political and 
economic interests alongside those of other global actors such as the US; and an interest 
in a new post-Cold War agenda based on a commitment to defining acceptable 
economic and human rights standards as a precondition of privileged contact with the 
EU. ASEM was also necessary to put life into the EU’s relations with the region since 
the EC-ASEAN relationship had ceased to be a “success story”” owing to deadlocked 
disagreements over human rights and conditionalities for a second-generation 
Cooperation Agreement.94
91 European Commission, “The Development o f the External Service”, COM(2001)381.
92 COM (94) 314 final, Part II; see also COM (2001)469 final, p.14 .
93 Anthony Forster, “The European Union in South-East Asia” Continuity and Change in Turbulent 
Times, International Affairs, 75/4, 1999, pp.743-744.
94 Contrast the optimism in Mols 1990 and Nuttall 1990, with Forster 1999.
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c) The EU and Human Rights
The Europe-wide concern for human rights can be traced to a shared 
determination never to allow the pogroms of the Second World War to recur on the 
continent. This concern led to the entrenchment of the norm of respect for human rights 
in Europe after 1945. European countries supported and played an active part in 
drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in December 1948. The Council of Europe made the respect for 
human rights and the rule of law a condition for membership.95 As early as 1950 the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was available for signature and ratification. Between 1953 and 1973 virtually all 
western European states had accepted that individuals could file human rights 
complaints and had awarded jurisdiction to the European Court of Human Rights in 
these matters.
Until the end of the Cold War, most EU member states - the Netherlands and 
Denmark were the only notable exceptions - and the European Community as a whole 
did not emphasise human rights in their foreign policy or attach conditionalities to their 
aid or relations with third countries. The Netherlands had issued an extensive White 
Paper on human rights and foreign policy in 1979. The Dutch paper outlined in detail 
the dilemmas that governments face in attempting to put human rights at the centre of 
foreign policy.96 Multilateralism served to legitimise human rights actions and provided 
information about the degree to which individual governments were likely to be isolated 
or supported in their respective stances. The Netherlands played an active role in the 
UN in developing a variety of human rights norms, such as those involving 
discrimination against women, persecution for religious beliefs, and the use of torture.
The Community’s development of an external policy in human rights took a first 
major step in 1977 when the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament adopted a Joint Declaration on the Protection of Fundamental Freedoms. A 
new “democratic condition” for entry to the Community was introduced in 1978: the 
Copenhagen European Council “solemnly declare(d) that respect for and maintenance
95 Donnelly, International Human Rights, pp. 107-114 and Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, p.49.
96 Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, p.48.
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of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential
07
elements of membership in the European Community.” This made it incumbent on 
new members to contribute to and not undermine the EC’s identity as a democratic 
community that protected human rights. From 1984, a member of the General 
Secretariat was tasked to coordinate the EC’s human rights policy, and in 1988 a new 
directorate within the General Secretariat included a specialist on human rights to 
enhance intergovernmental cooperation among member states.98
The human rights clause in EU Cooperation Agreements with third countries is, 
however, a recent development (from 1993), made possible only with the end of the 
Cold War. The main locus of effective decision-making on human rights issues in the 
European Union framework is the treaty-based Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
The Maastricht Treaty states that one of the goals of CFSP is to “develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”99 and that “the Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of action by the Union”. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council set out 
in greater detail various criteria for enlargement.100 References to human rights in the 
EU’s foreign policy initially became de rigueur in relations with the Central and East 
European countries which were seeking membership in the European Union. Then 
“conditionality” clauses on human rights were rapidly incorporated into all of the EU’s 
agreements with third countries and organisations.101
The perceived “imposition” of Western human rights standards by the EU on 
Asia, a continent with no regional human rights regime at all, was destined to create
i ryy
conflict. Nonetheless, the EU has established an important human rights dialogue
97 See Clapham, “EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy”, p.678.
98 Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, p.49.
99 Art. 11(1) o f the consolidated Amsterdam Treaty, cited in Clapham, p.636.
100 Membership requires that the candidate country “has achieved stability o f institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for the protection o f minorities”. See Clapham, 
p.631.
101 See Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, London: 
Routledge, 2000, p.443, and Bruno Simma, Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner and Constanze Schulte, “Human 
Rights Considerations in the Development Co-operation Activities o f the EC”, in Philip Alston (ed), The 
European Union and Human Rights, Oxford UP, 1999.
102 See Jack Donnelly’s Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989: and 
the revised edition, 2003 :130-31, 151-54 , which contrasts the complete absence o f regional human rights 
regimes in the Middle East and Asia with the development o f the strongest ‘enforcement’ regime in 
Europe between 1945 and 2000. Also Vitit Muntarbhom, “Current Challenges o f Human Rights in
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with China, is actively supporting efforts towards the strengthening of governance and 
civil society participation in Indonesia, and encourages any opening towards democracy 
in Burma/Myanmar and Pakistan. The EC is also bound by comprehensive 
cooperation agreements (including clauses related to the commitment by both partners 
to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and to the eventual 
suspension of the agreement) with five Asian countries -  Nepal, Laos, Cambodia, 
Bangladesh and South Korea. Similar agreements (but without a “suspension” clause) 
govern the EC’s relations with India, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Macao. An 
older style of cooperation agreement is still in force with ASEAN and with China. EC 
relations with Japan, Australia and New Zealand are governed by Joint Declarations.104 
The question of the suspension clause was a thorn in the flesh in EU-ASEAN relations 
and not only prevented the signing of a second-generation cooperation as a result of the 
East Timor and Myanmar participation issues, but completely held the EU-ASEAN 
dialogue in abeyance from 1996 until an EU-ASEAN Ministerial meeting finally took 
place in Vientiane in December 2000.
A major and controversial focus of the EU’s human rights action is China, “the 
most complex and multifaceted dialogue on human rights” which the EU has with any 
country.105 In dealing with China, the EU has suffered from conflicting interests and 
coordination problems between the General Affairs Council (GAC), the Member States, 
the Commission and the European Parliament (EP). After the French-led defection in 
1997, a new European approach to human rights in China was decided by the GAC and 
codified in the Commission’s March 1998 strategy paper, “Building a Comprehensive 
Partnership with China” (Chapter Four). As the shock of Tiananmen faded away, the 
GAC and larger Member States have tended to pay lip service to human rights in order 
to cultivate good political and economic relations with Beijing. An activist External 
Relations Commissioner is necessary to keep human rights on the agenda of EU-China 
relations. Commissioner Chris Patten, known for his strong views on human rights in 
China since his days as the last British Governor-general of Hong Kong, has listed
Asia”, in Dilys M. Hill (ed.), Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principle and Practice, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1989.
103 COM (2001) 469 final, p.l 1.
104 COM (2001) 469, p. 12 (fnlO).
105 Chris Patten, “China’s candidature for hosting the Olympic Games in 2008”, Commission statements 
in urgency debates, by External Relations Commissioner in the European Parliament, Plenary Session, 
Strasbourg, 5 July 2001, SPEECH/01/33.
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constructive engagement, multilateral cooperation, and the promotion of human rights, 
good governance and the rule of law, as three basic objectives of the EU in its relations 
with East Asia.106
Aside from common actions taken under the CFSP and coordinated by the 
Commission, individual governments raise human rights concerns in their discussions 
with Chinese leaders. In practice, the leading actor within the EU in promoting human 
rights in the world has been the European Parliament (EP). It has since 1987 made 
regular and public criticisms of the Chinese human rights record, especially on Tibet, 
arbitrary detention, capital punishment, religious and political freedoms. The EP’s 
involvement in the Community’s external relations was enhanced through its powers 
over the EU overseas development assistance budget. The GAC in May 1999 
supported the EP’s 1994 initiative to streamline a series of budget headings under a 
single chapter of the EU budget (B7-70) in the “European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights” (EIDHR).107 The EP’s budgetary power over the EIDHR, which 
concentrates on developing a coherent strategy in the field of EU external assistance in 
cooperation with NGOs and other international organisations, gives the EP added 
oversight of the Community’s external relations. The EP thus holds the Commission 
and GAC accountable for developments “on the ground” for the continuation of, for 
example, the EU-China dialogue.108
Aside from its powers over external assistance, the EP has leveraged on the 
political prestige and international publicity it can confer on foreign personalities 
embodying human rights or independence struggles, eg. opposition leaders in Burma 
(Aung San Suu Kyi) and pre-Independence East Timor (Ramos Horta). The EP 
infuriated the Chinese in 1996 when it awarded Wei Jingsheng -  then China’s most 
celebrated dissident - the Sakharov prize for Freedom of Thought.109 Then it invited the 
Dalai Lama to address a session in Strasbourg in October 2001. In the spring of 2003, 
the EP’s Liberal, Democrats and Reform (ELDR) Group attempted to invite Chen Shui-
106 Chris Patten, “What does Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy mean for Asia?”, Speech by 
Commissioner for External Relations at Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, 19 July 2000.
107 European Commission, The E U ’s role in promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third 
Countries, COM (2001)252 final, Brussels, 8 May 2001; European Commission, “The EU’s Human 
Rights and Democratisation Policy: Overview”, last updated December 2001, on 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human rights/intro.
108 European Union Annual Report on Human Rights, 1998/99:24-25 and 2002:131
109 Nathan, “China and the International Human Rights Regime”, p. 155.
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bian, Taiwan’s President, to address the European Parliament in Brussels (France had 
refused to issue a visa for the address at the EP’s building in Strasbourg). However, 
Belgium caved in when the Chinese Embassy threatened that Belgium-Chinese relations 
could be “set back 10 years” if the Belgian government proceeded to issue the visa to 
Chen. The decision to refuse the visa was then presented as a veto by the GAC, despite 
support from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Sweden and Denmark.110
I ll Interplay between French and European foreign policies
The overview of French “national” and collective “EU” policies above 
demonstrate that EU policy and French policy are not distinct, separate spheres of 
action. National and collective EU foreign polices in East Asia are intimately related in 
a dialectical process of continuous, iterative adjustment and cannot be neatly 
dissociated. This leads to the prime feature of the France-EU interaction in East Asia: 
the continual and ironic necessity for France to invoke and engage European Union 
prestige and resources, even when it wants to play a national role in the region.
Paris occasionally still makes attempts at a national great-power role in East 
Asia commensurate with its self-image as a global power, as in the Dumas-brokered 
talks leading to the Paris peace agreements on Cambodia in 1991.111 However, French 
prestige and power in Asia pale to what is enjoyed within the French-speaking 
international organisation the Francophonie or in Africa, where France remains a major 
economic and military player, commands clout as an “African” power and holds annual 
summit meetings with African leaders. For East Asia, the EU is more often than not 
necessary, even critical, to under-write French initiatives in the region.
ASEM, the link that gave France an opportunity to make a more institutionalised 
and permanent return to political and strategic affairs in the region, is on the surface a 
clear example of France “projecting” its national preferences onto the European 
platform and Europeanising a French initiative. Interpreting ASEM from this
110 Interviews with Mr Graham Watson, MEP and Leader, European Liberal, Democrats and Reform 
(ELDR) Group, 25 March 2003; and Singapore Ambassador to the European Communities, 28 March 
2003. See also “Brussels ban for Taiwan leader”, Financial Times 17 March 2003.
111 Interview with Quai d’Orsay CFSP Director, Paris, September 1999, who noted that the French 
position on Cambodia at the Paris Peace conference in 1991 was one o f the occasions France took an 
important international position without consulting its EU partners.
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perspective, we can trace ASEM’s lineage to the French government’s search for a 
means to assert a political and economic presence in a region where France was weak 
(Part I of this chapter). Balladur thus quickly seized upon the Singapore Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong’s proposal for a summit-level meeting of leaders from Europe and 
Asia, mooted in September 1994 in Paris and Brussels. As the Asia-Europe link needed 
collective EU support, France thus “Europeanised” this Franco-Singaporean initiative 
by using extant processes in the EU Foreign Policy-making system (Asia Working 
Groups, COREPER, Council of Ministers, the EU Presidency and the Troika system, 
etc). France gave “strong encouragement” before, after and during its EU presidency (in 
the first half of 1995) to inscribe this initiative on the EU’s agenda up to the inaugural 
1996 summit meeting in Bangkok.112
Yet, ASEM can also be read as a Commission or wider European initiative and
achievement, since Singapore was responding (as we saw in Part II of this chapter), to
the Commission’s “New Asia Strategy” paper of that summer, itself inspired by
1 11Germany’s 1993 “Asian policy”. Therein lies the rub: where exactly does the 
“national” end and the “European” begin in the foreign policies emanating from western 
Europe? Even foreign leaders implicitly acknowledge the mixed nature of European 
foreign policy-making today by de rigeur including Brussels (and the capital of the 
member state holding the rotating EU presidency) in their European tours, and making 
their big proposals at both European and national levels.
One could argue that East Asia is in the 1990s was exceptional because of the 
need to leverage on the larger political and institutional resources of the EU in such a 
large and diverse region -  something beyond the resources of any EU member state 
acting alone. As France had in recent times a relatively low economic and political 
profile, French and EU objectives overlapped on most issues out of necessity and this 
overlap was coincidental and cannot be expected to be permanent. I would argue that 
serious differences (in goals, means and approaches) did exist, but that EU actors were 
forced by EFP procedures and external expectations to work out these differences and to 
try to reach common positions, if sometimes only compromise positions that lack
112 Michael Leifer, “Europe and Southeast Asia”, in Maull 1998:199 and MAE, “La France et 1’Europe en 
Asie”.
113 See also Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC), The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia- 
Europe Cooperation, Tokyo: CAEC, 1997.
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conviction and commitment. The most evident of these differences was on human rights 
(which we shall see in greater details in later chapters), where France was at variance 
with the mainstream of EU opinion. In the 1990s, France put economic interests as a 
primary objective in East Asia, buttressed by closer political and security relations with 
East Asian states. Human rights came a poor third in the French scheme of things. In 
contrast, the general mood and trend in the EU was for a more assertive CFSP and 
human rights stance in the world, including East Asia. For the Commission, the 
European Parliament and several EU member states such as the Netherlands and 
Denmark, human rights were a critical objective just below, if not equal, to the 
economic objective. Political considerations came in third as many member states did 
not see the need to engage East Asian countries, aside from Japan, on an equal footing.
By and large, however, the vast majority of interests identified in Paris in the 
1990s were similar to those defined in Bonn/Berlin, London, Rome or Brussels. First, 
France, Germany, Britain and the Commission were interested in the economic 
opportunities offered by East Asian countries. This economic imperative was made 
clear in the Commission’s 1994 and 2001 NAS papers and reaffirmed in the slew of 
Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs) concerning eg. China, Japan, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, ASEM and ASEAN) from 1995. Second, the leaders of EU 
member states were becoming convinced of the need for Europe to be engaged in East 
Asia politically and strategically, both in multilateral fora such as ASEM, as well as 
bilateral dialogues between individual East Asian and EU countries. Third, human 
rights were being championed by several EU member states through EU structures. The 
Commission, the Parliament and several EU Presidencies (notably the Dutch and 
Danish) also took the initiative in the post-Cold War, post-Tiananmen era to champion 
human rights and attach political conditionalities in their aid and relations with East 
Asian countries. These three sets of objectives were shared by practically all EU 
member states (although intra-EU economic competition and quarrels over human rights 
approaches were evident in countries like China), whose leaders are devoting more time 
and attention to the whole Asian region. The rise of Asia’s political profile in Europe - 
noted in a research paper by a senior Quai d’Orsay official assessing France’s Asia 
policy from 1995 to 2002 - is evident in the increased number of visits to the region by 
the leaders of the four largest Member States (Tables 3.4a and 3.4b).
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Table 3.4a: Visits of French, British, German and Italian Heads of State/Government to Asia
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2001 2002  01 .01- 
30.04
France 0 C h irac: 2 (9d) 
Singapore 
Thailand 
(ASEM ) 
Japan
C h ira c: 3 (7d) 
China 
M alaysia  
Vietnam
C h ira c : 2 (5d) 
India 
Japan 
Jospin : 1 (3d) 
China HK
J o sp in : 1 (3d) 
Japan
C h ira c : 2  (6d) 
Japan 
South Korea 
(+A SE M ) 
China
0 0
United
Kingdom
0 M ajor: 1 (6d) 
Thailand 
(ASEM ) 
Korea HK
M ajor: 1 (6d) 
India 
Bangladesh  
Pakistan 
Blair 1 (Id )  
HK  
(retrocession)
Blair 2 (lOd) 
Japan 
China HK
0 B la ir : 1 (3d) 
Korea 
(A SE M )
B la ir : 1 
(2d) 
Pakistan 
India
B la ir : 1 (6d) 
Bangladesh  
India 
Afghanistan  
Pakistan
Germany K o h l: 1 (lO d) 
China  
Vietnam  
Singapore
Kohl : 2 (1 2 d )  
Thailand 
(ASEM ) 
Indonesia  
Philippines 
Japan
Kohl : 1 (4d) 
Brunei HK
0 Schroeder: 2  
(8d) China  
Japan
S ch roed er: 1 
(3d) South  
Korea 
(A SE M )
Sch ro ed er: 
1 (6d) 
Pakistan  
India China
0
Italy 0 Dini : 1 (3d) 
Thailand 
(ASEM )
P ro d i: 2 (12d) 
China 
South Korea 
Indonesia  
Singapore 
Philippines 
Japan
Prodi 1 (4d) 
India 
Bangladesh
0 A m a to : 1 
(3d) South  
Korea  
(A SE M )
A m a to : 1 
(3d) 
C hina
0
Table 3.4b: Visits of French, British, German and Italian Foreign Ministers to Asia
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
01 .01-
30.04
France 0 Charette :3 (12d) 
China HK  
Indonesia 
Japan
C harette: 1 (3d) 
Singapore  
(A SE A N  & ASEM )
V ed rin e: 1 
(2d) 
China HK
0 V ddrin e: 2  (5d) 
India 
Philippines 
China
V e d r in e : 2 
(4d) 
China  
(A SE M ) 
India 
Pakistan
V ddrin e: I 
(Id ) 
Afghanista  
n
United
Kingdom
Hurd : 1 (8d) 
Bangladesh  
India Pakistan
Rifkind : 3  (1 8d) 
HK China 
Pakistan India 
Sri Lanka Japan 
Mongolia, 
Vietnam
Rifkind : 1 (3d) 
Singapore 
(A SE A N  & ASEM ) 
C o o k : 1 (lO d) 
Indonesia M alaysia  
Singapore 
Philippines
C o o k : 1 
(4d) 
China
C o o k : 1 
(2d) 
Japan
C o o k : I (6d) 
India Thailand  
Nepal
Straw : 1 
(2d) 
Pakistan
S tra w : 2 
(2d) 
Afghanista  
n India
Germany K in k e l: 1 
(5d)Japan  
Cam bodia
K in k e l: 1 (6d) 
China  
M ongolia
K in k e l: 4 (14d) 
M alaysia India 
Singapore 
(A SE A N  & ASEM ) 
HK (retrocession) 
Thailand 
South Korea 
Japan
0 0 Fischer: 5 (1 6 d ):  
India Philippines 
Thailand Japan 
South Korea  
Indonesia  
Singapore C hina
Fischer :2 
(4d) 
China  
(A SE M ) 
Pakistan
0
Italy A gnelli : 2 
(4d) 
India (with 
President 
Scalfaro) 
Indonesia
A g n e lli: 1 (2d) 
India 
Dini : 1 (8d) 
China 
South Korea
D in i: 3 (12d) 
Singapore 
(A SE A N  & ASEM ) 
HK (retrocession) 
Japan 
China
0 0 Dini : 4  (12d) 
China  
North Korea 
Vietnam  
South Korea 
India 
China HK
D ini : 3 (6d) 
Singapore  
Japan 
China  
(+A SE M )
0
N.B. Multiple consecutive visits in several countries are counted as one visit; Visits made in the context o f a non- 
Asian multilateral meeting are not included - G8 in particular , neither are visits by Foreign Ministers accompanying 
their Heads o f State or Government in Table 3.4a.
Key: (jc d) = visit lasting x days; HK = Hong Kong; the annotation (ASEM) after a name = the minister visited the 
country to participate in an ASEM meeting; (+ASEM) = the minister made a bilateral visit in addition to participating 
in an ASEM meeting.
Source: Based on Rene Dorient, “Un septennat de politique asiatique: quel bilan pour la France?”, Politique 
Etrangere, 1/2002, 2002.
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The inter-connectedness of both national and EU policies exerts a homogenising 
effect in both directions. Even the Quai d’Orsay, one of the last bastions of Gaullist 
national independence, observes that France’s “nouvelle frontiere” Asia policy since 
1993 is closely related to the EU’s 1994 “New Asia Strategy”. Its statement explaining 
France’s Asia policy notes that this rests on three pillars: bilateral partnerships (of 
which the bilateral agreements signed with China, Japan and India in 1996-98 are the 
most significant); collective “European action”; and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
dialogue process.114 Although the first aspect is indicative of continuing Gaullist 
presumptions of bilateral “special relationships”, security cooperation and partnerships 
with Asia’s great powers, even this is closely related to the EU’s objectives and interests 
defined in the Commission’s series of country strategy papers for each of these states 
from 1995.
Conclusions
Habits of cooperation, consultation and coordination on common EU policy in 
the East Asian region are relatively new and not well established. Even so, the general 
overview above suggests that France’s East Asia policy has undergone convergence 
with other EU states and the Commission. France adapted its economic strategy from 
1993 in China and the greater East Asia region under the impetus of the strategic 
initiatives launched by Germany, Britain and the Commission. Although on human 
rights France changed from being a hardline member state in 1989 to a conciliatory 
“constructive dialogue” position on Myanmar, Indonesia and China, it has always 
defended its actions in the larger “EU interest” and sought to negotiate compromise 
positions with its EU critics.
Most of the examples above and in the case study chapters to follow may lead to 
the interpretation of EU foreign policy as an agent of change, with French policy often 
having to adjust to policies made in Brussels. Indeed, had the EU not existed, the 
incentives for France to seek compromises or allies to narrow differences of interests 
between itself and other member states, would have been far weaker. This counter- 
factual can be readily applied to the 1997 French defection from the common position
114 Ministere des Affairs Etrangeres (MAE), “La France et l’Europe en Asie”, updated 20 January 2003, 
on http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp7ARTK31657.
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on human rights policy vis-a-vis China, then convergence from 1998 with the EU 
mainstream position debated at the Council. Similarly, French protectionist policies 
towards Japan would have probably lasted longer without the moderating effects of the 
Commission in the early 1990s.
On the other hand, EU foreign policy is not always a straightforward 
independent variable affecting national foreign policies. The national representatives of 
Member States are deeply involved, through Commission and Council deliberations, in 
the formulation of EU policies. Thus, national interests are aired and national 
representatives often seek concessions and safeguards in accepting Commission-led 
decisions, eg. on the WTO positions taken at the Uruguay Round, or agreement to lift 
import quotas on Japanese cars.
National and collective EU foreign polices are thus related in a process of 
continuous and mutual adjustment, with both acting at different times as dependent or 
causal variables. What is conceived as eg., “French”, “German” or “Dutch” foreign 
policy is often perceived by the target state to be representative of “Europe” as a whole. 
Where dissonance between the “national” and the “European” occurs, the target state 
has often taken advantage of national rivalries within the EU until member states closed 
ranks on the common objectives, policies and actions to take on particular issues in 
particular areas of the world. This closing of ranks is a process symptomatic of the 
Europeanization of national foreign policies, especially Dimension I (national 
adaptation and policy convergence). This Europeanization process takes place in an 
increasingly coordinated and normative - if by no means always smooth or harmonious 
- environment of inter-state and inter-elite interaction for the general “European good”. 
This was most stark when the French approach on the trade-human rights linkage 
(which we shall see in later chapters) was at variance with the mainstream of EU 
objectives.
Increasingly, French objectives and foreign policy in East Asia cannot be easily 
separated from EU objectives and foreign policy, ie. they are fundamentally and 
inextricably enmeshed as part of Europe’s “External Relations System”, as part of
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European Foreign Policy (EFP).115 What were the extent and limit of Europeanization? 
Were they a top-down or bottom-up process, or did this vary from issue to issue and 
from country to country? The next three chapters will examine in detail in the country 
studies of China, Vietnam and Japan, the impact of EU institutions on French national 
foreign policies, the extent to which French policies in these countries have been 
Europeanised, and the reasons for variations across countries and issue areas.
1I5Following Christopher Hill’s “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
International Role”, J C M S 3 \/\, 1993, pp.306-328.
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Chapter Four
China
A Gaullist Partner?
China is today the key country in France’s and the EU’s Asia policy. It is not 
only the most populous country on earth, but boasts the fastest growing major economy 
and is seen as economically, politically, militarily and even culturally strategic to 
French interests. Many post-1964 analyses have tended to privilege the “Gaullist” 
interpretation (see chapter three) of French objectives and policies with regard to China. 
Some scholars even see it in terms of a “special relationship” of two medium, 
independent powers with China as a fast-rising power.1 Gaullist French foreign policy 
is characterized by a pronounced national independence, and activism in foreign affairs. 
There is an abiding desire to maintain rank with the major world powers, to preserve an 
equilibrium among blocs of states, and to pursue a policy of active involvement, if not
'y
intervention around the world . Often France is prepared to “go it alone” if its partners 
(whether EU or other Western allies) are thought to be “out of step”. Recent French 
academic and policy-makers’references to the US as an “hyper-puissance” that needs to 
be balanced by other powers -  in particular the EU and China -have updated this 
essentially Gaullist perspective in which China is perceived as the most promising, if 
not sole rising power capable of challenging continued US hegemony in the 21st 
century.4
A second, related perspective explains French policy in China as being driven by 
essentially “low politics” economic motives. The economic explanations portray China 
as a vast economic opportunity and potential market of over one billion consumers. In 
this “Eldorado” image, China is a colossal market for French goods and services. This
‘See Alain Peyrefitte’s La Chine s ’est eveillee, Paris: Omnibus, 1997, and Quand la Chine s ’eveillera...le 
monde tremblera, Paris: Fayard, 1973; also Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance 
vs. Economic Reality”, in The Pacific Review, 7/3, 1994; and Bridges and Domenach, “Challenges in 
Asia”, in La Serre, Leruez and Wallace (eds), French and British Policies in Transition: The Challenge o f  
Adjustment, London: RIIA, 1990, pp. 186-87.
2 Stanley Hoffmann, “La France face a son image”, Politique Etrangere, 51, 1986, pp.25-53; Alfred 
Grosser, Affaires Exterieures: La politique de la France, 1944-1984, Paris: Flammarion, 1984, p. 195.
3 Mark Wise, “France and European Unity”, in Aldrich and Connell (eds), France in World Politics,
London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p.39.
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perspective tends to explain French policies towards China as short-term and overly 
dependent on the personalities of the leaders involved, principally in the attitude of the 
French President. Such an explanation argues that in the 1980s and 1990s, bilateral 
relations underwent severe swings under the presidencies of Mitterrand and Chirac 
because these leaders brought to bear idiosyncratic values, assumptions and goals vis-a- 
vis China in the pursuit of short-term (essentially economic) goals5. On the flip side of 
China as an economic opportunity and the challenge of re-establishing an active French 
economic presence in the country, is the image of China as an economic threat and the 
challenges of coping with the penetration of Chinese exports.6
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Source: CIA, The World Factbook 2003, on 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.htmK as of 1 August 2003.
4 See Hubert Vedrine, (1998), “De l’utilite de la France”, (Interview with Foreign Minister Hubert 
Vedrine) in Politique Internationale 78, 1998, pp.41-64; and “Hubert Vedrine, France’s voice in the 
world”, Economist 11 November 2000, p.74.
5 Francis Godement, “Une politique fran^aise pour l’Asie-Pacifique?”, Politique Etrangere, 4/95; Aron 
Shai, The fate o f  British and French Firms in China, 1949-54: imperialism imprisoned, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1996.
6 Bridges and Domenach, p.175; Eric Choi, “Chine: on s’est trompe d’eldorado”, L ’Express, no.2678, 31 
October-6 November 2002, pp.72-77; and Godement 95.
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Which perspective better explains the record and evolution of French policy in 
the 1990s? In the 1900s, the economic explanation replaced the Gaullist perspective as 
the dominant account of French and policy in East Asia, and in China in particular.7 
French policy is often explained as being inspired by French mercantilist ambitions in a 
rapidly growing China whose economy quadrupled in size between 1978 and 1995. 
However, this economic account by itself is too one-dimensional and does not capture a 
complex relationship that included major disagreements over, inter alia, human rights, 
strategic arms sales to Taiwan, and the appropriate security role of France and EU states 
in East Asia. This chapter proposes that a more accurate understanding of French (and 
EU) objectives and policies in East Asia necessitates analysing the multiple facets and 
inter-relationship of the economic, political and human rights objectives of the East 
Asian region to French and EU interests. This chapter discusses these three domains 
after a short history of French perceptions of and relations with China up to de Gaulle’s 
diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1964. The key argument is that the national, 
Gaullist perspective still provides a compelling general explanation for French attitudes 
and policies towards China. However, French policy-makers’ manoeuvring space is 
continually being challenged by Europeanization pressures which undercut French 
leaders’ powers, and shape their preferences and options. This is especially so in the 
case of human rights, but is also evident in trade and economics, and encroaches on 
French political and strategic interests in China.
From Enlightenment Fascination to Contempt and Anti-Communism
First, a short history of French contacts with China up to Mao’s establishment of 
the communist People’s Republic of China in 1949 is in order. French attitudes towards 
China have mixed fascination with fear, adulation with loathing. French intellectuals 
have long tended to form a “utopian image” of a China in which the similarities of a 
strong and centralized monarchy, its old bureaucratic system, and its agrarian sector
Q .1
were highlighted. The first official contacts were in the middle of the 13 century, 
when King Louis XIII and the Pope tried to convince the Mongol Empire to fight
7 Godement 95; Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality”, in 
The Pacific Review, 7/3, 1994, pp.341-348; and Miguel Santos Neves, “Towards a Common China Policy 
for the EU: a Portuguese Perspective”, in Richard Grant (ed), The European Union and China: A 
European Strategy fo r the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge/RIIA, 1995.
8 For an analysis o f the role o f French physiocrats in shaping idealised Western images o f China, see 
Rupert Hodder, “China and the World: perception and analysis”, The Pacific Review 12/1, 1999, p.61-65.
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against the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor.9 The popularity of China as a philosophical 
subject began only five centuries later with the “rediscovery” of China by the Jesuits. 
French elites have for over two centuries been fascinated by China. French 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire and Rousseau idealized China for its 
centralized control, bureaucracy, arts and literature. Napoleon had famously predicted 
that “when China awakes, the world will tremble”.10
Most eighteenth-century French Enlightenment attitudes towards China were 
informed by positive writings and images propagated by Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci 
(who lived in Ming China from 1583-1610). For centuries, the chief “sinologists” in 
Europe were clerics and missionaries, whose works were the predominant sources 
available to European scholars and philosophers to “think China”. At a time when 
French society was dealing with major social and political changes, with the intellectual 
class pitted against the monarchy and the Church, China represented an idealized world, 
rich in dogmas and religions yet secular. Voltaire recommended the emulation of China 
to fight the dominance of the Catholic Church. La Description de I ’Empire de la Chine 
et de la Tartarie chinoise (1735), a four-volume work by Jean-Baptiste Du Halde, 
reflected this period. 1750 is usually taken as the turning point in which sinophobia 
replaced sinophilie, when the writings of voyagers and traders portraying a despotic 
China became dominant.11 Montesquieu invented the phrase “Chinese despotism” in 
1748, and F rancis Quesnay developed this image in his Le despotisme de la Chine 
(1767). Diderot cast doubts on China as a model and its prospects for positive evolution; 
Rousseau criticized “the autocratic Chinese system”.12 McCartney’s 1793 mission to the 
Qing court under Emperor Qian Long aroused much fascination in its failure to open a 
formal diplomatic mission and trading relations between Britain and China. After the 
French Revolution, while Chinese arts and paintings continued to fascinate the French, 
China’s feudal system became began to look more and more antiquated.
9 See Godement and Serra, “French Policy towards China: A Redefinition”, in Santos, Neves and Bridges 
(eds), Europe, China and the two SARs: Towards a New Era, London: Macmillan Press, 2000, p.4. About 
100 French missionaries were dispatched to China after France received confirmation o f the existence of 
the Silk Road and o f China.
10 This inspired the title o f former Gaullist minister Alain Peyrefitte’s best-selling book (over a million 
copies sold) on France’s relations with China under de Gaulle, and perspectives on the country, Quand la 
Chine s'eveillera...le monde tremblera, Paris: Fayard, 1973.
11 Michel Cartier (ed), La Chine entre amour et haine, Paris: Desctee de Brouwer, 1998, pp.7-14. 
Commodore Anson’s Voyage around the world in 1740-44 (published 1748).
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By the second half of the 19th century, fascination for China was replaced by a 
sense of contempt for the Qing court’s inability to modernize, especially when 
compared with Japan. Intra-European competition for lucrative trading privileges in 
China led to a scramble for “concessions”. French incursions into a weakening Chinese 
empire followed the British pattern of exacting territorial concessions after the First 
Opium War (1840-42), by which Hong Kong was ceded. France joined Britain in the 
Second Opium War (1858-60), and at the same time strengthened its position in 
Indochina by invading Vietnam in 1858. Shortly after capturing Saigon, the French 
colony of Cochinchina was established in south Vietnam in 1863, together with a 
protectorate over Cambodia (Chapter Six). Following the Second Opium War, a French 
legation was established in Shanghai in 1860, and France gained concessions in Canton 
and Tianjin (1861). The French were also active in the southern Chinese provinces 
bordering or near Tonkin in north Vietnam: Yunnan (for opium cultivation), Guangxi 
and Guangdong (for overland and maritime trade), as well as shipbuilding in Fuzhou, 
Fujian. Meanwhile moves to extend French influence northwards of Cochinchina into 
Annam precipitated conflict with China, which considered Annam a tributary state. In 
the 1885 Franco-Chinese war, the French destroyed in just 40 minutes the entire
Chinese navy of 11 warships at Fuzhou -  ironically a navy which the French had helped
• 1 ^  to build since 1869 at the then-largest shipbuilding dock in China. Tonkin was
recognized as a French protectorate by China in the 1885 Tianjin Treaty. By 1893, the
French had consolidated French Indochina, and acquired a secure coastal trading route
on top of the Mekong route into China by incorporating Annam and Laos.
At the dawn of the 20th century, French policies had nurtured a perception in 
China of France as another rapacious, Western colonial power. Like Britain, France had 
imposed unequal treaties, carved out colonial concessions and exacted indemnities on 
China following the Opium Wars, the 1885 Franco-Chinese war and the 1896-1900 
Boxer Rebellion. France was one of the eight allied powers in the 1900 siege of 
Peking14 that yielded a major French concession in Shanghai. Finally, the French
12 Godement and Sena 2000, p.5.
13 Christophe Dubois, “L’Arsenal de Fuzhou et la Presence militaire fran?aise au Fujian (1869-1911)”, in 
Jacques Weber (ed.), La France en Chine, 1843-1943, Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1997, pp.91-102. See also 
Yoshiharu Tsuboi', L 'Empire Vietnamien face a la France et a la Chine, 1847-1885, Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1987.
14 The others were Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, Italy, the US and Austria. A French Occupying 
power was present in China (mainly in Peking and Shanghai) until 1945. See Amaury Venon, “La
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military alliance with Russia (1894-1914)15 served to complicate the relationship 
between France and China, as Tsarist Russia’s territorial expansion eastwards had been 
accelerating in the 19th century at China’s expense. In 1943, de Gaulle in the name of 
Free France announced the termination of France’s traditional privileges in Shanghai 
and their relinquishment to Chiang Kai-shek. By 28 February 1946, a treaty renouncing 
French extraterritorial rights in China was signed by France and Chiang’s Republic of 
China.16 When the Communists established control over mainland China in 1949, a 
large proportion of the French companies active in China (centred in Shanghai) were 
still involved in public utilities and banking, the very sectors in which the new
• , 1*7
Communist regime was determined to take direct and immediate control. While the 
new Chinese regime made attempts to take over French enterprises at an early stage 
between 1949 and 1954, Beijing did not attempt outright confiscation as it was still 
interested in trading with France.
The Gaullist legacy in France-China relations
The essential elements of General de Gaulle’s national security doctrine and 
foreign policy were national independence in decision-making, a search for grandeur 
and rank, and the primacy of the nation-state. These three elements combined into 
foreign policy behaviour that included a persistent refusal to accept subordination to the
|  o
US, and an emphasis on an independent national defence. This “Gaullist” foreign 
policy emphasised national grandeur and an independent role for France in world 
affairs. Similarly, China in the 1960s had been disappointed by its troubled alliance 
with the Soviet Union. China desired prestige and status as a great power in its own 
right, and began to adopt defence and foreign policies independent of Soviet tutelage. 
Mao welcomed closer relations with the country which had introduced many of China’s 
leaders to Marxism, and whose revolutionary past had served as a model for the Chinese
des Boxers et Ie Corps franfais d’occupation de Chine (1901-45)”, in Weber (ed.), La France en Chine, 
1843-1943, pp. 145-159.
15 Anne Hoegenhuis-Seliverstoff, JJne Alliance Franco-Russe: la France, la Russie et VEurope au 
tournant du siecle dernier, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997.
16 Shai 96:88; Francois Chabot, “La fin de la presence politique franfaise k Shanghai (1937-1943)”, in 
Weber (ed.), La France en Chine, 1843-1943, pp.233-45.
17 Shai 96:87.
18 Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea o f France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, p.3 and Epilogue.
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Revolution (some had taken the Paris Commune as a model).19 From 1919 to 1924, 
over one thousand young Chinese students went to France on the “work and study” 
movement.20 There they became acquainted with the seamy underside of industrial 
capitalism while studying the French revolution. Among them were men who later 
assumed top leadership positions in communist China: Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Deng 
Xiaoping and Wang Ruofei.
As the first major Western country to exchange Ambassadors with the People’s 
Republic of China (full diplomatic relations were established in 1964),21 when the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) still occupied a permanent seat in the Security Council, 
France portrayed itself as laying the foundations for a special political relationship with 
China. The conventional wisdom on France-China relations is that during the Cold War 
they were founded on a conjunction of Gaullist and Chinese ambitions to be
99independent from the two superpowers, and that this understanding unravelled with 
the end of the Cold War. Patricia Wellon argues that de Gaulle and Mao were brought 
together by a convergence of worldviews and a shared desire for their countries to 
become strong and independent powers. This action was a symbolic gesture to underline 
French ambitions to act independently of the United States.23 I would add that it also 
underlined the mood of that time: French and Chinese leaders felt they had “arrived” as 
full-fledged great-powers with indigenously developed atomic weapons (in 1960 and 
1962 respectively) and the prestige then associated to nuclear-power status.24 De Gaulle 
himself alluded to the demographic, cultural, and strategic weight of China as the 
“weight of evidence and of reason” in his 1964 press conference announcing the
19 Le Monde, 7 June 1964. Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were the most important personalities among 
this generation o f Chinese leaders which had studied or worked in France.
20 See Frederic Girard, “Les Etudiants Chinois en France, 1919-1937”, in Jacques Weber (ed.), La France 
en Chine, 1843-1943, Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1997, pp. 119-128
21 Britain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries had recognized China in 1950. However 
London and Beijing exchanged only Charges d’Affaires in 1954; following Nixon’s visit to China, 
ambassadors were appointed in 1972 (the year West Germany established diplomatic relations with 
China). See David Shambaugh, China and Europe, London: Contemporary China Institute, SOAS, 1996.
22 Alain Peyrefitte, Quandla Chine s ’eveillera...le monde tremblera, Paris: Fayard, 1973.
23 Overtures towards the Soviet Union in 1959 and France leaving the NATO integrated command 
structure in 1966 were the more obvious gestures. See Charles G. Cogan, Oldest Allies, Guarded 
Friends: The United States and France since 1940, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994; Wellons 94.
24 See Avery Goldstein’s Deterrence and Security in the 21s' century: China, Britain, France and the 
enduring legacy o f  the Nuclear Revolution, Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000 for an analysis o f nuclear 
thinking in France and China.
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25establishment of diplomatic relations with China as reasons to recognize the PRC. 
From the Chinese perspective, diplomatic relations with France were a breaching of the 
wall of US-led Western sanctions, and a welcome European ally in the context of tense
relations with the USSR. The stress on political relations with “Europe” was thus biased
• 26towards France, the politically dominant member of the original EC-6.
In practice, as Franchise Mengin elegantly argues, there was no coherent French
policy on China for 30 years. The ziz-zags in the France-China relationship up to 1994
•  11  •were symptomatic of de Gaulle’s effective “One China-One Taiwan” policy. First, de 
Gaulle’s attitude towards China was complicated by his friendship with and respect for 
Chiang Kai-shek, leader of Nationalist China since 1935 whose Kuomintang forces had 
fled to Taiwan in 1949 after a bloody civil war with Mao’s Communists. After the 
formal establishment of the People’s Republic of China on mainland China in October 
1949, Paris had decided to adopt the American policy of recognizing Chiang Kai-shek 
and not Mao Zedong as China’s legitimate national leader (as opposed to Britain which 
recognized Mao’s PRC in 1950). The close links between France and Taiwan continued 
after 1964 and continue to be an issue in France-China relations.
I Trade and Investment Relations
France had severely scaled back its presence in China since French firms began 
closing their operations in the early years of the Communist regime. Unlike the 
British who held on to their strategic colony of Hong Kong and continued actively 
trading with China after Mao’s Communist forces took control of the government of 
China (excepting the island of Taiwan) in 1949, French economic presence in China 
declined drastically in 1949 and especially after the French colonial retreat from 
Vietnam in 1954.29 Despite the fillip to political relations after the 1964 French 
diplomatic recognition of China and the exchange of ambassadors under de Gaulle and
25 Charles de Gaulle: Discours et Messages vers le terme janvier 1964-decembre 1965, Paris: Plon, 1970. 
See also Peyrefitte 97:285.
26 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. See Kunming Liao, La Politique 
de la Republique populaire de Chine a Regard de VEurope occidentale, Ph.D thesis, Institut d’etudes 
politiques, Paris, 1989, p.8
7 See Fran?oise Mengin, “Relations France-Chine, quel anniversaire s’agit-il de celebrer?”, in Relations 
Internationales et Strategiques, 14, £te 1994, pp.29-34.
28 Shai 96, ch.6.
29 Shai, The fa te  o f British and French Firms in China, 1949-54im perialism  Imprisoned, 1996.
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Mao, economic relations were not significantly boosted.30 Since China’s opening in 
1978 under Deng Xiaoping, Germany, Britain and Italy moved to make China a priority 
and have dominated the top tables of EU trade exchanges with China (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 EU Trade with China (Percentage shares of largest EU Traders)
Exports___________________  Imports
1978 1988 1989 1992 1993 1978 1988 1989 1992 1993
Germany 52.1 41.1 35.6 42.7 43.0 30.2 31.9 33.7 38.5 40.1
Italy 9.8 19.2 17.9 17.1 18.3 16.4 18.5 18.4 14.3 12.5
UK 9.2 10.8 9.9 8.6 8.3 17.6 10.2 9.5 8.6 9.6
France 10.4 13.7 22.5 16.1 11.9 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.0 17.7
Source: Richard Grant, (ed), The European Union and China: A European Strategy fo r  the Twenty-First 
Century, London: Routledge/RIIA, 1995. p.93. NB: Figures for the UK above are artificially low as they 
exclude trans-shipment trade through Hong Kong.
What were the perceived interests and strategies adopted by French governments 
in their economic relations with China in the 1980s and 1990s, and to what extent have 
these objectives succeeded or been moderated by larger foreign policy objectives or 
European-level interests? Three sets of factors seem to perpetuate a continued weak 
French presence in the China market.
First, since Deng’s reforms, attempts to increase French economic presence in 
China have been predominantly driven by singular large-scale grands contrats signed 
by the French and Chinese governments. French economic initiatives tended to be 
launched in fits and starts, and have failed to coax small and medium sized French 
enterprises out of their caution in making investments in China. Unlike their British and 
German counterparts, French businesses are generally unconvinced of the wisdom of 
making China a priority country in their international or even regional (ie. Asian) 
strategies. As of 2002, China is still a second-tier recipient of French FDI, receiving far 
less French FDI than the other EU member states’ economies, the US and even 
Singapore.
Second, French economic initiatives in China tend to shadow policies 
spearheaded by Germany, and to a lesser extent Britain and the European Commission. 
French governments have made a strong political push to “catch up with the Germans” 
and have tried copying the “German Model” of strong economic and political relations
30 Shai, British and French Firms in China, 96; and Wellons 94.
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with China. Unlike Germany, however, the social effects of French companies moving 
production overseas and human rights questions - championed by the French media, 
civil rights and academic circles since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 - continue to 
dog economic relations and the large-scale transfer of French production to China.
Third, French economic policies in China are hamstrung by domestic politics 
and by competing industrial interests. This is no doubt true of French economic 
strategies in the rest of Asia (see chapter three) but they are worsened in the case of 
China as a result of especially strong pressures on French government exerted by high- 
tech French military industries -  which finds a lucrative market in Taiwan -  and the 
demands of aerospace, infrastructure and communications industries, which find in
o i
China their most important potential market.
a) The French lag and caution in China
The first set of reasons behind the comparatively weak French economic 
presence in China is the lack of French business confidence in profitability and China’s 
continued long-term stability. There is in France a deeply rooted tradition of scepticism 
regarding the vitality and future of the Chinese economy, and regular predictions of an 
imminent economic catastrophe each time China meets a difficulty. French economic 
analyses on China tend to advocate a prudent attitude because of the “state of transition 
of China’s economic framework, whose outlines remain vague, particularly with respect 
to legislation on foreign investments which fluctuate greatly, and whose organization is 
marked with divisions, or even contradictions.”33 French businesses that went into 
China soon after its opening in 1978 discovered that the promise of a vast potential 
market was taking many years to realize. China would become a great exporting nation 
before it became a nation of consumers for French-made luxury products such as cars, 
perfumes and wines.34 According to a Chinese marketing study, the number of Chinese 
consumers able to buy goods that are imported or produced in Sino-foreign joint-
31 Godement 95.
32 R. Guillan, Dans trente ans la Chine, Paris: Seuil, 1965; J. Hubler, and PX Meschi, “European direct 
investment in China and Sino-French joint ventures”, Asia Pacific Business Review, Spring 2001, Vol.7, 
No.3, p.157.
33 Hubler and Meschi, “European direct investment in China and Sino-French joint ventures”, p.l 58.
34 Eric Choi, “Chine: on s ’est tromp£ d’eldorado”, pp.72-77
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*1 c
venture companies is just over 60 million, around 5% of the population. French 
businesses would have to be prepared to stay the long term in China before they could 
turn a profit.
Bilateral trade has been dominated by singular grands contrats, often political in 
character and hostage to fluctuating political relations. For example, in 1981-83 French 
agricultural exports - primarily wheat - increased dramatically to constitute one-third of
• j /
all French exports to China, but then collapsed to less than 2% in 1984. During the 
first term of the Mitterrand presidency (1981-88), French governments did not consider 
China a priority but instead focused efforts in the rapidly growing Asian region on
n n
Taiwan , Japan and the Asian NICs. By the end of the 1980s, the French presence in
aL
the Chinese market was under-sized compared to its status as the world’s 4 largest 
exporter, accounting for 6% of world trade. In the mid-1990s, French economic and 
trade relations with China were criticized by the Chinese for being short-sighted, by 
other EU member states for being mercantilist and anti-European38, by French 
sinologists as unprincipled for consigning human rights to secondary importance39, and 
by economists as lacking in foresight, staying power and adaptability to local business 
culture.40 Meanwhile attempts made in concert with the Commission and under the EU 
umbrella have been more successful in delivering the appropriate market-opening 
responses from China. One logical step taken by France was to work under the EU 
umbrella in order to promote national economic objectives in China.
Levels of French-Chinese trade and investment have been disappointing in 
relation not only to French economic objectives, but also to the traditional strong French 
presence in Vietnam (chapter six), the large and bold French investments in Japan
35 G. Cui, “Qui sont les consommateurs chinois”, Problemes Economiques, No.2557, 1998, p.26, cited in 
Hubler and Meschi, p. 168.
36 Gilles Guiheux, France-China Economic Relations since 1979: Assessment, Policies, Debates, paper 
presented at the conference “The Role o f France and Germany in Sino-European Relations” Hong Kong, 
22-23 June 2001, p.5f, as cited in Markus Taube, “Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of 
Europe”, in China Quarterly, No. 169, March 2002, p.83.
37 Fran?oise Mengin, “Relations France-Chine, Quel Anniversaire s’agit-il de c&ebrer?”, in Relations 
Internationales et Strategiques, 14, Summer 1994, pp.29-34 and “The Prospects for France-Taiwan 
Relations”, in Issues and Studies, 28/3, March 1992.
38 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Paris-Pdkin: Un Dialogue sans Complexes?”, in Politique Internationale,!5, 
Spring 1997, pp.335-352.
39 Bridges and Domenach 1990, op cit.; Domenach, “Paris-P^kin, un axe k Redessiner”, in Liberation, 20 
October 2000; Marie Holzman, “Chine: Requiem pour les droits de l’homme”, Politique Internationale, 
pintemps 1997, pp.369-83
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(chapter five) after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the inroads made by Germany 
and Britain in China. In 1993, while Europe occupied some 14% of the China market, 
the French share was miniscule (1.4%), behind that of Germany, Britain, Italy and even 
the Netherlands. French exports to China amounted to less than one-third of the 
German level in 1993 (Table 4.1). The French government under Balladur in 1994 thus 
set itself a clear objective to recover its pre-Tiananmen share of the Chinese market and 
to catch up with the other EU countries.
The negative experience of flagship Sino-French joint ventures has also coloured 
French business attitudes and reactions to direct investments in China. In contrast to the 
positive attitudes towards direct investment in China in Western countries such as the 
US and Germany, the French attitude tends to be cautious and negative. The Guangdong 
Peugeot Automobile Company (GPAC), which on its foundation in 1985 was one of the 
first major joint ventures between a Chinese and a foreign company, collapsed after 12 
years of losses when Peugeot sold its 22% interest in GPAC to Honda and withdrew 
from Gaungdong in 1997.41 Reasons for Peugeot’s losses included the wrong choice of 
province (Guangdong has no real industrial tradition) and the wrong Chinese partners 
(who faced conflicts with central authorities and could not keep accounts, distribute or 
market professionally). In 1996, Peugeot occupied only 1% of China’s small market for 
private cars whereas Volkswagen had cornered 50% of this market, with a virtual 
monopoly in Shanghai.42
From the French government’s perspective, China is one of the foci of French 
attempts to re-establish an economic presence in Asia. Various French governments 
since 1988 have tried different strategies to engage France in the rapidly growing Asian 
economies. The push has been to increase market share in Asia’s largest potential 
market, China, which was booming 10 years into the modernization programme 
launched by Deng Xiaoping. Under conservative governments in the 1990s, the French 
sought to translate the French position as the fourth largest exporter in the world to 
China, where it ranked as the 10th. French business interests were lured to the Chinese 
market by the stereotypical image of “Eldorado” -  a vast market and opportunity for
40 Hubler and Meschi, pp. 157-188.
41 Ibid., pp. 164-167.
42 Ibid., p. 166.
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French products requiring little effort to make a “fast buck”. Although bilateral trade 
has been growing strongly, French exports have stabilized at just over €3 billion since 
1997 while French imports from China have continued to grow at a brisk pace (Table 
4.2), resulting in an ever-widening trade deficit that reached a record €7.6 billion in 
2001, the largest trade deficit that France has with any extra-EU trading partner.
As in the 1980s when France was confronted by a rising tide of Japanese 
imports, the French have resorted to using the European card. They have worked 
through the Commission, eg. in demanding market access and negotiating hard for 
reciprocity in China’s accession to the WTO (in December 2001), and in pushing for 
common EU trade promotion programmes in China.
Table 4.2 French Trade with China, 1993-2001 (in Cmillion)
Year French Imports French Exports Trade Balance
1993 3281 1382 -1899
1994 3514 1827 -1687
1995 4045 2010 -2035
1996 4751 1891 -2860
1997 5942 3013 -2994
1998 6551 2967 -3584
1999 7731 3072 -4659
2000 10501 3227 -7274
2001 10928 3258 -7643
Source: French customs, in L ’Express, no.2678, 31 October-6 November 2002, p.77.
b) Copying or Europeanising the “German Model”?
In the mid-1990s, Germany alone accounted for nearly 40% of total EU trade 
with China, over twice as much as Britain, China’s second largest EU trading partner.43 
In China and the dynamic and important East Asian economies - Japan (chapter 5) and 
the NIEs of South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, the French share of each country’s 
trade was only 1-2% in the mid-1990s; this weak presence paled in comparison with 
that of Japan, the US, even Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, and in relation to the 
6% French share of global trade. In Asia, the French were active and successful only in
43 The total value of EU trade with China in 1994 was $46 billion. Germany’s share was $16.7 billion, 
UK, $6.7 billion (including trans-shipment through Hong Kong), France, $5.7 billion, Italy, $5.5 billion. 
Figures from Shambaugh, “China and Europe”, p.21.
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Indochina (chapter 6) and Taiwan. China was in the throes of economic semi-isolation 
during the Cultural Revolution and traded mainly with its Asian neighbours and 
countries in the Communist bloc.
Germany’s policy towards China since 1992 had been founded on three 
principles: silent diplomacy (and hence no confrontation on human rights); change 
through trade (premising political liberalization in China on economic development); 
and a strict “one-China” policy”.44 The success of the “German model” was evident in 
its enhanced trade position. German exports to China practically doubled between 1992 
and 1994, from DM5.7 billion to DM10.2 billion. The UK (+71%), Italy (+71%), 
Netherlands (+146%), Spain (+226%) also witnessed significant export growth to 
China. In contrast, French exports only grew 22%45 in the same period as a result of the 
double fallout of Tiananmen and Taiwan. After Tiananmen, it was Germany which 
most systematically and successfully depoliticised economic relations with China. 
Germany recognized the significance of Asian new markets when EC trade with East 
Asia overtook EC-US trade for the first time in 1992. Germany took the lead in 
formulating its “Asian policy” in October 1993. The central ideas of Germany’s Asian 
policy were “to strengthen economic relations with the largest growth region in the 
world”,46 restore high level visits to Beijing and stop applying pressure on human 
rights 47 In December 1993, Chancellor Kohl returned from a visit to China with a pile 
of contracts and letters of intent. A few months later, Bonn was the first Western capital 
to host a visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng, in spite of Li's close association with and
Aftresponsibility for the Tiananmen crackdown.
The success of the “German model” seems to have had a demonstrative effect on 
other EU countries’ policies. Michael Heseltine, the British Secretary for Trade and 
Industry, visited China in 1994 accompanied by 130 businessmen.49 The German model 
also influenced French willingness to deal with pragmatically with China. France-
44 See Christoph Nesshbver, “Bonn et Paris face k Pekin (1989-1997): vers une strategic commune?”, 
Politique Etrcmgere 1/99, p.95.
45 NesshOver, p.9.
46 German Asian Policy, Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Peking, 1993, p.5, as cited in 
Yahuda and Zhang, “Europe and China”, in Maull, Segal and Wanandi (eds), Europe and the Asia 
Pacific, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 194.
47 Cabestan, “Sino-Westem European Relations”, p.42.
48 Ibid, p.42.
49 Ibid, p.43.
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China relations were normalized and a joint France-China communique was issued in 
January 1994 during Prime Minister Bahadur’s visit. The 1994 communique 
committed France to recognise one China and to refrain from selling new arms to 
Taiwan. French Industry Minister Gerard Longuet followed this up by visiting Beijing 
and Hong Kong in mid-1994 to launch “Ten initiatives for Asia”.
In 1995, Foreign Minister Herve de Charette announced that Asia would receive 
special attention as the “nouvelle frontiere ” of French diplomacy. French leaders’ visits 
to China began to take on a pattern of political dialogue on international developments, 
accompanied by announcements of contract signatures. Chirac himself played an active 
role in promoting French exports and industries in China and announced the goal of 
tripling the French market share in China to 6% within ten years.50 During his May 
1997 state visit to China, Chirac was accompanied by some 200 French industrialists 
and CEOs. By some accounts this delegation was the largest group of French 
businessmen ever assembled for an overseas visit. In the event, the Chinese agreed to 
buy 30 new Airbuses worth $1.5 billion, and together with other contracts on power 
stations and car production, the visit resulted in $2 billion worth of contracts. The 
Department of External Economic Relations (DREE) in the French Ministry of 
Economy, Finances and Industry has since increased the number of officials working in 
its East Asian departments; the Ministry has also increased its activities promoting trade 
and spent much time consulting with Chinese and other Asian colleagues during the 
Asian crisis.51
China in the late 1990s became the developing world’s top recipient of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), and was for the first time ahead of the United States as the 
world’s top FDI recipient ($53 billion) in 2002.52 Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Japan, Singapore, the US and the EU are the top international investors in China. 
Among EU member states, Britain and Germany have been the most bullish on China. 
French companies have however not made China a priority and have exhibited a 
cautious attitude towards China. In 2001 China ranked only as the 33rd destination for
50 Le Monde, 28 February and 1 March 1996. Interviews with Quai d’Orsay officials, Paris, March 1996 
and Chinese Embassy in Paris, September 2000 confirmed the French determination to match the German 
presence in the China market.
51 Dorient 2002:180-81.
52 “Special Report on China’s Economy”, Economist 15 February 2003, p.75.
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French FDI (€180 million). This amount was far smaller than the French FDI flowing 
to Singapore (€1187 million, 15th position), and just ahead of Hong Kong (€123 million, 
37th) and India (€92 million, 41s').53
In contrast to the situation in Vietnam where France easily ranks among the 
(mostly East Asian) top investors and in the context of China where the EU’s economic 
presence is small in relation to its global economic strength, France trails Germany and 
Britain in cumulative investments. At the end of 2002, French cumulative investments 
in China only represented 1% of total FDI in China. It was the 8th largest investor in 
China, far behind Hong Kong (50%) and Taiwan, but also behind Japan, the US, 
Singapore, the UK (2.7%) and Germany (1.7%).54 French investments have been 
concentrated in three areas -  Shanghai (the traditional area of French interest), Beijing, 
and the southern province of Guangdong.55 The perceived link between relocating 
overseas and the loss of jobs remains strong in France. Mitterrand himself was critical 
of French companies moving to Asia.56 French companies remain reluctant to relocate 
from France to low-cost venues outside Europe, even China.
c) Taiwan and Competing Industrial interests
The third set of reasons for the weak French presence in China is the issue of 
Taiwan, and the related trade and investment disruption caused by competing industrial 
interests. Big infrastructure and transport companies such as Suez, Airbus and Alsthom 
lobby the French government to help them penetrate the China market while defence 
and high-technology companies such as Matra and Dassault press the government to 
favour Taiwan, one of their most important markets. French businesses interests in the 
latter camp seized upon the ambiguous Gaullist legacy on the question of Taiwan to 
concentrate French investment and export efforts (especially expensive military 
hardware sales) on Taiwan rather than China. This state of affairs, especially between
53 French Embassy Mission Economique de Pekin, Chine: Investissments Directs Etrangers et presence 
frangais, 1 September 2002 edition, p.2
54 French Embassy, Mission Economique de Pekin, Chine: lnvestissements directs etrangers, p.2, on 
www. dree. org/chine/infopavs. asp.
55 The French industrial presence in Guangdong is centred on a 15-year agreement in 1987 to build 
nuclear power generators in Daya Bay and Ling Ao, and in investments in the Special Economic Zone o f  
Shenzhen. See French Embassy, Mission Economique de P6kin, Investissments directs etrangers dans le 
Guangdong et presence economique frangaise en Chine du sud, 6 September 2002, p. 1
56 Dorient 2002.
108
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Four / China
1989 and 1993, led to Chinese reprisals that hurt the first camp, eg. excluding French 
firms from lucrative infrastructure contracts.
The French share of China’s total trade had declined between 1989 and 1993 as 
a result of the acrimony generated from French activism on Tiananmen and worsened 
following the 1992 sale of French arms to Taiwan. The Chinese took punitive 
diplomatic, political and economic measures against France. The economic 
consequences of Chinese reprisals contributed to a shrinking French share of the 
Chinese market.57 Although French exports to China continue to rise in absolute terms 
in 1993, the French share of EU exports fell from 16% to 12%. After normalisation in 
1994, a series of French government initiatives was launched to encourage a greater 
French commercial presence in Asia, with China as the cornerstone. French leaders tried 
to emulate Kohl’s success. However, the Chinese did not put the Mirage affair totally 
behind them and were slow in warming to France. Prime Minister Bahadur’s April 1994 
fence-mending visit to Beijing only gained promises that French companies would soon 
be awarded contracts for the development of power stations, telecommunications, high­
speed trains, and sales of wheat. President Jiang Jemin’s visit to France in September 
1994 finally turned the comer when trade agreements worth $2.5 billion were signed.58
Another brouhaha erupted when the French government approved the sale of an 
observation satellite by the French-British company Matra Marconi to Taiwan in 1999, 
despite Chinese protestations that the satellite would be used for military purposes.59 
During Chirac’s October 2000 visit to China, Jiang Zemin warned that France should 
handle bilateral ties with “strategic perspectives”, proceeding from the “long-term and 
fundamental interests of the two countries”.60 This dispute was blamed for the exclusion 
of French companies Gaz de France and Total Fina Elf from the public tender for the 
construction of a gas terminal in southern China.61
57 According to Peyrefitte 1997:301, the French share shrank from 4% to 1.5% while the West German 
share rose from 3% to 5% between 1981 and 1990.
58 Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, p. 159.
59 Liberationx 24 December 1999.
60 Beijing Review, 6 November 2000. The German government had cancelled an export license for a 
similar German-made satellite to Taiwan following official protests during Chancellor Gerhard 
Shroeder’s visit to Beijing.
61 Le Monde, 23 October 2000. The Chinese were also unhappy with the high profile accorded to the 
Dalai Lama’s visit to France in September 2000.
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d) EU alternative to national efforts?
France has supported few attempts at pan-EU cooperation in China. Instead, 
there are many examples of cut-throat competition between French (often state- 
supported “national champions” such as Alsthom) and other European companies at 
winning contracts by employing a whole arsenal of political and economic incentives 
that often undercut agreed EU policies (notably common human rights positions, 
covered later in this chapter) on China. In this “two-track approach”, France has 
deployed national efforts in tandem with EU-level efforts to increase its economic 
presence in China. At the European level, coordination and cooperation of members 
states’ economic policies in China has been most pronounced in the negotiations led by 
the Commission (successfully concluded in May 2000) to pry open protected sectors 
such as insurance, telecommunications, aviation and infrastructure where European 
companies are strong. Coordination has developed over more than two decades of 
economic interaction between the EC as a unit and China.
The European Community as a whole was quick to develop closer economic ties 
with China in the post-Mao era following China’s opening in 1978. The 1980s 
witnessed a rapid expansion of relations with China,62 with member states’ economic 
relations with China initially governed by three EC framework of agreements with 
China. While France exercised caution in developing economic ties with China as seen 
in the preceding paragraphs, the Commission, supported by Germany and Britain, led 
the European charge. China concluded bilateral economic cooperation agreements with 
all but one of the nine Community members between 1978 and 1980 (Table 4.3). At the 
same time, economic relations between China and the Community as a whole were 
institutionalised with the establishment of three accords. The 1978 EC-China Trade 
Agreement was the most important accord. It opened the prospects of an upswing in 
trade relations, making the Community China’s second biggest economic partner after 
Japan. The Textile Agreement, initiated in July 1979 and effective from 1 January 
1980, allowed China to double its exports from 21,000 tonnes to 41,000 tonnes in two 
years.64 The third major agreement was the Community’s decision to include China in a
62 A good account o f this period is found in Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe, 
London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990, ch.9 and 10.
63 Kapur, p. 149.
64 Kapur, p. 150.
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preferential agreement with effect from 1 January 1980. Accorded unilaterally, it 
involved full exemption from customs duty for all industrial goods and for partial 
exemption for certain processed agricultural products exported to developed countries.
EC agreements have contributed significantly to expanding EC trade with China. 
The EC-China Joint committee created by the 1978 bilateral agreement and affirmed in 
the 1985 EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), quickly became the most 
institutionalised component of the EC’s interactions with China, with the Commission 
playing the role of intermediary.65 The cornerstone of the 1978 and 1985 Trade 
Agreements was the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause. The 1978 agreement was the 
first trade agreement concluded by the EC with a communist country and it placed 
China in an advantageous position compared to other communist countries.66 When the 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement was concluded in 1985, Article 14 reserved the right
f\7of the member states to conclude bilateral economic arrangements with China. In 
practice, the Commission has been the engine in developing various forms of economic 
cooperation. The number of bilateral agreements between the member states and China 
has declined since 1985.
Table 4.3 Economic Cooperation Agreements between China and EC members
Bilateral
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 27 June 1979
Denmark 14 Septem ber 1979
France 4 D ecem ber 1978
Great Britain March 1979
Ireland -
Italy 23 April 1979
Netherlands 30 October 1980
W est Germany 24 October 1979
EC-China
Trade Agreem ent 1978
Textile Agreem ent July 1979
Trade Preferential Agreem ent 1980
EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreem ent (TCA) 1985
Source: Hunglah Chiu, Agreements o f the People‘s Republic o f  China: A Calendar o f Events 1960-80.
65 It organizes meetings o f European and Chinese experts such as the Sino-EC business weeks.
66 Der-Chin Hong, “The EU’s New China Policy: The Dimensions o f Trade Relations”, in Issues and 
Studies, 34/7 July 1998, pp.91-92.
67 Details o f EU-China agreements are found in Wolfgang Bartke, The Agreements o f  the People’s 
Republic o f  China with Foreign Countries 1949-1990, 2° ed., Munich: Saur, 1992.
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Since the mid-1990s, the EC has emphasised commerce with China over
iTO #
political or strategic relations. In July 1995, the Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan 
unveiled the EU’s new initiative, “A Long-term policy for China”. The 1995 China 
strategy paper followed on the Commission’s 1994 “Towards a New Asia Strategy” 
initiative but placed even more attention on China as a “cornerstone in the EU’s external 
relations, both with Asia and globally.” The 1995 paper recognized the “rise of China as 
unmatched amongst national experiences since the Second World War.”69
The 1994 and 1995 papers, drafted by the Commission and approved by the 
Council, followed roughly similar positions taken by Germany and Britain. All the 
papers emphasised economic relations and looked upon China as a “cornerstone” of the
70EU’s “New Asia Policy” (NAS). The European goal is to develop relations with 
China on a long-term and comprehensive basis. Four areas were defined as a “new 
focus” by the EU in future cooperation with China:
a) human resource development - considered key to sustained economic growth 
and development in China;
b) support for economic and social reform through promoting modernization 
and market-oriented policies in key economic sectors;
c) business and industrial cooperation; and
d) cooperation on environmental and rural development matters.71
Trade and WTO negotiations since China’s 1986 application to join the 
GATT/WTO have further consolidated the Commission’s role as the central actor in 
economic relations between Europe and China. Unlike the US, the EU was receptive to 
Chinese arguments to be treated as a developing economy and thus brokered China’s 
agreement to accept commitments to an open market economy over a phased schedule. 
Based on objectives spelt out in the Commission’s 1998 “Comprehensive Partnership” 
country strategy paper, External Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy reached an 
agreement with China on its WTO accession on 19 May 2000. Outstanding market
68 See David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, London, 1996.
69 European Commission, “A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations”, COM (95)279 final, 
Brussels, 5 July 1995, Section A.
70 Yahuda and Zhang, “Europe and China”, p. 194. The impact o f Germany’s Asian concept paper on 
Paris, London and Brussels was confirmed in interviews with the Office for the French EU presidency in 
the Quai d’Orsay (September 2000) and Cabinet o f the Minister o f  Defence (March 2001)- the latter 
expressed that the “Asian policy” put forth in the German, French, British (Conservative Party) and 
Commission papers in 1993-94 “was essentially about China.”
71 Ibid., pp. 194-195; “European Union and China to Maintain long-term Cooperation”, Beijing Review, 2- 
15 February 1998, p. 10.
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access issues such as the liberalization of telecommunications, banking and insurance - 
sectors in which European companies are strong - were resolved after two years of
nointense negotiations. Despite the absence of a new TCA (stalled over China’s 
objections to the inclusion of human rights conditionalities), trade between the EU and 
China continued to expand at a spectacular pace, from €17 billion in 1990 and €70 
billion in 1999, to over €100 billion in 2001. Total trade increased over thirty-fold
O'Xbetween 1978 and 2001. In 1999, the EU overtook Japan to become China’s second 
largest export market. European companies invested US$4.5 billion in China in 1999, 
making the EU the largest foreign direct investor in China that year, and the second in 
2000.74 China is now the EU’s 4th largest trading partner (Appendix 2).
Besides direct business relations, the EU has also invested in technical 
cooperation activities and training institutions. Development cooperation is one area in 
which the EU plays a major role as one of the largest donors to China. The 1998 paper 
undertook to continue helping China’s economic reform, setting aside a budget of €65 
million a year for cooperation projects to aid economic reform and development. 
Several research centres and institutes have been set up. These include the China- 
Europe International Business School in Shanghai, the China-European Bio-technology 
Centre, and the China-European Agricultural Technological Transfer Centre.
Overall Trends
French economic policies in China exhibit a dual track of national and joint 
European policies. On the one hand, French businesses have been strongly supported 
by the state up to Prime Ministerial and Presidential levels in promoting bilateral trade 
and in winning bids (often against European competitors) for lucrative projects such as 
inter-city high-speed trains, nuclear power stations and urban metro systems. On the 
other hand, since the 1985 EC-China TCA, member states have entrusted the External 
Trade Commissioner to conduct economic negotiations with China at the EU level in 
order collectively to exercise greater bargaining power.
72 European Commission, Report on the Implementation o f  the Communication Building a 
Comprehensive Partnership with China, COM (2000) 552, Brussels, 8 September 2000, p.8 (para C .l). 
Also Le Monde, 26 February 2000.
73 European Commission, The E U ’s relations with China- An Overview, in 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/china/intro/index.htm: and Bilateral Trade Relations: China 
Overview, on http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china. 1 September 2003.
74 Ibid. In the 1998 and 1999 Asian economic crisis, Chinese exports to the EU and US compensated for 
falling exports to Asian countries by rising 16% and 18% respectively.
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Grid 4.1 European Economic Policies in China, 1985-2000
0 i 0 + o 1 0 +
F ♦ ♦ —► ♦ —► ♦
GB ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
D ♦ ♦ b ♦ ♦
EC ♦ a ♦ —> ♦c
= Cautious or anti-China policy by Government/EC
0 = Government passive, business community left on its own 
+ = Pro-Investment and Trade policy by Government/EC
a Signature of EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
bGermany’s pragmatic Asian Policy emphasizing trade with China rights is formulated and later 
formalized in 1993.
cIssue of European Commission’s A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations, COM (95)279 final, 
Brussels, 5 July 1995 emphasising economic ties.
The evolution of the French government’s position from that of cautious 
bystander to pro-active promoter of French trade and investments in China is clear. Its 
position has become more “European” through a process of policy learning from 
Germany (sideways Europeanization) and coordination in Commission structures (top- 
down Europeanization). The EC-China economic agreements have encouraged policy 
convergence by providing a framework for EU member states to coordinate their overall 
economic strategies in China. At the level of individual companies however, 
competition to secure contracts remains fierce, and has sometimes been aggravated by 
member states’ leaders lending political weight to securing deals for their “national 
champions”. French trade with China remains over-reliant on bilateral and often 
politically negotiated grands contrats such as the sale of Airbuses. Attempts since 1993 
to emulate the “German model” have not significantly raised French investments and 
economic competitiveness in China. French exports to China have not risen 
substantially despite improved relations since 1994 and almost a decade (and a full term 
of Chirac’s presidency, 1995-2002) of excellent relations with the top Chinese 
leadership. Instead of reinforcing its trade presence in China, France has barely 
maintained its mid-1990s share of 2% of China’s trade.75
75 In 2000, the French share of trade in China shrank to 1.7%. See Rene Dorient, “Un septennat de 
politique asiatique: quel bilan pour la France?”, Politique Etrangere, 1/2002, printemps 2002, p. 185.
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II Political and Strategic Relations
Unlike French economic objectives which were hesitant and did not see China as 
a priority until the 1990s, French political goals vis-a-vis China were clearly spelt out 
early in 1964. De Gaulle’s growing disenchantment with US power led him to 
appreciate first, China’s utility as a power that aspired, like France, to forge an 
international role independent of the US and the USSR. France gave diplomatic 
recognition to China in defiance of US-led efforts to isolate Beijing. This Gaullist 
legacy retains relevance today as both desire multipolarity to replace the post-Cold War 
American dominance of international affairs. The bilateral relationship is one between 
two medium powers with ambitions to play larger roles in international politics. De 
Gaulle’s recognition of China’s legitimate “destiny” as a great power, whatever the 
political and value system of its leadership, finds echoes in the Chirac-Jiang Zemin 
Declaration of 1997. At the international level, French relations with China are centred 
on redressing perceived American arrogance and preponderant power with 
institutionalised countervailing forces. French criticisms of the American “hyper­
puissance” and its policy in Iraq, for example, find ready sympathy in China.76 
However, this “Gaullist alliance” is tempered by Europeanization pressures arising from 
France’s participation in an ever-more institutionalised structure of European foreign 
policy coordination and a common European foreign policy, not to mention French 
commitments to Western values and the Atlantic Alliance with the US.
At the best of times, French relations with China are characterised by 
pragmatism, great-power dialogue and fascination for each other’s civilizations, and 
cooperation to build a stable multipolar world. At the worst of times, relations are 
marked by sharp East-West debates on human rights and values, xenophobic images of 
a “Yellow Peril”, sanctions and petty reprisals. This section focuses on two periods: 
1989-92, when a confrontational policy towards China was adopted by Mitterrand 
following Tiananmen; and from mid-1993 onwards, when French policy made a sharp 
u-tum towards engagement. The policy of confrontation (both bilateral and multilateral 
through, eg. the EU and G7) was abandoned for a policy of actively engaging China in a 
multi-faceted dialogue through a whole range of bilateral, EU-level, inter-regional
76 See Dominique de Villepin, D6placement en Chine: Discours du Ministre des Affaires etrangSres a 
l’Universite Fudan, Shanghai, 10 January 2003.
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(Asia-Europe Meeting), and multilateral institutions ranging from the UN to ARF and 
KEDO. It is a special type of “constructive engagement” - distinct from US policies 
that tend to treat China as a student rather than a partner - that engages China through a 
dense network of interactions as an equal and valuable partner in shaping the world 
order. A related interest has been the expectation that good political relations would 
result in enhanced economic interactions and a larger place for French business and 
exports to China. To understand the turnaround in French political relations with China, 
it is useful to appreciate the context of the EC-China relationship and the opportunities 
and constraints of the EC-China relationship in which France operates.
a) EC-China Political Dialogue, 1975-90
At the beginning of EC-China official contacts in 1975, the EC was perceived in 
China as an eventual counterweight to the Soviet Union while the EC was defining its 
place in the world in relation to the great powers. The relationship between the EC and 
China for most of the post-1945 period until 1989 was heavily influenced by Cold War 
considerations, rendering it a “secondary relationship”.77 In 1975, China became the 
first communist country to recognize the EC. An EC-China dialogue was established 
and several trade agreements, as seen in Part I of this chapter, were signed between 
1978 and 1985. China’s importance to post-war Europe was however of low 
significance compared with that of the US or the Soviet Union. The EU and its 
constituent members were unable to determine the outcome of conflicts in Asia and the
no
Chinese were similarly impotent in Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s, the relationship 
was thus heavily constrained by bipolarity. The EC’s Declaration on European identity 
in December 1973 was an attempt to respond to new challenges by defining Europe’s 
place in the world in relation to the great powers and powerful international 
organizations such as OPEC.79 The EC-9 states recognised the “major role played by 
China in international affairs” and resolved “to intensify their relations with the Chinese
77 This argument is made by Michael Yahuda, “China and Europe: The Significance o f a Secondary 
Relationship”, in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994.
78 Yahuda and Zhang, “Europe and China”, in Maull, Segal and Wanandi (eds), Europe and the Asia 
Pacific, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 183.
79 Henry Kissinger’s “Year o f Europe” speech taunting Europe for its external weakness, the October 
1973 Yom Kippur war and the subsequent OPEC oil embargo fed feelings that the EC was impotent in 
the face o f global challenges and that EPC had to advance quickly from procedure to substance.
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government and to promote exchanges in various fields as well as contacts between 
European and Chinese leaders”.80
The potential utility of the EC to China as an additional counter-weight on top of 
the US to a belligerent USSR (China and the USSR had an armed conflict at their 
border in 1969) was recognized early on by the Chinese, who sought a political 
dialogue. China attempted to develop an anti-Soviet international united front81 and it 
envisaged a strong and united Europe as a useful counterweight against the Soviet 
Union. In 1979, Roy Jenkins was the first President of the European Commission to 
visit China. The declaration of China’s “independent” foreign policy by Premier Zhao 
Ziyang in 1982 following the end of imminent security pressures on China from one or 
the other superpower, led to the basis of relations moving towards mutual interests 
rather than being influenced by third parties. However, Cold War considerations still 
predominated: the main Chinese political interest lay in encouraging “the emergence of 
the EC as an independent centre in world affairs with a view to reducing the leverage of 
the superpowers in international affairs.”82
In the late 1980s and 1990s, western Europe’s relations with China changed 
from being derivatives of the Cold War and broader relation with the superpowers, and 
“developed an independent dynamic of their own”. Political relations were fully 
normalized, and the EC moved to engage China in the international community and to 
encourage its participation in international institutions. A Head of State or Government 
from every western European state visited China during the 1980s.84 In 1988, a resident 
EC delegation was established in Beijing.
Although the June 1989 Tiananmen massacre strained relations and resulted in 
an EU sanctions policy on China (including the suspension of high-level talks), this
80 Para 17 o f “Declaration on European Identity by the Nine Foreign Ministers”, Copenhagen, 14 
December 1973, in Hill and Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, London: Routledge, 
2000, pp.92-96.
81 Strong Chinese insistence on the need for Western unity against Soviet aggressiveness led to Alexander 
Haig dubbing China the “16th member o f NATO” and being “more European than the Europeans”. See 
Yahuda, “China and Europe”, pp.268-69, and Gerald Segal, “Europe, China and the Soviet Threat”, in 
Shaw Yu-ming, Europe and China in the Twentieth Century, Taipei: Institute o f International Relations, 
1986.
82 Yahuda, p.272.
83 Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, p.2.
84 Shambaugh, p. 13.
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common policy effectively fell apart even before the economic sanctions were officially 
lifted in October 1990. The main economic sanction imposed by the EC involved the 
freezing of all government-guaranteed loans to China. However, both Germany and 
France had defected from the common approach and agreed to grant soft government 
loans to China (against the Madrid sanctions) in order to help their national industries. 
In 1989, the German government released DM460 million in October for the 
construction of the Shanghai metro system, and the French government released FF830
or
million in December for a Citroen factory in Wuhan. The Madrid sanctions depended 
on the cooperation of individual governments. They were largely symbolic and not 
intended to hurt substantive economic relations. As such, trade between the EU and 
China continued to grow steadily between 1990 and 1993 (Table 4.4). Except for the 
ban on weapons sales and military technology transfer, all the other sanctions were 
officially lifted in 1994.
Table 4.4 China’s trade with the EC, 1990-1993 (in US$ billion)
1990 1991 1992 1993
*EU 15.1 15.9 19.1 28.0
World 115.4 135.6 165.5 195.7
Proportion of 
China’s world trade
13.1% 11.7% 11.5% 14.3%
*EC-12 plus Austria, Finland and Sweden
Source: Zhang Yunling, “Europe and China”, in Maull, Segal and Wanandi (eds), Europe and the Asia 
Pacific, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 194.
After the Cold War and post-Tiananmen freeze on EC-China relations, political 
dialogue was upgraded in the 1990s, led mainly by Germany and France. The 
Community’s 1994 “New Asia Strategy” paper (NAS, which defined China as a key 
country)86, was published in July 1994. The relationship has been further 
institutionalised with the establishment of the EU-China meetings and the creation of a 
multilateral framework, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). From a European 
perspective, the critical question concerning China as a rising power is the terms on 
which China seeks to deepen its engagement in the international community, and here it 
is thought that the Europeans could play a constructive role in engaging China through 
their three levels of foreign policy (de facto rather than by design): Community, CFSP
85 See Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face k P6kin”, p.93.
86 Interviews with officials o f the Quai d’Orsay (September 2000) and Cabinet o f the Minister o f Defence 
(March 2001) confirmed that the “Asian policy” put forth in the German, French, British (Conservative 
Party) and Commission papers in 1993-94 “was essentially about China.”
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and national policies. Hence in terms of engaging China, the European position is 
distinguished from the American one in being more consistently in favour of economic, 
political and multilateral engagement of China in institutions like the WTO and Asia- 
Europe Meeting (ASEM), and having a more “pragmatic” and accommodating 
approach on the question of values and human rights. European governments are also
0*7
less troubled than US administrations by domestic criticisms of China.
China has insisted on a good political relationship as a precondition for 
economic deals and is adept at exploiting the internal competition between EU member 
states. Some EU countries have been more successful at fending off China’s “divide 
and rule” discriminatory tactics. When the Chinese government threatened in 1994 to 
discriminate against the British in trade matters because of alleged British 
misdemeanours over Hong Kong, the EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan warned 
that the EU would not condone a member state being singled out in this way. Brittan’s 
warning staved off Chinese action against the UK. Domestic pressures in Germany 
prompted the German government to host a conference for Tibetan dissidents in Bonn 
in summer 1996. German relations with China underwent a short period of crisis, but 
economic relations were unaffected.
b) Mitterrand’s early neglect then confrontation with China, 1989-92
Despite de Gaulle’s rhetoric of a special relationship with China and 
Mitterrand’s early support for French recognition of China89, the Chinese did not put as 
much weight on the relationship. Mao had wryly remarked to the first French 
Ambassador in Beijing that France’s role in Asia had ended with the French defeat at 
Dien Bien Phu.90 France by the 1980s was largely absent from China politically, 
economically, culturally and certainly militarily. This was quite remarkable in the 
context of increasing EC political relations with China over the decade. Mitterrand’s 
foreign policy (1981-95) incorporated several Gaullist principles - national 
independence, the balance of military blocs around the world -  together with European
87 Peter Ferdinand, “Economic and Diplomatic Interactions between the EU and China”, in Richard Grant 
(ed), The European Union and China: A European Strategy fo r  the Twenty-First Century, London: 
Routledge/RIIA, 1995, pp.26-40.
88 Yahuda and Zhang, “Europe and China”, p. 185.
89 Mitterrand had written a tract in support o f French diplomatic recognition o f China, “La Chine aux 
defis” in 1961. See Le Point, 9 May 1983.
90 See Domenach, “La Politique ffangaise au miroir de l’Asie”, in La Serre et al 90:229.
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construction, the right of people to self-determination, and the development of poor 
countries.91 It was noteworthy for its neglect of Chinese affairs.92
For most of the 1980s, China occupied a low rung in French priorities. France 
was content to let other European actors, especially Germany, Britain and the 
Commission, take the lead on political dialogue with China. Although Mitterrand 
visited China once as President (in 1983), the visit did not give rise to any significant 
initiatives. Bilateral political ties from the late-1970s to the mid-1980s were largely 
derivative of wider relations with the US and USSR. For example, Mitterrand’s 1983 
visit revealed a gulf on views between Paris and Beijing on detente, and on Soviet
Q1
expansionism in Europe and Southeast Asia. The French and Chinese governments 
were also experimenting with different macroeconomic models of modernization. 
France under its first Socialist President was nationalizing French industries in 1981-83. 
China was undergoing an economic revolution of effective privatisation under Deng 
Xiaoping in the 1980s. In the eyes of some idealistic sectors of the French Left which 
had often looked to China as a pure “Communist nirvana”, this represented a “double 
treason” of the socialist ideal: China was accepting capitalism, but without making any 
progress towards human rights and westem-style democracy.94
The Tiananmen massacre in June 1989 sparked a radical policy shift and 
dramatically ended the French neglect of China. In its place a strident and 
confrontational policy was adopted. This policy was informed by general public 
outrage at gross human rights abuses in China, the ideological influence of the French 
Left, and a strategic calculation to take advantage of Chinese weakness to step up 
relations with Taiwan. Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas took a 
vociferous leading position and used the EC to project and Europeanise French 
condemnation of the Chinese government in the aftermath of Tiananmen. This 
confrontational position coincided with a tilt towards “democratic” Taiwan, a tilt
91 Franfois Mitterrand, Reflexions sur la Politique Exterieure de la France: Introduction a vingt-cinq 
Discours (1981-85), Paris: Fayard, 1986, p.3.
92 Hubert Vddrine, Les Mondes de Franqois Mitterrand: A VElysee 1981-1995, Paris: Fayard, 1996, a 
detailed “inside account” of Mitterrand’s foreign policies towards different regions in the world, does not 
contain a single chapter on East Asia and mentions China only in passing.
93 See L'Express 6 May 1983, Liberation 3 May 1983 and International Herald Tribune, 2 and 4 May 
1983 on Mitterrand’s visit to China.
94 See Peyrefitte 1997:288 and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Paris-P^kin: Un dialogue sans complexes?”, in 
Politique Internationale 75, Spring 1997, p.336.
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boosted by economic considerations -  the protection of French military industries 
through arms sales to Taiwan.
Between 1989 and 1992, France-China relations suffered their lowest point since 
1964. Despite the Gaullist myth of a “special relationship” between France and China, 
the reality was that there had been no significant political dialogue or cooperation 
between France and China. At first, the deteriorating relations followed the pattern of 
the West’s alienation from China after the Chinese government’s brutal crackdown on 4 
June 1989 on the student-led democracy movement centred on Tiananmen Square. 
From China’s perspective, the French were particularly strident in their condemnation 
of China’s human rights record. Not only the media and NGOs, but also “political” 
personalities and well-connected human rights activists such as Bernard Kouchner 
(founder of Medecins sans Frontieres), Danielle Mitterrand, and President Mitterrand 
himself denounced the Chinese government.95 The substantive French reaction to 
Tiananmen was equally tough and confrontational. France imposed sanctions 
“freezing” relations, reduced French diplomatic representation in China, and suspended 
all political visits to China.96 At French insistence, the ban on high technology military 
sales and transfer to China was added as the 10th EC sanction at the EC’s June 1989 
Madrid summit.97
While France-China relations were hamstrung by the emotional and high-profile 
French critique of China, they sank to an even more rancorous level from early 1990 as 
news of secret negotiations to sell six French Lafayette frigates to Taiwan came to light. 
Although diplomatic relations with Taipei had been broken off after Paris recognized 
Beijing in 1964, economic and substantive relations with Taiwan continued to grow so 
that between 1978 and 1994, there was a “virtual normalisation” of relations in the light 
of Taiwan’s rapid rise as an economic and trading power.98 The $4.8 billion frigate sale 
went through in September 1990 after the French government flip-flopped on selling the
95 See L 'Express, 4 April 1996 and Andrew Nathan et al (eds), The Tiananmen Papers, 2001, p.397.
96 Le Quotidien de Paris, 8 June 1989.
97 Fran^oise Mengin, “The Prospects for France-Taiwan Relations”, p.48.
98 Fran^oise Mengin, Les Relations entre la France et Taiwan de 1964 a 1994: Contribution a une etude 
des relations exterieures d ’un non-Etat, Ph.D thesis, Institut d’etudes politiques, Paris, 1994, calls this la 
normalisation officieuse.
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frigates to Taiwan over Chinese objections." These objections were placated after 
France offered a $370 million loan to finance 5 projects in China.100 There was also an 
understanding between Dumas and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister sent to Paris to 
underscore Beijing’s displeasure, that the frigates sale could proceed only on the 
condition that they were unarmed, and that there would be no further arms sales to 
Taiwan.101
In 1991 France was again enticed by Taiwan’s offer to participate in its $300 
billion twenty-year development plan. French policy-makers saw in the Taiwanese 
arms market a major albeit risky opportunity to help bail out Dassault, the ailing French 
aeronautics company, from bankruptcy. They decided to promote the sale of Dassault’s
1 0*7highly sophisticated and expensive Mirage 2000-5 fighters to Taiwan. Dassault had 
developed the aircraft specifically for export, but had failed to find buyers due to their 
high cost and the worldwide trend of arms reduction after the Cold War. Without the 
Taiwan contract, Dassault faced closure, leaving 5000 unemployed.103 With France 
suffering from high deficit and high unemployment, the French government was faced 
with a dilemma of deciding between saving Dassault through the Mirage sale, or 
ensuring continued good relations with China.
The hardline French position was moderated by a short cooperative interlude in 
1991. Recognising the need for China’s cooperation in the UN following Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, as well as China’s role in the resolution of the third Indochina 
conflict at the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, Foreign Minister Dumas visited 
Beijing in April 1991 in a bid to lift the “freeze” in bilateral relations.104 Then in 1992, 
the French and Taiwanese governments reached an agreement on the purchase of 60 
Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets. The Mirage sale plunged bilateral relations into a sharp and 
long-drawn dispute. Beijing retaliated by closing the new office of the French
99 The French government authorized the Directorate of Naval Construction on 3 January 1990 to respond 
to Taipei’s appeals for tenders for the purchase o f  six frigates, revoked the decision six days later after the 
Chinese Ambassador protested to Dumas, but finally reinstated its approval. See Mengin, “France-Taiwan 
Relations”, p.46. Dumas was subsequently charged for accepting bribes to allow Thomson CSF to 
proceed with the frigates sale. See Economist, 27 January 2000.
100 A car-making joint venture, an airport, a power-generating plant, a water-processing plant, and a gas- 
regulating project. See Wellons, “Sino-French Relations”, p.345.
101 Peyrefitte 1997:314.
102 See Wellons, “Sino-French Relations”, p.345.
103 Wellons, “Sino-French Relations”.
104 Le Monde, 29 April 1991.
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Consulate-General and Economic Expansion Office in Guangzhou (Canton), and 
cancelled several large French contracts in China.105 Many governments were adopting 
a cautious wait-and-see attitude towards the beleaguered government in Beijing but 
Paris was exceptional in daring to raise the strategic and commercial profile of its 
relations with Taiwan.106 Egged on by the French military-industrial complex, the 
French government protested that the US was selling F-16s to Taiwan, and argued that 
they had a right to operate in the Taiwanese market as well. After all, the 1964 
establishment of diplomatic relations had been based on rather ambiguous language: the 
French recognition of the government in Beijing, not the state of the People’s Republic 
of China. Neither did the 1964 communique explicitly commit Paris to recognize only
107one China and nor to consider Taiwan a renegade province.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese were unimpressed by the French “betrayal” of the
1 OR1964 spirit. The high-value French arms sales to Taiwan in 1990-92 underlined the 
absence of a clear policy with regard to political relations with China, consistency on 
the Taiwan question, and especially a weakness of the French trade position in the 
Chinese market.109 The Taiwan episode put into sharp relief the fragile Gaullist 
underpinnings of bilateral relations. Beijing’s shrill reaction forced French decision­
makers to re-examine their triangular relationship with China and Taiwan. Following 
the 1992 Mirage episode and the Chinese reprisals, France lowered its profile on 
European sanctions and statements against China and moved towards a rapprochement 
in 1994 under a Conservative government.
c) Europeanising French cooperation with China, 1993-2002
A shift away from a confrontational policy towards China and towards a more 
“Europeanised” foreign policy of engagement began in 1993. This shift was prompted 
first by the election of a government dominated by the Gaullist party, which was more
105 The Balladur government estimated at FF3 billion the value o f contracts lost during the “freeze” in 
relations. The French employers’ association put it at twice that value. See Financial Times, 7 April 
1994.
106 There were expectations by French analysts and China-watchers that the Chinese communist regime 
might not remain in power for too long, or would not survive Deng's death. See Peyrefitte 1997:294, 314; 
and Jean-Luc Domenach, “Chine: pour une politique democratique”, Le Monde, 29 March 1990.
107 Mengin, France et Taiwan, p.94.
108 See Peyrefitte’s account of his meetings with two ex-Chinese Ambassadors to France, and with 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Beijing, 12 and 18 September 1993, in Peyrefitte 97:309-16.
109 Mengin, France et Taiwan , p.682.
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attuned to good political and business relations with China. Second, the realization that 
France could better achieve its national objectives vis-a-vis China and the Asian region 
through institutionalised EU-based networks. Elected into office in April 1993 with an 
overwhelming majority, the new conservative government under Balladur moved the 
control of foreign policy in Paris away from an enfeebled President Mitterrand110 to the 
Matignon (Prime Minister’s Office). Balladur resolved to change France’s China policy 
to one of appeasing and “constructively engaging” Beijing. While French politicians 
complained of the “double standards” Beijing applied to France and the US over the 
Mirage affair, Foreign Minister Alain Juppe declared that long-term French interests lay 
in a China of 1.3 billion people rather than a Taiwan of 20 million.111 The January 1994 
joint communique which normalized relations thus for the first time officially 
committed France to a “one China” policy, as well as an undertaking not to sell heavy 
arms to Taiwan in future.
After bilateral relations were normalized in 1994, the French government 
worked on institutionalising a dense network of contacts between French and Chinese 
leaders. This network included not only diplomatic contacts but also trade, defence and 
cultural cooperation. This strategy was simultaneously projected onto the EU.
Bahadur’s fence-mending mission in April 1994 improved atmospherics. It was 
however heavily criticized at home for being “humiliating”, ignoring China’s human 
rights record, and bearing no commercial fruits.112 Although the Chinese made Balladur 
pay for the sins of the preceding Socialist governments, the visit was appreciated by the 
Chinese and was followed by a rapid succession of visits and contracts. Industry 
Minister Gerard Longuet visited Beijing that summer on a tour of Asia, ahead of 
President Jiang Zemin’s state visit in September. Chinese Trade Minister Madam Wu 
Yi, who arrived four days before Jiang Zemin in Paris, announced the signature of 
contracts and letters of intention totalling FF17.5 billion.113
During Jiang Zemin’s state visit to France in September 1994, Jiang proposed 
“four principles on Sino-West European ties”: stable, long-term and friendly
110 Mitterrand’s political position had been gravely weakened by scandals concerning corruption in the 
Socialist party, revelations o f his Vichy past, his very poor health, and the fact that he was a lameduck 
president serving out his final years before the end o f his presidential term in May 1995.
1,1 Juppe, “Diplomatic Franfaise: le deuxieme souffle”, Politique Internationale 6 1, 1993, pp.24-25.
112 Le Point 16 April 1994.
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cooperation for the 21st century, respect for each other and seeking common ground 
while putting aside differences, engaging in complementary trade and economic 
cooperation, and consultation and cooperation in international affairs.114 Balladur was 
quick to seize upon Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s proposal of a regular 
APEC-style meeting of leaders from Asia and Europe115. The French government saw 
in this the perfect European vehicle to put a definitive end to the preceding 5 years of 
bilateral difficulties with China. ASEM could not only make up for the embarrassment 
over Taiwan, it would institutionalise regular cooperative contacts with Chinese leaders 
in a multilateral European framework which excluded the US (as well as Taiwan). 
France then worked closely with Singapore to persuade the other EU member states and 
the Commission to put the idea on the EU agenda. Working through its EU presidency 
in the first half of 1995 and presence in the Troika in the second half of that year, 
France lent critical support to the preparatory talks and officials’ meetings that went into 
launching the inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting (a summit of EU and East Asian countries 
- ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) in Bangkok in March 1996.
The Commission’s July 1995 policy paper, “The Long-Term policy of the 
European Union towards China”116 placed for the first time the full breadth of Europe’s 
ties with China within a single strategic framework. The strategy paper envisaged 
reinforcing and extending the established pattern of high-level meetings with Chinese 
ministers. The objective was to cover the complete range of political and economic 
issues, regional affairs, security issues, human rights and transnational questions such as 
the environment, and chart a course for EU-China relations into the 21st century. The 
strategy paper is impressive for the coherence and consistency of EU objectives towards 
China with the individual policies of member states. This coherence was an outcome of 
the many discussions, frequent and regular contacts between Commission officials and
117diplomatic services that enhance consultation and policy convergence.
113 Le Figaro, 8 September 1994.
114“Four Principles on Sino-Westem European Ties”, text o f speech by President Jiang Zemin, Paris, 12 
September 1994, in. Beijing Review 37/38, 19-25 September 1994, pp.14-17.
115 Hill, “Closing the Capabilities-Expectation Gap?”, in Peterson and Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign 
Policy fo r Europe?, London: Routledge, 1998, p.32.
116 European Commission, “The Long-Term policy o f the European Union towards China”, COM (95) 
279, Brussels, 5 July 1995.
117 Glarbo, “Wide-awake diplomacy”, and Ohrgaard, “Less than Supranational, More than 
Intergovernmental”, argue that frequent and regular contacts between national diplomacies have 
socialised them into becoming more “European” and taking a “coordination reflex” in their foreign
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At the same time, the France-China dialogue was expanded in other sectors. 
The French Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade visited Beijing in March 1995, the first 
European Chief of Staff to visit China since Tiananmen, and held high-level talks with 
Politburo, defence officials and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Lanxade declared that 
France was “normalizing political and military relations”, and had discussed China’s 
military modernization, nuclear proliferation in Asia, and the possibility of French
1 1 o
warships paying ports of call in China with his interlocutors. After Jacques Chirac 
was elected French President in May 1995, relations between France and China took on 
the flavour of a “politico-commercial entente”. Human rights were marginalized as an 
issue of discussion. Commercial contracts and grandiose statements on a multipolar 
world order took centre stage.
In the area of political dialogue, France has been especially active since 
normalization in 1994 in promoting a comprehensive political and diplomatic 
engagement of China, at the bilateral, European and multilateral levels. There are 
several reasons for this. First, France sees itself as a great power with global 
responsibilities, one of only two EU states - together with the UK - that possess nuclear 
weapons and occupy permanent seats in the Security Council. Second and unlike the 
UK, France is uncomfortable with the US being the sole superpower in the world. 
France prefers to have a multipolar world order in which France can enjoy greater 
independence in foreign policy, and be able to exercise influence through a strong EU. 
Third, France was eager to catch up with Germany in the Chinese market. As detailed 
in Part I, the French viewed good political relations with the Chinese (following the 
German example) as a step towards achieving that goal.119
As the EU’s declared goals in its political dialogue with China dovetail with 
French goals (indeed the July 1995 paper reflected the political consensus of France and 
the other big EU states that the EU should engage China), France has not had major 
problems reconciling its national policy with EU policy. Except for a few minor 
derogations, eg selling low-level weapons to China despite the EC’s post-Tiananmen
policy-making. According to the French Defence Minister’s cabinet, policy consultation and 
coordination between officials in Paris, Bonn, London and Brussels in EFP was “significant”. Interview 
in March 2001.
118 Le Figaro, 24 March 1995 and Le Monde 25 March 1994..
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sanctions prohibiting military sales120, France has steadily pushed for increasing 
dialogue with China under the EU framework. Aside from political engagement, France 
established a high-level strategic dialogue involving defence ministers and senior
191officials with China in 1996. In some areas, France has been ahead of the game. 
Responding to Singapore’s October 1994 proposal for a regular APEC-style meeting of 
leaders from Asia and Europe, the French immediately supported the proposal as a 
means, inter alia, of further institutionalising regular cooperative contacts with Chinese
199leaders. Despite an initial lukewarm response from the British and German 
governments, France used the offices of former EC President F rancis Xavier-Ortoli 
and the French presidency of the EU in the first half of 1995 to push the idea in EU 
circles. It managed to use EU institutions to build a coalition of support from the other 
member states and the Commission to launch the first ASEM summit in March 1996, 
just 17 months after the idea was first broached in Paris.
The Commission’s March 1998 “Comprehensive Partnership with China” 
initiative, which expanded on the earlier 1995 China strategy paper, drew inspiration 
from the 1997 France-China Declaration on a Global Partnership. Like the 1997 
France-China declaration, the EU’s 1998 paper envisaged a comprehensive partnership 
between the EU and China that included upgrading political consultation to annual 
summits, dialogue on human rights, support for China’s accession to the WTO, and the 
promotion of bilateral trade and investment. The ASEM process has facilitated regular 
high-level contacts between Chinese and European leaders. The occasion of ASEM II in 
London in April 1998 allowed Zhu Rongji to make his first official visit abroad (to 
London and Paris) as the new Chinese Prime Minister. The first EU-China summit, was 
held in London immediately after ASEM II.. Zhu’s reception in Europe was positive. 
He was hailed by the media as a liberalising reformer and “Chinese Gorbachev”.123 
Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, acknowledged the utility of 
multilateral dialogues like ASEM in complementing bilateral dialogues such as the EU-
119 In 1995, Chancellor Kohl proclaimed after his third visit to China in just over a year that Germany and 
China enjoyed a “special relationship”. See Shambaugh, China and Europe, p .21.
120 France (and Italy) justified their weapons transfer to China as contracts predating the 1989 sanctions. 
See Shambaugh, China and Europe, p.33 (fii.53).
l21“European Defence and Euro-Asia Security Relations,” Speech by Alain Richard, French Minister of  
Defence, Paris, 19 February 1999. Strategic talks with Japan began in 1994, and South Korea in 1996.
122 Hill, “Closing the Capabilities-Expectation Gap?”, p.32.
123 Liberation, 7 April 1998.
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China dialogue: “strong regional frameworks, such as the ASEAN, or the ASEM 
process, are gaining ground as the natural interlocutors for a more comprehensive and 
global dialogue....We should use these meetings to provide a new impetus across the 
full range of issues where we have shared concerns and interests.”124
Overall Trends
Grid 4.2 European Political-Strategic Positions in China, 1985-2002
85" 90 95 2002
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
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EU ♦ —► ♦ e -> ♦
- = Sanctions/Containment policy or Conflict with China 
0 = Ambiguous or neutral policy on China 
+ = Active Engagement with China
a In 1985, most EC countries had good and improving political relations with China. Britain had in 1984 
concluded negotiations with China on the return o f  Hong Kong, and Germany was expanding political 
contacts. The EC-China TCA had been signed between the Commission and China. Only the 
Netherlands had poor relations with China after the sale o f Dutch submarines to Taiwan. 
b Madrid Summit sanctions on China issued, June 1989.
c President Chirac and Prime Minister Balladur before him keen on mending fences with China, 
welcomed Chinese Presidential (1994 and 1997) and PM-level visitors (1995 and 1996). France 
championed the ASEM dialogue within the EU from 1994 to 1996. 
d Relations leading up to the 1997 handover o f  Hong Kong were tense
eThe Council approved the Commission’s paper, China A Comprehensive Framework, which welcomed 
upgraded political and economic ties but was critical o f China’s human rights record.
The French government’s position towards China evolved from neglect, through 
to confrontation (1989-92) then pro-active promoter of EU engagement with China 
between the 1980s and 2002. Over this period, the French position has become more 
“European” through a process of policy learning from Germany (sideways 
Europeanization) and exporting French ideas and initiative (such as ASEM) to the EU 
(projection or bottom-up Europeanization).
The Gaullist rhetoric of special relations between France and China 
notwithstanding, French policy makers have since 1993 skilfully played the European 
card to quietly and gradually increase French presence in Asian political affairs through 
a process of discreet diplomacy aimed at institution-building where France plays a role
124 “Future Relations between the European Union and Asia”, fourth ASEF Asia-Europe Lecture by 
Javier Solana, High Representative for the EU CFSP, Singapore, 26 July 2000.
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through the EU. French policy makers recognizes that “in this immense zone...where 
we are not the principal partner, interlocutor or protagonist, we do our work with 
perseverance to make links, create habits of consultation which did not exist
I je
before.. .and slowly but surely, I expect that this will bear fruit”.
I ll Human Rights
French human rights policy towards China underwent Europeanization in terms 
of policy convergence and policy projection because it coincided with the end of the 
Cold War and the rise of human rights as a priority issue in US and EU foreign policies. 
A vigorous French position on human rights was triggered by the crisis over the 
Tiananmen crackdown on 4 June 1989, with France playing a leading European and 
international role in support of the student demonstrators and condemning the Chinese 
government. The French government under President Mitterrand responded to public 
demands for Western governments to act firmly and in unison against China. Under 
President Chirac from 1995, a much more conciliatory and national human rights 
approach to China was adopted. The French “defection” from the common CFSP action 
at the 1997 UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) session was the culmination of 
several years of a softening French approach towards China (Part II of this chapter). 
Nonetheless, it created a storm in the EU and led the following year to a major CFSP 
reversal. In the highly publicized conclusion of the General Affairs Council in March 
1998, it was decided that neither the Presidency nor the member states should co­
sponsor a draft resolution on China at the 54th UNCHR session in 1998.126 This 
position has been repeated each year since then.
Part III examines the motivations behind first the policy convergence of EC 
governments in forging a common policy on human rights in China from 1989 to 1996, 
then the French-led defection from that consensus, followed by a new compromise 
consensus each year since 1998. As indicated in Parts I and II, the Europeanised 
common approach to human rights -  of which France had been a leading protagonist -
125 Foreign Minister V6drine’s speech at the 8th French Ambassadors’ Conference, Paris, 29 August 2000, 
as cited in Dorient 2002: 180. My translation.
126 Andrew Clapham, “Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How is it 
Manifested in Multilateral Fora?” in Philip Alston (ed), The European Union and Human Rights, Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1999, p.628.
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broke down when it conflicted with the new French government’s interests in improving 
French economic and political relations with China in the mid-1990s.
a) French Human Rights Policy and China
French policy-makers have long claimed that France has a “historic heritage” as 
the “cradle of human rights”, with a special role in promoting these rights. In the 1980s 
French foreign policy discourse started to contain normative references to the defence of 
human and citizenship rights, democracy and the rule of law. Although French policy 
makers stressed that French political and diplomatic interests should be pursued in 
compliance with moral interests, France in practice accorded little interest to human 
rights in its foreign policy. France tolerated and often supported repressive regimes in 
its former African colonies. Accordingly, until 1989 human rights in China were a low-
19ftpriority issue for France. The French government’s interest in human rights in China 
was incidental and largely confined to individual cases involving French nationals. For 
example, French ministers interceded in the case of French diplomat Emmanuel 
Bellefroid who had been expelled in 1981 and his Chinese fiancee, sentenced to two 
years’ “re-education” for Bellefroid’s alleged financing and support for Maoist 
reactionaries.129 The French government, like most other Western governments, by and 
large ignored domestic interest groups’ demands to pressure the Chinese government on 
gross human rights violations and abuses in China, notably during the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution.130
French reactions to the Tiananmen massacre were in line with the mainstream 
international shock and horror at the bloody crackdown on pro-democracy 
demonstrators in June 1989. However, French Socialist leaders reacted more 
“emotionally” and with less restraint than those of other Western democracies in their
127 Kessler, La Politique Etrangere de la France: Acteurs et processus, 1999, pp. 160-61.
128 Interview conducted in Paris, March 2001 with French diplomat based in Beijing in June 1989. He 
recounted that other EC members were surprised by France’s “extreme action” and the leading role (role 
moteur) played by France in pursuing an EC sanctions policy. This contrasted with the muted French 
reaction to the Algerian government’s massacre o f hundred of students in 1988, on a scale “greater than 
Tiananmen”.
129 Le Point, 16 November 1991.
130 See Andrew J Nathan, “China and the International Human Rights Regime”, in Elizabeth Economy, 
and Michel Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1999, p. 148.
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identification with and support for the student demonstrators.131 Paris particularly
infuriated Beijing because it offered political asylum to the dissident student leaders.
1Not only were they given a special place in the bicentennial Bastille Day parade, 
Mitterrand publicly expressed sympathy for the exiled opposition and the French 
authorities allowed them to set up an organization, the Federation for Democracy in 
China (FDC) in Paris in September 1989.133 France was a leading advocate in the 
coordinated EC “Madrid sanctions” on China, human rights dialogue, and holding 
China accountable in international fora such as the CHR.
The French position began to shift in 1994 under Prime Minister Balladur and 
the normalization of French relations with China. Relations had become frosty after 4 
years of confrontation over Tiananmen and arms sales to Taiwan. The French approach 
moved towards a more pragmatic stance that emphasised economic exchange and 
implicitly acknowledged the validity of Chinese arguments that human rights could be 
culturally relative. The policy shift was reinforced by President Chirac’s philosophical- 
semantic approach to human rights in China from 1995. Finally, France in 1997 broke 
ranks with the EU practice since 1990 of sponsoring the human rights resolution on 
China at the CHR, one month ahead of Chirac’s state visit to China. Due to the fact that 
the French were so instrumental in the European position of 1989, the French policy 
reversal in 1997 was stunning. This was impelled essentially by national political- 
economic motivations to improve the atmospherics and substance of France-China 
bilateral relations. In effect, the French failure to project their new preferences since 
1994 into a general EU position convinced them to break away (together with Germany, 
Italy and Spain) from supporting the annual EU sponsorship of the UNCHR resolution. 
Even so, the French sought to preserve a semblance of European unity despite this split, 
and defended their action in terms of serving the larger “European interest” through 
engaging China in human rights dialogue rather than ritually criticizing it at the 
UNCHR. From March 1998, a new European approach to human rights in China was 
codified in the Commission’s strategy paper, “Building a Comprehensive Partnership 
with China”.
1311 am grateful to Marie Holzman for pointing this out. Peyrefitte 1997:296 criticised the Socialist 
government’s post-Tiananmen China policy as based on the “emotion du m om enf\
132 Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, p. 117.
133 Fran9oise Mengin, “The Prospects for France-Taiwan Relations”, pp.51-52.
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b) The EU’s Human Rights policy in China
In the area of human rights, interactions between France, the EC and China were 
non-controversial until Tiananmen. Periodic disputes on EC quotas and tariffs on 
Chinese goods occurred, and EC producers complained about Chinese market access 
obstacles, but the General Affairs Council was not involved in EC-China interactions. 
Tiananmen politicised the Community approach to economic relations with China. The 
introduction of sanctions, human rights and the UNCHR issues in EC-China relations 
shifted much of the discussions on China to the Council and CFSP structures. For 
example, the Commission which had hitherto refrained from political comments, issued 
a statement expressing “consternation” and “shock” at the “brutal suppression” in 
Beijing, and cancelled Foreign Trade Minister Zheng Tuobin’s scheduled visit to 
Brussels.134
From 1989 to 1997, the EU policy on human rights in China lay principally in 
(i) the sanctions policy (effectively lifted in October 1990), (ii) dialogue between 
individual EU governments and China, and (iii) holding China accountable in 
multilateral fora, in particular the CHR by annually co-sponsoring with the US a 
resolution criticizing China’s human rights record.135 All three approaches often 
invoked a vigorous response from the Chinese alleging foreign “interference” in 
China’s domestic affairs.
In a demonstration of swift and effective policy coordination and convergence, 
the 12 EC countries formed a collective human rights EU policy towards China that 
included sanctions. At its 27 June 1989 Madrid summit, the EC-12 announced that they 
would impose a package of 10 joint sanctions on China. The two key sanctions were the 
suspension of soft loans and a ban on military sales.136 Other sanctions included the 
immediate suspension of high-level contacts and financial aid, reduction of cultural, 
scientific and technical cooperation, and extension of visas to students seeking
107 # #
asylum. From Paris’ perspective, there were several benefits to the Europeanization
134 Shambaugh, “China and Europe”, p.l 1.
135 Some human rights activists consider this the most “symbolically important” EU policy in monitoring 
and moderating human rights in China. See Baker 2002.
136 Roland Dumas, “Situation en Chine: Reponse de M. Roland Dumas, Ministre d’Etat des Affaires 
Etrangeres, k une question ecrite au S6nat”, 25 January 1990, Quai d’Orsay website 
(www.doc.diplomatie.fr ).
137 Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality”, p.342.
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of human rights policy towards China, as well as coordination with other Western 
governments. First, it dovetailed with general Western consternation at the brutal 
crackdown of the Chinese authorities on unarmed student demonstrators in Tiananmen 
Square. Besides Mitterrand, US, British, Swiss, German and Australian leaders swiftly
n o
expressed their particular revulsion at the crackdown. Second, the crackdown 
coincided with the bicentennial of the French Revolution, and France had decided to 
make human rights the main theme of the celebrations. There were popular and 
Socialist party demands for France to stand up for human rights as the originating 
country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Third, as Socialists, President 
Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Dumas were keen to portray themselves as defenders 
of human rights. They wanted France to be seen as still having a civilizing, universal 
and relevant mission in the world 200 years after the French Revolution. The Madrid 
sanctions were reinforced on 15 July with the agreement of Canada, the US and Japan at 
the G7 summit hosted by France.139 Fourthly, a collective position allowed individual 
countries to gain strength in numbers and to spread out the risks of Chinese 
retaliation.140 The EC-12 held together in supporting most of these sanctions from June 
1989 to October 1990, the date when most of the sanctions were lifted (except the ban 
on military sales, which is officially still in force at writing).
The CHR approach was adhered to each year from 1990 to 1996, except 1991 
because the US, Britain and France needed China’s vote in the Security Council to 
endorse allied action against Iraq in the Gulf War. Although the resolution was always 
defeated by a no-action motion (except in 1995), the move was politically symbolic and 
significant in underlining the EU’s commitment each spring to improvements in China’s 
human rights record. However, mercantilist considerations chipped away the collective 
EC resolve and discipline so that EC countries were competing to get back into the 
Chinese market as early as the end of 1989. Almost a year before the EC officially lifted 
the economic sanctions in October 1990, both Germany and France breached the EC 
sanctions on financial aid and extended soft loans to projects undertaken by German and
138 Andrew Nathan et al (eds), The Tiananmen Papers, 2001, p.397.
139 Dumas, “Situation en Chine”, op cit.
140 This point was made by the British Embassy in Paris. Interview in March 2001.
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French companies in China.141 In February 1990, France offered China new loans and 
authorized its export credit guarantee body to cover the China risk. This move was 
followed by Italy, then West Germany in April.142 The cracks in the material and 
symbolic aspects of the sanctions policy were partly a response to Chinese concessions 
(the Chinese lifted martial law in January 1990), but also a result of the perception that 
the US executive was not fully behind that policy. Although the EC-12 formally 
decided to retain the ban on military sales and military contacts at their October 1990 
Luxembourg summit, further breaches in the common foreign policy occurred as Spain 
became the first to send its Foreign Minister to Beijing. These cracks widened because 
of China’s perceived importance to global and regional order, especially with its role in 
the UN Security Council in the light of the Gulf War.
Aside from common actions taken under CFSP, individual governments raised 
human rights concerns in their discussions with Chinese leaders. During his visit to 
Beijing in April 1991, Dumas urged the Chinese government to grant amnesty to the 
Chinese dissidents, and to demonstrate respect for human rights.143 The British worked 
hard to win assurances from China that basic democratic freedoms and rights would be 
respected after Hong Kong was transferred to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. 
Meanwhile, the European Parliament (EP) has been the most consistent and vocal EU 
institution on the human rights situation in China. The EP has since 1987 made public, 
regular criticisms of the Chinese human rights record, especially on Tibet. In 1996, the 
EP even awarded Wei Jingsheng - China’s most celebrated dissident - the Sakharov 
prize for Freedom of Thought.144
c) The 1997 debacle: French National Interests vs. EU Solidarity
Following the Japanese and German examples in abandoning human rights 
pressure on China so as to promote trade, the French government also set out to modify 
its human rights approach in order regain its share of the China market. Commercial 
and political relations had suffered after France’s initial hardline human rights stand in 
response to Tiananmen, and were further battered after the 1992 Mirage sale to Taiwan.
141 The German government released DM460 million in October for the construction o f the Shanghai 
metro system, and the French government released FF830 million in December for a Citroen factory in 
Wuhan. See Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face a Pekin”, p.93.
142 Ibid.
143 Le Monde, 28-29 April 1991, Liberation, 2 May 1991.
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The victory of the French Right in the general elections in 1993 set the stage for a 
change in French human rights policy. The change was controversial in French 
intellectual and even government circles, but after 1996, Chirac’s “philosophical- 
semantic” approach gradually became established French policy.
The Balladur-led normalisation of relations with China in 1994 sparked a heated 
human rights debate in France.145 French “China hands” attacked the government by 
using the Chamberlain analogy to reprimand the Balladur government for “sacrificing” 
both France’s moral position on human rights in a repressive China, and abandoning a 
democratising Taiwan. France was seen as being “discreet” on China’s human rights 
record in the hope of commercial gain and appeasing China.146 The accommodating 
French position towards human rights in China was further reinforced when Jacques 
Chirac -  a Gaullist enamoured by East Asian civilizations, philosophy and art - was 
elected President in May 1995. Chirac’s approach to human rights in China is pragmatic 
and accommodates the Chinese argument for cultural relativism. Foreign Minister 
Herve de Charette had promised “discretion” rather than a “belligerent position during 
his visit to Beijing in February 1996. This approach went down very well with the 
Chinese, at the time engaged in a protracted quarrel with Britain over Governor Chris 
Patten’s “unilateral actions” on constitutional reform in Hong Kong.147 De Charette 
confidently declared that France-China relations were “cordial again”.148 At the 
inaugural ASEM summit in Bangkok in March 1996, Prime Minister Li Peng urged 
Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac to press for the dropping of the annual UNCHR 
resolution criticising China’s human rights record, a resolution the EC had sponsored 
six times since 1990.
De Charette made it clear ahead of Li Peng’s contentious visit to Paris in April 
1996 that France was more interested in pragmatic economic relations with China. The 
French government agreed to Li Peng’s demand that he should neither “see nor hear
144 Nathan, “China and the International Human Rights Regime”, p. 155.
145 For a defence o f this normalization, see Interview with Foreign Minister Alain Jupp6, “Diplomatic 
Frangaise: Le Deuxieme Souffle”, Politique Internationale 61, 1993.
146 See article by Jean-Luc Domenach, one of France’s foremost sinologists, in Le Monde, 11 February 
1996; International Herald Tribune, 12 April 1996; also Marie Holzman, “Chine: Requiem pour les 
droits de l’homme”, Politique Internationale, Printemps 1997, pp.369-83.
147 Percy Craddock, Experiences o f  China, new ed., London: John Murray, 1999, pp.272-285.
148 Le Monde, 10 February 1996.
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public protests.” 149 De Charette pointed out that what was important about Li Peng’s 
visit were the economic deals, including a definite sale of 30 airbuses, an agreement for 
Citroen to increase its car production in China, and a new joint venture project worth 
FF500 million.150 Notwithstanding this understanding, Li’s visit was plagued by 
controversy and demonstrations by human rights and Tibetan as well as Taiwan 
independentists- albeit out of Li’s sight. An embarrassing “diplomatic incident” 
occurred when Li Peng kept his host Prime Minister Alain Juppe waiting for over an 
hour at an official dinner over Juppe’s refusal to remove references to the human rights 
situation in China in his toast. After frantic negotiations between the Quai d’Orsay and 
the Chinese Embassy, a compromise was reached in which both sides agreed to cancel 
their speeches since Juppe refused to drop the offending paragraphs.151 Chirac’s 
approach can be characterised as one which does not preclude the discussion of human
1 Orights, but only as a “private philosophical-semantic” discussion . In de Charette’s 
words, it was “a new approach, constructive and dynamic, preferring constructive
1 ^ 3dialogue to confrontation”.
Jacques Chirac’s “constructive dialogue” approach to human rights in China was 
confirmed in the lead-up to his May 1997 state visit.154 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen announced in Paris in January that he was convinced that a “strategy of 
cooperation...would go further toward ensuring that progress is made than a strategy of 
confrontation”. De Charette was reported to have remarked that it was “preposterous 
for the West, which invaded and humiliated China in modem times, to ‘lecture’ China, a 
country with a 5000-year old civilization, on the Human Rights Declaration and the US 
Constitution, which are merely 200 years old.”155 The new French position was brought 
to bear at the 53rd UNCHR debate in April 1997 in Geneva. Unable to persuade its EU 
partners and the Dutch EU Presidency to drop the resolution criticizing China, France
149 Li Peng cancelled plans to visit Luxembourg and the Netherlands because they refused to guarantee a 
demonstration-free visit. See Le Monde, 9 April 1996.
I50Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, pp. 193-194.
151 See Le Monde and Le Figaro, 12 April 1996. A more detailed account o f the incident and Li Peng’s
aversion to human rights issues is found in Peyrefitte 1997:346-348.
152 This expression is found in Liberation, 12 April 1996.
153 Herv6 de Charette, “Politique Etrangere de la France en Chine: Riponse du Ministre des Affaires
Etrang&res, a une question dcrite au Senat”, 3 April 1997, on www.doc.diplomatie.fr.
154 Many commentators drew a direct line between French UNCHR action and Chirac’s Beijing visit. See 
David Allen and Michael Smith, “External Policy Developments” in Geoffrey Edwards and Georg 
Wiessala, The European Union 1997: Annual Review o f  Activities, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, p.85.
155 Beijing Review, 26 May-1 June 1997.
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decided to withdraw its support from the ritual EU sponsorship of the resolution. 
Instead France led the “airbus group” (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) in defecting 
from the common position. It was left to Denmark to draft the resolution, and the US 
and 14 other Western countries to co-sponsor it. With the split in EU ranks, the vote 
was 27 in favour of China’s no-action motion, 17 against and 9 abstentions, the most 
stunning repudiation of the UNCHR mechanism condemning China since the campaign 
started in 1990.156 The UNCHR debacle was celebrated as a spectacular victory by 
Chinese diplomacy. Meanwhile France was heavily criticized by many Western 
governments for “kowtowing to Chinese pressure”, putting short-term national 
economic interests over collective long-term EU interests and hence undermining the 
EU’s credibility and its own credentials as the birthplace of human rights157. The stage 
was then set for Chirac’s state visit to China in May 1997, where a France-China joint 
declaration was issued. On human rights, it declared that both parties would “respect 
diversity” and take into account the “particularities of all sides”.158
When Zhu Rongji visited France on his first bilateral visit as the new Chinese 
Prime Minister in April 1998, he declared that there were “identical views” on human 
rights between France and China.159 Zhu was hailed by the French media as a reformer 
and “Chinese Gorbachev”, an almost triumphal reception compared to the ritual human 
rights, Tibetan independence and other demonstrations that ritually greeted visits by 
Jiang Zemin and especially Li Peng. Even under Chirac’s 1997-2002 Cohabitation with 
Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, the accommodating French position was 
maintained. Jospin’s official visit to Beijing in September 1998- “a necessary step, like 
Washington and Moscow” for presidential hopefuls- was noteworthy for its adherence 
to the Chirac policy on human rights. Jospin contented himself with emphasizing 
China’s importance to international finance in the context of the Asian financial crisis 
and kept to the “private philosophical-semantic” approach developed by Chirac in 
discussing human rights with Chinese leaders160. This allowed Jiang Zemin to assert 
China’s “right to be different” during his state visit to Paris, in October 1999.161
156 Beijing Review, 5-11 May 1997.
157 Interviews with Dutch, British and Chinese Embassies in Paris, April 1997.
158 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration conjointe Franco-chinoise pour un Partenariat 
Global, P6kin, 16 May 1997. See also English translation in Beijing Review, 2-8 June 1997.
159 Liberation, 1 April 1998.
160 Liberation 25 and 27 September 1998.
161 Le Monde 30 October 1999.
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d) Compromise and EU Coordination from 1998
The 1997 rift in EU solidarity at the UNCHR and Chinese retaliation against 
Denmark convinced the EU member states of the need to fine-tune and formalise a 
common Council position on China ahead of the next UNCHR.163 The 14 March 1998 
General Affairs Council agreed that at the upcoming 1998 UNCHR session, the EU 
would “neither propose nor endorse, either by the organization as a whole or by 
individual members” any resolution criticizing China.164 In effect, the French position 
had won the day and the “hardliners” found themselves tied to an EU position projected 
by France. This Europeanised position not to co-sponsor (albeit with reservations 
expressed by the “hardliners”) the UNCHR resolution with the US has been reached at 
the Council each March since 1998. The Council has typically agreed that the EU 
should adopt the following approach at the UNCHR on China165:
If the resolution is put to a vote, EU members of the Commission will vote in 
favour, but the EU will not co-sponsor;
EU members will vote against a no-action motion, should one be presented, and 
the EU will actively encourage other Commission members to do likewise, since 
in the EU’s view, the very notion of no-action is itself contrary to the spirit of 
dialogue.166
The above approach can be viewed as a compromise convergence of EU 
member states’ preferences, between the pragmatic minimalist approach of the French- 
led “airbus group” and the idealist approach of the human rights “hardliners”. Since the 
EU-15 could not reach a consensus on outright support or abandonment of the 
resolution, it was felt that the EU should balance its non-sponsorship of the resolution 
with voting in support of the resolution and against no-action. The 1998 position 
represented a classic intergovernmental compromise, managing to combine quite
162 The Chinese delayed high-level visits, cancelled contracts and suspended exchange and cooperation on 
human rights issues with Denmark. See Beijing Review, 5-11 May 1997. According to the British 
Embassy in Paris, the general reaction in the other European capitals was “thank goodness it’s not us!” 
Interview in March 2001. Relations between Beijing and Copenhagen were normalized in the autumn. 
See The European Union 1997, p.85.
163 In my interview with the Quai d’Orsay CFSP directorate in March 2001, the analogy was drawn with 
the 1982 incident when the Netherlands was ‘punished’ by China (downgrading o f diplomatic relations to 
Charge d’Affaires level until normalization in 1984) for selling submarines to Taiwan. See also Mengin, 
“France-Taiwan Relations”, Issues and Studies, 28/3, March 1992.
164 Beijing Review, 6-12 April 1997.
165 Interviews with Quai d’Orsay CFSP directorate and British Embassy in Paris, March 2001.
166 See EU General Affairs Council, Human Rights - Conclusions, General Affairs Council 2338th 
Council meeting, Brussels, 19 March 2001.
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different preferences into a common position that is not altogether cohesive or coherent. 
In catalysing a change in the EU’s CHR policy on China, France had Europeanised its 
human rights policy by “exporting its national policy model, ideas and details to the 
EU” on not confronting China by supporting an EC-sponsored resolution. However, 
France was also subject to top-down Europeanization. It had to coordinate and 
harmonise its position with the other member states on voting in favour of a resolution.
Aside from the CHR approach, the Commission’s 25 March 1998 paper on 
China stressed two main sets of activities: dialogue and cooperation projects. The EU- 
China dialogue on human rights forms the main component of dialogue activities. 
Initiated in January 1996 and interrupted by China after the EU tabled a resolution in 
the 1996 UNCHR session, they were resumed in 1997 only after French success in 
changing the EU’s CHR policy. Held alternately in China and Europe, 9 dialogue 
sessions were organized between 1997 and 2000, providing a forum “to engage China 
on sensitive issues, channel EU concerns, provide arguments to the relevant Chinese 
authorities, and generate proposals for cooperation projects”.169 The existence of the 
human rights dialogue does not preclude the EU expressing publicly its concerns at 
human rights violations in China. In 1999 and 2000, the EU Presidency expressed 
serious concern at the human rights situation in China in its annual opening statements 
to the CHR session. China’s recent tightening of political controls in 1999 arose from 
the regime’s nervousness over the politically charged anniversaries that year, (eg the 
1919 May Fourth Movement, 1949 Chinese revolution, 1989 Tiananmen). Chinese 
back-pedalling on its commitment to sign the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) prompted German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to deliver 
an unusually sharp criticism of China’s human rights record at the 1999 UNCHR 
session on behalf of the European Union.170
In terms of cooperation projects (initiated by the Commission to support and 
complement the human rights dialogue), the flagship project is the EU-China Legal and 
Judicial Programme, launched in March 2000 and expected to last at least 4 years. A
167 Interview with British Embassy in Paris, March 2001.
168 Bulmer and Burch, “The Europeanization o f Central Government”, p.6.
169 European Commission, “Report on the Implementation o f the Communication ‘Building a 
Comprehensive Partnership with China’”, COM (2000) 552, Brussels, 8 September 2000.
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contract worth €13.2 million was signed with a consortium led by the British Council, 
with the programme aimed at strengthening the rule of law in China through training 
and exchange schemes for Chinese legal practitioners. A Master of Law course in
171human rights is also being set up at the University of Hong Kong. China has also 
responded positively to various European governments’ national initiatives to discuss 
on a bilateral basis human rights, the rule of law and legal frameworks. It was felt that 
to promote the rule of law, the EU should work to help China develop a “sound and 
transparent framework of civil and criminal law... helping Chinese citizens use the right 
that the increasing growth of the rule of law will provide, and training lawyers and
I 77judges”. On civil society, “the aim here is to assist Chinese society itself by 
promoting grass-roots democracy, consumers' rights and the rights of ethnic minorities 
and other vulnerable social groups, not least through the provision of targeted co-
i n'l
operation policies in these areas.”
Combined with high-level diplomatic exchanges and symposia, the EU-China 
human rights dialogue and cooperation projects were a means of responding to criticism 
of the EU’s failure to sanction China because of intra-EU economic competition. These 
activities satisfied a desire among many Western officials to do something concrete in a 
country where much needed to be done. In the 1995 EU strategy paper on China that 
was unveiled by EC Vice-President and External Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, 
it was hinted that trade concerns and China’s capacity to react affected the EU’s human 
rights policy. In a revealing passage, the paper stated that:
A commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the heart of EU 
policy worldwide. ...The key criterion for pursuing human rights initiatives 
must be effectiveness, the impact that an initiative would have on the ground. 
For this reason, there is a danger that relying solely on frequent and strident 
declarations will dilute the message or lead to knee-jerk reactions from the 
Chinese government. To make progress, all the EU institutions should pursue 
human rights issues through a combination of carefully timed statements, formal 
and private discussions and practical cooperation.174
170 Speech by Joschka Fischer, German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and President o f the EU 
Council o f Ministers at the 55th session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 23 March 1999.
171 European Commission, “Report on the Implementation o f  the Communication ‘Building a 
Comprehensive Partnership with China’”, COM (2000) 552, Brussels, 8 September 2000.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 European Commission, “A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations”, COM (95)279 final, 
Brussels, 5 July 1995. The Europeanization o f the member states’ human rights policy on China has
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The convergence, or Europeanization, of the member states’ human rights 
policies on China has arguably watered down the positions of some of the more hardline 
countries at key multilateral fora such as the UNCHR. A combination of the hard 
European Parliament and hardline governments’ unilateral approaches combined with 
the conciliatory EU approach of “constructive dialogue” pioneered by France, could be 
viewed as a way of engaging China through a mixture of negative measures and positive 
incentives.175 Even Chris Patten, a long-time critic of China, acknowledged that the 
“European Union-China Human Rights dialogue is actually getting somewhere....it is 
not just the exchange of pleasantries about the sort of world we would like to live in.”176
Overall Trends
Grid 4.3 European Human Rights Positions in China, 1985-2002
0 + 0 0 + 0 +
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EU ♦ —> ♦b — ♦ ' — <— ♦
- = Confrontational/critical policy 
0 = Ambiguous policy or “silent diplomacy ” with China 
+ = “Constructive Engagement” with China
a Mitterrand-Dumas policy very critical o f  China’s human rights record after Tiananmen, supportive o f  
Chinese dissidents in France and democratisation in China.
bEC policy on pressuring China on human rights at international fora agreed at Madrid summit, 1989. 
c Britain and the Netherlands defend the majority EU position criticising human rights in China at CHR, 
which conflicted with France’s “constructive dialogue” and Germany (and Italy’s) “silent diplomacy”.
The record of French policy on human rights in China exhibits simultaneously 
all three processes of Europeanization. In the aftermath of Tiananmen in 1989, France 
was among the countries that worked hardest at cobbling together a set of common EC 
sanctions and policies to promote human rights in China, and advocated harmonizing 
member states’ policies in this issue-area (convergence and projection Europeanization).
arguably watered down the commitment o f  some o f the more hardline countries’ positions at the 
UNCHR.
175 Simma, Aschenbrenner and Schulte, “Human Rights and Development Cooperation”, in Alston 1999, 
pp.578-80 define a positive approach as an incentive-based one which does not infringe on the 
sovereignty o f  the State. Positive measures constitute policies that support and are increasingly based on 
consensus and consultation through political dialogue.
176 European Commission, Press Conference by Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, 
Brussels, 16 December 1999, DOC/99/18.
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Paradoxically, it was France that broke the EU consensus in 1997 and struck out on a 
new path (see Grid 4.3), backed by the “Airbus countries”.
Dealing with China on the subject of human rights remains a bone of contention 
within the EU, between member states who prefer making China publicly accountable 
at international fora, and those who prefer silent diplomacy or constructive engagement. 
While France chose a Gaullist tack in 1997, it is nonetheless constrained by the general 
EU consensus at the GAC that China’s human rights record is in need of improvement. 
French leaders can and often do in their bilateral dialogue gloss over or ignore human 
rights altogether with the Chinese. However, they are obliged to vote en bloc against a 
no-action motion should China resist a resolution at the CHR.
Conclusions
At the establishment of French diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with a 
People’s Republic of China shunned by the US and most of the West in 1964, French 
relations with China exhibited the strong Gaullist trademarks of national foreign policy 
independence (vis-a-vis the US), a strategic “special” friendship with a growing Asian 
power that had just turned nuclear, and political rhetoric on building a balanced 
multipolar world. Although de Gaulle’s objectives were ambiguous and France in 
substance kept substantive relations with Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China on 
Taiwan, France made a bold diplomatic statement by being the first major Western 
country to recognize and build political relations with communist China. Georges 
Pompidou in 1972 was the first Western head of state to visit China officially, although 
by then France had been overshadowed by the US’ decision, under Nixon and 
Kissinger, to end its isolation of China. Today, French relations with China -  as 
outlined in the Chirac-Jiang Joint Declaration - continue to exhibit Gaullist 
characteristics: political rhetoric on national grandeur, cooperation with China in 
building a multi-polar world order, and claims of a “special relationship”.
Notwithstanding the Gaullist political statements of Pompidou and Chirac, there 
has been little in terms of concrete bilateral cooperation between France and China 
amounting to a “special relationship”, aside from shared anxieties and opposition to US 
unilateralism. In fact, the age-old alternations between “romanticized” French views of
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China as utopia versus views of China as a Yellow Peril and source of the
• 177“confrontation of two civilizations”, is still evident in French attitudes towards China. 
Mitterrand’s neglect of China for most of the 1980s turned, following Tiananmen, into 
strident French exceptionalism, with France taking the human rights torch in criticizing 
China, extending moral support, and giving asylum to student demonstrators and other 
pro-democracy dissidents in the early 1990s. The Mitterrand-Dumas human rights 
approach was in many ways a manifestation of Gaullist activism in pushing an 
international ideological agenda, this time in confrontation with China and using the EU 
as an umbrella. The French Lafayette and Mirage sales to Taiwan were also policies 
related to Gaullist ambitions to make France a strategic player in Northeast Asia. The 
manufacture and delivery of the last of the 60 Mirage fighters, made only in 2001-2, 
gives the French military a long-term training, supplies and maintenance role in one of 
the most advanced air force establishments in Northeast Asia.178 This lends credence to 
larger French claims to a continued global security role as a Permanent Member of the 
UNSC, and one of the guarantor countries following the Korean armistice, as well as the 
1973 and 1991 Paris Peace Accords following the Second and Third Indochina Wars.
Compared to the Gaullist perspective, economic explanations of French policy 
in China are limited in their explanatory value. French economic exchanges with China 
were insignificant even in the first years after 1964 when France enjoyed for a short 
while the status as China’s largest Western trading partner (thanks to political grands 
contrats) until Nixon’s decision to visit China and China’s entry into the UN, in 1971. 
In economic and investment exchanges, France is but for the EU a minor player in 
China’s rapid economic development. It must rely on the EC to gain a voice in China’s 
affairs, eg. in WTO negotiations. France deploys high-handed political tactics and 
portrays French business as “European” (and hence appeals to China’s anxieties over an 
over-dependence on the US or Japan) in hard-nosed negotiations to win high-value and 
highly publicized grands contrats such as the delivery of Airbuses to China’s airlines.
177 Peyrefitte, Le choc des civilisations, 1970; Erik Israeliwicz, Ce Monde qui nous attend: les Peurs 
frangaises et I ’Economie, Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1997; Cabestan, “Paris-Pdkin: Un Dialogue sans 
Complexes?”. See also Stdphane Courtois et al, Le Livre noir du Communisme, 1996, which contains a 
highly critical chapter on atrocities committed under China’s communist governments .
178 A French Defence official noted that the Chinese were furious that France dared to act like a “mini 
US” in its argument that China should accord France the same right as the US in selling advanced 
weapons to Taiwan. He noted that France expected to be involved in Taiwan’s military for “at least 20 
years.” Interview with Diplomatic Advisor, cabinet of Defence Minister Alain Richard, Paris, March 
2001 .
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One may argue that in the 1990s, EU policy towards China has effectively been 
“Germanised”, in that Germany has succeeded in exporting its model of discreet 
diplomacy, change through trade and non-confrontation on human rights to the EU 
level. In other words, Germany has “Europeanised” what was originally a member 
state’s national China policy. This is most patent in the economic and trade issue-area, 
where the issue of human rights has been de-linked from trade.
Returning to the three variations of the Europeanization process proposed in 
chapter two, we see all three processes at work in French policy towards China. “Top- 
down” Europeanization, where France is increasingly constrained by CFSP agreements, 
EU directives, policy positions and coordinated actions in its approach to China, was 
seen paradoxically in the strong intra-EU reaction to France in 1997 breaking away 
from the agreed human rights approach to China at the Commission on Human Rights. 
With the progress of European integration and European foreign policy encroachment 
into French policy, France had to work hard to rally the other member states to a new 
compromise position from 1998. One might argue that France “Europeanised” its China 
policy in the first place in 1989 by projecting French preferences of confrontation with 
China onto larger European structures and processes (“bottom-up” projection 
Europeanization), then ran into stiff resistance when attempting to reverse what had 
become established EU policy by trying to export a more conciliatory national policy 
onto the EU.
France may continue to see in China a nation that it could deal with on Gaullist, 
often selfish national-interest terms, but the overall trend is a movement towards 
harmonization and convergence of member states’ policies towards China. In human 
rights, France may have defected from the specific agreed EU action of sponsoring a 
resolution at the CHR, but it had to redouble its efforts urging the Chinese government 
along other paths desired by the EU, eg. signing onto the ICCPR, resuming the EU- 
China dialogue on human rights, and in 1998 agreeing to a common GAC position to 
vote in favour of a resolution on China (albeit one not sponsored by the EU). 
Harmonisation was strongest when there was convergence of internal member states’ 
national goals and external demands for a strong and unified EU presence. This was the 
case in ASEM’s genesis, where EU member states and the Commission between 1993 
and 1995 agreed on the need to engage China in a political framework, and Asian states
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called on the EU to engage in a summit-level dialogue with East Asia in order to 
counter-balance perceived excessive US (and growing Chinese) influence in the region.
Since 1994 France has invested considerably in building a close political 
relationship with China: high-level political visits, “constructive dialogue” on human 
rights, annual consultations at presidential level, close consultation in the UN Security 
Council on international issues. It has championed forging a web of multilateral 
dialogue and engagement with China via the Asia-Europe Meeting and EU-China 
Dialogue. In the grids comparing the national positions of France, Britain, Germany 
and the Commission on China in the three issue-areas of economics, political-strategic 
interests and human rights, there is overall a more coordinated European position on 
China in 2000 compared to 1985, and certainly in relation to the defections from the 
common EC sanctions in 1990, and the disaccord in 1997 over the CHR debate. Even 
in the area of human rights, the common EU positions built from 1989 acted as a 
constraint and damper on the French defection in 1997. The French justified their 
behaviour as serving the larger “European interest” in promoting the cause of human 
rights in China more effectively through quiet diplomacy and dialogue rather than open 
confrontation. Over time, European policy-making elites can be expected to share even 
more coordination reflexes on foreign policy towards China. They have similar values 
and interests in China’s economic development, diplomatic-military power, as well as 
its political and social evolution. Having lost the last of their historical colonial staging 
posts and special privileges in China (as have Britain and Portugal since 1997 and 
1999), EU member states will have to work together (and with the US and Asian states) 
in order to make any significant economic or political impact on developments in China.
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Chapter Five 
Japan
Beyond fascination and suspicion
References to contemporary France-Japan relations in scholarly studies are 
usually incidental and framed in Europe’s economic relations with Japan or vice versa.1 
Very few books or detailed studies have been dedicated to France-Japan relations per 
se.2 This chapter would argue that the two predominant themes in Paris’ relations with 
Tokyo are fascination and suspicion. The fascination for Japan, led by French writers 
and painters such as Baudelaire, Loti, Monet and Toulouse-Lautrec, was confined 
primarily to exoticising Japan for its art and culture. It is evident in the century-long 
French love affair with japonisme (the movement of Japanese influences in Western 
art), which heavily permeated Impressionism and Art Nouveau from the second half of
t hthe 19 century. French cultural luminaries popularised japonaiserie, the craze in 
Europe at the turn of the twentieth century for Japanese objets d’art, propagating an 
“exotic-aesthetic” image of and fascination for Japan.4 On the flip side of this aesthetic 
image of Japan is an abiding fear and suspicion of Japan’s political, military and 
economic ambitions. This has its roots in Japan’s spectacular modernization and 
successes in the military field (defeat of China in 1895, Russia in 1905, over-running 
French Indochina in 1940 then taking over all the European colonies in Southeast Asia 
in World War II) as well as its economic superpower status by the 1970s.
1 See Brian Bridges’ EC-Japanese Relations: In Search o f  a Partnership, London: RIIA/JIIA, 1992; 
“Japan and Europe: Rebalancing a Relationship”, Asian Survey 32/3, March 1992:230-245; and Europe 
and the Challenge o f  the Asia Pacific, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, Ch.3; Peter Lowe, “Japan and 
Europe in the Occupation Period, 1945-52”, in Bert Endstrom (ed), The Japanese and Europe, 2000; 
Kazuki Iwanaga, “Europe in Japan’s Foreign Policy”, in Endstrom (ed), The Japanese and Europe.
~ The rare exceptions include KoTchiro Matsuura, La Diplomatie japonaise a I ’aube du 21e siecle: 
Reflexions sur les relations du Japon avec la France et sur son role international, Paris: Publications 
orientalistes de France, 1998; and to a lesser extent, Christian Sautter’s La France au Miroir du Japon: 
Croissance ou Declin, Paris: Odile Jacob, 1996, which compares France’s economy with Japan’s.
3 Ministere de la Culture et de la Communication, Le Japonisme, Paris: Editions de la Reunion des 
musees nationaux, 1988, pp. 16-32.
4 See Endymion Wilkinson’s classic Japan versus Europe: A History o f Misunderstanding, Middlesex, 
England: Pelican, 1983, pp.43-52; Ian Littlewood, The Idea o f  Japan: Western Images, Western Myths, 
London: Seeker and Warburg, 1996; Matsuura 98.
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The influential Wilkinsonian thesis of European attitudes and policies towards 
Japan running on outdated stereotypes and misunderstanding has been applied in 
particular to France. France-Japan ties are characterised as an “emotional love-hate 
relationship”.5 Some scholars argue that bilateral relations remain fragile and that the 
Japanese remain wary of France as the European country that could most easily turn 
“anti-Japanese”.6 The Wilkinson-Bridges thesis of France-Japan relations as 
“emotional” is right in highlighting the surprising lack of a stable, long-standing 
relationship between France and Japan compared, for example, to that which the UK, 
Germany and especially the US enjoyed with Japan. This perspective of an “emotional” 
relationship, however, has limited value beyond accounting for episodic bouts of 
“Japanophobia” and “Japanophilia” in France. It obscures a more complex relationship 
which included French involvement in building Japan’s navy in the 19th century, and 
French economists and leaders (including Chirac) holding up Japanese society and 
economic organization as a model.
This chapter argues that explaining contemporary French attitudes and policies 
towards Japan requires understanding the interplay between France’s post-1945 
obsession with great-power status, and Japan’s post-war economic, security and foreign 
policy dependence on the US (Japan regained its independence in 1952 at the end of the 
American occupation and was admitted into the UN only in 1956). French foreign 
policy’s Gaullist preoccupations after World War II with national independence and 
security issues, effectively ruled out close foreign policy coordination between the two 
countries. Japan’s security situation (it was not at peace with either the USSR or 
Communist China) and pacifist Constitution made it dependent on security guarantees 
from the US. Japanese foreign policy was limited to national economic recovery and 
growth. Japan was thus viewed as being of little political significance, “being closely 
allied with, and subordinate to the United States.”8
5 Also Wilkinson, Japan versus the West: Images and Reality, London: Penguin Books, 1990; Marc 
Rigaudis, Japon Mepris...Passion: Regards de la France sur le Japon de 1945 a 1995, Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1998; and Bridges, EC-Japanese Relations, p.10. Littlewood (1996) and others argue that a 
large number o f works on Japan produced in the West falls into the Orientalist tradition o f japonisme.
6 Bridges, Europe and the Challenge o f  the Asia Pacific, p.47.
7 Christian Sautter 96; and Jean-Franfois Delassus, Japon: Monstre ou Modele, Paris: Hachette, 1970; A. 
Callies, France-Japon: Confrontation culturelle dans les entreprises mixtes, Paris: M6ridiens, 1986.
8 Iwanaga, “Europe in Japan’s Foreign Policy”, in Endstrom (ed), The Japanese and Europe, p.2I3.
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With the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations have developed rapidly in 
tandem with the EU’s search for a common foreign policy and Japan’s search for more 
foreign policy independence. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has been viewed in Paris as a 
major player in the post-Cold War world and a partner of the EU with similar foreign 
policy goals in East Asia and the wider world- political stability, economic growth and 
liberal democracy. France and the EU have begun to shift their treatment of Japan as a 
secondary member of the “West” and adjunct to the US, towards that of a key Western 
partner and Asian/global power on its own terms. As a member of the G-7, OECD, and 
even observer and financier in European security fora like the OSCE, Japan’s wealth 
and influence make it a case apart from the typical developing Asian state seeking 
assistance from the EU. In this regard, Japan is often a partner for French and EU 
objectives, whether for development aid in Asia, Africa or Eastern Europe, in EC 
sanctions on post-Tiananmen China or Burma, or the transition to free markets and 
democracy in Russia or Southeast Asia.
The three parts of this chapter examine the evolution of French policies towards 
Japan in the economic, political-strategic and human rights arenas, asking whether and 
to what extent the European Union moderated, raised the common denominator or 
followed the French lead on Japan in each issue-area. France has a notorious reputation 
for being protectionist and resorting to EU structures to amplify its trade and investment 
policies, yet by the mid-1990s it was welcoming and becoming among the top recipients 
of Japanese FDI in Europe, as well as one of the largest sources of international FDI in 
Japan from 2000. This is the subject of Part I, which examines the domestic, European 
and international reasons for the French about-turn on Japan. Part II, on political and 
security relations, focuses on the mutation of French attitudes towards Japan, from 
neglect, to confrontation, to active collaboration after the Cold War. France has been 
one of the key countries actively encouraging a greater role and voice for Japan in 
international diplomacy and the fashioning of the international system. Part III looks at 
French and Japanese efforts in promoting human rights in international relations. The 
coordination of policies between Japan, and France and the EU, is examined in the 
context of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), linked to the promotion of 
economic and social rights, “constructive dialogue”, and the death penalty. But before 
analysing the contemporary relationship, we need to trace the reasons behind France’s 
misgivings concerning Japan’s rise as a geopolitical power.
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French Reservations about Japan’s rise to power, 1895-1945
The French have historically been slow to engage Japan, and often had 
misunderstandings or conflicts of interests when they did deal with the Japanese 
leadership. The first Europeans to arrive in Japan were the Portuguese in 1543. They 
introduced Christianity and western muskets to the feudal lords on the southern island 
of Kyushu. The phenomenal success of Jesuit missionaries (by 1600 there were some 
300,000 Christians, mainly in Kyushu’s Nagasaki region), alarmed the central 
authority.9 Tokugawa Ieyasu, who established the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) in 
Edo (Tokyo) upon reunifying Japan, cut off Japan’s contacts with the West. Japanese 
were prohibited from travelling abroad and foreigners were banned from the Japanese 
islands on pain of death. From 1637, trade was confined to Nagasaki and limited to the 
Chinese and Dutch, with some contacts with Korea allowed.10 Japan’s two centuries of 
isolation were broken when US Commodore Perry’s “black ships” in 1853 forced the 
Tokugawa government to open to Western trade and missions. Tokugawa Japan had 
observed China’s humiliation and slow dismemberment following the First Opium War 
in 1839-42, and its leaders were determined to avoid a similar fate. France was among 
the Western powers (together with Holland, Russia and Britain) that jumped on the 
American bandwagon in forcing the Tokugawa to sign unequal commercial treaties.11
The 1858 France-Japan Treaty of Friendship and Trade, the first treaty 
concluded between the two countries, granted France extra-territorial rights.12 Second- 
Empire France under Napoleon III was initially favoured as the main model for 
adapting Tokugawa Japan’s backward agrarian society to the West’s dynamic industrial 
challenge. France was involved in the construction of an iron foundry in Yokohama in 
1865 and a modem naval dock in Yokosuka, capable from 1865 of producing steam- 
powered steel warships. The French engineer L.E. Bertin designed the battleships 
which won the Sino-Japanese War. The Napoleonic legal system, French Army,
9 For a history o f early Western contacts with Japan, see Jacques Gravereau, Le Japon: I'ere de Hirohito, 
1988, pp. 17-33; and Jean-Marie Bouissou, Japan: The Burden o f  Success, 2002, ch. 1-2.
10 During Japan’s self-imposed seclusion from the West (1637-1853), only the Dutch were allowed 
trading rights at Nagasaki, and rangaku (“Dutch studies”) became the generic term for Western 
knowledge and science. Emperor Akihito visited the Netherlands in 2000 to commemorate the 400th 
anniversary o f commercial exchange between their two countries. Financial Times, 23 May 2000.
11 See Edwin Reischauer, Japan: The Story o f  a Nation, 4th ed., 1990, ch.6; Economist, “Special Report, 
150 Years after Commodore Perry: Japanese Spirit, Western Things”, 12 July 2003, pp.20-22.
12 Matsuura 98:18-19.
150
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Five / Japan
i o
democratic ideas, and even silk and textile industries were copied by Japan. The 
Tokugawa’s concessions to increasing Western demands however fuelled regional 
unrest. France supported the Tokugawa shogunate with a military mission,14 while the 
disaffected lower samurai who launched the Meiji Renovation were backed by Britain. 
After the reformers took power in 1868, France was rapidly displaced by Britain and 
Germany as the preferred models for Japan’s modernization during the Meiji period 
(1868-1912). The Meiji reformers, whose ultimate goal was to build a fukoku kyohei 
(“rich nation/strong army”), turned to Britain and unified Germany for inspiration, 
especially after France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. Japan’s naval 
programme was modelled on the British navy, and Germany’s 1871 Constitution was 
the basis for Japan’s first Constitution, in 1889.15
On top of France backing the wrong horse in the Tokugawa-Meiji power 
transition, suspicions in bilateral relations were reinforced by French policies that 
conflicted with Japan’s expanding colonial interests. While Britain abrogated its 
unequal treaty rights in Japan in 1894 and signed a series of Anglo-Japanese agreements 
from 1902 to protect British imperial interests in the Far East (it was the first Western 
power to sign an alliance with Japan)16, France resisted Japanese expansion. France’s 
1891-1917 alliance with Russia was the basis for its joint participation with Russia and 
Germany in the “Triple Intervention” that forced Japan to restitute some of the territory 
won after Japan’s victory in its 1894-95 war with China.17 In the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-1905, Japan defeated Russia and destroyed its navy, winning control over 
Korea, Port Arthur and Russian holdings in Manchuria. Fearful of future Japanese 
designs on French Indochina and the possible repercussions of an Asian victory over a 
European power, France recognised Japanese rights in Korea in exchange for Japanese 
recognition of French rights over Indochina in the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth.18
13 Gravereau, p.26 and Matsuura, Developpement et perspectives des relations entre le Japon et la 
France: point de vue d ’un Ambassadeur, Paris: Publications orientalistes de France, 1995, pp.72-73; and 
Haruko Fukuda, “The Peaceful Overture: Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin (1877-1967)”, in Hugh 
Cortazzi and Gordon Daniels (eds), Britain and Japan 1859-1991, London: Routledge, 1991, p.201.
14 Hugh Cortazzi, Modern Japan: A Concise Survey, London: Macmillan, 1993, pp.26-27.
15 Gravereau, p.27.
16 See Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds), The History o f  Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol 1, London: 
Macmillan Press, 2000. Britain and Japan in their 1902 treaty recognised mutual zones o f influence -  in 
China for Britain and in Korea for Japan.
17 See Georges Michon, L'alliancefranco-russe, 1891-1917, Paris : Delpeuch, 1927.
18 Admiral Castex in 1905 had predicted in a sensational article, “Le probleme militaire indochinois: 
Jaunes contre Blancs”, that Japan would be a threat to French Indochina one day. Nicolas Regaud and 
Christian L6chervy, Les Guerres d ’Indochine, Paris: PUF, 1996, p.91. Gravereau, pp.33-34.
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Ambassadors were exchanged in 1906. In 1911 the unequal clauses in the 1858 Treaty 
were amended.19 Japan’s support for the Allies against Germany in the World War I 
was rewarded with full participation in international politics as a great power in the 
League of Nations.20 In the 1922 Washington Naval Agreement, Japan was recognised 
as one of the world’s three greatest naval powers, with limits to the respective tonnages 
of the American, British and Japanese navies set at 5:5:3 respectively.
France, Britain and the US opposed Japanese expansion in Manchuria in the 
1930s, and it was a matter of time before France was engaged in direct colonial 
confrontation with Japan (allied with the Axis powers from 1937) over Indochina. With 
France defeated and Paris occupied by the Nazis in June 1940, the French colonial 
administration in Indochina at first collaborated with Japan under a “dual 
administration” (see chapter 6). Then the Japanese coup de force in March 1945 
completely disarmed and abolished French authority. Imperial Japan’s installation of 
monarchs in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos allowed the Viet Minh to consolidate its 
positions ahead of the delayed resumption of French authority in Indochina in 
September 1945.21
Secondary Relationship and Suspicion, 1945-88
During most of the post-war period, relations between France and Japan were a 
secondary or even tertiary priority. Both were preoccupied with their own postwar 
reconstruction programmes, relations with the US, and their respective goals of 
institutionalising European cooperation, and pursuing economic growth. For almost half 
a century, the US’ role as occupying power (1946-52) and security guarantor under the 
US-Japan Security Treaty (1951 and 1960), in addition to its position as Japan’s most 
important market, had meant that the “US factor” not only predominated, but 
overwhelmed Japanese foreign policy.22 European nations were neither individually or 
collectively important to Japan’s security or political and economic development. 
France (with Britain) was nominally one of the Allied Occupation powers in Japan, but
19 See Regaud and Lechervy, pp.91-94; and Matsuura 98:30.
20 The Royal Navy was under the command o f the Japanese Imperial Navy in the allied capture of  
Tsingtao (Qingdao) in 1914 from the Germans. Britain received Japanese naval support in the Baltic and 
Mediterranean from 1917. See Fukuda 1991: 204-5, 308 fn.5.
21 Jacques du Folin, Indochine 1940-1955- La fin d'un Reve, Paris: Perrin, 1993.
22 Richard D. Leitch, Jr., Akira Kato and Martin E. Weinstein, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, 
Westport: Connecticut, 1995, pp.30-31.
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it was unable to influence policy or resist controversial decisions by General 
MacArthur, eg. to protect Emperor Hirohito from being tried for war crimes, and the 
“reverse course” in 1947-48 to re-arm Japan and hasten its economic recovery. In the 
1950s, the attitude of “punishing” Japan or at least withholding normal relations, 
predominated in European capitals. European leaders were unmoved by requests made 
by Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s first postwar Prime Minister, for a Trade and Navigation 
Treaty during his 1954 European tour.24 This had the effect of reinforcing the “Yoshida 
doctrine” which accepted the “dominant bilateralism” of Japan’s relations with the US, 
and adopted a passive stance on the existing international environment.
The normalisation of ties between France and Japan began only in the 1960s. 
France did not take Japan seriously and Japanese prime ministers were only interested 
in Europe primarily as a market for exports. When Japan joined the GATT in 1955, 14 
countries (including Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands) invoked Article 35 
of the agreement and refused to establish full GATT relations with Japan. As 
negotiations for an EC-Japan trade agreement in the 1960s failed, Japan worked on 
bilateral trade agreements. Its first agreement was with Britain in 1963 (this included 
safeguards allowing for the imposition of import restrictions when these “caused or 
threatened serious injury to domestic productions”). The British example was followed 
by France and the Benelux. Japan did not seek strong ties with European countries 
aside from Britain, then the top priority in Japan’s European policy. An exception was 
Ikeda (1960-64), who negotiated trade agreements with individual European countries 
and won Japan’s membership in the OECD.27 French interest in Japan was low under 
De Gaulle’s presidency (1958-69). De Gaulle had dismissed Ikeda as a “travelling 
transistor salesman” during the latter’s 1962 visit to Paris.28 Georges Pompidou in 1964 
was the first French Prime Minister to visit Japan, and annual consultations between 
French and Japanese Foreign Ministers were established after the visit. Scientific 
cooperation agreements were made in 1972 and 1974, but no major bilateral
23 See Peter Lowe, “Japan and Europe in the Occupation Period, 1945-52”, in Endstrom (ed), The 
Japanese and Europe, 2000, pp. 196-198, 206.
24 Akira Matsui, Memoires d'un Ambassadeur du Japon ne en France: vers un renouveau, Geneva: JR., 
1989, pp.56-58, 218-19.
25 Iwanaga 2000:211,222.
26 Marlis G. Steinert, “Japan and the European Community”, p.39.
27 See Iwanaga 2000:214-230.
28 Bridges 1992.
153
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Five / Japan
breakthroughs resulted. France could not dislodge Britain as “Japan’s preferred
29European partner”.
While economic exchanges in the 1970s were intensifying in step with Japan’s 
growing international economic power, political relations did not keep pace to check the 
intensifying trade frictions. In 1973, Tanaka whose priority was ‘resource diplomacy’ 
in the wake of the oil crisis, made the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Europe 
in almost a decade. Tanaka discussed cooperation schemes like joint ventures with 
Britain for North Sea oil, exploitation of Africa’s natural resources with France, and
If )partnership with Germany in the Siberian energy projects. As President (1969-74), 
Georges Pompidou made the first French attempt at cultivating a serious relationship 
with Japan (Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann visited Tokyo in January 1972 to 
prepare Pompidou’s state visit) but the President died before the visit could proceed.31 
Under Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1974-81), Tanaka was among the five leaders invited 
to the inaugural “Western” summit meeting of the world’s economic powers in 
Rambouillet in November 1975 (what was to become the G7), but Giscard did not 
consider Japan a priority and thus relations were left under-developed. It required 
Marshal Tito’s funeral in 1980 for a Japanese Prime Minister to visit Europe again.
A short period of flowering in France-Japan political relations occurred between 
1981 and 1983 under Francis Mitterrand, the first French President to make a state 
visit to Japan. Yet Mitterrand’s 1982 visit and Emperor Hirohito’s return visit in 1984 
(the first by a Japanese monarch)34, failed to reverse the tide of deteriorating relations, 
dominated by bilateral and EC-Japan trade disputes. While Britain and Germany were 
developing strong political ties with Japan from the mid 1970s,35 France was viewed in 
Japan as a “hostile power” for its protectionist measures. Nakasone Yasuhiro, a vocal
29 See Bouissou 2002:164.
30 Bouissou 2002:212.
31 Jean-Luc Domenach, “La Politique franpaise au miroir de l’Asie”, 1990, p.229. See also Georges 
Pompidou’s “Message du President Pompidou au peuple japonais public dans le journal Yomiurf’, l er 
janvier 1973, on www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
32 Eric Seizelet, “Japon: Contraintes et defis de la puissance”, in Frederic Charillon (ed), Les Politiques
Etrangeres: Ruptures et Continuites, 2001:179; and Matsuura 98: 85.
33 Domenach 90:230. Mitterrand was also the first French president to visit all the major Asian countries -
China, Japan, India and Indonesia (during his first term, 1981-88).
34 Liberation, 12 January 1990. Hirohito had first visited Paris in 1921, as Regent. As Crown Prince, 
Akihito had visited Paris officially in 1953 as part o f his 6-month tour o f Europe and the US, timed with 
Queen Elisabeth II’s coronation on 2 June 1953. See Matsui 88:198-200.
35 Queen Elizabeth visited Japan in 1975, Germany and Japan reached an agreement on scientific 
cooperation in 1974 and President Walter Scheel visited Tokyo in 1978. Bouissou 2002:213.
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and charismatic prime minister, had in the early 1980s identified Japanese interests with 
the US and Europe against the Soviet Union, but another opportunity to forge a 
meaningful relationship was missed. Instead, relations deteriorated to a low point by 
the end of the 1980s so that the threat of trade wars became a real possibility.
i
I Economic and Trade Relations
As the world’s second largest economy, Japan is an economic superpower and 
has since the 1970s ranked with the US and Switzerland as one of the three largest 
trading partners of the EC/EU. The France-Japan economic relationship has been a 
microcosm of the larger EC-Japan relationship. In the 1970s and 1980s, France 
(together with Britain and Italy) projected anti-Japan protectionism into EU policy. 
France-Japan economic relations in the late-1980s and early 1990s were a victim of the 
internal French debate on globalisation, the reform of the welfare state and the need for 
a Single European Market to increase competitiveness. Modernising French industry to 
meet the challenges of economic globalisation (of which Japan was a particular symbol) 
provoked a protracted internal debate.36 By the 1990s, however, France found itself 
having to adjust and conform to new EU attitudes and trading policies vis-a-vis Japan. 
Part I examines how this change took place, from lowest common denominator policies 
(spearheaded by France and the Commission) regarding Japan, to a raising of the 
common interest and active collaboration at both the EU-Japan and bilateral levels.
a) The Commission: Beyond a Common “EC vs. Japan” Commercial Policy
Japan has been one of the priorities in the Common Commercial Policy because 
of the large and persistent trade deficit the EU has with Japan (Table 5.1, Appendices 1 
and 2). The Commission has transformed in the 1990s from being a supporter of short­
term confrontational approaches (advocated by France, Italy and Spain from the late 
1980s) towards Japan, to being the champion of long-term healthy economic relations 
and partnership with Japan. EU commercial policy towards Japan has been on the 
whole successfully Europeanised. This process was an incremental one of top-down 
policy convergence, made possible by the prominence of trade issues EU-Japan
36 Peter Karl Kresl and Sylvain Gallais, France Encounters Globalisation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2002, pp. 1-16.
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relationship which has given the Commission a great deal of manoeuvring room to take 
initiatives under the Common Commercial Policy.
Table 5.1 EC/EU Trade with Japan. 1980-1996
EC imports from 
Japan ($ million)
As % of total 
EC imports
EC exports to 
Japan ($ million)
As % of total 
EC exports
1980 19680 2.55 6694 0.97
1985 22689 3.42 8049 1.24
1990 67506 4.37 30911 2.07
1991 72603 4.56 29464 1.98
1992 74936 4.55 28723 1.82
1993 66564 4.77 28790 2.00
1994 68982 4.35 34465 2.09
1995 76908 4.03 43040 2.14
1996 72022 3.69 44978 2.20
Source: IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1987 and 1997 editions, in Brian Bridges 1999: 28.
As late as 1970, Japan was not a major trade competitor to Europe. Japanese 
exports of transistor radios to Europe amounted to no more than $52.7 million, while 
cars were a paltry $47.2 million. In the mid-1970s, the situation began to change 
dramatically. Between 1969 and 1977, Japanese exports to Europe increased by 620%,
7^from $1.4 to $8.7 billion. The Japanese were accused of “social dumping”. In a 1979 
confidential paper, the Commission’s Director-General for External Relations described 
Japan as “a country of workaholics who live in what a Westerner would regard as little
io
more than rabbit hutches”. Japan on the other hand accused European countries of 
being “lazy” and having lost the Protestant work ethic. Although the leaked 
Commission report included a thorough and sober analysis of the situation which 
concluded that Japan was simply more competitive and that Europe should learn from 
Japan, Japanese political and media attention focused on the threat of selected import 
controls. The report created a storm of indignation in Japan and is still cited by the 
Japanese media and government today as an example of Europeans’ arrogance and 
failure to compete with Japan in the 1970s and 1980s.39 The main defence mechanism 
to which European countries resorted in the 1970s and 1980s -  particularly France,
37 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, “France, Japan, Europe, and Industrial Competition: the Automotive Case”, 
International Affairs 68/1 (1992), p.41.
38 Cited in Steinert, “Japan and the European Community”, p.40 ; Wilkinson 83.
39 Interview with Kenjiro Monji, Minister Counsellor and Deputy Chief o f  Mission, Japanese Mission to 
the European Union, Brussels, 27 March 2003.
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Britain and Italy - was to obtain bilateral agreements from Japan restricting exports in 
such areas as cars, television sets and video recorders.
Unlike in the EU’s relations with China, India, Vietnam and Southeast Asian 
states where European powers with colonial ties or strategic presence in Asia had 
dominated, the Commission has long played a significant role in relations with Japan. 
Regular consultations were inaugurated between EC and Japanese foreign ministers in 
1963 although negotiations for a common commercial policy towards Japan according 
to Article 113 of the Rome Treaty failed. In 1969 the Japanese, fearing further 
enlargement, took the initiative and closed a Long Term Agreement on textiles with the 
EC. In 1970 the Commission formally gained new powers to negotiate a common 
commercial policy. Japan was the first nation with which the Commission carried out 
trade negotiations, and a Commission Delegation was established in Tokyo in 1974.40 In 
1976, a Keidanren (Japanese Confederation of Industries) mission led by Chairman 
Doko Toshio to Europe was shaken by Europe’s strong reactions to Japan’s decision to 
redouble its export drive by devaluing the yen. This had followed the 1971 “Nixon 
shock” when the US devalued the dollar, and the 1973 oil crisis. The Doko mission’s 
failure back in Tokyo to effect a breach in the consensus between MITI and Japanese 
industry to resist the EC’s market access demands, led to the Commission allowing 
individual member states to impose Voluntary Export Restraints on a national basis.
At first, the common policies vis-a-vis Japan that resulted under the 
Commission’s leadership were conflictual, lowest-common denominator outcomes. A 
major reason for launching the Single European Market idea in 1986 was to enable EC 
economies to enjoy economies of scale so as to better compete with US, Japanese and 
NIC rivals. The creation of the single market was presented as the solution to revitalize, 
re-industrialize, and regain global competitiveness for a Europe of sclerotic companies 
in the face of American economic prowess and the onslaught of the defl japonais 
(Japanese challenge).41
40 Glenn D. Hook, “Opportunities and Constraints in Euro-Japanese Relations: A Multidimensional 
Approach”, in Bert Endstrom (ed), The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, Richmond 
Surrey: Japan Library/Curzon Press, 2000, p.245.
41Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and Conventional 
Statecraft”, in Hoffmann and Keohane (eds), The New European Community, 1991, pp. 1-40; and 
Lehmann, “France, Japan, Europe, and Industrial Competition: the Automotive Case”.
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Up to 1988, the Commission led the charge in confronting Japan over trade 
disputes. It accused Japan of unfair trading practices such as GATT-inconsistent 
government subsidies for Japanese industries, setting discriminatory standards for 
foreign products, and tolerating a complicated and anti-competitive distribution system. 
From the European perspective, images of the modem samurai or bushido warrior 
lurking behind Japanese business suits, bedevilled bilateral trade relations. 42 In the 
1980s, Commission threats to launch a complaint against Japan under Article 23 of the 
GATT to challenge Japan’s economic system and “social dumping”, led to Japan 
agreeing to “moderate” the export of ten “sensitive items” to Europe, including video 
tape recorders, colour TVs, forklift trucks and machine tools 43 Then in April 1988, the 
EC Council determined that market access would henceforth be sought in parallel with 
cooperation with Japan. The Community’s change of tack in the way it approached 
Japan was prompted by a change of heart in Thatcher’s Britain. The UK had resolved 
its outstanding trade problems with Japan, and when Britain changed sides in 1988, the 
weight of opinion in the EC moved away from confrontation towards a cooperative 
dialogue with Japan on subjects such as science and technology, the environment and 
development aid policy.44
Although individual EU states cannot compete with the US or other Asian states 
in trade importance to Japan, the EU as a trading group is today Japan’s 2nd largest 
trading partner (Table 5.2) and collectively has leverage over policies such as market 
access and internal reform. Member states have rallied behind the Commission to 
negotiate on their collective behalf. In the 1990s, the nature of the economic dialogue 
began to change, from trade disputes to an emphasis on partnership. Council 
Conclusions in 1992 instituted the Trade Assessment Mechanism (TAM) and the new 
policy of industrial cooperation. The TAM enabled both sides to compare their 
respective trade performance on the basis of objective trade statistics, and was useful for 
problem-solving if indicators reveal significant under-performance by Japanese or
42John Richardson, “EU-Japan Relations: Common Interests and Cultural Differences”, in Godement and 
Shinya (eds), France-Japan Political and Security Dialogue, Les Cahiers de PIFRI no. 17, Paris: 
IFRI/JIIA, 1996, p . l l .
43 Nuttall 96:106-107.
44 The UK had won the liquor tax panel in Geneva when the Japanese tax system which discriminated 
against Scotch whisky had been condemned; Japanese car exports to the UK were capped by a 
government-brokered industry-to-industry deal; British firms were shortly to be given seats on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange; and the major industrial concerns o f semiconductors and agriculture were o f  less 
importance to Britain than to other EC states. See Nuttall 96:100, Bridges 1992 and Abe 1999.
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European companies in the other’s market. The second purpose was to put trade 
discussions on an explicitly objective and reciprocal basis. TAM’s third and most 
important purpose was to provide a permanent meeting forum for the Japanese and 
Europeans, without the need for debilitating and protracted negotiations to fix an agenda 
and meeting.
Table 5.2: Japan’s Top Ten Trading Partners. 2000
Rank Partner %
1 USA 25.0
2 EU
[Of which: *Germany 3.35%; France 1.69%; 
Italy 1.40%; UK, 1.72%]
14.6
3 China 10.0
4 Taiwan 6.3
5 Korea 6.0
6 Hong Kong 3.6
7 Malaysia 3.3
8 Singapore 3.2
9 Thailand 2.8
10 Indonesia 2.8
Sources: EC Delegation in Tokyo, http://ipn.cec.eu.int, accessed 13 November 2002; *French Embassy 
Mission Economique de Tokyo, Le commerce bilateralfranco-japonais en 2001, 29 March 2002, pp. 1-2.
The issue of market access, considered a major reason for the persistent trade 
and current account deficit Europe suffers in its relations with Japan, continues to seize 
the Commission.45 The Japanese government resolved to dismantle the myriad 
regulations that had for decades been part of the Japanese industrial scene and had 
hampered trade and foreign investment, but were becoming domestically unacceptable 
in a time of prolonged recession. The EU was quick to accept the Japanese 
government’s invitation to its foreign partners to provide an input into the exercise, and 
obtained a permanent discussion forum in which the process of deregulation was to be 
kept under review.46 Since 1995, the EU has participated actively in Japan’s economic 
reforms in the Regulatory Reform (formerly Deregulation) Dialogue, chiefly through 
submitting deregulation proposals. As a result of the Commission’s activities, two 
important agreements were recently concluded: the EC-Japan Mutual Recognition
45 European Commission, Japan: Bilateral Trade Relations, July 2001, on EU website 
http://europa.eu.int.comm/trade/bilateral/iapan/iapan.htm, accessed 25 February 2002.
46 Nuttall 96:112
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Agreement (MRA, in January 2002), and an Agreement on Cooperation on Anti­
competitive activities.47 The MRA will permit acceptance of conformity assessment in 
four product areas, and the second Agreement is expected to facilitate trade and 
investment by securing a level playing-field between insiders and outsiders. These EU- 
Japan cooperative efforts have led to collusion between the EU and Japan on global 
trade issues. As such, joint statements such as the January 2000 EU-Japan call for the
A*
launch of a new round of WTO trade negotiations were issued.
The phenomenon of EU member states competing to promote their national 
industries in Japan- as seen notably in China -  is also present in Japan, with Chirac and 
Kohl in the mid-1990s making regular high-level visits to Tokyo to expand French and 
German trade links with Japan, and Britain and France competing for Toyota’s inward 
investments.49 Alongside these national efforts have grown, however, EC-wide trade 
promotion efforts such as EXPROM (set up in 1979 to target specific sectors which 
were having difficulty entering the Japanese market) and the EC-Japan Centre for 
Industrial Cooperation (set up in 1987 to assist European investment and cooperation in 
Japan). EXPROM organized the Community’s first “Gateway to Japan” programme in 
1994, modelled on the British and French export promotion programmes.50
As a result of Japan’s protracted recession in the 1990s and the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997-98, Japan has undertaken structural economic reforms to stimulate 
domestic consumption, foreign investment and growth. This has allowed for increased 
foreign investment, especially in sectors that have undergone regulatory reform. Such 
sectors have included financial services, after the “financial bubble” collapsed, and a 
few areas in distribution. More dramatically, the recession of the Japanese car market 
and the large number of manufacturers has enabled US and EU companies to acquire or 
increase their stake in several Japanese companies. Over the 1995-1999 period, EU FDI 
flows into Japan picked up dramatically so that the two-way flows were almost equal. 
FDI jumped by 247% in 1999. The impact of “big-ticket” investments (such as Renault 
in Nissan, and Vodafone in Japan’s telecommunications sector) has been significant:
47 European Commission, “The EU’s relations with Japan: Overview”, August 2002, on 
http://europ.eu.int/comm./extemal relations/iapan/intro/indec.htm. accessed 23 October 2002.
48 EU-Japan Joint Statement on the WTO, 11 January 2000.
49 Julie Gilson, “Europe in Japan: A Growing Identity”, in Hook and Hasegawa (eds), The Political 
Economy o f  Japanese Globalization, London: Routledge, 2001, p.77.
50 European Commission, “The EU’s relations with Japan: Overview”, August 2002.
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EU investment in Japan in 1999 amounted to half the opposite flow in 1997 and 1998, 
and in the boom year of 1999, the EU invested twice as much as Japan did in the EU. 
By 2001, the EU FDI stock in Japan amounted to half Japan’s stock in the EU, 
compared to just one-sixth in 1992.51
b) French economic policy: from Conflict to Cooperation
As alluded to above, Japan’s growing technological, economic and financial 
power was perhaps noted with greater alarm in France than in any other EC country. 
The French response was firstly, to work with like-minded countries such as Britain and 
Italy to project their anti-Japan preferences as protectionist EC policies. This was 
successful until 1988, when Britain changed its position, promoted inward Japanese 
investments and started becoming an advocate for cooperation with Japan within the 
Community. In the 1990s, France found itself in the minority together with Spain and 
Italy, in pushing for Community protection, and when the Commission in 1991 ruled on 
a phased elimination of car import quotas between 1993 and 1999. France was forced 
to rethink its economic policy. The transformation of French economic policy from 
protectionism to an active courting of Japanese business has been a spectacular volte- 
face in the 1990s which owes much to France accepting the need to adapt to global 
competition. This was critically promoted by supranational EU policies that forced 
French industries to compete or collaborate with Japan.
During the period of confrontation over trade and investment, France played the 
role of European spokesman ranting against Japan and globalisation. French strategies 
consisted first of calling attention to the threat posed by Japan and other foreign 
competitors, and encouraging the pooling of European resources in “Euro-projects” 
such as the Airbus and Ariane programmes. Second was the strategy of initiating and 
leading Community-wide protectionist measures, failing which national measures were 
taken. Third, France resorted to international fora such as the GATT in which to engage 
Japan. Pursuing the first strategy, Pompidou in 1973 issued a joint statement with 
British Prime Minister Edward Heath and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt 
calling upon European Community countries to cooperate closely in the development of 
new technologies (under programmes such as ESPRIT and Eureka) or run the risk of
51 European Commission, Japan: Bilateral Trade Relations, July 2001.
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being dominated by the USA and Japan in a rapidly evolving world economy. Last, 
France resorted to protectionist measures such as standards and bilaterally negotiated 
quotas to stem the “Japanese invasion”. At the same time, the French government was 
making urgent and ultimately futile efforts to get Thomson, the French electronics 
company, to join forces with Grundig and Philips to produce “European” machines to 
counter the Japanese challenge.
Trade became practically the sole focus of relations between France and Japan 
after the France-Japan bilateral trade deficit had turned in Japan’s favour in 1965 and 
began to be serious from 1971. Many leaders in French government and industry 
deeply feared that Japanese financial and industrial strength could weaken or even 
eliminate vital sectors of European manufacturing. In the 1970s and 1980s Europe was 
suffering from ever-rising trade deficits with Japan and was feeling squeezed between 
the economic and technological superiority of Japan and the US above them, and the 
threat from the fast-growing NICs below. Although in the mid-1980s little more than 
2% of French imports originated from Japan (compared to 4-5% each for the UK and 
West Germany),54 the French held an exaggerated image of the Japanese as intruders 
and responded to Japanese economic power by calling for EU restrictions on Japanese 
imports, while steadfastly resisting internal change.55 French leaders were justifying 
national quotas on Japanese imports, or threatening Commission retaliatory measures 
against Japanese “dumping”, and Japanese industry and leaders were taking steps to 
counter the expected creation of a protectionist “Fortress Europe”.56 In the 1983 dispute 
over video cassette recorders (VCRs), France imposed an obstructionist customs policy 
which required all Japanese VCRs to be checked by a handful of customs officials in 
Poitiers. This made VCRs a much rarer and more expensive commodity in France than
c n
in other EC countries. In this occasion, the EC chose the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ approach upholding the French action and adopted as Community policy 
the position of the most protectionist EC member states.
52 See Mark Wise, “France and European Unity”, in Robert Aldrich and John Connell (eds), France in 
World Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p.55
53 Wise, “France and European Unity”, pp.42-43.
54 Wilkinson, Japan versus Europe; Marlis G. Steinert, “Japan and the European Community: An Uneasy 
Relationship”, in Ozaki and Arnold (eds), Japan’s Foreign Relations: A Global Search for Economic 
Security, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, pp.33-46.
55 Lehmann, “France, Japan, Europe, and Industrial Competition”.
56 Kenjiro Ishikawa, Japan and the Challenge o f  Europe 1992, London: Pinter, 1990.
57 Bridges, EC-Japanese Relations, p.7.
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The car dispute provides another important example of French attempts to 
project anti-Japan economic nationalism as Community policy. The value of Japanese 
car imports in the Community had jumped 1,377% between 1970 and 1975 to $650
co
million. Up to the end of the 1980s, the French government and French car 
corporations were notorious in Brussels for acting through the European Association of 
Car companies (ACAT) for “driving European policy” on car import restrictions on 
Japan.59 France also levied national quotas limiting Japanese car imports to 3% of the 
French market. In 1991 the Commission ruled in favour of free trade, backed in 
particular by Britain (which stood to benefit as it hosted a Nissan assembly line). 
Germany was neutral as its car industry was standing up to Japanese competition. 
Overcoming French, Italian and Spanish opposition, the EC undertook to remove all 
restrictions on Japanese car imports from January 1993 in return for which Japan would 
monitor exports until the end of 1999. The ‘car deal’ in July 1991 was thus a significant 
step forward from the 1983 deal struck between the EC and Japan on VCRs.60
The domestic reasons behind France’s conflictual stance towards Japan can be 
traced to the domestic debate between traditionalists and modernisers on the need to 
adapt the “French model” of capitalism to new pressures and international competition. 
The traditionalists, represented by Cresson, argued that the Japanese model was alien 
and that France could and should “keep our social security, our holidays, to live like 
human beings as we have always lived.”61 But it was becoming clear that some drastic 
change in the dirigiste model of state-directed economic development had to take place 
after over a decade of despondent economic growth and ever-rising unemployment in
AOFrance following the “trente glorieuses” (1946-75). French leaders and journalists 
were painfully aware that Japan-bashing in France would only result in Japanese 
investments in Europe being diverted to other countries, chiefly to Britain and the
58 Lehmann 92:41.
59 Interview with Mr Simon Nuttall, former Director for Far East (1988-95), European Commission 
External Relations Directorate-General (DG 1), in London, 12 March 2003. See also Lehmann, “France, 
Japan, Europe, and Industrial Competition”.
60 Bridges, EC-Japanese Relations, p.7.
61 Cited in Littlewood, The Idea o f  Japan, pp.46 and 209.
62 Post-war French governments during the trente glorieuses planned and attained unprecedented rates o f  
national growth. France transformed into an industrialised nation through state-directed finance and 
resource allocation, an industrial policy to promote national champions in “strategic industries”, and state 
predominance in the policy making process. See Jean Fourastid, Les trente glorieuses: ou, La Revolution 
invisible de 1946 a 1975, Paris: Fayard, 1979; Elie Cohen, “France”, in J.E.S Hayward (ed), Industrial 
Enterprise and European Integration, Oxford UP, 1995.
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Netherlands. Economists advocating modernization argued that a “Meiji revolution” in 
French economic thinking was needed, and that France could learn from Japan’s 
success in combining almost full employment with high growth rates. Japan was 
beginning to be viewed less as a menace and more as a model, and Japanese investment, 
a stimulus to the French economy and creator of employment.64
After the failed 1981-83 nationalisation programme, the French Socialist 
government and looked to the European Community as a means to restructure its 
economy. Mitterrand had signed up to the 1986 Single European Act, and measures 
such as the Commission’s July 1991 car deal with Japan forced protectionist Member 
States such as France to make internal adjustments through a process of top-down 
policy convergence.65 Sideways Europeanisation (ie. policy learning from the UK) was 
instrumental in changing French economic policy toward Japan. A more cooperative 
policy was signalled by Industry Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn and promoted under 
the slogan Le Japon, c ’est possible (1992-97), a campaign to promote French exports to 
Japan. Even Cresson climbed down from her confrontational stance over the proposed 
acquisition by NEC of a 5% stake in Bull, the French state computer company. She also 
changed her tune regarding Japanese investment in suggesting that France would be a 
good location for a future Japanese car factory.66 The French export campaign was 
inspired by the success of earlier “Opportunity Japan” (1988-91) and “Priority Japan” 
(1991-94) campaigns launched by the British government to increase commercial
f\7awareness of corporate opportunities available in Japan. The UK had in 1987-88 
taken a conscious decision to change tack after a severe bout of trade friction and sabre- 
rattling at Japan. Foreign Secretary Howe returned from a trip to Japan in 1988 
convinced that Japan should be drawn into a much wider ranger of consultations.68 For 
the sake of industrial regeneration at home, Britain became a stout defender of Japanese 
investors, and a vocal advocate of the EU engaging in dialogue rather than confrontation 
with Japan.
63 Fouchard 88:61
64 Matsuura 98:53-54.
65 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization o f Domestic Politics and Institutions: The case o f France”, Journal 
o f  Common Market Studies, 32/1, 1994.
66 Lehmann 92:42; Bridges, EC-Japanese Relations, pp.4 and 10.
67 Bridges 92: 4 and 10. “Action Japan” ran from 1994-97. See Drifte 1998:103-104. The Dutch and 
Germans also instituted similar campaigns.
68 See Bridges, Europe and the Challenge o f  the Asia Pacific, 1999:45-46; and Simon Nuttall, “Japan and 
the EU”, Survival 38/2, Summer 1996, pp. 104-120.
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Meanwhile, the anticipated “Fortress Europe” resulted in a massive influx of 
Japanese FDI in Europe’s manufacturing sector in the late 1980s. In the run-up to 1992, 
Japanese manufacturers feared that new barriers in the single market may be “broader, 
more systematic and more damaging than the scattering of measures that already hinder 
some aspects of trade”.69 The first big wave of Japanese investments was concentrated 
in Britain, symbolized by Nissan’s establishment of a state-of-the-art car manufacturing 
plant in Sunderland, a plant that was lobbied for by British ministers up to and including 
the prime minister. In 1990, the EC accounted for 23% of total Japanese FDI, and
70Britain alone received more than did the rest of Europe. As late as 1999, 40% of 
Japanese investment in Europe went to Britain, and many Japanese companies had set
71up their European headquarters in the UK. In return, Japan received Britain’s support 
in intra-EU debates. Japanese investors were also buying up companies in France and 
other EC countries, fuelled by the rising yen and increasingly sophisticated EC trade 
barriers such as “local content” requirements. By 1984, Japan was the second largest
77foreign investor in France. The annual value of Japanese investments in France 
reached a peak in 1990, and surged again in 1995 following French measures to
77deregulate foreign investment. French public opinion was initially fearful and hostile 
to Japanese corporations and individuals buying up French industrial symbols, such as 
Bordeaux vineyards, the Lucas Carton restaurant and hairdressing chain Carita.74 
Gradually becoming aware of the industrial and technological benefits of collaboration 
with the Japanese, France and Italy - formerly the most hostile to Japan -  joined the 
broadly favourable EU-wide welcome offered to Japanese investment, and even joined 
the competition to attract Japanese FDI. The volte-face from confrontation and hostility 
towards welcoming Japanese investments was epitomized by the opening of Toyota’s 
car factory in Valenciennes (in the Nord region) in 1999. Both Chirac and Jospin
69 Ishikawa, Japan and the Challenge o f  Europe 1992, 1990, p.6.
70 Bridges, EC-Japanese Relations, pp.5-6.
71 Itaru Umezu and Lord Howell o f Guildford, “The Anglo-Japanese Relationship: Looking into the 
Future”, in Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, UK and Japan, London, 2000, pp.99-100.
72 Les Echos, 15 July 1985. Cumulative Japanese investments were worth over FF700 million.
73 Japanese Embassy, “France-Japan Relations: Economic Relations”, 1996, on
http://www.infoiapan.org/region/Europe/france/index.html. accessed 4 May 2003.
74 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987, pp.238, 411; International Herald Tribune 31 August 1988.
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presented top French state awards to Toyota’s CEO and President, during their visits to 
Japan in 1998 and 1999, respectively.75
Although France registered in the 1990s a continual trade deficit with Japan in 
the region of €3 billion a year, with the value of French exports to Japan about half the 
value of French imports (Table 5.3), it has been one of the rare countries to increase or 
maintain its export levels to Japan. This is mainly because demand for French luxury 
products has posted strong growth in Japan. Despite the recession and reduced 
spending patterns, Japanese consumption of luxury goods remains among the highest in
7 f\the world. Recent statistics have been encouraging. In 1998, France was the only
77country among Japan’s top 20 trading partners to increase its exports to Japan. 
France’s exports to Japan continue to be led by its strong consumer sector, which 
accounted for 54% of total French exports in 2001. The surge in Japanese imports of 
French fashion labels, gastronomic products and even French cars, has compensated for
7 Rthe recent fall in high-value purchases and grands contrats (eg. Airbus).
1994 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001
French exports (billion €) 
French imports (billion €) 
Trade balance (billion €) 
French export/import ratio
3.9
7.2
-3.3
53%
4.3
7.3 
-3.0 
58%
4.2
6.9
-2.7
60%
4.3
7.9
-3.6
53.8%
5.3
12.6
-7.3
42%
5.4
11
-5.6
49%
Source: French Senate, Les Relations Franco-Japonaises, 1999, on www.diploniatie.fi’ and French 
Embassy Mission Economique de Tokyo, Le commerce bilateral franco-japonais en 2001, 29 March 
2002, pp. 1-2. Figures before 1999 (in French francs) converted to euros by author based on €1=FF6.56.
c) Towards Industrial Collaboration and a French presence in Japan
While France-Japan trade figures are not particularly impressive, French FDI in 
Japan has made great strides since the late 1990s, buoyed by active French government 
lobbying and support. Foreign Minister Herve de Charette had noted in 1996 that less
75 According to Invest in France Agency (IAF) Japan, “Toyota Motor Manufacturing France”, on 
http://www.afii.fr. accessed 3 May 2003, Toyota employs nearly 3000 workers in Valenciennes. Over 
two-thirds of the vehicles produced in the Valenciennes factory are exported. Jacques Chirac, 
“Allocution du President de la Republique, lors de la remise des insignes de Commandeur de la Legion 
d'Honneur a M. Shoichiro Toyoda”, Tokyo, 27 April 1998; Lionel Jospin, “Allocution du Premier 
Ministre lors de la remise des insignes d’Officier de la Ldgion d’Honneur au President du Conseil 
d’Administration de Toyota Motor Corporation, M. Hiroshi Okuda”, Tokyo, 17 December 1999.
76 Le Monde 30 November 2001.
77 Le Figaro, 5 May 1999.
78 Mission Economique de Tokyo, Le commerce bilateral franco-japonais en 2001, pp.2-3.
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than half of the top 100 French companies were present in Japan, while other European 
countries had a greater presence in Tokyo and other Japanese cities. De Charette felt 
that a France should launch a “new offensive” to conquer the Japanese market and that
70increasing French FDI and presence in Japan was the first step towards this goal. The 
opportunities soon came when Japan was buffeted by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis 
and as European confidence grew with the launch of the euro in 1999.
The French External Trade Department’s assessment is that recent French 
investments will embed France as a major player in the Japanese economy, and 
contribute to a more balanced trade relationship over the long term.80 The tide of 
investments began to change directions as Japan’s recession drew on. French 
companies moved to buy into newly affordable Japanese companies with a huge wave 
of French investment into Japan in the mid-1990s (40% of French companies present in 
Japan today arrived in the 1990s). The latest wave, from around 2000, includes
o  I
Carrefour and Renault. France was the largest source of foreign investment in Japan 
m 1999 and the second largest investor in 2002. With Japan’s recession dragging on 
and the 1997 Asian crisis prompting the Japanese government to relax rules on foreign 
ownership, French investors have turned the tables and bought over many Japanese 
corporations. In the most famous deal, Renault bought controlling stakes in troubled 
Japanese car-maker Nissan at a cost of ¥605 billion (FF31 billion). Nissan-Renault's 
new president Carlos Ghosn, set the ambitious goal of making Nissan-Renault the 4th 
largest car-maker in the world, with an annual production of 6-8 million cars by 2010. 
Ghosn’s Nissan Revival Plan forecast that Nissan would return to profitability by the 
end of fiscal year 2000, achieve an operating margin of 4.5% of sales by 2002, and 
halve debt from ¥l,400bn to ¥700bn by the same year. In addition, five factories would 
be closed, 21,000 jobs would go, the number of suppliers would be halved, the brand 
restored and new products launched. At the end of 2000, Ghosn announced a full
79 Interview with Foreign Minister Herve de Charette published in the journal France/Japon/Eco, Paris, 1 
October 1996, on MAE website archives (www.diplomatie.fr).
80 Interview with Bertrand de Cordoue, Director (Asia), Department o f External Economic Relations 
(DREE), French Ministry o f Finance, Paris, 9 April 2003.
81 Air Liquide (1907) was the first major French firm to set up operations in Japan. The first wave o f  
French firms arrived in the 1950s (Air France, P^chiney, Rhone-Poulenc, Michelin), followed by a 
second wave in the 1980s (primarily luxury companies Chanel, LVMH, Baccarat, Hermes). See 
Presence Frangaise/Profil: Une communaute d'excellence en osmose avec la societe japonaise, on 
http://www.ambafrance-ip.org/vivre-au-iapon/presence/Profil et statistiques. accessed 3 May 2003.
82 Japanese Embassy, “Visite en France de Moniseur Koizumi, Premier Ministre du Japon (29 avril 
2003)”, 2 May 2003, on http://www.fr-emb-iapan.go.ip/koizumi/03 koizumi.html, accessed 9 May 2003.
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year operating profit of ¥220bn - twice its forecast - and that operating profit at the 
interim stage was ¥136bn, double 1999’s figure.
The French entry into the Japanese market in such non-traditional industries 
radically changed the image of France from being merely a player in the luxury and 
gastronomic sectors into that of a serious industrial partner, with Ghosn feted in Japan 
as a sort of “national hero”.84 In the past, French producers were unsuccessful, apart 
from luxury, food and alcoholic products, in competing with the Germans and 
Americans in penetrating the heavy machinery, car and tools markets in Japan.85 This 
changed with Renault’s controversial takeover (and spectacular turnaround) of Nissan- 
the first time a Japanese enterprise employing over 200,000 people had agreed to let a 
foreign company acquire a controlling stake. Renault’s share in Nissan is projected to 
rise from 36.8% in March 1999 to 44.4% by 2004, while Nissan has taken a 15% share 
in Renault.87
Overall Trends
Grid 5.1 Economic Policies in Japan , 1985-2002
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
F ♦ a <- 4 b -> ♦ —► ♦
GB ♦ a ♦ b ♦ ♦
D ♦ ♦ —► ♦ ♦
EU ♦ a ♦ c -> ♦ —► ♦
- = Protectionist or anti-Japan policy 
0 = Government passive, business community left on its own 
+ = Pro-Investment and Trade policy
a In 1985, both France and Britain (until 1988) adopted confrontational trade policies towards Japan. The 
European Commission’s “lowest common denominator” approach justified, eg. restrictions on VCR 
imports and nationally imposed limits on cars imports.
b Despite Cresson, trade relations between all EC countries (especially Thatcher’s Britain) and Japan were 
improving in the 1990s.
c EC-Japan Joint Declaration signed in 1991; “Car deal” (Quota Agreement) reached, by which quotas for 
Japanese car imports are gradually raised and completely lifted in 1999.
83 Financial Times, 17 November 2000.
84 David Magee, Turnaround: How Carlos Ghosn saved Nissan, 2003.
85 Interview with Olivia Calvet-Soubiran, Japan Desk, Paris Chamber o f  Commerce and Industry, 15 
April 2003.
86 French Senate, Les Relations Franco-Japonaises, op cit.
87 Le Figaro, 30 October 2001.
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Up to 1991, the French response to the “Japanese challenge”, like the “American 
challenge” before it, was to champion the hardline cause within the EU. Later, 
encouraged by the Commission, Japanese incentives, and policy learning from other EU 
states, French government and industry moved away from confrontation and tended to 
shadow British trade and investment promotion policies. The common denominator was 
that France acted within Community structures and used Community policies to achieve 
or amplify national economic interests vis-a-vis Japan. France was able to do so 
because of disproportionate French influence in the EC, particularly the Commission.88 
By the end of the decade, French had gained a new confidence in exporting to and 
making investments in Japan. The conflicts prompted Japan to seek better political and 
economic relations with France as a key actor in Europe, especially with the 
establishment of the Single European Market and the Euro, in 1992 and 1999 
respectively. Britain’s appeal in attracting Japanese investment was refined and 
supplanted by the French government post-1999 with the launch of the euro. French 
companies realised that the Japanese economy was neither invincible nor impenetrable, 
and were quick to take advantage of new opportunities offered by Japanese economic 
reforms and market openings. Following on the privatisation of Air France and France 
Telecom, the Renault-Nissan merger was defended in the National Assembly as 
complementary and offering “real growth opportunities”.89
The change in France’s attitude towards Japan could not have taken place 
without a revolutionary change of the French economic dirigiste mindset. We could 
attribute the change in French foreign economic thinking to the globalisation of 
economic liberal thinking, starting first within the EC and the 1986 Single European 
Act, then enlarged with its major extra-EC trading partners. However, the fact of 
France’s very close economic and political interactions with other EC member states 
and with the Commission was certainly instrumental in changing the protectionist reflex 
in the French mindset. The Commission’s role, not only among governing elites, but 
crucially in French industry and society, was key for example in 1991 when its lead in 
imposing liberal policies on the Member States effectively opened the Single Market to
88 Compare this with French strategies used against the US in the Uruguay Round. See Youri Devuyst, 
“The European Community and the Conclusion o f the Uruguay Round”, in Rhodes and Mazey (eds), The 
State o f  the European Union: Building a European Polity?, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995.
89 See statement by Christian Pierret, “Consequences du rapprochement entre les entreprises Renault et 
Nissan: r^ponse du Secretaire d'etat a I'lndustrie, a une question d'actualite a l'Assemblee Nationale, Paris,
6 April 1999, on www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
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foreign competition in previously nationally-negotiated protected sectors. Many 
arguments on the role of “Europe” in reforming the dirigiste French state have been 
made.90 Suffice to say here from the evidence in Part I that the “Europeanization” of 
“domestic” economic policy was in this case crucial in France’s economic relations with 
Japan. Or from another perspective, “Europe” was necessary as an external force to 
change ingrained French economic habits and reflexes -  the exception frangaise.
II Political-Strategic Relations
France is usually perceived as a secondary partner for Japan in Europe, behind 
Japan’s close relations with the UK and Germany. Economic conflicts dominated 
bilateral relations in the 1980s and 1990s and stymied the development of political and 
security ties. More often than not, political ties were driven by and derivative of 
economic ties, with French ministers of External Trade, Industry or Finance, rather than 
Foreign or Defence ministers, taking the lead on bilateral relations. This was somewhat 
inevitable in the light of the French penchant for the Gaullist grande geste and show of 
independence from the US, and its view of Japan as a US dependent and one­
dimensional economic power.91 France did not take Japan seriously as a political 
partner in the 1980s but it was a constant troublemaker because of its influence within 
the EC. France was also causing problems to Japan via its membership of the G7, 
NATO and UNSC.92 Yet by the end of the 1990s, France had metamorphosised from 
one of the most anti-Japanese EU member states to one of Japan’s most vocal 
advocates. Part II argues that the EU hardly played a role in this transformation, which 
was motivated by essentially national objectives.
90 See Vivien Schmidt’s From State to Market? The Transformation o f  French Business and Government, 
1996 and “French dirigisme”, in Modern and Contemporary France, 5/2, 1997, pp.229-41; Jacques 
Barraux, “L’Exception frangaise”, Les Echos, 16 November 1998; “Nouvelle initiative commerciale 
franco-japonaise”, Les Echos, 29 March 2001. Elie Cohen, “France”, in J.E.S. Hayward (ed), Industrial 
Enterprise and European Integration, 1995.
91 Eric Seizelet, “Japon: Contraintes et ddfis de la puissance”, in Fr6d6ric Charillon (ed), Les Politiques 
Etrangeres, Paris: La Documentation Frangaise, 2001, pp. 179-96.
92 Le Figaro, 28 April 1992.
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a) Taking post-Cold War Japan seriously
France started taking Japan seriously as a political interlocutor only after the 
Cold War. The change in French economic thinking from economic nationalism to 
collaboration, as covered in Part I, was a necessary factor in improving bilateral ties. 
But a “real rapprochement” between France and Japan, observed Christian Sautter in 
1988, could not take place “until France had modernised its industries and Japan could 
assume its international responsibilities.”93 Two other important motors were: Japan’s 
search for a higher profile in post-Cold War international diplomacy; and the personal 
role of the French President in driving French foreign policy.
Japan’s post-Cold War search for a greater international role has resonated with 
the French vision of a multipolar world order. After the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the emergence of new threats, the Japanese leadership began to question its reliance 
on the US, to re-define Japan’s foreign policy, and to seek a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council. The first official statement of Japan’s new internationalism appeared 
in the May 1990 issue of the Gaimusho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) journal, 
“Gaiko Forum”. A senior diplomat urged a trilateral international leadership among the 
US, the EU and Japan, as the “key to world peace and prosperity”.94 Calls for Japan to 
play a more assertive and pro-active role in international affairs were redoubled after the 
1991 Gulf War.95 A more activist Japanese foreign policy took shape from 1990 after 
Japan was criticised internationally - despite making a massive $11 billion financial 
contribution - for not contributing militarily to the war effort96. In June 1991, the 
Japanese Diet approved the use of Japanese forces abroad in Peace-Keeping Operations. 
Inspired by the 1990 Trans-Atlantic Declaration, the Gaimusho pushed for the EU- 
Japan Joint Declaration, signed in July 1991. Japan’s rising internationalism coincided 
with progress in European integration with the 1985 Single European Act and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1991, which reflected Europe’s own quest for a 
global role. Among the states in the EU, the G8 and the UNSC’s permanent five, the
93 See Christian Sautter, L 'Etat du Japon, Paris: La D6couverte, 1988, p.339.
94 See Leitch et al, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, pp.35-44.
95 Leitch et al; Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan that can say No, Tokyo, 1991; A. Bennett, J. Lepgold and D. 
Unger, “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War”, International Organization, 48/1, 1994, pp.39-75.
96 The reinstated government o f Kuwait glaringly omitted Japan in the list o f countries it thanked in a full- 
page advertisement in the New York Times, and a monument constructed in Kuwait some months later for 
the same purpose flew the flags of all coalition nations except Japan’s. Leitch et al 1995:45.
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French government is the most vocal supporter of a multi-polar world in which Japan 
would carry a greater weight than is currently the case.
French governments have encouraged a more assertive Japanese foreign policy 
and stronger bilateral ties. Efforts to build up strong political and cultural relations with 
Japan - thereby broadening the relationship away from a near-exclusive focus on trade 
and economics - have been sustained and consistent. France and Japan have found new 
avenues for cooperation on issues ranging from stabilising international exchange rates 
to combating terrorism. At an ASEM meeting in Kobe in January 2001, a controversial 
discussion paper (“Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Economies”) jointly 
authored by the French and Japanese finance ministries, and appealing for a fresh
07approach to currency regimes, was released. The improvement in relations among 
government elites has been buttressed by enhanced French images of Japan, which have 
moved beyond alternating between fascination and suspicion, to accepting Japan as a 
normal country. According to official surveys, the proportion of “opinion-makers” in 
France expressing confidence in Japan rose from 57% in 1993 to 62% in 1996 and 72%
QO
in 1998. This political rapprochement was carried into the cultural arena with the 
opening of the Maison de la Culture du Japon in 1997 (officiated by Chirac and a 
visiting Japanese princess), 15 years after agreement on the project was reached at 
Mitterrand’s 1982 state visit to Japan. High-profile cultural festivals (1997 was “Japan 
Year” in France and 1998 was “France Year” in Japan) have contributed to a “second 
wave” of japonisme." Likewise, French management in Nissan and Japan’s World Cup 
2002 soccer team have contributed to a very positive image of France in Japan.
The change in the tenor of bilateral relations under the Mitterrand and Chirac 
presidencies is drastic. Mitterrand adopted a “hands-off policy towards Japan and did 
not intervene in bilateral conflicts. Apparently displeased about broken promises and 
the delay on re-furbishing the French lycee in Tokyo, Mitterrand allowed his party
97“Paris et Tokyo veulent une cooperation renforcee sur les changes”, La Tribune, 6 January 1999; and 
Financial Times, 16 January 2001. The discussion paper argued that a managed or pegged exchange rate 
(in which currencies move within a band centred on a basket o f currencies including the yen and the euro) 
could best stabilise volatile exchange rates across Asia.
98 French Senate, Les Relations Franco-Japonaises, op cit.
99 Interviews with Tsukasa Kawada, Japanese Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris, 4 April 2003; and Atsushi 
Nishioka, Cultural Affairs and Information Director, Japanese Embassy in Paris, 16 April 2003 confirmed 
a markedly heightened interest and demand for Japanese language teaching, and appreciation of Japanese 
arts (ranging from cinema to sumo wrestling). See also Matsuura 98:61-71.
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protege and ally Edith Cresson to overshadow political relations in later years. In 1988- 
91, bilateral quarrels resulted in France being perceived in Japan as the “most racist and 
hostile” European country.100 The “Cresson effect” so dominated bilateral ties that by 
the time she assumed the premiership, her short but tumultuous term over 1991-92 was 
marred by bilateral diatribes and threats of trade conflict.101 In June 1991, Peugeot’s 
Tokyo showroom was the target of anti-French graffiti while demonstrators marched 
outside the French Embassy. Relations improved towards the end of Mitterrand’s 
presidency under Beregovoy and Balladur, and France received Emperor Akihito on a 
state visit in October 1994.
Under Chirac, however, Japan is recognized as one of the world’s seven great 
powers with “global influence” (China and India are named as the other Asian great 
powers). French diplomacy under Chirac has been taking the initiative, both 
unilaterally and through the European framework, to create “strategic alliances” with 
Japan in order to balance the sole post-Cold War hyper-power, the United States. 
Chirac’s first Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette, explained in 1996 that Japan was the 
second economic power and the largest ODA donor in the world. It thus played a 
primary role in Asia that dovetailed with Chirac’s designation of Asia as the nouvelle 
frontiere of French diplomacy. France wanted to give a “special dimension” to bilateral 
relations with Japan.104 A France-Japan Forum was launched in September 1996, 
chaired by former French and Japanese prime ministers Raymond Barre and Nakasone 
Yasuhiro. This Forum has been held annually and has served as a generator of 
initiatives for improving France-Japan bilateral relations and exchanges.
Chirac’s activism in stepping up high-level contacts between France and Japan 
has been a crucial factor in improved bilateral relations. Chirac has a singular familiarity 
with Japan unique among Western (or even Asian) leaders. Having visited Japan over 
40 times in various capacities (as private citizen, Mayor of Paris, Prime Minister, etc),
100 Le Monde, 12 January 1990; Liberation, 12 January 1990.
101 Japan delivered a rare diplomatic protest by objecting to Cresson’s attacks on its trade practices. The 
Japanese Ministry o f Foreign Affairs had summoned the French ambassador and warned that Cresson's 
remarks were “inappropriate” and might “adversely affect friendly relations” between the two countries. 
Financial Times, 30 May 1991.
102 La Tribune de I'Expansion, 27 June 1991.
103 Ren6 Dorient, “Un septennat de politique asiatique: quel bilan pour la France?”, Politique Etrangere,
1/2002, 2002, p. 180.
104 MAE, Interview with Foreign Minister Herv6 de Charette with the journal “France/Japon/Eco”, Paris 1 
October 1996, found on www.diplomatie.fr.
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his long and close friendships with Japanese leaders have helped improve bilateral 
atmospherics.105 The “Chirac factor” was instrumental in overcoming a history of 
bilateral relations fraught with misunderstandings since the start of the 20th century. 
Chirac and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (who addressed each other by first 
names)106 signed in November 1996 a long-term bilateral agreement, “20 Actions pour 
VAn 2000”, to comprehensively develop their bilateral relations. This document 
provided a model for the EU’s own 10-year Action Plan in 2001 for EU-Japan
1 (Y1relations. Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, a close advisor to Chirac and the first fluent 
Japanese-speaking French Ambassador, was accredited to Tokyo between 1998 and 
2002.108 Chirac’s “Cohabitation” with a Socialist prime minister in 1997-2002 did not 
affect the rapprochement. Lionel Jospin's visit in December 1999, which included 
meetings with the emperor and Prime Minister Obuchi, continued the new offensive to 
woo Japan.109 The theme of political partnership initiated by Paris was reproduced in 
subsequent German and British bilateral agreements with Japan. Like the Franco- 
Japanese document, the 1996 Japan-Germany Partnership Action Plan and the 
September 1998 UK-Japan “Action Agenda 21” are “strategic partnerships” which rest 
on strong economic links and shared values on international issues. 110
b) France-Japan Security Cooperation
In tandem with improving political relations and perceptions, French willingness 
to work with Japan on security matters has also made huge strides from the 1980s. At 
the G7 Williamsburg summit in 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone had to work hard to
105 Le Monde, 20 May 1995 highlighted in a front-page article Chirac’s interest in Asia, “les tropismes 
asiatiques du president”. See also “Jacques Chirac veut attirer des entreprises japonaises a Paris”, Le 
Monde, 2 November 1993. Allegations of Chirac’s shady business dealings, and an illegitimate Japanese 
son, were recently published in a book by Guy Birenbaum criticising the financial and personal 
misdemeanours o f the French political class. Liberation 1 September 2003; L ’Express 4 September 2003.
106 The “Jacques-Ryu” entente recalled the “Ron-Yasu” relationship between Ronald Reagan and 
Nakasone Yasuhiro. It was however much more short-lived; Hashimoto was out o f office by 1998. Jean- 
Pierre Lehmann, “Japanese Attitudes towards Foreign Policy”, in Richard Grant (ed), The Process o f  
Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 127.
10 Interview with Seamus Gillespie, Head (Japan Unit), European Commission External Relations 
Directorate General, Brussels, 26 March 2003.
108 Le Figaro, 17 April 2003. The British Embassy in Tokyo, in contrast, has had a long tradition of  
fluent Japanese speakers among their diplomats. See Hugh Cortazzi, British Influence in Japan since the 
end o f  the Occupation (1952-1984), Oxford: Nissan Occasional Paper Series No.13, 1990.
109 “Mr Jospin goes to Tokyo: From carmakers to soccer coaches, the French are taking Japan by storm”, 
Financial Times, 16 December 1999. The Financial Times opined that France was launching a “drive to 
usurp the UK as Japan's most favoured European nation.”
1,0 Hughes 2001:63; Umezu and Howell, “The Anglo-Japanese Relationship: Looking into the Future”,
p.101.
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convince a reluctant Mitterrand to agree to the wording of the final communique on the 
“indivisibility of Western security”, the first time Japan linked its security in such a 
public way with the West as a whole against the USSR.111 France opposed Japan’s 
proposal of an informal arrangement with NATO in 1983, which led Nakasone to 
intensify consultations directly with the EC’s “big three” member states. When in 1990 
Japan and NATO organised the first NATO-Japan Security Conference involving 
government officials and academics from both sides, France refused to attend because it 
felt that such a conference violated NATO’s charter. Likewise, Foreign Minister 
Nakayama Taro floated the possibility of Japanese involvement as OSCE Observer in 
Prague in May 1990, but French opposition persuaded Japan to shelve the idea then.112
Today, Japan is perceived in French strategic thinking as one of a very select 
core group in the Asia Pacific - including Australia, Singapore and South Korea - for the
I j  1
future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific. France has also welcomed Japanese 
participation in the evolving European security architecture through the OSCE.114 
France has been keen to play a role in Northeast Asian security through the Korean 
Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). France and the UK clamoured to get 
involved in the US-Japan-South Korea initiative as members of the UN Armistice 
Commission and Advisory Group, apart from participation via the EU.115
On a bilateral level, France since 1994 (and Germany since 1996) started annual 
bilateral dialogues with Japan on a “two-plus-two” basis, involving both Foreign and 
Defence Ministries.116 On the ground, French and Japanese troops have cooperated in
111 Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan: A State Strategy fo r the Twenty-first Century, London: Routledge Curzon, 
2002, pp.54-55.
112 Drifte 98:86. The Director of Japan’s Defence Agency visits NATO occasionally, and Japan has been 
sending parliamentarians to the North Atlantic Assembly since 1980.
113 Francis Godement, “The US and Japan into the 21st century: New Geopolitical Thinking?”, August 
2001, paper presented at Asia Pacific Security Forum, on http://iffi.orf.fr.
114 20 Actions pour I ’An 2000, Chirac-Hashimoto statement, Tokyo, 18 November 1996, Action 16. 
Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro publicly floated the possibility o f Japanese involvement as OSCE 
Observer when he visited Prague in May 1990, but mixed reactions from European countries -  with 
France opposing -persuaded Japan to shelve the idea then.
115 France and Britain, the only European signatories to the 1953 Joint Policy Declaration on the Korean 
Armistice, have leveraged on this Cold War vestige to obtain national roles in KEDO. Paul Stares and 
Nicolas Rdgaud, “Europe’s Role in Asia-Pacific Security”, Survival 39/4, Winter 1997-98, pp.l 17-139.
116 Alain Richard, “European Defence and Euro-Asia Security Relations,” Speech by French Minister of  
Defence, Paris, 19 February 1999, on www.diplomatie.fr. Because o f their arms supplies to Japan, 
Germany and Sweden also hold security-related discussions with Japanese officials. See also Alain 
Richard, “European Defence and Euro-Asia Security Relations,” Speech by French Minister o f Defence,
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UN Peace-Keeping Operations (PKOs), notably in Cambodia and in Zaire (to support
117Rwandan refugees) in 1994. Although France and Japan play at best only marginal 
roles in each other’s security, Japan represents a potential source and lucrative market 
for helicopters and military high technology. Japan has the second highest military 
expenditure in the world, notwithstanding its pacifist constitution (Article 9) and limits
1 1 Q
on its defence capability. France tried to offer itself as a partner during the early- 
1990s at the height of Japan’s internal debate about developing an autonomous defence 
industry, or kokusanka. The August 1994 Higuchi report on a security policy vision for 
the 21st century urged that joint research and development of weapons should be 
pursued “with other countries” (ie European countries) as well as the United States.119 
The “European card” was evident in the highly publicised international strategic 
alliance between the Mitsubishi group and Daimler Benz in April 1990 (which sent 
shock waves through the US aerospace community in Tokyo). Throughout the FSX 
controversy when US doubts over sharing technology and whether Japan was an 
economic ally or challenger had fuelled Japanese kokusanka attempts to build an 
indigenous fighter plane, French aerospace companies made offers for joint 
development, with Dassault offering to help to build the FSX based on its Rafael 
fighter. However, arms sales and military technological exchange between France 
and Japan to date are insignificant aside from helicopters, and limited by Japan’s “Three 
Arms Export Principles”.121
France has given diplomatic support to Japan’s bid for the diplomatic-security 
forum of highest priority to Japan’s foreign policy -  the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). In July 1993, the Japanese government stated in an official response 
to the UN Secretary-General’s enquiry about UNSC reform, that “Japan is prepared to 
do all it can to discharge its responsibilities on the Security Council”.122 Other
Paris, 19 February 1999, on wvyw.diplomatie.fr. See Stares and Regaud, “Europe’s Role in Asia-Pacific 
Security”, Survival 39/4, Winter 1997-98, p. 122.
117 “Japan-France Relations”, www.infoiapan.org/region/europe/france/index.html. accessed 4 May 2003.
118 In 2001, the USA accounted for 36% of the world total, followed by Japan with 6% and France, Russia 
and the UK, with 4% each. See SIPRI 2002:13.
119 Green 95:148.
120 Green 95:149 and p.180 n.65. See also Michael Chinworth, “The Technology Factor in US-Japan 
Security Relations”, in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds), The US-Japan Alliance: Past, 
Present and Future, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp.286-310.
121 Military technology exports to the US are however an exception to the export principles, clarified in a 
1983 US-Japan MOU on Joint Military Technology Transfer. Green 95:84.
122 Cited in Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Quest fo r a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter o f  Pride or 
Justice?, London: Macmillan /St Antony’s College Oxford, 2000, p.l.
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statements expressing Japan’s candidature for a permanent seat on the UNSC followed 
this. Japan has often been treated as a banker to finance the UN and UN peace-keeping 
operations (PKOs) -  see Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 UN and PKO Budget Assessment Ratios
UN Budget share PKO special contribution rate
1994 1997 1994 1997
USA 25.0 25.00 31.7 30.862
Japan 12.4 15.65 12.5 15.662
Germany 8.9 9.06 8.9 9.066
Russia 6.7 4.27 8.5 5.271
France 6.0 6.42 7.6 7.925
UK 5.0 5.32 6.3 6.568
China 0.7 0.74 0.9 0.914
Source: Reinharc Drifte 2000:76 and 1998:140.
Japan’s efforts to win support among the P5 focused on the US, expecting 
France and the UK eventually to go along with the position of the US. French support 
for Japan’s bid first expressed on the eve of French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe’s visit 
to Japan in March 1994, and reaffirmed in Juppe’s speech to the UNGA that same year.
France and Japan see eye to eye on most security issues save the notable 
exception of French nuclear policy. This came up against Japanese anti-nuclear 
sentiments during the 1995 French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. As the only nation 
to have suffered a nuclear attack, and surrounded by nuclear weapon states (China and 
Russia) or others on the verge of becoming nuclear powers (North Korea), Japan’s 
stance and campaign for nuclear non-proliferation is a foreign policy matter of the 
utmost existential importance. It was one of the most vociferous international critics of 
France during Chirac’s nuclear testing in 1995.123 While the US-Japan Mutual Defence 
Treaty guarantees the defence of Japan, Japan has expanded incrementally but 
significantly its security role and the reach of its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in the 
1990s. A New Taiko (Defence Programme Outline) adopted in November 1995 to 
replace the 1976 Taiko shifted the emphasis of the security treaty from the defence of 
Japan to Japanese support for the US military presence and mission in the Asia Pacific.
123 The Japanese Ambassador to France described as a “very serious divergence” the bilateral quarrel over 
nuclear testing in his interview in France Japan Eco (No. 65, winter 1995), in Matsuura 98:175.
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The 1996 Joint Declaration issued after Clinton’s visit to Japan envisaged an expansion 
of Japan’s security role “in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas 
surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security 
of Japan.” Under the 1998 US-Japan Defence Guidelines, Japan’s security role was 
enlarged to include providing logistics support for US forces, the operation of Japanese 
minesweepers in international waters, and the evacuation of Japanese citizens from 
trouble spots overseas.124
Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks however, the Western focus on 
China’s key role in maintaining world order and fighting international terrorism, has 
somewhat reduced Japan’s relevance to France and Europe as a security partner.125 This 
has had the effect of pushing Japan towards greater collaboration with the West. In 
February 2003, Japan signed an MOU agreeing to logistical support for French, German 
and New Zealand military forces, a move hailed in Paris as a breakthrough in bilateral 
defence ties.126
c) EC-Japan Political Cooperation and 1991 Joint Declaration
Commission officials who have worked on relations with Japan tend to bemoan 
the lack of a clear EU political strategy for Japan.127 The EU-Japan relationship has 
often been a “weak link” in political terms and almost exclusively concerned with
I 9 Rtrade. From the European perspective, Japan is often “pretty much an after-thought”, 
in contrast to dense Europe-US and US-Japan relations.129 Notwithstanding this relative 
neglect, the EC-Japan political dialogue is the EC’s oldest dialogue with any Asian 
country, and is sometimes considered a “special” relationship.130 EC-Japan political 
consultation began in the 1970s when the EC “held high level consultations” with Japan 
to discuss EC enlargement and shared concerns such as the Middles East and the oil 
crises. The two sides agreed on twice-yearly high-level consultations in 1973; the EC
124 “China upset over US-Japan Defense Agreement”, Stratfor Report 27 May 1998; “Japan Gains Access 
to Bases in Singapore”, Stratfor Report, 3 May 2000.
125Interviews with Counsellor, French Embassy in London, December 202, and with European 
Commission External Relations official (Japan Unit), 26 March 2003.
126 “Exchange o f Notes concerning the Contribution of Supplies and Services to the Armed Forces or 
Other Similar Entities o f France, Germany and New Zealand”, Tokyo, 28 February 2003, on 
http://www.infoiapan.Org/announce/2003/2/0238-2.html.
127 Wilkinson 1983, 1990; Nuttall 1996, and Richardson 1996.
128 See Bridges, “Japan and Europe: Rebalancing a Relationship, pp.230-245; Iwanaga 2000:208-235.
129 Nuttall 1996:104-120.
130 See Wiessala 2002:3 and Gilson 2001.
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established a delegation in Tokyo in July 1974; regular European Parliament-Diet 
interparliamentary conferences began in 1978; and a separate Japanese delegation to the
i o i
EC in Brussels was set up in 1979. In 1980, the first moves towards joint political
cooperation were made when the Japanese and EC Ambassadors to Iran made a joint
demarche to the Teheran government requesting the release of the US Embassy
hostages, and Japan and Europe displayed a degree of solidarity on the issues of
Afghanistan, Poland and even the Middle East (Japan supported the EC’s Venice
Declaration in favour of Palestinian participation in any Middle East peace talks).132
These meetings were used to provide mutual support for allies worried by the 1980s
1bellicosity of the Reagan administrations. These early attempts at foreign policy 
coordination and timid joint declaratory diplomacy were, however, sporadic and not 
well followed-up. For example, the Troika Ministers and Political Directors’ meetings 
with their Japanese counterparts, started in 1983, were held so irregularly that they did 
not even take place from 1986 to 1990.134
Serious EC-Japan political cooperation began only at the end of the Cold War. 
In 1990 Jean-Pierre Leng was the first EC Ambassador accredited to the Emperor 
instead of the Foreign Minister in Tokyo; before that, the Japanese refused to accord the 
head of the EC Delegation full ambassadorial rank.135 Gaimusho in late-1990 initiated 
ideas for a new dialogue with Europe, having noted the EC-US Transatlantic 
Declaration that autumn and feeling that something had to be done to strengthen EC-
1 36Japan relations. The Japanese Government’s White Paper in 1990 included an 
assessment of the political relationship with the Community ahead of the Maastricht 
Treaty, recognising that the EU could be both a political and economic force on the 
international stage. Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro told the Diet in 1991 that “Japan 
intends to take this opportunity to deepen its dialogue with the EC in political, 
economic, cultural and many other areas”, and to further strengthen its cooperative 
relations, including cooperation in problems of global magnitude”.137 A “Joint 
Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and
131 Hughes 2001:59-60 and Hazel Smith 2002.
132 Hughes 2001:59.
133 Hazel Smith 2002: 148-149; Steinert, “Japan and the European Community”, p.42.
134 Brian Bridges, “Japan and Europe: Rebalancing a Relationship”, p.235.
135 Christopher Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 151.
136 For a detailed study o f the genesis and formulation of this initiative, see Abe 1999.
137 Gilson 2001:76-77.
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Japan” was signed in the Hague on 18 November 1991. It set out potential areas of 
cooperation, particularly in political dialogue to enhance the Japan-EC relationship and 
also restore some of Japan’s prestige, battered by its failure to contribute other than 
financially to the Gulf War in 1991. Negotiations for this Declaration were difficult 
because some EC politicians and officials felt that Japan was diverting attention away 
from core economic issues by stressing political cooperation, while the Japanese felt 
that some EC member state government, particularly the French, were trying to impose
n o
“managed trade” as the price for political dialogue.
The Joint Declaration was a breakthrough in seeking to strengthen a political 
relationship which was arguably even less institutionalised than the EC-ASEAN 
relationship. The 1991 Declaration instituted the first regular EU summit with an Asian 
country and supported the Japanese claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. The two sides agreed to work together on strengthening the UN, supporting 
democracy, human rights and market economies, nuclear proliferation, support for 
developing countries, transnational challenges such as international crime and the 
environment, support for central and eastern Europe and stability in the Asia-Pacific. 
The Declaration’s major achievement was to initiate a register of Conventional Arms at 
the UN, but it failed to bring about the political cooperation that had been envisaged.
The Commission’s 1994 New Asian Strategy (NAS) paper reaffirmed Japan as a 
priority country for the EU in Asia, but the 1995 Commission communication, “Europe 
and Japan: The Next Steps”, still bemoaned that the dialogue “has hardly proceeded 
beyond the level of exchange of views and information and there have been few 
examples of concrete cooperation”.139 Recent moves to boost EU-Japan political 
cooperation and dialogue have been more positive. At the 9th EU-Japan Summit in 
Tokyo in 2000, a ten-year Action Plan was established to reinforce the EU-Japan 
partnership and to move it from consultation to joint action. Attempts were made to 
reinvigorate the political dialogue with the “Decade of Japan-Europe cooperation” at the 
tenth EU-Japan summit in 2001. In April 2002, Romano Prodi was the first 
Commission President accorded Head of State status when he addressed Japan's
138 Bridges 1992:11.
139 European Commission, Europe and Japan: The Next Steps, COM (95)73 final, 8 March 1995, p.7; 
Smith 148-149.
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parliament, a month after President Bush had spoken in the Diet.140 Increased 
interaction resulted in Prodi and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi meeting an 
unprecedented five times over the course of 12 months in 2001-2002.141 This has 
somewhat compensated for the relative European neglect of Japan since the 1997 Asian 
crisis. As Le Monde noted in June 2000, the level of European representation was 
telling at the funeral of Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, who died in office. While the US 
and Asian countries were represented by their Heads of State or Government (including 
President Clinton), France and Italy only sent former Prime Ministers (Alain Juppe and 
Massimo D’Alema) and other European countries sent second-ranking ministers.142
d) Security dialogue and partnership between civilian powers?
Following Francis Duchene and others, it is useful to think of the EU-Japan 
relationship as one between “civilian powers”. This approach emphasises the use of 
economic leverage and a focus on issues such as environmental concerns and open 
trading - areas in which the EU and Japan are strong - rather than military power.143
At the end of the Cold War, the EC/EU was quick to recognize that many of the 
“new” security issues- terrorism, environmental degradation, resource scarcities, drug 
trafficking and other forms of organized crime- required global cooperation for 
successful management. As non-military powers, the EU and Japan have by default 
been among the chief actors pushing this agenda. EC countries leveraged on Japan’s 
economic and financial clout to engage Japan in the reconstruction of post-communist 
Europe. In late 1989 the Japanese government joined the G-24 group of states to 
discuss multilateral economic assistance to Eastern Europe, and in May 1990 Japan 
became a founding member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). Japan held 8.5% of total shares and became the second-largest individual 
contributor after the US. Japanese aid to Russia had been hampered by the unresolved
140 Financial Times 26 April 2002.
141 In December 2001: EU-Japan Summit in Brussels; in 2002: G8 Summit, EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo, 
Prodi’s visit to Japan and Diet speech, and 4th ASEM Summit in Copenhagen. Interview with Japanese 
Embassy to the EU in Brussels, 27 March 2003.
142 Le Monde, 10 June 2000.
143See Francis Duchene, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence”, in 
Kohnstamm and Hager (ends), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European 
Community, London: Macmillan, 1973; Julie Gilson, Japan and the European Union: A Partnership fo r  
the 21s Century?, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 169-170; Hans W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New  
Civilian Powers:”, Foreign Affairs, 69 (1990-91), pp.91-106; and Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New  
World Order”, Foreign Affairs, 70 (1991-92).
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territorial dispute over the Northern Territories, but in January 1990, following Kaifu’s 
visit to Eastern Europe, Japan pledged almost US$2 billion in economic aid to Poland 
and Hungary.144
Japan’s main utility to European interests in regional and international security 
has been its financial power. The EU has found in Japan a willing and financially 
generous partner in its post-Cold War aims of stabilising the ex-communist countries in 
central and eastern Europe via the OSCE, the UN and other institutions. The Balkans, 
the greatest area of security concern to the EU, has given rise to the greatest amount of 
EU-Japan security cooperation and allowed Japan via the OSCE to play a role in 
European security for the first time since the 1920s. During the 1991-95 conflict, the EU 
assumed both a “civilian power” role in attempts by the troika and various EU-UN 
mediators to broker a cease-fire in the summer of 1991, and a limited military role 
following the deployment of WEU and NATO forces in the Adriatic and Danube to 
monitor the enforcement of economic sanctions. Gaimusho sent a fact-finding mission 
to the former Yugoslavia in January 1994 and even considered, in response to the UN 
Secretary-General’s special representative Akashi Yasushi’s request, the dispatch of the 
Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to Macedonia on a UN preventative diplomacy mission. In 
the end, it was decided that Japan’s contribution should be financial and civilian, and 
focused on humanitarian aid.145 In April 1995, Japan had pledged a total of US$140 
million in aid to the states of the former Yugoslavia.146 In the absence of a military role, 
the use of Japanese economic power in aid was seen as a boost to Japan’s campaign for 
the UNSC. Japan again stood aside during the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999, but 
following the cessation in bombing, it pledged a US$200 million aid package for 
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in line with Obuchi’s conception of “human 
security”.
The “civilian” aspects of EU-Japan cooperation in the security field can also be 
seen in the reciprocity and cooperation arrangements in getting involved in each other’s
144 Hughes 2001:64.
145 The proposal for a Japanese military contribution was quashed over reservations that deployment 
might contravene Japan’s constitution, and by domestic opposition to sending SDF soldiers overseas. 
Hughes 2001:65.
146 Drifte 1998:87. Akashi, a Japanese national, lobbied the Japanese government very strongly for 
economic and political support of the region.
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regional security concerns. Prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) is very high on the agenda of Japanese foreign policy. An 
incentive for the EU’s involvement in KEDO, set up in March 1995 by the US, Japan 
and South Korea, was the tacit understanding that Japan would offer assistance in the 
reconstruction of former Yugoslavia in return for a greater European commitment to 
activities in Asia. Some observers see in this apparent KEDO-Bosnia quid pro quo 
between Japan and the EU a “specific reciprocity” arrangement which reinforces their 
respective civilian power roles in seeking non-military solutions to regional 
problems.147 In 1997, the EU decided to provide North Korea with $69 million in food 
aid to alleviate the continuing famine in that country. It was the most generous response 
then to the world-wide UN appeal for food aid, and European Commission officials saw 
its benefits in both security and humanitarian terms.148
Despite the community of security interests between the EU and Japan, any 
closer EU-Japan security cooperation is however, not on the cards. Japan lacks force 
projection capabilities, and the Cold War threats in its neighbourhood have not receded 
(North Korea remains a totalitarian and unstable communist regime threatening nuclear 
brinkmanship). Its security critically dependent on the US, Japan has supported Anglo- 
American intervention in Iraq in 2003, and even without a UN mandate sent its largest- 
ever contingent of SDF troops abroad to help the occupation forces.149
Overall Trends
French political relations with Japan during the Cold War were framed within 
the larger context of EC-Japan relations. Bereft of special historical ties, France at first 
neglected Japan in the first postwar decades and failed to take Japan seriously. Yet 
from a Gaullist dismissal of Japan as an adjunct of the US, France has become probably 
the most enthusiastic supporter in the EU of an assertive Japan that pulls its weight as 
the world’s largest ODA donor and receives the political prestige and trappings, in 
Vedrine’s formulation, of a “power of global influence”.
147 Gilson 2000:131 and 201-2, f.n. 35.
148 Stares and Regaud, p. 124.
149 Interview with Japanese Mission to the European Union, 27 March 2003; “Japan: to arms”, Economist 
26 July 2003.
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Grid 5.2 European Political-Strategic Positions in Japan, 1985-2002
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
F ♦ a ♦ —► <- *c _> ♦ e
GB ♦ —» ♦ ♦ ♦
D ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
EU ♦ ♦ b — ♦ d — ♦
- = Confrontation or Conflict with Japan 
0 = Ambiguous or neutral towards Japan 
+ = Collaboration or Active Engagement with Japan
a Bilateral relations deteriorated to over trade disputes throughout most of the 1980s. In addition, France 
opposed Japan’s participation in Western security fora like NATO and the CSCE. 
b First EC-Japan Summit is held, and EC-Japan Joint Declaration is issued, The Hague, July 1991. 
c Relations turned frosty in 1995 as a result of French nuclear testing in the Pacific. Then in November 
1996, Chirac and PM Hashimoto issued the “France-Japon 20 Actions pour Fan 2000”. 
d The Council issued a 1995 Communication on the EU and Japan: The Next Steps. 
e This clearly convergent European position on political and security relations with Japan is tempered by 
France, Britain and Germany maintaining privileged bilateral security dialogues with Japan.
France-Japan political and strategic relations have been largely unaffected by the 
European Union. In 1988-91, France resisted policy convergence with other Member 
States and effectively blocked British attempts to promote EU political engagement 
with Japan. However, the EU-Japan rapprochement heralded by the 1991 EC-Japan 
Declaration provided the context for French leaders to mend fences with Japan. In good 
times (1996-2002), France has tried to keep many of its activities outside the ambit of 
the EU. Yet, the salience of France to Japan was and continues to be (aside from 
Japan’s UNSC bid) France’s place at the heart of European integration. The France- 
Japan cooperation agreement in 1996 even served as an inspiration for the 2001 EU 
document.150 By 2000, French policy towards Japan converged with the European 
mainstream and the Commission, by default rather than by design (and sometimes 
despite Paris) because of the overwhelming need for the EU to find like-minded 
partners in the new post-Cold War world. France, whether on its own or with the EU, is 
not capable of seriously challenging Japan’s relationship with the US. With or without 
the Europeanisation of French relations with Japan, the EU remains secondary to 
Japan’s key foreign relationship.
150 Interview with European Commission External Relations official (Japan Unit), 26 March 2003.
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III Human Rights
Part III of this chapter - unlike in chapters 4 and 5 where human rights is an area 
of French and EU concern in China and Vietnam- will treat the issue of human rights in 
France-Japan relations as an issue for aid cooperation in third countries (especially in 
Asia). The US and Western institutions such as the EU have typically expected Japan 
as a liberal democracy to support Western conceptions of democracy, freedom and 
human rights. In the main, Japan has been treated as a member of the club of Western 
democracies, and as the second largest industrialized democracy after the United States. 
Identifying itself as a major ‘Western’ power but located in a region where non-Westem 
institutions and values remain powerful and where memories of Japanese aggression are 
still very much alive, Japan is often faced with conflicting demands in the area of 
human rights.
Unlike China, Myanmar/Burma, Vietnam, Taiwan and South Korea under 
martial law (until 1989), and Malaysia and Singapore in leading the “Asian values”151 
debate in the 1990s, Japan is virtually unique among Asia countries for not having any 
serious human rights disagreements with Western liberal democracies. It can of course 
be argued that Japan is in effect a Western liberal democracy, albeit one geographically 
located in Asia. French elites and public opinion have long viewed Japan as a 
“civilized” polity which respects and shares what in France are perceived as 
fundamental republican values of democratic government, secularism, non­
discrimination (ie equality of the citizen), and freedom of expression. First, alone 
among the larger states in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Vietnam), postwar Japan has not been a major target of human rights action or criticism 
by human rights groups and Western countries (aside from the gender lobby)152. 
Second, Japan is not a target state in French human rights policy. Neither Mitterrand’s 
principled approach nor Chirac’s pragmatic “constructive dialogue” approach has 
included Japan as a target state. Third, Japan’s relevance to French human rights and 
democratisation objectives in East Asia (chapter 3) are twofold: as a partner to leverage 
on Japan’s status as the richest and largest industrialized democracy in Asia and hence
151 “Les valeurs du Dr Mahathir”, Le Monde, 1 October 1998.
152 Women’s rights in Japan (eg. women’s salaries and participation in Japanese politics) have been 
criticised as ranking among the bottom of all developed nations. See United Nations, The World’s Women 
2000: Trends and Statistics, New York, 2000, pp. 151-76.
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to cooperate on ODA and technical assistance programmes with Japan (ie. the 
promotion of “economic” rights).
a) East and West?
Beneath the surface similarities, there are of course many areas in which 
Japanese attitudes towards gender, the individual’s place in the community and nation, 
the rights and obligations of citizens, the treatment of ethnic minorities, foreigners, and 
capital and corporal punishment, would shock a European public. French leaders and 
the japanologist intelligentsia have a high regard for Japan’s position as a potential 
leaders of pan-Asianism and hence, a different approach to democratic and human
1 o
rights values as Western governments. Granted, some French NGOs have criticized 
Japan’s human rights record on issues such as the treatment of prisoners and the 
conditions of detention in Japan.154 The largest single issue of human rights contention 
between Japan and Western human rights NGOs (and some Nordic countries) is that of 
capital punishment, which (in common with some of the States in the USA and most 
Asian countries) is still practiced in Japan. Otherwise human rights NGOs have not 
noted major human rights violations in Japan apart from certain human rights abuses 
such as fingerprinting foreigners, including Koreans and Chinese who were forcibly 
moved to Japan during the war and had stayed; discrimination against the burakumin 
(the under-class minority); and the official oppression of the indigenous Ainu people 
which was lifted only in 1997.155
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU as a whole has been more active and 
vocal in promoting democracy and human rights values around the world. EU 
pronouncements on Japan since the 1991 Joint Declaration have consistently stressed 
that the EU and Japan share the same values of “democracy, freedom, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights”.156 Japan has generally subscribed to these values and 
objectives, although the content, priorities and pursuit of these objectives may vary 
significantly. Japan is keener on “second-generation” (social and economic) rights than
153 “Vers un nouvel ‘asiatisme’ I.-Une prise de conscience regionale”, Le Monde, 2 December 1994.
154 Patrice Bouveret and Belkacem Elomari (eds), Ventes d'Armes de la France: tour du monde des pays 
acquereurs, Lyon: Observatoire des transferts d’armements, 1997, p. 107.
155 Takagi 95:99 and Ian Neary, Human Rights in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, London: Routledge, 
2002, ch.2 on Japan.
156 See also Romano Prodi, “The New Europe and Japan”, speech to the Keidanren, Tokyo, 19 July 2000, 
on EU website archives, www.europa.eu.int.
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“first-generation” political freedoms. The 10-year EU-Japan Action Plan, “Shaping our 
Common Future” of December 2001 contains references to human rights and the EU
|  c n
called on Japan early in 2001 to abolish capital punishment , but human rights do not 
form part of the core of the EU-Japan dialogue, in contrast to its prominent and 
controversial place in EU-China relations (Chapter 4).
b) Human rights and development: Taking the cue from Japan
Japan is interesting to French efforts to influence democracy and human rights 
conditions in East Asia through the instrument of ODA. France has since the 1980s 
been the world’s second to fourth largest source of aid to developing countries. French 
ODA is however overwhelmingly channelled to Africa (where standards of political and 
economic rights have often been ignored). Since 1989, Japan has been the world’s 
largest ODA donor, providing about one quarter of total world aid. Despite a prolonged 
and ongoing recession in the 1990s, Japan was the only country among the major aid 
donors to increase its ODA in the decade up to 1999 (Table 5.51.
Table 5.5 World’s Top Ten ODA Donors in the 1980s and 1990s (US$ million)
1985 1989 1995 1999
1. US 9,403 Japan 8,965 Japan 14,489 Japan 15,302
2. Japan 3,797 US 7,677 France 8,443 US 9,135
3. France 3,134 France 5,802 Germany 7,524 France 5,494
4. Germany 2,942 Germany 4,948 US 7,367 Germany 5,478
5. Canada 1,631 Italy 3,613 Netherlands 3,226 UK 3,279
6. UK 1,530 UK 2,587 UK 3,202 Netherlands 3,134
7. Netherlands 1,136 Canada 2,320 Canada 2,067 Italy 1,750
8. Italy 1,098 Netherlands 2,094 Sweden 1,704 Denmark 1,724
9. Sweden 840 Sweden 1,799 Denmark 1,623 Canada 1,721
10. Australia 749 Australia 1,020 Italy 1,623 Sweden 1,634
30,743 45,735 58,926 55,993
Source: OECD, DAC, Development Report, various years, cited in Saori N. Katada, “Japan’s Two-Track 
Aid Approach: The Forces behind Competing Triads”, Asian Survey, 42/2, March/April 2002, p.325.
French and Japanese accounts of the G7’s relations with developing countries, 
especially in the 1990s, tend to give more emphasis to poverty and development aid for 
the Third World.158 The G7 Summit in Tokyo (1993) and Lyon (1996) and Evian
157 Wiessala 2002:109
158 Matsuura 98:103.
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(2003) were thus presented as summits which stressed development aid. At the 
November 1997 Denver summit when the G7 was formally rechristened G8, Chirac and 
Hashimoto issued a joint letter as the leaders of the world’s top two ODA donors urging 
the G8 to maintain levels of ODA to developing countries.159 Asia remains the high 
priority for Japanese aid (over 60% goes to Asia). Since the mid-1990s France and 
Japan have been cooperating on aid projects in French-speaking Africa and in 
Indochina. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) officers undergo French- 
language training in France before moving to the field in Africa. Under the Chirac- 
Hashimoto “20 Actions” plan of 1996, joint aid projects were launched, beginning in 
Asia (Cambodia and the Philippines) and in Africa (health and sanitation projects in 
Djibouti and Madagascar).160
France and the other EU states have often taken the cue from Japanese actions 
with regards to human rights aid and sanctions in Asia. Japan’s human rights policy has 
largely been soft and symbolic. One reason for this self-conscious approach is the 
legacy of Japan’s brutal imperial past; hence Japan’s reservations in appearing to preach 
human rights in Asia.161 In addition, Japan (in contrast to Germany) is often seen as not 
having expiated its World War II war crimes because of its symbolic attachment to the 
Yasukuni war memorial, and the government’s non-apologetic portrayal of the Pacific
169war in Japanese textbooks. The Japanese Prime Minister issued a written apology to 
South Korea only in 2001 for Japan’s war crimes against its people.163
Myanmar, China and Cambodia provide excellent case studies of the 
ambiguities of Japanese human rights policy in Asia, especially in relation to US and 
European approaches to pressure authoritarian regimes in the region. Edward 
Friedman notes that the Chinese government “especially enjoys trying to silence Japan 
by claiming that Japan’s savage behaviour in its wars in Asia” in the first half of the 
20th century disqualifies Japan from any right to a voice on behalf of victims of human
159 Jacques Chirac, Allocution du President de la Republique, lors du dejeuner offert en I ’honneur des 
membres du Forum de dialogue Franco-Japonais, Paris: 12 July 1997.
160 “Japan-France Relations”, www.infoiapan.org/region/europe/france/index.htm 1. accessed 4 May 2003.
161 Seiichiro Takagi, “Human Rights in Japanese Foreign Policy: Japan’s Policy towards China after 
Tiananmen”, in James Tang (ed), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific, London 
and New York: Pinter, 1995
162 Ian Buruma, Wages o f Guilt: Memories o f  War in Germany and Japan, London: Vintage, 1995.
163 See Evelyne Dourille-Feer (ed), “Japon: Le renouveau?”, Notes et Etudes documentaries No. 5147, 
Paris: La Documentation Fran9aise, February 2002: 176-77.
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rights violations in China today. A second reason is Japan’s mixed identity as both a 
Western and an Asian country with a penchant for projecting an image of itself as a 
leader in Asia. Japan resisted going with the Western tide of linking foreign aid and 
human rights until 1988, when it first attached political conditions to its assistance to 
Burma (renamed Myanmar in 1989). Japan took the unequivocal step of identifying 
itself with Western values of democracy and human rights at the G-7 Paris Summit in 
July 1989. Then in 1991 Prime Minister Kaifu announced four major Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA) policy principles164 when deciding whether to extend ODA:
(0 the recipient country’s military spending;
(ii) its arms exports and imports;
(iii) its development and production of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear
missiles; and
(iv) its efforts to promote democratisation, ensure human rights, and move
toward a market-oriented economy.
Of the four principles, the fourth has been seen as the new battleground for 
North-South confrontation in the post-Cold War era. The euphoria that greeted the 
December 1990 UN decision to convene a World Conference on Human Rights was 
soon dispatched by the “East Asian challenge” when several Asian governments sought 
to redefine the concepts of human rights by questioning the applicability of universal 
human rights in different cultural, economic and social settings. The April 1993 
Bangkok Declaration, signed by over forty Asian governments ahead of the Vienna 
World Conference, suggested that universality should be considered “in the context of a 
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds.” The Asian governments also sought to delink aid and human 
rights.165 Japan was thus put under considerable pressure by Asian states to subscribe 
to a pan-Asian cultural relativist reading of human rights.
Human rights are a key area in which Japan tries to play the role of intermediary 
between East and West. On Western, notably American and European pressures for 
more attention to human rights and in particular humane working conditions, Japan has 
actually grown into the role of helping to insulate East Asian countries against outside
164 Eiichi Hoshino, “Economic Sanctions against Myanmar” , p. 123.
165 James Tang (ed), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific, pp. 1-2.
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pressures. One example is the UN-sponsored Asia Regional Preparatory Meeting for 
the World Conference on Human Rights held in Bangkok in 1993. Japan signed the 
Bangkok Declaration with reservations because of the contradictions between its 
1991/92 new principles on aid which linked human rights to ODA, and the Declaration 
which called for a separation of the two issues.166 On this matter, the Japanese 
government came under strong pressure from other East Asian governments, and also 
domestically from a group of influential politicians, academics and business people who 
opposed the Western sponsored link between human rights and aid. At the Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights in May 1993, the Japanese representative Nobuo 
Matsunaga reiterated Japan’s policy of linking ODA to human rights: “human rights 
should never be sacrificed to development. Rather development should serve to 
promote and protect rights....Convinced of this, Japan believes that development
1 f\7assistance should also contribute to the promotion of the rights of individuals.” On 
the Myanmar case, Hoshino Eiichi has dubbed the Japanese approach a “sunshine 
policy” in contrast to the US’ “North wind policy”. In August 2002, Kawaguchi Yoriko 
defied Western isolation of Myanmar and made the first trip by a Japanese Foreign 
Minister to Myanmar since 1983. She met both Aung San Suu Kyi and the ruling 
military and renewed offers of future assistance for democratisation and nation- 
building.168
Cambodia has also been a testing ground between Western and Japanese 
approaches to human rights. In the 5-6 July 1997 coup launched by Prime Minister Hun 
Sen against First Prime Minister Ranariddh, Japan suspended aid and attached four 
conditions for its resumption. These included assurances of fundamental human rights 
and political freedom, and respect for the results of the 1993 elections. Yet on 26 July, 
Gaimusho announced the resumption of Japanese aid despite evidence of oppression 
and summary executions of Ranariddh’s supporters, and before these four conditions 
were even seen to be agreed to.169 With Japan’s influence as the largest donor in 
Cambodia, the European Union and its member states soon followed suit.
166 This argument made by Reinhard Drifte in Japan’s Foreign Policy fo r  the 21st Century, London: 
Macmillan Press/St Antony’s College Oxford, 2000, pp. 144-145.
167 Cited in James Tang (ed), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific, London and 
New York: Pinter, 1995, p.218.
168 BBC News, “Japan urges progress in Burma” 5 August 2002, on http://news.bbc.co.uk/world/asia- 
pacific.
169 Human Rights Watch 98:98 and 162-170.
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c) Constructive Dialogue a la japonaise?
In this regard, the new “constructive dialogue” French approach to human 
rights in Asia under Chirac finds resonance with Japanese human rights approaches. 
This is in contrast to Japan’s rather reluctant start in linking foreign aid to human rights 
in 1988 and the strident French approach in the 1980s under Mitterrand and Dumas. 
Criticism was heaped on Japan for its mild response to the Chinese government after the 
Tiananmen massacre on 4 June 1989. Japan applied negative sanctions on China 
following the Tiananmen crackdown “under pressure from other Group of Seven (G-7)
* i yr\
countries.” However Japan and Germany were perceived as the pragmatic leaders of 
“silent diplomacy” in their early resumption of loans and normal trading relations with
171China, in spite of the G7 sanctions on China.
Japanese actions (or non-actions) in the field of human rights in East Asia have 
provided a model and defence for a more pragmatic French approach in the region 
under Chirac,172 in contrast to what was earlier perceived as a “holier-than-thou” 
approach under Mitterrand. In the 1997 Commission on Human Rights, Japan was also 
one of the countries that decided not to co-sponsor that year the resolution criticizing 
China. In effect, Japan was acceding to a request made when Foreign Minister Ikeda 
visited Beijing in March 1997, to resumed grants to China (suspended in 1995 over 
China’s nuclear tests); a February official request to the Gaimusho to set up a bilateral
• 177human rights dialogue. Japan’s actions provided fuel to French arguments defending 
its controversial defection from the common EU position on China at the CHR (ref. 
chapter 4).
Japan’s soft approach towards human rights in China is manifest not only in its 
mild reaction to the Tiananmen massacre and the disregard for political asylum of 
Chinese in Japan. It has also pursued a pragmatic policy vis-a-vis Myanmar, one of the 
regimes most isolated in the world for its lack of respect for human rights and 
democratic legitimacy after it failed to honour Aung San Suu Kyi’s 1990 elections 
victory. The EU has even found in Japan a useful ally over differences in human rights
170 Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy fo r the 21st Century, London: Macmillan Press/St Antony’s College 
Oxford, 2000, p. 159.
171 See Christoph Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face a Pekin (1989-1997): Vers une Strat6gie Commune?”, 
in Politique Etrangere 1/99, 1999, pp.91-106.
172 Jupp6 1994 and V6drine 2000.
173 Human Rights Watch 1998: 199.
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approaches with the US. This has been the case over US extra-territorial laws such as 
the Helms-Burton Act over business with Cuba, and laws banning trade with Myanmar. 
In contrasting Japanese sanctions policy with the US, Japan prefers positive sanctions, 
such as reward and inducement, and prefers to keep the door open rather than isolate the 
country. This is a significant policy difference that has a great impact on many 
countries as Japan is the largest aid giver in the world. In October 1998, the EU and 
Japan called for a WTO dispute panel on the Massachusetts Burma Law, which bars 
state agencies from making contracts with any US or foreign company doing business in 
Myanmar.174
Overall Trends
Grid 5.3 European Human Rights Positions compared with Japan’s, 1985-2001
■ 1
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
F ♦ ♦ a -» ♦ b — ♦
GB ♦ ♦ ♦
D ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
EU ♦ ♦ «- V  ->
- = Criticism o f  Japan’s human rights foreign policy 
0 = Neutral policy
+ = Cooperation with Japan in promoting economic rights and development
a France at first called for solidarity among the liberal democracies toward China after Tiananmen, and 
was critical o f  Japan’s “soft approach”, but later followed the Japanese and German leads in lifting 
economic sanctions (Ch.4)
bJapan subscribed to the coordinated Asian position in Bangkok ahead o f  the 1993 Vienna Conference on 
Human Rights; France was moving towards a more relativistic position on human rights. 
c Up to 1997, Britain, the Netherlands and the Nordic Member States led the majority human rights 
position in the EU criticising China and Myanmar, in contrast to the “constructive dialogue” approach o f  
Japan and France.
dMany EU member states are uncomfortable with Japan’s “sunshine policy” in Myanmar and North 
Korea. The European Parliament remains critical o f  the death penalty in Japan.
The French in particular have since the mid-1990s adopted a highly tolerant and 
pragmatic view of human rights in third countries after the principled and publicly 
critical Mitterrand-Dumas approach which dominated French policy in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Instead of confronting and publicly criticising China, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia over East Timor, etc, the French have undertaken an 
approach of quiet diplomacy and philosophising, an approach close to Japan’s low- 
profile policy in East Asia in which it gives generous aid but no “lessons”. In this
174 Hoshino 2000:125, 147-148.
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regard, French governments have developed a rather distinct national human rights 
policy which permits close cooperation and coordination with Japan over recent human 
rights and democratic crises in East Asia, eg. Myanmar throughout the 1990s, 
Cambodia in 1997, and the Commission on Human Rights debate on China in 1997.
Conclusions
Bilateral relations between France and Japan have improved significantly in tone 
and broadened substantially between 1988 and 2002. From a thinly veiled and 
sometimes outwardly hostile French role as “leader of the pack” in the EC against 
making any economic or political concessions to Japan, France has become one of 
Japan’s most willing and vocal partners in Europe, keen on a closer economic, political 
and security collaboration with Japan. French policies towards Japan have become 
closely aligned with the EU mainstream, and France under Chirac has achieved a 
position of trust on a more even footing with Britain’s and Germany’s traditional 
positions as Japan’s preferred interlocutors in Europe.175
In economic policy, the Commission and other Member States (especially the 
UK) were instrumental in moving France away from confrontation and national/EC 
protectionist measures towards active collaboration and welcoming Japanese 
investments. During the worst phases of France-Japan conflictual relations in the late 
1980s, France began to be increasingly isolated in a European Community which was 
subscribing to the dominant idea of free trade and opening its internal market to the free 
movement of goods, capital and services. Thus while we can trace the change in French 
attitudes to Japan to domestic trends such as the French acceptance of the need to adapt 
to globalisation after the Socialists’ 1981-83 nationalisation experiment, it is undeniable 
that policy learning from other EC member states (ie. sideways Europeanisation) also 
played a critical role. The demonstration effect of successful economic restructuring in 
Britain and the Netherlands, which received massive Japanese investments, prompted 
French leaders to reconsider their Japan policy.
France gradually Europeanised (via policy transfer and the imposition of 
Commission policies) its “economic nationalism” approach to Japan. The British model
175 The UK-Japan “special relationship” had been “diluted” by recent Japanese cooperation agreements 
with Italy, France and Germany. Interview with Commission official (Japan Unit), 26 March 2003.
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was emulated in the launch of “Le Japon, c ’estpossible” in 1992, and France agreed to 
the Commission’s 1991 “car deal” for a phased removal of import restrictions, and a 
comprehensive EC-Japan dialogue at the Hague meeting. The Commission also led in 
its involvement in reforming and dismantling barriers to the entry of European 
companies in the Japanese market. By 1999, France had become a leading economic 
partner and advocate for Japan in the EU, and was both a leading recipient of Japanese 
FDI and foreign investor in Japan, with Renault-Nissan and Toyota-Peugeot among the 
high-profile industrial collaborations. In effect, governments under Mitterrand had 
changed tack with ministers such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Prime Minister 
Chirac (86-88) “using” the EC as the main vehicle in pushing forward a difficult agenda 
of privatisation and competition. The EC/EU was critical, either as a constraint or 
opportunity (ie. top-down or bottom-up Europeanisation), to French economic policies 
vis-a-vis Japan.
French political attitudes towards Japan tended to be hostage to, and derivative 
of, French economic relations with Japan. Despite Japan’s long involvement in the 
West and re-insertion since 1952 in key Western organizations, French presidents since 
De Gaulle neglected addressing the lack of good political ties with Japan. Mitterrand 
even permitted economic conflicts to boil over to the political arena in the late-1980s in 
the Cresson phase. Political relations were properly redressed only in the 1990s through 
the role played by French leaders seeking a serious partnership with Japan. French 
policy evolved from mixed signals of suspicion and engagement (witness early French 
opposition to Japan’s involvement in NATO and the OSCE, while offering to help build 
the FSX) to consistent political and security cooperation. Foreign policy under President 
Chirac - the most “Japanophile” leader in the history of France-Japan bilateral
1 7 f%relations - has encouraged Japan to play a role in fashioning a post-Cold War 
multipolar world. Early criticisms of Chirac’s insensitivity to Japanese sentiments on 
nuclear testing at the start of his presidency177 have been repudiated by very active and 
sustained French efforts in wooing Japan. While the occasional perception of Japan as
176 Gaimusho’s webpage (http://www.infoiapan.org/region/europe/france/index.html. accessed 4 May 
2003) describes Chirac as “perhaps better informed about and more friendly toward Japan than any other 
politician in France... (he) probably knows more about Japan than any other politician outside Japan.”
177 Franfois Godement, “Une politique franfaise pour l’Asie-Pacifique?”, Politique Etrangere, 4/95.
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17R“enemy” has not completely receded from popular French consciousness, French 
government thinking and policies towards Japan have outgrown the orientalist view, 
decried by Wilkinson, of Japan and its people as unfathomable “others” and economic 
animals fundamentally different from Europeans and inimical to Western interests. The 
recent “Francophilia” in Japan via the Ghosn and World Cup effects extend to industry 
and sports in Japan, and “neo-japonisme” in France, to the masses. Minus the Chirac 
factor, bilateral political ties can thus tap deeper into the larger cultural rapprochement 
in both populations, where positive images are more mutual and broad-based than at any 
other time in recent decades.
Japan in 1991 was the first Asian country with which the EU established regular 
summit-level consultations, and was again highlighted in the Commission’s 1994 and 
2001 Asia Strategy papers as a priority country and key partner in East Asia.179 The 
EC/EU provided the setting of a working EC-Japan partnership for improving France- 
Japan collaboration. The about-turn in France’s position as the main objector to closer 
EC-Japan political and security consultation in NATO and the OSCE to one of its main 
advocates, has allowed for diplomatic, aid and security coordination between Japan and 
the EU in trouble-spots such as the Balkans and North Korea. Security dialogues take 
place in the EU-Japan meetings as well as in the ARE (established 1994), KEDO
1 OA
(1995), and ASEM (1996). In the past few years however, the prolonged sluggishness 
of Japan’s economy and the EU’s rethinking of its overall approach to Asia have 
contributed to what Brian Bridges calls a “by-passing” of Japan in favour of China.181 
This trend has been accentuated by the increased importance of security and anti­
terrorism cooperation post-September 11. Efforts to stimulate greater EU-Japanese 
contact and convergence may well have passed their peak. The relevance of strong 
bilateral ties between Japan and France as one of the EU’s “big three” will thus continue 
to be important to Tokyo.
178 Marc Rigaudis, Japon Mepris... Passion: Regards de la France sur le Japon de 1945 a 1995, Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1998, p .13.
179 COM(2001)469 final, p.3 and Conclusions.
180 Gilson 2001:81. In the case o f KEDO, the EU established from the beginning the North Korean issue 
as a joint action o f the CFSP, as a result o f which, as a pre-ASEM gesture, the EU made a first financial 
contribution (US$6.3 million) to KEDO in February 1996.
181 Bridges, Europe and the Challenge o f the Asia Pacific, p.48
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In the human rights arena (Part III), hardly any convergence Europeanization is 
observable. Policy learning took place in an international rather than European context 
in the evolution of France’s human rights policy. France works on a national basis with 
Japan to promote their mutual interests in Africa and Asia. More often than not, French 
and Japanese interests in joint projects are political, economic and commercial, and the 
“human rights” they promote, if any, are predominantly economic and social rights, 
rather than the political rights dominant in Dutch, Scandinavian, US or recent British 
“ethical foreign policy”. In Asia, French human rights policy has moved from a 
hardline position under Mitterrand and Dumas to a “soft” position of constructive 
dialogue under Chirac - similar to Japan’s - on human rights in countries like China. 
France is aware of its inability export its model of “constructive engagement” to the EU 
level for every East Asian country in which it has interests, and often has to fall back on 
national means or joint efforts with like-minded partners like Japan.
French foreign policy elites recognise that France is but a middle power in the 
international system and that over the long term, its relative power will continue to 
decrease vis-a-vis the “giants” (in particular China and Japan) of East Asia.182 With a 
country that has over twice the population of France and three times its GDP, France’s 
relations with Japan can become more equal and make more sense only in the context of 
France as an integral member of European Union, able to use the political and economic 
resources afforded by a larger entity in its dealings with external powers.
Of the three aspects of Europeanization (top-down policy convergence, bottom- 
up national projection and lateral policy emulation) in French policy towards Japan, the 
sideways transfer of ideas (Dimension III) and top-down policy convergence 
(Dimension I) were the dominant processes in the 1990s. Europeanization was not the 
sole or determining process for the change in French policy from confrontation to 
collaboration with Japan, except in the economic field where the homogenizing effects 
of the SEA, Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties on the French economy and its 
economic relations with third countries played a critical role. The overall underlying 
dynamic is a process of increasing engagement with Japan at the EU  level, with national 
engagement taking its cue from EU-level initiatives and agreements.
182 Interview with H.E. Mr Michel Filhol, French Ambassador in Singapore, 7 February 2003.
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Chapter Six
Vietnam:
Relations priviligiees in Southeast Asia?
French policy in East Asia is often explained as driven by French mercantilist 
ambitions in the rapidly growing markets in the greater China area, the NIEs and in 
Southeast Asia (at least until the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98).1 We have seen in 
the preceding two chapters that this account reflects an important facet of French 
relations with Japan and China, as well with the NIEs and economically dynamic states 
of ASEAN. However this economic account by itself is too one-dimensional even for 
the economic dynamos in East Asia. In the case of Vietnam, where the level of trade 
and investment exchanges is not significant, economic arguments are even less 
persuasive. More relevant than the economic account, France’s relations with its former 
colonies in Indochina are characterized by a sense of affinity and shared history, and a 
desire to keep relations with Vietnam privileged, a weak kind of special bilateral 
relationship2.
This is not to say that France-Vietnam relations are based on colonial 
sentimentality or attempts to exclude the EU, as in France-Algeria relations. Rather, 
French objectives in Indochina are informed first, by the larger “Asia Policy” of French 
governments since 1993 to expand French economic and political influence in East 
Asia , using France’s natural advantage in Vietnam as a familiar base, and the EU's 
resources and prestige - as well as other multilateral tools and France’s UNSC status - 
as leverage. Second, this chapter wishes to argue that in the issue-areas of trade, 
human rights and political-strategic interests, there is minimal voluntary or conscious 
movement towards a top-down Europeanization of French policies towards Vietnam. 
Instead, France prefers to deal with Vietnam on a bilateral level (eg. through bilateral
1 See Francis Godement, “Une politique frangaise pour l’Asie-Pacifique?”, Politique Etr anger e, 4/95; 
Miguel Santos Neves, “Towards a Common China Policy for the EU: a Portuguese Perspective”, in 
Richard Grant (ed), The European Union and China, London: Routledge/RIIA, 1995; Brian Bridges, 
Europe and the Challenge o f  the Asia Pacific, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999.
2 Manners and Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies o f  European Union Member States, 2000, p. 11, 
define “special relations” and special issues within the EU as those which Member States seek to ‘ring- 
fence’ in order to keep them out of the EU’s policy process.
3 See assessment o f the Asia Policy by Rene Dorient (a French diplomat’s pseudonym), “Un septennat de 
politique asiatique: quel bilan pour la France?”, Politique Etrangere, 1/2002, Jan-Mar 2002, pp. 173-188.
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development cooperation and the French-dominated Francophonie). The third theme is 
that the end of Vietnam’s isolation after the Cold War and the Paris Peace in 1991 have 
rendered increasingly irrelevant the close political relationship with France during 
Vietnam’s 1980s isolation. Instead, international systemic developments and the 
external demands of Indochinese and ASEAN states give incentives to France to act 
within and through the EU  in order the better to make an impact in Southeast Asia.
Establishing French Indochina, 1858-1954
Many historians explain French colonialism in Indochina, built from a series of 
conquests between 1858 and 1893, as an outgrowth of global colonial rivalry with the 
British Empire (then well established in India, Burma and Malaya), and keeping up with 
the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and Russians, all of whom had established empires in 
Asia towards the end of the 19th century.4 If “God, gold and glory”5 were the essential 
motivations behind European imperialism, the French were late converts to the colonial 
game in the Far East. French colonialism was neither inspired by a “grand strategy”, nor 
a series of faits accomplis by imperial entrepreneurs leading to conquest and empire. 
But the siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and the loss of two 
provinces (Alsace and Lorraine) to newly unified Germany were the most critical events 
in the national consciousness of the Third Republic (1871-1940). The national trauma 
of 1870 stoked French nationalism and energized renewed efforts at overseas expansion 
to compensate for domestic losses.6 In contrast to the clearly commercial goals of 
British and Dutch colonialists in Asia, a quest to recover French national pride and 
imperial glory in the aftermath of humiliation by Bismarck’s Prussia and the rise of a 
unified Germany were important motives behind France’s late push to establish colonies 
in Asia.
4Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hemery, Indochine: La colonisation ambigue 1858-1954, Paris: Editions la 
Decouverte, 2001.
5 See Winfried Baumgart’s incisive study o f the ideological, economic and political motives and theories 
used to justify late 19th century colonial expansion in his Imperialism: The idea and reality o f  British and 
French Colonial expansion 1880-1914, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
6 Agnes Murphy, The Ideology o f  French Imperialism, 1871-1881, Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1948; James J. Cooke, New French Imperialism 1880-1910: the Third 
Republic and Colonial Expansion, Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1973.
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M a p  o f  V i e t n a m
(showing provinces, major cities and geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia)
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Source: M AE, D ivision Geographique (Direction des Archives), May 2000, on 
http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/evenements/vietnam2/carte.html accessed 1 May 2003.
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Aside from the rising and final burst of European imperialism mentioned above 
which especially affected the French Third Republic, French imperialism in Indochina 
was facilitated by the decline of Qing China and the concomitant re-arrangement of 
international relations in East Asia in the mid-19th century, and the regional rivalries 
between Dai Nam (Annam), Siam and Burma.7 The French already possessed an 
intimate knowledge of Vietnam gained from over two centuries of missionary work by 
French Jesuits (the most famous was Alexandre de Rhodes, who founded the Missions 
Etrangeres and romanised the Vietnamese script from Chinese characters to Quoc ngu). 
French entrepreneurs were already present and active in Southeast Asia since the end of
t hthe 18 century. Nguyen Anh, who from 1790 fought a 12-year war to unite Annam in 
the centre, Tonkin to the north and Cochinchina to the south, had ascended to the throne 
of a unified Vietnam in 1802 with the help of French mercenaries. Renaming himself 
Gia Long once established as emperor (1802-20), the founder of the Nguyen dynasty 
kept the service of French advisors. Later Ngyuen emperors who imposed a Chinese- 
Confucian system of court rule on their subjects were less tolerant of foreign influences. 
Ming Manh (1820-47) persecuted the fast-growing Catholic population in Vietnam and 
expelled missionaries from 1832. Napoleon III, keen to extract concessions from China 
along the model of Hong Kong’s cession to Britain in 1842, seized on the persecution of 
Christians in Vietnam in the 1860s to expand French influence through his self­
professed role as protector of the persecuted Catholic minority.9
The first military operations, launched in 1858 in Da Nang, lasted four years. 
Heading south to capture Saigon and the Mekong delta area, the French established an 
outright colony in Cochinchina, with a protectorate over the Khmer kingdom of 
Cambodia under the terms of the 1863 treaty. Through a series of military conquests, 
French rule extended from the south to the north along the South China Sea coast of the 
Indochinese peninsula. Third Republic moves to extend French influence northwards
7 Brocheux 2001, ch.l Dai Nam was the Vietnamese name for the kingdom o f Annam with Hue as its 
capital under the Nguyen dynasty from 1802. “Annam”, the Chinese name, was used by the Europeans. 
The “emperor” in Hue ruled over Cochinchina in the south and Tonkin to the north, but paid tribute to the 
Chinese Emperor as a vassal state.
8 French missionary activities in Indochina pre-dated French colonialism by some 200 years. Between 
1660 and 1858, France was represented in this part of the world chiefly by evangelising missionaries. See 
d’Ainval 2001:16; Cao 1993; Forest 2000; Cady 1954.
9 Between 1857 and 1862, 115 Vietnamese Catholic priests were executed, and more than a quarter o f the 
500,000 Christians in Vietnam perished through violence or starvation. See Guy-Marie Oury, Le Vietnam 
des martyrs et des saints, Paris: Le Sarment-Fayard, 1988. At 8 million out o f a population o f 80 million, 
Vietnam today has the second largest Catholic population in Asia after the Philippines.
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precipitated conflict with China, to which Annam was tied as a tribute-sending vassal 
state. In the 1885 Tianjin Treaty, China recognized Tonkin as a French protectorate, and 
granted French access to the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi and 
Yunnan.10 With the acquisition of Laos as a French protectorate in 1893, France 
acquired a secure coastal trading route in addition to the Mekong route into China. 
French Indochina consisted of one full-fledged colony (Cochinchina) and four 
protectorates (Cambodia, Annam, Tonkin, and Laos).
The prevailing Zeitgeist of the age of imperialism was summed up by French 
statesman Jules Ferry’s famous speech in 28 July 1885 in which he drew comparisons 
between France and the former Spanish empire, claiming that if France did not take part 
in the colonial rush which had seized Europe, “we shall meet the fate...which has 
overtaken other nations which played a great role on the world’s stage three centuries 
ago but which today...are now third- or fourth-rate powers.”11 A burst of French 
colonial expansion concentrated in Africa and Asia in the 1880s tripled France’s 
overseas territory and was justified by contemporary French advocates of colonialism as
1 *7a mission civilisatrice. Of course, there were economic objectives in French 
colonialism that predated the frantic last stage of imperialism beginning 1880. French 
traders had aimed in the 1850s to make Saigon a “French Singapore.” The control of the 
river and maritime trade routes between India and China was thus a major goal. The 
earliest French traders had arrived in the trading port of Hoi An (Tourane) in Annam in 
the 17th century, but they had no major trading links in Asia except with China. French 
Indochina was to be the link to compensate for the loss of the last French possessions in 
India, and to act as a launch pad for French trade with China. During the French 
colonial period, roads, ports, schools and hospitals were built to service the imperial 
economic needs of France as an industrializing imperial power. Resources such as
10 Christophe Dubois, “L*Arsenal de Fuzhou et la Presence militaire fran9aise au Fujian (1869-1911), in 
Jacques Weber (ed.), La France en Chine, J843-1943, Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1997, pp.91-102. See also 
Yoshiharu TsuboT, L ’Empire Vietnamien face a la France et a la Chine, 1847-1885, Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1987; and Nicolas Regaud and Christian Lechervy, Les guerres d ’Indochine, Paris, 1996, p.82.
11 Cited in Baumgart 1982:73.
12 Murphy 1948:15, 68, 158, 175, 204. Imperialism was legitimated by the 1885 Berlin Conference on 
Africa.
201
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Six / Vietnam
rubber and coffee were extracted using cheap local labour to export to the metropole.
i -i
Many considered Indochina the “jewel in the crown” of the French empire.
The First World War did not radically change colonial structures, but it allowed 
for the fermentation of growing Vietnamese nationalism, which found sympathy in 
China after the success of Sun Yat-sen’s 1911 revolution, as well as in successfully 
modernising Japan. After Paris fell to Hitler in June 1940, the Japanese Imperial Army 
took over Indochina from a pliant colonial administration that reported to Vichy France, 
and used it as a staging post for the Japanese conquest of Burma, Malaya, the Dutch 
East Indies and the Philippines. Indochina went into “dual administration” following the 
France-Japan Defence Pact in December 1941, then was completely annexed by Japan 
after a coup de force in March 1945 when the Japanese disarmed and interned French 
soldiers.
The Decolonisation Struggle, 1940-1954
French colonialism had introduced to Vietnam the French language and Western 
ideas of democracy and self-determination. Nascent Vietnamese nationalism, often led 
by French-educated local elites, had been rising in the inter-war period, inspired by the 
dramatic transformations in Meiji Japan and the 1911 revolution in China. However 
repressive policies such as forced military conscription, increased resource extraction 
and heavy taxation to serve metropolitan French efforts in two wars against Germany, 
the weakness of the French colonial government against the advancing Japanese, and 
some two million deaths in the famine of 1944-45 resulting from food mismanagement 
under the French-Japanese dual administration, inspired ordinary Vietnamese to take up 
armed struggle to drive out all foreign powers.14 The most well-organised group was 
the Viet Minh (Vietnamese Communists) - led by the wily and charismatic Ho Chi 
Minh.
The power vacuum created by the sudden Japanese surrender in August 1945 set 
the stage for a confrontation between the Communists goal of national independence
13 Springhall 2001:38. Jacques de Folin, Indochine 1940-1955- La fin d ’un Reve, Paris: Perrin, 1993, 
p.23 wrote that in 1940, “l’lndochine etait la plus belle, la plus riche, la plus peuplee de nos colonies: 24 
million d’Indochinois, 40 000 Fran^ais.”
14 Some 100,000 Indochinese soldiers and workers were sent to France to help in the First World War 
effort against Germany. In early 1939, Paris planned to recruit 1.5 million men from French Indochina 
for World War II. See Ngo Vinh Long’s condensed political history on “Vietnam”, in Allen and Long 
(eds), Coming to Terms, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 18.
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and determined French attempts at recolonisation, albeit in the context of a looser 
French Union.15 Following the terms of the Potsdam Agreement on the Japanese 
surrender, the Japanese were disarmed by British forces south of the 16th parallel, and 
by Nationalist Chinese forces in the north. After initial Chinese unease over the return 
of French colonial rule in Vietnam, the Chinese and French governments cooperated 
against Ho Chi Minh’s plans for a strong and united Vietnam (Ho declared 
independence in September 1945).16 By the end of 1945, the bid by Fourth Republic 
France to recolonise Indochina formed part of a larger obsession to recover great-power 
glory and colonies, lost during the humiliating German defeat and occupation of France. 
Unlike Britain, France was unwilling to grant independence to its Asian colonies. Even 
though de Gaulle at the historic Brazzaville conference in February 1944 promised self- 
government to the colonies in a more humane and liberal post-war French Union, 
outright decolonisation and independence were not countenanced as acceptable 
solutions to the post-war French Empire. Few leaders of Free France -  albeit grateful 
for the colonial contributions to the French war effort - were unwilling to fathom French 
colonies becoming “associated states” in a French Union. French leaders were deeply 
attached to the notion of “Empire”, and this was no less pertinent in Indochina. Gaston 
Monnerville declared in May 1945 that “sans Empire, la France ne serait qu’un pays 
libere”. Echoing this sentiment, Governor Francis de Langlade expressed that “sans 
l’lndochine, la France n’est plus une puissance mondiale”.17
The desire to recover French imperial prestige was again a major factor in the 
French determination to recolonise Indochina after French weakness in the Second 
World War. Ho and his Viet Minh forces however, firmly entrenched in the north, 
viewed the returning French colonial authorities who had collaborated with, then 
capitulated to the Japanese as illegitimate. Ho agreed in March 1946 to the return of 
25,000 French troops to Vietnam for five years as a stop-gap measure to ensure the 
departure of 200,000 Nationalist Chinese troops from the north. Ho Chi Minh gambled 
on accepting a full-scale but temporary French return in order to ensure the departure of
15 See Pierre Montagnon, La France coloniale. [Vol. 2], Retour a VHexagone: Des premiers aspirations a 
I'independance aux ineluctables realites de la decolonisation, Paris: Pygmalion/Gerard Watelet, 1990.
16 Lin Hua, Chiang Kai-shek, de Gaulle contre Ho Chi Minh, 1945-46, Paris, 1994.
17 See Folin 1993:20.
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the Chinese.18 The failure of the July 1946 Fontainebleau accords for limited 
Vietnamese autonomy within an Indochinese Union led to a long and bloody war (aided 
heavily from 1950 by the US with the onset of the Cold War in Asia). A ceasefire was 
agreed to as part of the Geneva Accords only after the ignominious French defeat at 
Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, which sounded the death knell for French imperialism in 
East Asia and resulted in the division of Vietnam into two halves at the 17th parallel.19
Although defeated and badly bruised and with another colonial war in Algeria 
looming, the French sought to maintain good relations with their ex-colonies of Laos, 
Cambodia and South Vietnam. The quest for glory and prestige evolved after 1954 into 
a pursuit of a “special relationship” with Saigon, then with the Hanoi government of a 
reunified Vietnam since 1975. The French have consistently tried to play some 
political-strategic role in Southeast Asia throughout and after the Cold War, even amidst 
successive attempts by the US, China and the Soviet Union to dominate the region. The 
economic imperative has ebbed and waned, with the French putting more efforts in the 
neighbouring Chinese, Japanese and dynamic economies of Southeast Asia. The 
enduring legacies of French colonialism in Indochina, which inform present-day 
policies, are a concern for political and cultural prestige, economic benefit and religious 
and minority rights, in that order. As we will see in later in this chapter, the object of 
boosting national prestige and influence appears to be the dominating motive in France- 
Vietnam relations, with France preferring to use the EU as a vehicle towards the end of 
reinforcing its “relations priviligiees” with Vietnam. This has consequences for French 
readiness to pool resources with the other Member States and EU institutions for a 
common EU policy in Vietnam.
French exception vs. EU convergence in Vietnam
While the primacy of French national interests in the case of Vietnam may 
appear obvious, this chapter tests the argument presented in chapter three that a more 
accurate understanding of French objectives and policies in East Asia necessitates
18 Defending his action as a necessary step towards independence, Ho famously declared to his critics in 
Hanoi that he would prefer to “sniff French shit for five years than eat Chinese shit all my life”. Cited in 
John Springhall, Decolonisation since 1945: The Collapse o f  European Overseas Empires, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001, pp.44-45.
19 According to French government estimates in January 1955, French forces suffered over 92,000 dead 
and 170,000 wounded in the First Indochina War (1946-54), even more than the number o f Americans 
killed in the Second Indochina War (1965-75). Journal Officiel du 12 janvier 1955, in Folin 93: 322.
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analysing the multiple facets and inter-relationship of the economic, political and human 
rights interests in East Asia in which France and the EU have a stake. Chapter three and 
the case studies of China and Japan suggested that EU policy and French “national” 
policy are not always distinctive or easily separable. Notwithstanding the inter­
penetrated character of French and EU policies in Asia, Vietnam presents an interesting 
case of a “special relationship”, albeit “special” from a more French unilateral -  and 
somewhat paternalistic -  perspective than a feeling of solidarity shared by both sides. 
First, colonial links confer on the relationship an intimacy Vietnam shares with few 
other Western states; second, the largesse of French economic and cultural assistance to 
Vietnam and other Indochina countries; third, consistent French engagement in 
Indochinese affairs throughout the 2nd and 3rd Indochina Wars up to its role as co-host of 
the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement. The French role in the resolution of the Cambodian 
conflict and the 1991 peace accords was in many respects a rentree politique for French 
prestige and involvement in political affairs in Asia . President Mitterrand followed 
this up with a state visit in 1993 which preceded and prepared France for the end of 
Vietnam’s isolation, and its integration into regional and international clubs: the ARF 
(1994), ASEAN (1995), ASEM (1996), and APEC (1997).
This rest of this chapter examines the evidence for EU policy convergence and 
national projection in French policies in Vietnam. France still pursues a persistently 
national, bilateral track with Vietnam in areas where it enjoys a comparative advantage 
vis-a-vis other EU member states and can compete with strong non-EU states: trade and 
investment, education and technical training, state institution building and uniquely in 
Asia, a level of linguistic and cultural empathy (albeit less than with Cambodia and 
Laos). This is the subject of this chapter’s first section. The second section proposes 
that after its “return” as a player in Indochinese geopolitical affairs at the end of the 
1980s, France resisted Europeanizing its relations with Vietnam and sought to maintain 
“privileged relations”. In the third section, on human rights, France plays the role of 
advocate for “constructive engagement” and quiet diplomacy on human rights abuses in 
Vietnam. Unlike EU policies towards Myanmar since 1990 and Indonesian conduct in 
East Timor (1975-2000), France inhibits a collective EU position that criticises human 
rights abuses in Vietnam.
20 Godement 95:962.
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I Trade and Aid
French economic and aid policies in Vietnam are intensely and consistently 
national in outlook, objective and implementation. They seek to maintain France’s 
position as Vietnam’s largest Western partner. Successive French governments and 
business leaders have long been at the forefront of Western countries doing business 
with Vietnam. After 1954 and despite the Cold War, France sought to protect its 
remaining assets in the North in the face of nationalisation, and maintained extensive 
holdings and economic relations with the economically dynamic South in the face of
9 1overwhelming American economic power. In late-1954 Paris irritated Washington 
and London by sending a high-level “trade mission” to Hanoi, and in turn received a
99North Vietnamese trade mission in April 1956. Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam’s 
prime minister presciently noted in an interview with Le Monde that “France must 
choose between Washington and Hanoi, and only the latter policy will enable France to
9Tmaintain political and economic positions in the Pacific”. In the 1960s, the French 
maintained strong economic ties with Saigon and tried to keep relations with Hanoi as 
cordial as possible. Between 1969 and 1972, Paris hosted peace talks for US withdrawal 
from South Vietnam. France had been one of the top investors and trading partners in 
South Vietnam even before the signing of the January 1973 peace settlement for the 
Second Indochina War.
The strong French economic presence in Saigon was an advantage the French 
hoped to capitalize on post-“American War” (ie. “Vietnam War” for the US), and in the 
subsequent reunification of Vietnam in 1975. In 1972, France ranked fifth as the 
supplier of South Vietnam and second as a destination for Vietnamese exports. France 
received 25% of South Vietnam’s total exports (35% went to Japan, which replaced 
France as South Vietnam’s top supplier in 1972).24 French goods represented 5.6% of 
South Vietnam’s imports (after 46% from the USA; 19%, Singapore; 18%, Japan; and
• 256%, Taiwan). In June 1973, a French exploratory mission headed by Francis
21 See Marc Frey, “Creations o f Sovereignty and the Waning o f Influence: Southeast Asian-European 
Relations after Formal Decolonization”, in Bunnag et al (eds), Europe-Southeast Asia in the 
Contemporary World, 2000, pp.20-34 (“France and Indochina”).
22 Frey, p.23.
23 Le Monde, 2-3 January 1955, cited in Frey 2000:21.
24Marianna Sullivan, “France and the Vietnam Peace Settlement”, Political Science Quarterly, June 
1974.p.319.
25 Sullivan, p.320.
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Missoffe visited Vietnam to report on future economic cooperation between France and 
South Vietnam. Based on the Missoffe report, the two governments signed an 
agreement in December 1973 whereby France would supply 100 million francs in 
economic assistance. In the 1970s, the French had already envisioned:
“(a) major effort to increase their trade with Asia in the next decade and 
Vietnam is the focal point. President Pompidou’s trip to China in September 
1973 was also important in this regard.”26
Paris established full diplomatic relations with the government in Hanoi in 1973 
after the Paris Peace, and French governments kept a close watch on a unified 
communist Vietnam under Hanoi’s control after 1975. France was one of the few major 
western countries to trade and have political contacts with Hanoi despite the US-led 
international embargo on Vietnam (1975-1994). By the end of 1992, French companies 
had emerged as the third largest investors in Vietnam, after Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
with pledged investments worth US$322 million.27
a) Economic Ties: French Investment in Doi Moi
The French government’s economic thinking and policies in Vietnam since 1973 
do not seem to have fundamentally changed in the 1990s. They continue to be based on 
certain assumptions about a “special relationship” between France and Vietnam and the 
attendant strategies to take advantage of this relationship. First is the assumption that 
historical and colonial ties translate into continued familiarity with and preference for 
French products, and could be used to good advantage in the Vietnamese market. Many 
French brand names are familiar to Vietnamese consumers and French businessmen aim 
at specific higher-end markets or levels of consumption for a future scenario of a large 
middle-class in Vietnam buying French for its prestige value.28 Second, the reliance on 
good political ties to seal grands contrats. This has been the case for large-scale French 
projects in oil29 and gas exploration as well as infrastructure. During Mitterrand’s 1993 
state visit to Vietnam, he pushed the Vietnamese to favour bids by French industrial
26 Sullivan, p.321.
27 Oxford Analytica, “Vietnam: Economic Orientation”, 17 February 1993.
28 I am grateful to Dr Eric Teo, former Business Development Manager, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 
Southeast Asia (1997-2000), for pointing this out. Some economists in the mid-1990s were confidently 
predicting that Vietnam would become the “fifth economic tiger” in Southeast Asia.
29 Vietnam is estimated to have 600 million barrels o f proven oil reserves. Stratfor Report, “Vietnam 
looks to France for Economic Boost”, 14 February 2002.
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giants such as the Compagnie Generale des Eaux (CGE) and Thomson-CSF for
O A
Vietnam’s lucrative infrastructure projects. Third, there is a residual feeling that 
Vietnam could serve as a strategic bridgehead for the French economic presence in 
Asia, where France recognizes the need to recover lost ground vis-a-vis Japan, the US, 
Germany, and even the UK and the Asian NIEs. The sectors targeted are hotels and
tourism, banks, telecommunications, food and beverage, luxury products and
11
pharmaceuticals.
France was among the most bullish investors in the first years of doi moi 
(economic renovation) reforms, announced in 1986 and made concrete when a liberal 
foreign-investment law was enacted in December 1987. With advice from the IMF, 
Vietnam introduced a strict monetary policy early in 1989, which helped bring down 
inflation. Reform spread from industry and agriculture to the banking sector as well. 
Agricultural reform was the most pronounced success; from repeatedly being close to 
famine in early 1988, Vietnam became the world’s third largest rice exporter in 1989.32 
Unlike French activity elsewhere in Asia (where Japanese, US and the NIEs are 
dominant), the French level of FDI in Vietnam ranks it among the strongest players in 
Vietnam, where it is the largest non-Asian investor (Table 6.1)
French efforts at making an economic impact in Vietnam have reaped qualified 
success. French exports to the East Asian region are strong in pharmaceuticals, luxury 
sectors (eg. fashion, cosmetics, wine), aeronautics, aerospace, weapon sales, and heavy 
infrastructure. These are mostly products that the Vietnamese are ill able to afford. 
Despite a population of 80 million (the second largest among the ASEAN-10 after 
Indonesia), the market for French goods in Vietnam is small (and practically non­
existent in the rest of Indochina). The growing consumer market (motor-cycles, home 
electronics and appliances) has been cornered by Asian companies- chiefly from Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and increasingly, China - which sell products better adapted to 
Vietnamese needs and tastes, and at lower costs compared to European companies,
30 East Asian Affairs, “Coup de pouce de Mitterrand aux industriels frantpais”, 3 February 1993.
31 Henrich Dahm, French and Japanese economic relations with Vietnam since 1975, Surrey: 
Curzon/Institute o f Asian Affairs Hamburg, 1999, pp.38-40, 71-74 and 128.
32 Masahide Shibusawa, Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Brian Bridges, Pacific Asia in the 1990s, London: 
Routledge/RIIA, 1992, pp. 120-122. See also Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy o f  a Peace, London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997.
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while the Russians have long been dominant in, and continue to dominate the 
Vietnamese arms market.
Table 6.1: Accumulated Foreign Investments in Vietnam. 1988-2000
(Licenses awarded and ongoing projects)
Country No. of Projects Licenses awarded 
(US$ billion)
Percentage of 
Total
1. Singapore 236 6.7 18.4%
2. Taiwan 618 4.9 13.7%
3. Japan 301 3.9 10.7%
4. South Korea 260 3.1 8.5%
5. Hong Kong 208 2.7 7.4%
6. France 108 1.8 4.9%
7. BV Islands 101 1.8 4.9%
8. Russia 34 1.6 4.4%
9. Netherlands 40 1.2 3.3%
10. UK 33 1.2 3.3%
11. Malaysia 79 1.0 2.7%
12. USA 107 0.9 2.5%
Sub-Total 2125 30.0 84.9%
13. Others 494 6.4 15.1%
Tota l 2619 36.40 100.0% '
Source: MPI-Vietnam Investment Review, and French Embassy Mission Economique de Hanoi, Les 
investissements etrangers au Vietnam en 2000, January 2001.
The first of the three inter-related assumptions underpinning French investment 
in Vietnam is that abiding historical ties and the force of habit would favour French 
companies. This is fuelled by the colonial factor of Vietnam having been an important 
trading partner and supplier of raw materials to metropolitan France in the past. Many 
French companies have relations that date back to colonial times, eg. Banque Indosuez, 
Banque Nationale de Paris, PSA Peugeot, Citroen, or never left the country, eg. Air 
France, Roussel, Uclaf, Rhone-Poulenc.33 In the early 1990s, French companies 
assumed that past ties, including habits of buying quality French products, and the 
positive orientation of French-trained local elites (the evolues), would help them to 
regain an important place in the Vietnamese market. In addition, the Viet kieu (Overseas 
Vietnamese) community in France maintains close contacts with relatives in Vietnam 
and regularly exchange information and goods. Thus French products have always been
33 Interview with Mr David Phan Than, President o f Overseas Vietnamese Businessmen’s Association 
(OVIBA), Ho Chi Minh City, 27 January 2003. See also Dahm 99:72-73.
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available in Vietnam and kept a good reputation despite the wars and US-led Western 
embargo. In the pharmaceuticals industry for example, Roussel, Uclaf and Rhone- 
Poulenc never left the country and continued to produce antibiotics, anti-malarial and 
veterinary products which became dominant in the Vietnamese market. In 1979, just 
four year after Vietnam’s reunification, a joint venture agreement was reached with the 
Ministry of Health’s General Pharmaceuticals Company, with the equity at 51:49 in 
favour of the local partner. Due to their excellent reputation34 and their early market 
entry, French companies have captured some 75% of the Vietnamese pharmaceuticals 
market. French government support for medical students to study in France and 
funding for the health industries such as the Heart Institute in Ho Chi Minh City, has
o c
helped to sustain a market for French drugs.
The second assumption - that Vietnamese decision-makers would favour French 
products and services - has been vindicated by fewer success stories. Qualified success 
has been seen mainly in the effective French leveraging of good political relations to 
seal grands contrats. The first foreign company to be granted an oil exploration license 
(in 1988) was French state oil company Total, which entered a joint venture with 
Petrovietnam. This was however terminated after three unsuccessful years of 
exploration in the Gulf of Tongkin. The third assumption is the lingering view of 
Vietnam in some minds as a strategic bridgehead from which to conquer markets in 
Laos, Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia. French companies were among the first 
and largest investors in Vietnam. In 1988, four French companies invested a total of 
US$63.3 million (26.5% of the total investment of all countries that year). The two 
largest foreign investments in Vietnam that year were by French state companies: an 
exploration project by the oil company, Total, and Bull’s joint venture for hardware and 
software production. Having failed to penetrate other markets in the Asia-Pacific, 
many French companies saw Vietnam as their best chance to build a presence in a 
dynamic and rapidly growing region in which they were weak. They hoped for “spill­
over” effects to Cambodia and Laos, and viewed Vietnam as an important link in their
34 The Vietnamese respect for French medical scientists and research is so high that the only street names 
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City that have not been "Vietnamised" by the communists are those named 
after the French scientists Calmette and Pasteur.
35 Dahm 99:127.
36 Elf-Aquitaine tried to start oil exploration activities in Vietnam in 1982 but was rebuffed by the 
Vietnamese government.
37 Dahm 99:89.
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10
“return to Asia” strategy by making an early market entry. French banks played a 
major role in brining international capital to Vietnam, starting with a financing project 
for the Metropole Hanoi and later becoming banker and financial advisor to Nestle,
an
Perrier-Vittel, Elf Atochem, Novartis and Shell. With tourism being one of Vietnam’s 
boom industries and France as one of the top sources of tourists to Vietnam, it is not 
surprising that French companies are investing heavily in major hotel and leisure 
projects. The French hotel chain Accor, one of the first foreign companies to risk a 
major hotel project in 1989- the historic five-star Metropole Hotel in Hanoi which 
opened in March 1992- and whose restoration and expansion was made possible by the 
finance of several French banks. French-Vietnamese cultural cooperation (Part II of 
this chapter), eg. the biennial Festival Hue, also brings in its wake important economic 
spinoffs for French economic interests in tourism, hotels, etc.
b) High Investment vs. Declining French Trade position
French economic activity in Vietnam is concentrated in the south. 78% of 
French investments are found in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and the three surrounding 
provinces of Dong Nai, Binh Duong and Baria-Vung Tau.40 Here, France ranks as one 
of the top foreign investors (Table 6.2). This region roughly corresponds to France’s 
first colonial presence in Southeast Asia region when it made Cochinchina a French 
colony in 1859. In November 2002, 130 French companies employing 10,000 people 
were found in the HCMC area.
Table 6.2 The Largest Investors in Ho Chi Minh City. 1988-2001
US$ million Percentage of Total
Hong Kong 1773.20 19.45%
Taiwan 1726.40 10.49%
Singapore 1462.20 9.93%
France 888.10 6.69%
Korea 711.10 5.74%
Japan 640.20 5.49%
UK 552.20 5.01%
Source: French Embassy Mission Economique de Ho Chi Minh Ville, Les Investissements directs 
etrangers dans la region de Ho Chi Minh Ville, Version no.l, 15 February 2003, p.2.
38 Dahm 99:73.
39 Dahm 128.
40 French Embassy Mission Economique de Ho Chi Minh Ville, Les Investissements directs etrangers 
dans la region de Ho Chi Minh Ville, Version no.l, 15 February 2003.
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While French FDI in Vietnam compares favourably to other Asian investors, it 
is still very modest compared to the amounts of French FDI flowing into the economies 
of Vietnam’s neighbours: Japan, Singapore, China, South Korea, and even Thailand 
(Chapter Three, Table 3.1). The bilateral trade perspective is sobering. In 1993, French 
trade with Vietnam was only about the level of French trade with Malta.41
Vietnamese exports to France were chiefly in three categories: food and farm 
products, leather products, textiles and clothings, and were buoyed by a series of EU - 
Vietnam trade agreements from 1991. Bilateral trade increased eight-fold from 1991 to 
€1.1 billion in 2001 and the trade balance - in favour of France up till 1995 turned to 
Vietnam’s favour in 1997.42 French exports to Vietnam have contracted in recent years, 
partly as a result of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The value of French exports to 
Vietnam fell by over 50% to FF1.8 billion in 1998. In 1998, France was the 8th largest 
source of imports into Vietnam, far behind Singapore (21%), Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Hong Kong (4.5%). Its position fell to 12th by 2001. In fact, the 
French share of Vietnam’s trade fell from 4.5% in 1995 to 3% in 1998 and 2% in 
2001.43 The 1996 goal - declared in Singapore by Chirac - to increase the French share 
of Asian trade from 2% to 6% by 2006, has thus suffered a serious setback in what has 
hitherto been traditionally the strongest market for French goods and services in Asia.
c) French aid to Vietnam
France was at the vanguard in extending bilateral aid to Vietnam and is today its 
second aid donor after Japan. The doi moi economic renovation programme launched in 
1986 by the Sixth Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) had been 
prompted by political and economic reforms in the Soviet bloc that reduced assistance 
to Vietnam. Following the collapse of Vietnam’s economic dependence on the Soviet 
Union and COMECON and the demobilization of half a million soldiers after Vietnam 
withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989, France was the first major Western country
41 Le Monde, 14 September 1993.
42 France’s trade deficit was FF1.3 billion in 1998. French Senate (Michel Caldagues, ed), Rapport fa it 
au nom de la Commission des Affaires etrangeres, de la defense et des forces armees sur le projet de loi 
autorisant la ratification de la Convention relative a I ’Entraide judiciare en matiere civile entre la 
Republique franqaise et la Republique socialiste du Vietnam, S6nat No.282 (session ordinaire de 1999- 
2000), Annexe au proc^s-verbal de la seance du 22 mars 2000, p.9
43 French Senate (Caldagues 2000), p.9; Dorient 2002:185; and MAE, “France-Vietnam: Donnees 
g£n£rales et relations bilaterales avec le Vietnam” 25/10/02 ed., on Quai d’Orsay website .
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to resume aid to Hanoi.44 France’s resumption of aid (in 1989) was followed by 
Australia (1991) and Japan (1992)45 French banks were active in Vietnam even earlier: 
they were among the few financial institutions to take the risk of confirming letters of 
credit issued in Vietnam since 1986, when Vietnam was still embroiled in the 
Cambodian conflict. Also in 1991, French banks and Standard Chartered in Singapore 
were the only banks to give (silently) confirmation to letters of credit after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union -  Vietnam’s chief source of foreign finance.46
France attempted to amplify its influence in Vietnam from the late 1980s 
through policy leadership in a variety of multilateral financial channels, in particular the 
IMF and the Club de Paris. Vietnam’s friendship with the Soviet Union and invasion of 
Cambodia in 1979 had been at the cost of good relations with China and the United 
States. When Soviet bankrolling of the Vietnamese economy ended with the collapse of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1991, Vietnam was forced to 
look to the World Bank, IMF and the ADB for aid.47 However, Vietnam had defaulted 
in 1985 on US$138 million debt repayment to the IMF and had been classified as 
“insolvent” by the IMF.48 Against the US veto in the IMF until 1993, Vietnam’s status 
could not be raised in the international fund-raising market. This had the effect of 
blocking third countries from extending new loans to Vietnam. France unsuccessfully 
applied pressure on Washington to end the US embargo and veto on Vietnam receiving 
multilateral financial institutional credit. A French bank in 1993 organised a bridging 
loan to settled Vietnam’s US$145 million debt to the IMF. The “Club de Paris” of 
donor countries, and an inner “Friends of Vietnam” circle led by France and Japan held 
its first meeting in Paris in November 1993 to consider ways of helping Vietnam get 
around the US veto to spread out repayments and raise money for economic reforms.
France has been very generous in its bilateral aid programmes to Vietnam. 
French largesse to Vietnam is noteworthy and goes against the grain of two overall 
trends in French aid over the last decade: a shrinking Overseas Development Assistance
44 Oxford Analytica, “Vietnam: Economic Orientation”, 17 February 1993.
45 French Senate (Adrien Gouteyron et al, eds), Rapport d'Information fa it au nom de la Commission des 
Affaires culturelles, a la suite d ’une mission d ’information effectuee en Republique socialiste du Vietnam, 
sur la ffancophonie et l’enseignement du ffan9ais, Senat N o.l (session ordinaire de 1997-1998), Annexe 
au proc6s-verbal de la stance du ler octobre 1997.
46 Dahm 99: 107.
47 Udai Bhanu Singh, “Vietnam’s Security Perspectives”, Strategic Analysis, XXIII/9, December 1999.
48 Le Monde, 15 July 1992.
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(ODA) budget (which has fallen from 0.7% of French GDP at the start of the 1990s to 
just 0.31% in 2001), and a sharply decreasing budget for Asian countries. This anomaly 
can only be explained by the political importance attached to Vietnam. The generous aid 
is linked to publicly stated French national objectives in Vietnam: “solidarity, influence 
and economic presence.”49 Vietnam is one of the highest-priority targets in French 
international aid, which is strongly biased towards ex-French colonies. In the first half 
of the 1980s, Vietnam was the only country to escape the budget cuts in the “scientific, 
cultural and technical cooperation” aid programmes of the Quai d’Orsay50 - when 
Vietnam was still occupying Cambodia. Aid to Vietnam escaped budget cuts in the 
1990s and Vietnam continued rising as a rising priority country for French aid. A 1994 
report of the French Economic and Social Council, noting that France enjoyed strong 
historical links to mainland Southeast Asia (the Indochinese countries, Thailand and 
Myanmar), recommended that France should take advantage of the economic and social 
transformations linked to their market openings by increasing French exchanges with 
countries in the region. French assistance in the domaines strategiques of government 
and legal cooperation, cultural and technical training were particularly stressed.51 The 
primary focus of these efforts was of course Vietnam.
The French ODA budget fell in both absolute and percentage terms, from nearly 
€7.2 billion euros or 0.64% of GDP in 1994 to under €4.5 billion 0.32% of GDP in 2000 
(Chapter 3, Table 3.2). Despite these cutbacks that divided a smaller pie of French aid 
between more countries and with the largest chunk of aid going to French-speaking 
North Africa and sub-saharan Africa and only 9% to Asia, French assistance to Vietnam 
continued to grow in the 1990s. In addition, France gave Vietnam FF45 million 
worth of aid to build a new convention centre and sent 125 limousines to Vietnam for 
the 1997 Francophonie summit in Hanoi. France also set up bilingual (French- 
Vietnamese) schools and helped to train translators for the summit. It was then 
estimated that there were only some 50,000 French speakers in a population of 77 
million - less than 0.1% of the population, and Paris aimed to raise this percentage to
49 See section on “France” in EC Delegation in Hanoi, European Union Development Cooperation 
Activities in Vietnam 2001, p.57.
50 Godement 95:965.
51 Jean Billet, Les Relations Exterieures de la France avec le Vietnam, le Cambodge, Le Laos, la 
Thailande et la Birmanie, Rapport du Conseil Economique et Sociale, No.CESX93001 V, 12 March 1994.
52 China, India, and Indonesia had figured among the top 10 recipients o f French development aid in 
1988-89, but by 1998-99, Vietnam was the only Asian country remaining on that list. Dorient 2002:182-3.
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5% . The French government paid for 1500 language training classes and opened the 
first French language schools in Vietnam since the last French lycees in Saigon were 
closed in 1975.
French aid to Vietnam is quite unapologetic in its stress on unilateral French 
efforts and national goals rather than a collective EU programme based on common 
European objectives such as the promotion of human rights. The five sectoral priorities 
in French aid to Vietnam are in judicial reform, modernization of Vietnam’s research 
and higher education system, cultural cooperation, economic reform to promote 
interactions with French companies, and the reduction of poverty and social 
dislocation.54 In 1997, Vietnam became the second recipient of aid from Paris55. 
Vietnam was the largest recipient of French “scientific, cultural and technical 
cooperation” aid in Asia, and the fourth largest in the world after the three Maghreb 
countries.56 With the absorption of the Ministere de la Cooperation (ex-Colonial 
Ministry) by the Quai d’Orsay in 1998, the number of aid-receiving countries in the 
zone de solidarity prioritaire (ZSP) rose from 37 to 61. In 1999, Vietnam was
en
promoted to ZSP status. By 2002, Vietnam had become the largest recipient of French
C O
ODA in the world, ahead of even the Maghreb countries.
d) EU Trade and Cooperation Assistance to Vietnam
In contrast to generous French benevolence towards Vietnam, EU policies have 
concentrated on the humanitarian repatriation of refugees to Vietnam (early 1990s), 
market access and development cooperation (mid-1990s onwards). Diplomatic relations 
between the EU and Vietnam were normalized in November 1990. Between 1990 and
1995, the EU was represented in Vietnam by a Project Office whose main task was to 
repatriate 200,000 Vietnamese refugees who had fled the country. Between 1989 and
1996, more than €110 million was provided for this purpose.59
53 Le Figaro and Le Monde, 14 November 1997.
54 Section on “France” in EC Delegation, EU Development Cooperation Activities in Vietnam 2001, esp. 
pp.57-58.
55 Le Monde, 14 November 1997.
56 See report by the Cultural Affairs Commission o f the French Senate in Gouteyron 1997, op cit.
57 The co-existence o f economic cooperation activities, ZSP and Agence franfaise du developpement 
(AFD) programmes is exceptional and reserved only for the Maghreb countries, South Africa and 
Vietnam (EC Delegation, “France” entry, p.57).
58 Vietnam Economic News, Vol.2/No.3, 14 January 2003, p.2.
59 European Commission, EC-Vietnam Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Brussels, 15 May 2002.
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Indochina is of negligible trade importance to the EU, and the work of the EC 
Delegation and other EC offices in Vietnam reflects an emphasis on development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid. 60 It was France that called for the EC to sign a 
cooperation agreement with Vietnam in 1995, similar to the one the EC had with 
ASEAN and China. (Vietnam formally acceded to the EC-ASEAN Cooperation 
Agreement on 1 May 1999.61) The EC Delegation to Vietnam was officially opened in 
1996 and since then, policy towards Vietnam has been led by development priorities. 
The switch of the EU’s priority in Vietnam from refugee relief to the promotion of trade 
and development cooperation was heralded by the Commission’s 1994 “New Asia 
Strategy” (NAS) paper. This outlined three clear economic goals of the EU in Asia:
i) to benefit from the economic opportunities and to respond to the economic
challenges in the region which contains the world’s fastest growing 
countries, and which could represent a quarter and a third of the world 
economy by the year 2000;
ii) to integrate into the open, market-based world trading system those Asian
countries, such as China, India or Vietnam which are moving from state 
controls to marker-oriented economies; and
lii) to assist in the enormous problem of poverty alleviation.
The third goal was the immediate one applied by the EU to Vietnam. Financial 
and technical assistance for development in Asia (and Latin America) has only been 
available on a systematic basis since 1976 when the Community introduced a budget 
line for non-associated developing countries, designed to benefit the non-ACP states 
and those not covered by the financial protocols attached to the agreements with 
Mediterranean countries. In terms of the humanitarian aid budget, Asian states were 
allocated 123 million ECU in 1998, out of a global budget of 936 million ECU. 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Vietnam and Pakistan were the chief 
beneficiaries.63 Between 1986 and 1998, Afghanistan (€244 million), Bangladesh (€112 
million), Vietnam (€91 million) and Cambodia (€74 million) received the majority of 
humanitarian assistance in Asia.64 Aside from humanitarian aid, the EU is assisting 
Vietnam’s market reforms, and promoting bilateral trade. European-level programmes
60 Interview with Ambassador Frederic Baron, Head o f EC Delegation in Hanoi, 16 January 2003.
61 “The EU’s relations with Vietnam: Overview”, European Commission website,
http://.europ.eu.int/comm./external relations/Vietnam/intro/index.htm. accessed 16 February 2002.
62 See NAS 1994, section IV, pp. 10-11.
63 Hazel Smith 2002:207.
64 Hazel Smith 2002:209.
216
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Six / Vietnam
have included the EU market transition programme in Vietnam. This is part of the 
larger EU effort at providing expertise and policy advice to the “ex-state trading 
companies of Asia which have embarked on structural reform, such as China, Mongolia, 
Vietnam or Laos, to assist them to set up the institutions, policies and laws to make a 
smooth transition to market-based economies”.65
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, the EC granted 
greater market access for Vietnamese goods through a series of EC-Vietnam Textiles 
and Clothing Agreements (1993, 1997 and 2000). The European Commission’s CSP on 
Vietnam for the period 2002-2006, has a budget of €162 million and focuses on two 
priorities: human development (rural development for the poorest provinces and 
education support) and the integration of Vietnam into the international economy by 
assisting reforms towards a market economy.
Table 6.3: EU Aid to Vietnam (Member States and Commission)
Country
Cumii
commii
ilative
tments4
Cumulative
disbursements4
Disburs
20C
ements
11
€
thousand
%l €
thousand
%l €
thousand
%J
Austria 1,945 0.07% 1,527 0.15% 1,527 0.51%
Belgium 89,410 3.44% 51,724 5.22% 20,015 6.71%
Denmark 363,302 13.97% 147,226 14.85% 48,654 16.31%
Finland 145,914 5.61% 120,105 12.11% 5,006 1.68%
France 493,978 19.00% 179,755 18.13% 76,037 25.49%
Germany 417,978 16.04% 182,104 18.36% 25,425 8.52%
Italy 37,464 1.44% 4,242 0.43% 1,261.34 0.42%
Luxembourg 42,374 1.63% - - - -
Netherlands 143,536 5.52% 57,586 5.81% 24,894 8.34%
Spain 83,000 3.19% 26,855 2.71% 9,717 3.26%
Sweden 308,790 11.88% 132,218 13.33% 34,096 11.43%
UK 206,455 7.94% 25,629 2.55% 24,815 8.32%
Commission 266,894 10.26% 62,975 6.35% 26,875 9.01%
TOTAL 2,600,272 100% 991,587 100% 298,323 100%
(1) cumulative commitment per country/ Total o f cumulative commitment
(2) cumulative disbursement per country/ Total o f cumulative disbursement
(3) Disbursement 2001 per country / Total disbursement 2001
(4) On-going and pipeline projects only
Source: EC Delegation in Hanoi, European Union Development Cooperation Activities in Vietnam 2001, 
May 2002, Table 3 on p.3.
65 NAS, 1994, p. 16.
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The EU accounts for almost 20% of all ODA to Vietnam. In terms of cumulative 
commitments, the EU is the third largest donor in Vietnam, after Japan and the World 
Bank. In terms of total disbursement up to December 2001, the EU is the second largest 
donor after Japan.66 France’s cumulative commitments to Vietnam make up one-fifth of 
total EU aid to Vietnam (Table 6.3), a share that has been increasing in recent years.
Overall Trends
To summarise, French economic policies in Vietnam since the mid-1980s have 
been based on familiarity with the Vietnamese market, an unbroken long-term presence 
(at least in the HCMC region) for up to a 100 years for some French companies, as well 
as politically motivated grands contrats. The French have invested heavily on the 
success and continued viability of Vietnam’s mixed economy as set into motion by doi 
moi since 1986. There is also an element of post-colonial nostalgic sentiment which 
explains an unexpectedly high level of French government and MNC investments and 
representation offices in Vietnam, out of proportion to actual French assets in the
f \ 7country and in other countries in Southeast Asia.
French trade and investment levels in Vietnam are modest relative to France’s 
total international trade and investments, and decreasing proportionately as a result of 
Vietnam’s rapidly growing economy, exporting power and integration in the regional 
and international economy. Cognizant of Vietnam’s rapid economic growth averaging 
8% every year between 1991 and 1997 and trade with the world exponentially 
increasing since 1991, France seems to have placed its bets on Vietnam becoming the 
next Asian tiger. Vietnam weathered the Asian economic crisis very well and continued 
to post growth rates above 5% in 2000 and 2001. Although its per capita GNP was only 
US$370 in 2000 (the World Bank puts Vietnam near the bottom, 167 out of 206 in the 
ranking of the world’s poorest nations),68 its purchasing parity power (PPP) in 2001 was 
estimated to be US$1860.69
66 EC Delegation in Hanoi, European Union Development Cooperation Activities in Vietnam 2001, May
2002, p.8.
67 Interview with Dr Martin Albani, Executive Director, European Business Information Centre (EBIC), 
Hi Chi Minh City, 28 January 2003.
68 Frederick Z. Brown, “President Clinton’s Visit to Vietnam”, Asian Update Series, Asia Society, 
November 2000.
69 MAE, “France-Vietnam: Donnees generates”, 25/10/02 ed.
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Grid 6.1 Economic Policies in Vietnam, 1985-2001
0 + 0 + 0 + - 0 +
F ♦ a ♦ ♦ ♦
GB ♦ ♦ b - ♦
D ♦ ♦ b ♦ ♦
EU ♦ ♦ c # c ♦
- = Cautious or anti-Vietnam policy by Government/EC 
0 = Government passive, business community left on its own 
+ = Pro-Investment and Trade policy by Government/EC
a The French government and business community have throughout the 1980s up to the present been 
consistently active in engaging Vietnam economically. They and their Japanese counterparts were the 
only major countries in the West to trade actively with Vietnam and give generous aid. Most other non- 
Asian countries waited for doi moi in 1986, Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, or the lifting 
o f  the US embargo in 1994.
b Britain and Germany were among the Western countries which entered the Vietnamese market after 
Vietnam’s economic opening and 1989 military withdrawal from Cambodia. 
c EC-Vietnam Textiles Agreement signed in 1993, and Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 1995.
The convergence of economic policies between the major EU Member States 
and the Commission (Grid 6.1) after doi moi and Vietnam’s diplomatic rehabilitation 
after 1989 is a result of common interest in encouraging Vietnam (as in China) along 
the path of market reforms, rather than an act of policy coordination or a conscious 
common policy. This is most evident with regard to aid policy. Vietnam is today the 
largest recipient of French ODA in the world. French aid has been especially generous 
in the fields of education, French-language training and agriculture. These ODA 
programmes are aimed at strategic areas related to national French objectives and the 
advancement of the over-arching objective of relations priviligiees with Vietnam. 
Hence other objectives pursued by other EU member states, eg. human rights by the 
Nordic Member States (Part III of this chapter), are quietly ignored by France.
II Political-security Objectives
Despite the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Cold War, France has 
consistently sought good relations with Hanoi as the key power centre in Indochina 
since 1954. French governments have dealt extensively with the communist government 
in Hanoi for almost half a century. “Vietnam ghosts” did not bedevil French relations 
with Hanoi. The French preferred Hanoi to the pro-American Saigon regime under Ngo
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Dinh Diem, and were prepared to deal with the communists, whom they expected to win
7 fiin the event of the reunification elections scheduled for 1956. The French tried 
between 1954 and 1975, in spite of the Cold War, to pursue a pragmatic, policy towards 
the two Vietnams. They maintained diplomatic missions in both Hanoi (raised to 
“Delegation-general” level in 1966) and Saigon. A friendly exchange of letters between 
De Gaulle and Ho Chi Minh, and De Gaulle’s extremely critical attitude towards 
widening US war aims in 1966, could not conceal France’s powerlessness in 
influencing the war, but France was quick to recognise the North in 1973 and to build 
ties with a post-1975 reunified Vietnam.
As seen in the first part of this chapter, nostalgia for the French colonial 
presence in Indochine and the desire to revive French cultural and economic influence 
in East Asia using Indochina as a familiar base, have informed French economic policy 
and generous French ODA programmes in Vietnam. The second part would argue that 
the positive though somewhat paternalistic French attitude towards Vietnam is also an 
essential component in political relations. This is seen in French efforts in portraying 
itself as Vietnam’s closest Western partner and ally in Vietnam’s internal reforms, and 
in assisting Vietnam’s integration in the Francophonie and the wider international 
community. Vietnam has also been critical to French attempts since the 1980s to carve 
out a diplomatic-security role in Indochinese (and wider Southeast Asian) affairs.
1979-1989: A Special Relationship during Vietnam’s isolation?
France and Vietnam appear to share a particular, close relationship characterised 
by warmth between national elites. This relationship is however, not ‘special’ in the 
sense that the concept is often used to characterize, for example, US-UK relations, as 
‘two nations divided by a common language’. Such “special relationships”71 are 
underscored by shared historical roots, psychological proximity between the populace, 
social ties, and governmental policies that consistently express preference, cooperation 
and friendship. They are recognized and declared as ‘special’ by both parties, are long-
70 Frey, pp.20-22.
71 The term “special relationship” was first used in contemporary international relations by Winston 
Churchill at his Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. In that speech, Churchill called 
for a special relationship between the British Empire and the United States, to prevent another world war. 
See John Bayliss, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1980: The Special Relationship, London: 
Macmillan, 1981; Alan P Dobson, The Politics o f  the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988.
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n nstanding, and have the power to endure crises. There is also a lack of extensive 
transgovemmentalism, involving the inter-penetration of policy-making between Hanoi
noand Paris. After French colonialism in Indochina ended in 1954, US involvement in 
South Vietnam (up to 1975), and Chinese (up to 1978) and Soviet (up to 1989) 
involvement with the Hanoi government certainly made stronger cases for a “special 
relationship”. France-Vietnam relations lack just such a fraternal character, and do not 
possess the intimacy of a longstanding and mutually recognized special relationship 
between the peoples of both countries.
Aside from an unusually high level of French involvement in Vietnamese affairs 
during the latter’s decade of international isolation (1979 to 1989), Vietnam has not 
responded in kind. Nevertheless, there is long-standing habit by French statesmen to 
portray bilateral relations as a partenariat priviligie. French leaders often speak of a 
“special relationship” with Vietnam and a special role for France in Indochina. De 
Gaulle in his 1966 speech in Phnom Penh criticised the US’ policy of military escalation 
in Vietnam, called on the US to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, and urged a 
political solution based on the 1954 Geneva Accords.74 In the first presidential visit to 
Vietnam since 1945, Mitterrand declared in 1993 the aspiration for “special relations of
n e
the type France enjoys with Algeria”. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe spoke in 1994 of
• • • • nf\intimacy, familiarity and an “affinity and complicity of spirit” while Chirac in 1997
77called for a partenariat priviligie.
For much of the 1975-1994 period, Vietnam was an archetypal isolated state, 
ostracized from most international political-diplomatic fora and denied full participation
70
in international financial institutions because of the US embargo. In the four broad 
areas of isolation identified by Geldenhuys - political and diplomatic, economic,
72 See Lily Feldman’s definition in her The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel, 
Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp.249-52, 272.
73 Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, New York: 1970.
74“Allocution prononc£e k la reunion populaire de Phnom-Penh”, 1 September 1966, in Charles de 
Gaulle: Discours et Messages vers le terme janvier 1966-avril 1969, Paris: Plon, 1970, pp.74-78.
75 Patrice de Beer, “La visite du President fran^ais au Vietnam”, Le Monde, 11 February 1993.
76 Alain Juppe, “Allocution du minister des affaires etrangeres lors du diner offert par le ministre 
vietnamien des affaires etrangeres,” Hanoi, 22 November 1994.
77 Jean-Claude Pomonti, “Jacques Chirac a appeie de ses voeux un partenariat priviligie avec Hanoi-”, Le 
Monde, 14 November 1997.
78 Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis, Cambridge” Cambridge University Press, 
1990.
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military, and social-cultural79 - Vietnam fitted the mould of a ‘pariah state’.80 In its 
immediate neighbourhood, it was shunned by anti-communist ASEAN, and enjoyed 
few trading links with its neighbours. From 1979-1990, Vietnam was shunned not only 
by the US, but was fiercely condemned by ASEAN, China and the EU over its invasion 
and occupation of Cambodia. The bridges Vietnam built with geographically distant 
but ideologically close countries, in particular the Soviet Union and COMECON, which 
provided most of Vietnam’s political, military, economic and ideological support 
partially compensated for its isolation. In this context, the role of France as a ‘bridge’ 
between Vietnam and the wider Western world between 1975 and 1994 was thus 
significant. France acted as a special partner in Vietnam’s relations with the 
international community outside of the Soviet-led communist bloc.
a) French post-colonial responsibility towards Vietnam
Fran<?ois Godement has noted that French interest in East Asia has waxed and 
waned several times since 1954. I would argue that while this may be true for the 
region in general, the French have long recognised Vietnam’s strategic value and have 
been consistent in their relations with Vietnam. Unlike the US after 1975, France 
adopted a pragmatic policy and sought to build a privileged relationship with the 
government in Hanoi, even when the Vietnamese in 1975-78 opted for rapid unification 
and the socialist integration of South Vietnam, alignment with the Soviet Union and the 
establishment of quasi-total domination over the whole Indochinese peninsula. French 
criticism of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979, 
encouragement of the Cambodian factions to use Paris as a venue for negotiations, and 
French pressure for a neutral and independent Cambodia, were conveyed without overly
o 1
antagonising the leadership in Hanoi.
The nostalgia, colonial history, and bridgehead factors presented in the previous 
section on French economic interactions with Vietnam, are also present in diplomatic 
relations. There is a post-colonial sentimental, almost paternalistic attitude towards 
Vietnam and the nostalgic idea of Indochine as a special French responsibility. Based 
on the relatively low levels of French trade and investment in Vietnam compared with
79 See Geldenhuys, ch. 1.
80 See R.E. Harkavy, “The Pariah State Syndrome”, Orbis; 21/3, 1977:623-649; and Richard K. Betts, 
“Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Non-Proliferation”, Foreign Policy, 26 (Spring 1977), pp. 122-146.
81 The Treasury even blocked a payment o f FF200 million in aid to Vietnam in December 1981. 
Godement 90:190-91.
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China, Japan and the rest of East Asia, it is clear that the economic imperatives usually 
associated with East Asia - and spelt out in the Commission’s 1994 New Asia Strategy 
document (chapter three) -  do not readily apply to French relations with Vietnam. In 
this regard, French political objectives in Vietnam are based on a more long-term 
assessment of Vietnam’s current geostrategic and future economic significance as a 
buffer state connecting Northeast Asia (in particular China) to Southeast Asia and 
ASEAN. A senior Quai d’Orsay official writes that Vietnam is one of France’s key
89interlocutors in ASEAN, one with which France enjoys close relations. Based on its 
population, economic potential and strategic location, its role as the key state in 
Indochina and in relations between China and Southeast Asia has been appreciated since 
French colonial days.
French efforts at developing economic relations with Vietnam were only limited 
by the international embargo imposed on Vietnam by the United States. While the EU 
supported ASEAN, China and the US against the Soviet Union on the issue of 
Cambodian representation at the UN and publicly condemned Vietnam after its invasion 
of Cambodia in 1979, the French moderated EU actions against Vietnam and
* • 87maintained open channels of communication with Hanoi. Just as de Gaulle criticized 
American military escalation in Vietnam after 1965, Mitterrand criticized the American
84embargo for no longer having a raison d’etre.
During his state visit to Vietnam (timed to coincide with the sixth Francophonie 
summit in Hanoi) in November 1997, Chirac noted that the French presence in Asia was 
strongest in Vietnam, where the French share of Vietnam’s trade was 9% compared to 
an average French share of under 2% in the rest of Asia. As Le Monde's Southeast Asia 
correspondent Jean-Claude Pomonti pointed out, the strategy was to make Vietnam the 
entry point for French interests in Southeast Asia, and France, that for Vietnamese 
interests in the EU:
Le pari est done clair: le Vietnam est destine a etre la porte de la France au sein
de VASEAN tout comme la France sera la porte du Vietnam au sein de I ’Union
85europeenne.
82 Dorient 2002: 181. Today, French navy ships make ports of call at both Chinese and Vietnamese ports.
83 Dorient 2002: 173-174 and Godement 95.
84 Le Monde, 11 February 1993.
85 Jean-Claude Pomonti, “Jacques Chirac a appele de ses voeux un partenariat priviligid avec Hanoi”, Le 
Monde, 14 November 1997.
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ASEAN is seen in Paris today as one of the “four poles” of power in Asia -
o /
together with China, Japan and India. French policy in Southeast Asia, while long
centred on Indochina and on Vietnam in particular, has consistently been strategic in
using its “soft power” -augmenting its cultural influence throughout Southeast Asia via
the promotion of the French language and education. F rancis Godement notes that
Mitterrand had a marked tendency in following the precedent of the Fourth Republic
(1946-58) to attach a high importance to questions on Indochina. Mitterrand tended to
consult Vietnamese leaders as his preferred interlocutors in Southeast Asia, often at the
expense of ASEAN states - save Indonesia.87 Manfred Mols noted in 1990 when
ASEAN comprised six members:
French relations (with ASEAN) are in part a product of its long history in 
Indochina. The whole of Southeast Asia, beyond only the six ASEAN countries, 
has thus has a significant place in French foreign policy conceptions, including 
cultural policy as indicated by the successful activities of the Alliance 
Franchise.”88
In Southeast Asia, France focuses on Vietnam as a strategic country from which 
to project French influence. Its strategic cultural policy in the region involves the active 
promotion of French language and culture among predominantly English-speaking 
elites. In this regard, Radio France Internationale (RFI) set up a 24-hour broadcasting 
facility in Hanoi, the first foreign station to be allowed to broadcast from Vietnam, in
OQ
1997. The French government has also sought to boost its profile by sponsoring the 
broadcast of French-language TV programmes produced by TV5 and RFI in Singapore 
and Malaysia. A continuation of a strategic cultural presence is evident in the generous 
support France gave to Vietnam in the Francophonie. France was not only supporting 
Vietnam’s candidature at the 1995 summit, it also poured in material and personnel 
resources to help Vietnam host the Francophonie Summit in Hanoi - the first held in 
Asia -  in November 1997. French cultural policy is intended to reinforce and promote 
an image of France as a cultural power and patron of the arts, beyond the use of the 
French language. In 2000 and again in 2002, French aid was critical in the Franco-
86 Dorient 2002:7.
87 Godement 95:962.
88 Manfred Mols, “Cooperation with ASEAN”, in Edwards and Regelsberger (eds), Europe’s Global 
Links, London: Pinter, 1990, p.69.
89 Le Monde, “Radio France Internationale 6met en FM sur Hanoi et sa region”, 11 November 1997.
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Vietnamese launch of the first biennial Hue Festival, a performing arts festival held in 
spring in the former imperial city -now a UNESCO world heritage site.90
Of course, Vietnam’s involvement in the Francophonie is not unproblematic. 
The Vietnamese government closed down the last French lycee in Hanoi in 1965, and 
the remaining lycees in Saigon upon reunification in 1975 as western schools were seen 
as corrupt founts of Western values and opposition to the communist regime. Many 
Vietnamese who had been sympathetic to French interests fled to South Vietnam or to 
France and Canada after 1954, and US sympathizers fled after Saigon fell to the 
Communists in 1975.91 Although Vietnam has participated in the Francophonie since 
the first summit in 1986, it was by then hardly a French-speaking country. Most of its 
leaders spoke Russian, English or Chinese as their second language. Vietnam’s troubled 
recent history has made its leaders highly nationalistic and sensitive to suggestions of 
neo-colonial ties with France. At the first Francophonie summit in 1986, Vietnam was 
among the countries which objected to French domination, arguing for a “Summit of 
countries having in common the use of French” rather than la Francophonie?2
French ODA’s strong emphasis on higher education and training in Vietnam is 
symptomatic of the very clear national political goals and strategic principles pursued 
by France. First, it hopes to re-establish a French-speaking elite in Vietnam (on the 
assumption that this elite would be more sympathetic to French interests). There is a 
recognition that Vietnam is not and will never become a francophone (ie. French- 
speaking) country on the same level of French linguistic penetration in many of the 
African countries in the Francophonie. The early optimism at the beginning of the 
1990s that Vietnam was “formerly francophone, and would soon become francophone 
again”, had given way to more realistic goals of targeting specific local elite groups in 
society. As such, French resources are deployed to carefully targeted (cible) groups of 
professionals and technicians who have the potential to become opinion and political 
leaders in Vietnam. Second, and related to the first principle is the policy of creating a 
francophonie de niche, a niche of French-speaking elites in key professions. These
90 Le Monde 18 April 2000.
91Louis-Jacques Dorais, “Vietnamese communities in Canada, France and Denmark”, 
Journal o f  Refugee Studies, Jun 1998, Vol.l 1, No.2, pp. 107-125
92 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (eds), France in World Politics, London: Routledge, 1989; Leruez et 
al 90:140
93 Interview with Philippe Orliange, Cultural Counsellor, French Embassy in Hanoi, 21 January 2003.
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groups include state officials (particularly in law and finance), engineers, lawyers and 
doctors. For example, half of the Vietnamese doctors trained abroad (3% of the total) 
receive their training in France. In the academic year 2000-2001, there were 1,472 
Vietnamese students in French universities, of which over 30% (some 500) were on 
French government scholarships. Surveys conducted by the French Embassy in Hanoi 
revealed that French was still viewed positively as a “language of distinction and of 
cultural differentiation”94.
There are four French Centres in the provinces outsides the two metropoles of 
Hanoi and HCMC - Hue, Danang, Nha Trang and Can Tho. The Alliance Fran9aise de 
Hanoi was inaugurated in November 1991. In the decade 1991-2001, over 150 
agreements/Memoranda of Understanding were signed between French and Vietnamese 
educational establishments and more than 3000 university scholarships were awarded to 
Vietnamese students. Discussions over the French proposal for a French-language 
university in Saigon (central Ho Chi Minh City) are ongoing.95 The French have had to 
compete very hard with English-speaking countries to appeal to the growing number of 
middle-class Vietnamese seeking higher education abroad. Australia (which has an 
overseas Vietnamese community of some 140,000), the UK and even Singapore are 
beginning to attract increasing numbers of fee-paying students from Vietnam.96
Finally, French relations with Vietnam must take into account the significant 
human element and reservoir of interest and goodwill among foreign policy elites in 
Paris. French benevolence towards Vietnam is not simply borne by post-colonial 
nostalgia. France is home to over 300,000 Overseas Vietnamese, the oldest and second
07largest Viet kieu community in the world. As recently as the 1990s, Vietnam was the
Q O
top source of children available to French families for adoption. Many Franco-
94 Ibid.
95 A campus o f five hectares had been earmarked in Saigon for this university, and the funding was 
supposed to be shared 50/50 between the French government and the Vietnamese private sector . 
However, representatives of the Overseas Vietnamese Business Association (OVIBA) told me that they 
were uncertain about the long-term feasibility o f this project. Interview in HCMC, 27 January 2003.
96 Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics o f  Human Rights in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 191. 
Australia attracted 4000 Vietnamese students in 1999, over three-quarters o f whom were on private 
funding
97 MAE, “France-Vietnam: Donn6es g6ndrales et relations bilaterales avec le Vietnam” 25/10/02 ed., on 
Quai d’Orsay website; Dorais 98.
98 Since the early 1990s, France received half o f the Vietnamese babies put up for adoption. Between 
1995 and 1998, 5133 Vietnamese babies were adopted by French families. Le Monde 4 July 2001. 
Jacques and Bernadette Chirac’s third daughter, Anh Dao, is among the thousands o f Vietnamese “boat
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Vietnamese have been successfully integrated into French society and occupy 
significant positions in French decision-making.99
b) Vietnam as entree for a French security role in Southeast Asia?
Historically, Vietnam’s strategic position at the confluence of great civilizations 
and empires has made it a battlefield in the international relations of the region. After 
all, French colonialism in Indochina was founded on French strategic objectives in 
gaining a colonial foothold in the Far East in order to benefit from trade with China and 
Southeast Asia. Under the unequal treaties imposed on the Qing government following 
the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, the French had won concessions in and trading rights in four 
Chinese cities (Shanghai, Canton, Wuhan, Tianjin) but Indochina served as their
thpermanent colonial trading base in East Asia. At the turn of the 20 century, the 
strategic position of Indochina was exploited by Sun Yat-sen’s Chinese revolutionaries 
as a base for preparations leading to the 1911 revolution that ended the Qing dynasty. 
The Japanese used Vietnam as a launching pad in their conquest of European colonies 
in Southeast Asia, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) extended men and materiel to 
the Viet Minh in South Vietnam between 1949 and 1954, and the US saw communist 
Vietnam in Cold War terms as a front for the expansion of communism to the whole of 
Southeast Asia.
The French continue to see Vietnam as a strategic tremplin (launch-pad) in 
Southeast Asia. France has leveraged on its historical ties with Vietnam, by far the 
most populous state in Indochina, as a bridgehead for French interests in Southeast 
Asia. Despite losing the First Indochina War (1946-54) against the Viet Minh and the 
partition of Vietnam at the 1954 Geneva Conference, many French economic assets 
were maintained in Vietnam. France was an influential economic force in Saigon, de 
Gaulle spoke up strongly against superpower rivalry in Indochina, and France played a 
mediating role in the negotiations leading to the resolution of the Second Indochina War 
(1965-73 ‘Vietnam War’) and Third Indochina War (1979-89, which ended with 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and UN nation-rebuilding and elections in
people” naturalized in France. She was 18 when the Chiracs took her into their care in 1979. Le Monde, 
15 February 2002.
99 The current Head of the EC Delegation in Hanoi, Fr6deric Baron, is a Frenchman who has Viet kieu 
roots on the maternal side of his family. Margie Sudre, the French Minister for the Francophonie in Alain 
Juppe’s cabinet (1995-97), also traces Vietnamese ancestry.
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Cambodia). Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in 1989 noted that France’s geographical 
distance from Indochina and lack of direct interest in the region allowed it to play a 
leading mediating role in the Cambodian conflict.100
In his visits to Hanoi in February 1990 and November 1991 before and after the 
signing of the Paris Peace Accords, Dumas stressed to the Vietnamese leadership that 
France was committed to Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN and its integration in the 
wider international system. France would support Vietnam in securing a solution to its 
IMF debt problem, and in “finding again a place on the international scene 
commensurate with its stature”.101 Dumas and other French leaders urged the 
Vietnamese leadership to continue its doi moi policies on the path of economic reform.
President Mitterrand in February 1993 made the symbolic first state visit by a 
major Western leader to Hanoi since the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, at a time when 
the US still called for an international embargo on Vietnam. A regular France-Vietnam 
political dialogue was started in 1993 (the only one Vietnam has to date with any
1 f)0 •European country). The need to shore up France’s position in the Indochinese region 
explains the keen French interest in encouraging the integration of Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos in regional and international organizations like ASEAN, ASEM, APEC, the 
Francophonie, and the WTO. Mitterrand’s visit sealed the reconciliation between 
France and Vietnam. By 1994 (ironically the 40th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu), 
Vietnam had become all the rage in Paris. A slew of artistically and commercially 
successful films released in 1992-93, inter alia, Dien Bien Phu, Indochine and L ’Amant, 
recalled French colonialism in Vietnam in a romantic light. This “engouement 
romantique” for all things Vietnamese was evident in French political, business and 
even academic communities. Historiographies and assessments of French colonialism 
were re-cast from earlier self-conscious apologies on imperialism to highlighting the
100 Roland Dumas, “Statement delivered by Minister for Foreign Affairs o f the French Republic, Co- 
President of the Paris Conference on Cambodia”, Paris, 30 July 1989, in Acharya et al (eds), Cambodia: 
the 1989 Paris Peace Conference: background analysis and documents, 1991.
101 Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, “Toast pronounced at Lunch hosted by Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Man Cam, Hanoi”, 25 November 1991. France doubled its aid to Vietnam in 1991.
102 Interview with Duong Van Quang, Deputy Director-General o f Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Institute 
of International Relations (HR), Hanoi, 17 January 2003. Vietnam also has political dialogues with 
Japan, China, ASEAN, Russia and India.
103 Jean-Claude Pomonti, “La visite du President Mitterrand: L’6trange engouement des Franfais pour le 
Vietnam”, Le Monde, 9 February 1993. Also Jean Brunot de Rouvre, “Vietnam: L’an 1 du decollage. Un 
tremplin?”, Le Monde, 14 September 1993.
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positive contributions made by French colonialism to indigenous economic and social 
developments.104
The year after Mitterrand’s state visit, six French ministers and then-Mayor of 
Paris Jacques Chirac visited Vietnam in 1994. This tempo of high-level visits was 
maintained and widened to include major Asian countries after Chirac became president 
in 1995 (Chapter 3, Table 3.3). In return, President Le Due Anh was invited in 1995 to 
Paris to attend the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Allied Victory105, and President 
Tran Due Luong made the first-ever state visit by a Vietnamese President to France, in 
October 2002.
In terms of hard security (military alliances and joint training, troop presence, 
etc), prevailing conditions do not seem to favour an increased French presence in Asia 
beyond current troop levels concentrated in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific in the 
French DOM-TOM (Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories in Reunion and 
New Caledonia- see chapter 3). The French military presence in Africa is a function of 
three factors- the high level of France’s economic interactions and involvement, the 
number of French residents and the nature of relations between France and the national 
ruling elites.106 These elements of close economic, political and social ties simply do 
not apply to France’s relations with any Asian state, not even Vietnam. Unlike Taiwan 
and Singapore - the only Asian countries with which France enjoys a high level of 
military cooperation - Vietnam is unable to afford to purchase French weapons. Despite 
the end of the Cold War and Vietnam’s integration into many regional and international 
organizations, it has maintained strong military links with Russia and continues to buy 
most of its weapons from that country. Most of the members of the CPV Politburo
104 See for example Brocheux and H&nery’s excellent historical tome, Indochine: La colonisation 
ambigue 1858-1954, Paris, 2001; and Robert Aldrich, “Imperial Mise en Valeur and Mise en Scene'. 
Recent Works on French Colonialism”, in The Historical Journal, 45/4, 2002, pp.917-936.
105 Bui Huy KJhoat, “Impact o f European Integration on Vietnam”, in Viet Nam Economic Review, 7/61, 
1999, p.4.
106 Guy Martin, “France and Africa”, in Aldrich and Connell 89:115. France is Algeria’s largest trading 
partner, and there were 20,000 French residents in Cote d’Ivoire that had to be evacuated during the 
violence o f 2002-2003. Small wonder that France is often called the ''''Gendarme o f Africa”. See Rachel 
Utley, “’Not to do less but to do better...’: French military policy in Africa”, International Affairs, 78/1, 
2002, pp. 129-146.
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were Soviet-educated and Vietnam has not changed its long habit of buying weapons
• 107mainly from Russia, eg. the acquisition in 1995 of 12 SU-27 fighter jets.
After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the shrinking domestic markets for arms 
in the US and Europe obliged the major arms makers to concentrate their attention in 
new markets. France was already a major arms supplier to the four major arms markets 
in Southeast Asia which was dominated by US hardware - Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, but it was practically non-existent in the Soviet and Chinese-
10Rdominated Indochinese arms markets. France made its first breakthrough in 
substantial military sales to an East Asia country when it won a deal to deliver Mirage 
200-5 fighters to Taiwan (chapter four).
One might expect Vietnam to have an ideological resistance to the presence of 
foreign troops after its recent half-century history of repeated foreign interventions and 
protracted wars with France, the US, China, and its unpleasant experience with 
overbearing Soviet advisors and their military presence in Cam Ranh Bay (1979-2002). 
However, increased military relations between France and Vietnam cannot be 
discounted once Vietnam’s economic weapons acquisition capability rises, and since the 
Russian navy has vacated Cam Ranh Bay -  once the Soviet Union’s largest foreign base 
outside the Warsaw Pact - after its lease ran out in May 2002.109
c) Leveraging on the EU
In the security field, France found it more useful to leverage on the EU to extend 
aid to post-war reconstruction in Cambodia. Likewise, in security dialogues like the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), where the EU is represented by the Commission and 
the EU Presidency (the French and British demarches for separate membership 
notwithstanding). Substantive French military relations in East Asia are much stronger 
with Taiwan and other Southeast Asian states. French defence equipment sales to 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia were gaining in importance in the 1990s. There have been
107 See Sergounin and Subbotin, Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s, SIPRI Research 
Report No. 15, New York: Oxford UP, 1997, pp. 105-106.
108 Russ Swinnerton, “The strategic environment and arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia”, in Bates and 
Mak (eds), Arms Transparency and Security in Southeast Asia, SIPRI Research Report No. 13, 1997, 
pp.35, 101-140.
109 Interview with senior Vietnamese official, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Institute o f International 
Relations (HR), Hanoi, 17 January 2003, who opined that military relations were still undeveloped 
because French weapons were “trop chers”.
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far more concrete military cooperation activities and contacts between French troops 
and Malaysian and Indonesian peace-keepers in Bosnia since 1995, and with the 
Singapore Air Force in southwest France since 1998.
In contrast to French activism in politically engaging Vietnam in dialogue, EU 
policies focused on containing and isolating Vietnam in the 1980s. One underlying 
objective of the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement in 1980 was to contain potential 
Vietnamese hegemonic ambitions in the Southeast Asian region, given that the defeat of 
the United States in 1975 and Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 had increased 
regional insecurity and raised the credibility of alternatives to capitalist ffee-market 
modes of development.110 Although diplomatic relations between the EU and Vietnam 
were normalized in November 1990, the EU’s 2002 Country Strategy Paper hardly 
mentions Vietnam’s political relevance to the EU.
The EU’s support for the post-war establishment of democratic governments in 
East Asia have helped contribute to peace and security in the region. The largest two 
operations have been the UN mandates in Cambodia and East Timor, where the EU was 
heavily involved in finance, election monitoring, constitution-drafting, etc. The first 
EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting in recent years was held in Vientiane in December 
2000.111
French participation in the resolution of conflicts in Indochina has been indirect, 
either through diplomatic pressures on the parties concerned, or through the carrots of 
aid, regime recognition or election monitoring. In these instances, France has preferred 
to work in a larger framework of the EU where more resources could be raised and 
committed. In Cambodia in 1992-93, for example, the EU’s role was not only in 
conflict prevention and crisis management, but also in post-war reconstruction and 
return to civilian life for the ex-combatants.112 Even after the French role as host for the 
1991 Paris Peace agreements ended, France continued to be an active player in 
Cambodian affairs. France was intimately involved in UNTAC’s nation-building 
programme in Cambodia -  two-thirds of French military cooperation funds in Asia are
110 Hazel Smith 2002: 200
111 COM(2001), “Europe and Asia”, p. 14.
112 Chris Patten, Politique Etrangere, July-September 2001, p.650.
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today still channelled to Cambodia.113 In the stand-off after Hun Sen launched a coup 
d ’etat against First Prime Minister Rannarridh in 1997, Rannarridh sought refuge in 
France after the putsch while Sam Rainsy and leaders o f other anti-Hun Sen Cambodian 
factions continue to lobby the government in Paris to bear directly and through the EU 
on Hun Sen.
The EU has begun attempts to speak with one voice to Vietnam. Since 1999, 
meetings between the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and the EU “Troika” in Hanoi (ie. 
Head o f EC Delegation+Ambassadors o f current and former EU Presiding country). 
The EU Troika also meets with the Vice-Ministers o f  the Ministries o f Foreign Affairs, 
Internal Security and Justice, to raise their concerns about human rights abuses in 
V ietnam .114 Excluded from these discussions however, are cases o f clergy (whether 
Buddhist or Catholic) who “overstep” their bounds by engaging in political activities.115
Overall Trends
Grid 6.2 European Political-Strategic Positions in Vietnam, 1985-2002
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a In 1985, EC countries had recognized the communist government o f  Vietnam but relations were tense 
during this phase o f  the “Second Cold War”. The USSR has invaded Afghanistan and the EC was critical 
o f  Vietnam’s treaty o f  friendship with the USSR and its military intervention in Cambodia. 
b France was exceptional in keeping very close relations with Vietnam during its decade o f  diplomatic 
isolation (1979-89). It kept open relations with all four Cambodian factions (including the Vietnamese- 
backed Heng Samrin/Hun Sen regime). Vietnam took part in the first Francophonie summit (Paris, 1986). 
c The resolution o f  the Cambodian conflict in 1991 led quickly to Vietnam’s integration in the 
international community. Diplomatic relations with the EC were established in 1990. Mitterrand made 
the first-ever visit by a French President to Vietnam in 1993.
d In 1997, Hanoi hosted the Francophonie summit (the first in Asia), and a state visit by Chirac. 
e EC-Vietnam Cooperation Agreement (1995); Vietnam in EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement (1999). 
f President Tran Due Luong made the first-ever Vietnamese state visit to France in Oct 2002.
113 Interview with Emmanuel Farcot, French Embassy First Secretary, Hanoi, 21 January 2003.
114 Interview with Ambassador Fr&teric Baron, Head o f  EC Delegation in Hanoi, 16 January 2003.
1,5 Interview with Baron, and Michele Sauteraud, French Embassy Deputy Chief o f  Mission, Hanoi, 21 
January 2003. The case o f  Father Ly, a Catholic priest imprisoned for fanning dissent, was not raised by 
the EU. Interestingly, the Vatican chose to ignore Father Ly’s case during DPM Vu Khoan’s visit to 
Rome in 2002.
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In summary, France throughout the 1980s and 1990s enjoyed a very strong 
bilateral relationship with Vietnam, reinforced by colonial history, longstanding 
economic interests, family ties, and nostalgic, post-colonial goodwill. Through 
mediating the resolution of the 1965-1975 “American War”, and 1979-89 Cambodian 
Conflict,116 the French were motivated by the goals of national prestige and ensuring a 
rentree for French political, economic and cultural influence in Indochina. French has 
to a large extent succeeded in achieving these goals on its own, and is unlikely to submit 
its close political and security ties with Vietnam to an over-arching EU framework. 
Throughout the 1980s and along the lines of current French relations with Algeria, 
France enjoyed particularly close political relations with the Vietnamese government, 
and French economic interests in Vietnam were far greater than any other Western 
country save Japan. Paris maintained close relations with Hanoi when many other 
countries froze relations, and helped Vietnam to “break the ice” during its most difficult 
period of international isolation in the decade 1980-1990 when it could not access IMF,
117World Bank and ADB funds. The importance of France to Vietnam following 
Vietnam’s international integration since 1995 has decreased.
In contrast, EU Member States and the Commission have not been enthusiastic 
about developing political dialogue with Vietnam since the Vietnamese withdrawal 
from Cambodia in 1989. the EU established diplomatic relations with Vietnam only in 
1990, and the EC-ASEAN relations established in 1980 were originally a united anti- 
Communist front against perceived Vietnamese and Soviet aggression. French support 
was instrumental in the passage of the EC-Vietnam Cooperation Agreement in 1995. 
Without French support, it is unlikely that a common political EU approach to Vietnam 
can be formulated beyond the least common denominator of declaratory diplomacy on 
good neighbourliness within ASEAN, cooperation in international for a such as 
ASEAN-EU relationship and ASEM.
116 The French and Vietnamese terms for the two wars are Guerre d ’Indochine americaine (better known 
in the US as the “Vietnam War”) and the Cambodian conflict.
117 Interview with senior Vietnamese official, HR, Hanoi, 17 January 2003.
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III Human Rights
Part III of this chapter would argue that France has played a critical role in the 
elaboration of the EU’s human rights position on Vietnam. First, France has adopted an 
“Algerian” approach by avoiding public confrontations with Vietnam over human rights 
abuses. This policy has been steadfastly adhered to since Vietnam’s withdrawal from 
Cambodia in 1989, the last major diplomatic bone of contention between France and 
Vietnam. Second, although French governments and civil groups have historically been 
particularly concerned and vocal about the rights of religious groups and ethnic 
minorities in Vietnam, these concerns have in the 1990s been overtaken and deflected 
by the rapid economic growth facilitated by doi moi. Arguments put forward by 
Vietnamese governments that the goal of meeting economic and social rights are a 
major achievement of Vietnam over the last decade have resonance in Paris, even 
among the most vocal anti-Hanoi Viet kieu organisations.
a) French criticism of Vietnam’s human rights
The French government’s position on human rights in the Indochinese countries, 
as nowhere else in Asia, is informed by a large and vocal domestic constituency that 
follows human rights developments closely. The most consistently vocal foreign critics 
of the Hanoi government have been anti-communist Viet kieu (Overseas Vietnamese) 
organizations, especially those founded by disaffected Vietnamese forced to flee their 
homeland in 1975 and 1979 following the communist unification of the two Vietnams, 
and the anti-capitalist purges in 1978-79. 118 The 300,000-strong Viet kieu community in 
France - the second largest overseas Vietnamese community in the world after the one 
million Viet kieu in the US -  counts among its ranks some of the oldest, most well 
organized and staunchly anti-Hanoi Viet kieu groups. They have on several occasions 
been successful in mobilizing French public opinion and highly publicized 
demonstrations against political and religious repression in Vietnam.
For the first half of most the 20th century, France promoted human rights in the 
metropole but was dismissive of human rights abroad and in its colonies. Like Britain, 
the French resisted the ideas of human rights, nationalism and self-determination, for 
fear that they may “make the natives restless in their far-flung colonial domains.” For
118 See Dorais, “Vietnamese communities in Canada, France and Denmark”.
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that reason, France and Britain they squashed a proposal made by Haiti at the League of 
Nations in 1934 for a treaty to guarantee the human rights of ethnic minorities.119 
Conscious of having violated norms of human rights and just war itself during its 
colonial occupation and war with the Viet Minh, France refrained from taking a critical 
human rights position on Vietnam until 1975, when Vietnam was unified by the 
communists. The end of the Vietnam War was followed by the passage of the 
Declaration Against Torture by the UN General Assembly, which was inspired by the 
mass tortures in Chile under Pinochet.120 In 1976, the twin Covenants of the UN 
entered into force and President Carter made human rights a US foreign policy objective 
in 1977.
In the context of these international human rights developments, the French 
government adopted a critical policy towards Vietnam’s human rights record throughout 
the 1980s. This was not only because of the sizeable French Vietnamese community 
following developments in the newly united Vietnam. Socialist governments under 
Mitterrand were particularly interested in human rights and had made the promotion of 
Third World solidarity and human rights a major plank of their foreign policy (chapter 
three). Thirdly, French governments were faced with an international “boat people” 
crisis directly related to the Vietnamese government’s post-reunification policies (“re­
education” of officials linked with the Saigon regime, state appropriation of private 
property, persecution of Chinese-Vietnamese, etc), as well as Vietnam’s invasion of 
another ex-French colony, Cambodia, in 1979. That year, the Vietnam Committee on 
Human Rights in Paris (Comite Vietnam), launched an international campaign in 
support of the Vietnamese “boat people”, a human tragedy in which a million boat 
people perished in the South China Sea trying to flee economic hardship, political 
repression and “re-education camps” at home. This campaign was supported by French 
intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron, and became one of the focal 
points in the international outcry over Vietnamese government policies and conditions 
that had caused this massive exodus.
119 This was the only reference to the subject in the League’s history before its demise at the onset o f the 
Second World War. See Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle fo r  Global Justice, 
2nd ed., London: Penguin, 2002, p.22.
120 Robertson 2002:45.
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To legitimise its position with the UN after its overthrow of the Khmer Rouge 
government in Phnom Penh, Vietnam acceded to the ICCPR, ICESR and the 
conventions relating to women, children, genocide and racial discrimination in 1981-82. 
However, its engagement with the UN human rights system was at best at “arm’s 
length”.121 It is no wonder that Foreign Minister Dumas lectured the Vietnamese 
leadership on human rights during two visits to Vietnam in 1990-91, and Mitterrand in 
his 1993 state visit, urged the Vietnamese leadership to adapt to a new post-Cold War 
world in which “liberties long suppressed were becoming expressed everywhere...and 
the respect of human rights has become a universal demand”.122
The Vietnamese community in France comprises many members who are 
stridently critical of the communist-controlled country they fled in 1975.123 Pressure 
groups like the Comite Vietnam and Reporters sans Frontieres regularly organise 
demonstrations when Vietnamese leaders visit Paris. Occasionally, large demonstrations 
occur in tandem with developments in Vietnam.
Vietnam entered the Asian values debate in 1993 at the Bangkok Regional 
Preparatory Meeting to the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in the summer 
of that year.124 Unlike the authoritarian governments in Malaysia and Singapore (the 
intellectual gurus of Asian values) -  who were self-confident and justified their 
authoritarian methods as necessary for economic growth and social cohesion, however, 
Vietnam’s entry to the debate was a defensive reaction to popular demands for greater 
religious freedom and self-expression. A large Buddhist protest movement had grown in 
momentum since 1992, set off by the funeral of the United Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam’s (UBVC) Patriach Thich Don Hau on 3 May that year. On 24 May 1993, a 
massive protest involving 40,000 Buddhists -  the largest since 1975 -  was held in the 
ancient capital of Hue when Thic Tri Tuu, head of a Buddhist temple in Hue, launched a 
hunger strike to protest against the authorities’ strong-handed tactics in ordering him to 
deny that a Buddhist had immolated himself at the temple.125 The authorities were
121 Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics o f  Human Rights in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 2002, p.72.
122 Le Monde, 11 February 1993.
123 Le Monde, 28 June 1993. The Vietnamese Embassy in Paris estimated that the Vietnamese 
community in France (including French nationals o f Vietnamese descent) numbered over 400,000. 
Source: interview with Counsellor in Vietnamese Embassy, Paris, June 1996.
124 Vo Van Ai 2000: 92 and 101.
125 The most famous case of self-immolation was that by the monk Thich Quang Due on 11 June 1963, 
which provoked worldwide protests against the US-supported Ngo Diem Dien government o f South
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unprepared for a popular challenge of such a magnitude, and a lively discussion
1 9Afollowed with hundreds of articles on human rights in the media. The France-based 
Vietnamese Congregation in Europe organised a demonstration at the Trocadero in
197Paris in conjunction with Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s visit in June 1993, while the
198Comite Vietnam demonstrated at the Place de la Concorde.
Vietnam has always denied holding political detainees, maintaining that 
dissidents -  mainly Buddhists and intellectuals who question the Communist Party’s 
absolute monopoly of power -  are common criminals. Among the first dissidents in 
the post-1975 era were twelve Buddhist monks and nuns who immolated themselves at 
Duoc Su Pagoda in Vietnam in November 1975 to protest against violations of religious 
freedom.129
Non-governmental human rights groups and newspaper columnists have 
constantly drawn attention to the government’s repression and discrimination of
1 90Vietnam’s ethnic minorities, religious groups and political dissidents. Human Rights 
Watch, for example released a report in April 2002 detailing continued religious 
restriction, land disputes and violence against the Montagnard people, a hill tribe of 
Dega protestants in Vietnam’s central highlands. The Montagnards’ grievances erupted 
into demonstrations in February 2001 which resulted in the authorities sending in 
troops.131 Human Rights Watch claimed that the government’s own policy of 
encouraging large-scale migration by majority Vietnamese Kinh people from the 
overcrowded northern provinces to the Montagnards’ ancestral homelands, has 
increased disputes over access to land and scarce resources.
b) Constructive engagement after 1994
In parallel with the French approach to human rights in China, the principled 
Mitterrand-Dumas position gave way after 1994 to a pragmatic dialogue constructif
Vietnam. See Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy (eds), The politics o f  human rights in East Asia, London: 
Pluto, 2001, p.l 14. The Unified Buddhist Church o f Vietnam (UBCV), established in 1951 and prominent 
in the anti-war movement o f the 1960s, was outlawed in 1981 when the government created the official 
Vietnam Buddhist Church as an umbrella organization for Buddhists.
126 Vo Van Ai 101.
127 Le Monde, 25 June 1993.
128 Le Monde, 26 June 1993.
129 Vo Van Ai, “Human Rights and Asian Values in Vietnam”, in Jacobsen and Bruun, 2000:97.
130 Olivier Todd and Van Ton Tran, “Indochine: Vive un Vietnam libre!”, Le Monde, 10 February 1993.
131 BBC news website, “Vietnam criticized over hill tribe rights”, 23 April 2002.
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under-written by political and economic objectives. This policy change can be
attributed to the new conservative government in France, especially after Jacques
Chirac’s election as President in 1995. It was facilitated by positive developments on
the ground: the 1992 constitutional reform in Vietnam gave greater prominence to
individual rights, and almost all known officials of the Saigon regime held continuously
1since 1975 without trial for “re-education”, were released. Meanwhile, France may
lack the moral authority after its about-turn on China in 1997 (chapter 4) and it has itself
been the target of human right criticism by NGOs and even European institutions for
1 ^serious human rights shortcomings, especially in its judicial process.
Chirac’s approach to the human rights question in Vietnam is characterized by a 
“constructive approach” based on the “China model” (see chapter four) which consists 
of a philosophical dialogue on human rights with repressive regimes but no overt 
pressure for change. France had pressured Vietnam on human rights up to Vietnam’s 
accession to ASEAN (in 1995), but this has since become a non-issue.134 During his 
November 1997 state visit to Vietnam, Chirac argued that “globalisation leads to a 
certain harmonization of political ideas” and suggested that France need not lecture or 
put the human rights spotlight on Vietnam:
A long experience has shown me that there is a total incompatibility between 
mediatisation and efficacy....concerning human rights, it is not in making 
impetuous declarations, by arrogance, by humiliating others that a solution can 
be found. It is through the capacity of explaining and convincing, by the 
medium of dialogue... .This is a capacity I have.135
Interestingly, this sanguine expectation of peaceful change and political 
development in China and Vietnam is reminiscent of that held by senior statesman Lee 
Kuan Yew, Singapore’s ex-Prime Minister who is held in high esteem and regularly
1 7 Aconsulted as Chirac’s “guru” on Asian affairs.
132 HRW 93:193.
133 Amnesty International Report (henceforth AI) 2000:103-105. In 1999, the European Court o f Human 
Rights found France guilty o f torture and excessively long judicial proceedings, which breached 
international norms of preventive detention
134 Interview with senior Vietnamese official, HR, Hanoi, 17 January 2003,
135 Le Monde, “Droits de l’Homme: On ne gagne pas par l’arrogance”, and Le Figaro, “Visite d’Etat du 
President franfais: Chirac se felicite de la confiance renforcee”, 14 November 1997. My translation.
136 See Lee Kuan Yew’s views on developments in Asia in a detailed interview by Patrice de Beer, 
“Singapour: un entretien avec l’ancien Premier ministre”, Le Monde, 12 June 1993.
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Human rights issues threatened to overshadow Chirac’s visit when five days 
before Chirac’s state visit and the Francophonie summit in 1997, international attention 
was turned on the clash between 10,000 Catholic protestors and police in the southern
1^7
province of Dong Nai over state seizure of religious lands. French television channel 
T F l’s celebrity news reporter Patrick Poivre d’Arvor (“PPDA”) further embarrassed the 
French and Vietnamese governments by conducting clandestine interviews documenting 
human rights abuses in Vietnam. Filming was done in collaboration with the Director 
of Reporters sans Frontieres, who accompanied PPDA to Vietnam, and featured 
interviews with former political prisoners as well as the wife of a professor then jailed 
for expressing contrary political opinions. PPDA’s 41/2-minute documentary was 
televised in France despite the Vietnamese authorities’ confiscation of some of PPDA’s 
footage.
This laissez-faire attitude in France is an important reason for the lack of human 
rights interest in Vietnam by the EU: there is no member state (especially a member 
state with strong historical ties) which consistently “champions” the cause of human 
rights in Vietnam. This is in stark contrast to the case of Britain and the Netherlands in 
Myanmar, Portugal in East Timor, or France (1989-1993), Britain, the Netherlands and 
several Nordic member states (especially Denmark from 1994) in China. The French 
approach to human rights in Vietnam has informed the EU’s declared objective of 
“constructive engagement”, which is juxtaposed with the imposition of negative 
sanctions and the American penchant for the application of raw power:
We are now firmly in a post-Cold War world. Countries cannot be put into 
boxes labelled ‘communist’ and ‘capitalist’. Nor can all problems be resolved 
by the application of American power. European foreign policy does not define 
itself by ostracism, embargos and investment bans. We aim to engage in the 
hope of bringing about stability and sustainable development where they are not 
present.138
Today, the French government does not make an issue of the human rights 
situation in Vietnam. This is despite the French Senate’s recognition in a March 2000 
report which noted that the rights to freedom of expression, the press, association, 
demonstration and religion in Vietnam’s new Constitution of 1992 “still remained
137 BBC news website, “France wants to return to ‘Indochine’”, 12 November 1997.
138 Chris Patten, Tokyo, 19 July 2000, Speech 00/276.
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theoretical even if some relaxation of limited effect occurred in the last two years in the
11Q »domains of human rights and religious freedom...”. During President Tran Due 
Luong’s historic October 2002 state visit to France, human rights were “not at all 
discussed” in Luong’s meetings with Chirac, the Presidents of the National Assembly 
and Senate, and Prime Minister Raffarin.140
c) The EU and constructive dialogue
In the light of wanton human rights abuses in Vietnam documented by numerous 
NGOs, government and journalists, the absence of a clear EU human rights position in 
Vietnam, is conspicuous. The ban on NGOs and even human rights fact-finding mission 
in Vietnam, and the absence of a human rights regime - even of the declaratory kind in 
Asia - has made it incumbent on external state actors to take up the human rights cause 
in repressive countries such as Vietnam.141 While no international regime on human 
rights existed in 1945, by 1985, this had become a strong promotional regime 
underpinned by two important documents at the UN. The regional regime in Europe 
had developed into an enforcement regime by 1985, and is the most institutionalised 
human rights regime in the world, with strong monitoring and enforcement power. It is 
usually regarded as a successful example of regional cooperation over human rights 
protection by a group of like-minded states which share a common cultural tradition. 
The EU has even made the promotion of human rights world wide one of its chief 
foreign policy goals.142 The EC-Vietnam Framework Cooperation Agreement signed in 
July 1995 contained a Human Rights Article143 (in contrast a third generation EC- 
ASEAN Cooperation Agreement could not be concluded because ASEAN rejected the 
human rights conditionality).
139 French Senate (Caldagues 2000), pp.4-5.
140 Interview with a senior Vietnamese official who was a member o f Luong’s delegation, Hanoi, 17 
January 2003. MAE, “Visite d’Etat du president de la Republique socialiste du Vietnam, M. Tran Due 
Luong”, 06/11/02, reported that “a list o f persons detained or under house arrest whose situation was o f  
concern to France and the European Union” was transmitted to the Vietnamese authorities. This was 
probably done at a low level, and discreetly.
141 Human rights regimes can be classified as declaratory, promotional, implementation, and enforcement 
regimes. See Tang 95:191 and Jack Donnelly 89:224.
142 See Karen Smith’s “The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy”, in Jan Zielonka, (ed), 
Paradoxes o f  European Foreign Policy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998; and “The EU, 
Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: Foreign Policy with an Ethical Dimension?", in Smith 
and Light (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
143 Commission o f the European Communities, EC-Vietnam Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, 
Brussels, 15 May 2002.
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The EU’s profile on the human rights situation in Vietnam is thus surprisingly 
muted in contrast to the positions it has taken on Asian countries such as China, 
Myanmar, Indonesia, East Timor and even Malaysia (in 1997 over Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s detention). The Vietnamese government is regularly cited by 
human rights NGOs as one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Although the 
Vietnamese defended their 1979 invasion of Cambodia as humanitarian and necessary 
to depose a very brutal regime (Pol Pot’s), they have been extremely sensitive to foreign 
criticisms of their own human rights record. The CPV’s Party Secretary Le Kha Phieu 
revealed much of the leadership’s tough view on human rights when he stated at a party 
plenum in August 1999 that “any ideas to promote ‘absolute democracy’, to put human 
rights above sovereignty, or support multiparty or political pluralism...are lies and 
cheating.”144 The EU has been playing a very low-key role in human rights protection in 
Vietnam. It has limited itself to raising human rights concerns on issues of religious 
freedom and the rights of ethnic minorities, and refrained from criticising the 
Vietnamese government on the detention of citizens for political dissent.145 To 
investigate an alleged human rights violation, the EU requires that at least two 
independent NGOs can attest to the alleged abuse, and that the Council of Ministers 
agrees on a common approach to deal with the matter.146 The EU has also tried to tie its 
aid to progress on the human rights front, but has usually backed down despite evidence 
of human rights deterioration.
By projecting its national preference of a quiet approach to human rights in 
Vietnam to the EU arena, France has caused the “levelling down” of the EU’s human 
rights position and effectiveness in Vietnam. Unlike the French turnaround on China at 
the UN CHR in 1997 (chapter 4), the EU has not had to face an acrimonious, publicized 
internal debate or outcry from NGOs and other state actors concerned with human rights 
on its compliant attitude towards Vietnam. However the stakes for many oppressed 
ethnic peoples, religious groups and political dissidents are just as high. Although 
Vietnam was in 1995 the first ASEAN country to enter into a third-generation 
Cooperation Agreement (ie. one containing human rights conditionalities) with the EU,
144 Human Rights Watch World Report (henceforth HRW) 2000: 218.
145 Chris Patten, “Religious Freedom in Vietnam”, Commission statements in urgency debates, by 
External Relations Commissioner in the European Parliament, Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 5 July 2001, 
SPEECH/01/33.
146 Interview with Michele Sauteraud, French Embassy Deputy Chief o f Mission, Hanoi, 21 January 2003.
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the EU has taken no concrete action on blatant human rights abuses in Vietnam over the 
last decade.147
It has fallen on individual EU governments, especially those of the Nordic 
countries, and the European Parliament, to take up the cause of human rights in 
Vietnam. Denmark for example has made its aid conditional on human rights
148progress. Since 1992, Vietnam has increasingly engaged in dialogue on human rights 
issues at inter-state level as well as with other parties, including the British Minister of 
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the Human Rights Coordinator of the 
German Foreign Ministry, and the Executive Director of Asia Watch.149 The Swedish 
government’s intervention made possible a meeting between Amnesty International 
representatives and Vietnamese officials during a Vietnamese delegation’s visit to 
Sweden in January 1999.150 In June 1999, prior to a mid-term review of donor aid in 
Haiphong, the German Ambassador to Vietnam pushed on behalf of the EU presidency 
for economic and social reforms, and expressed concerns about political prisoners and 
restrictions on press and religious groups. Similarly, when Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai visited Finland in September during the Finnish presidency, the Finnish prime 
minister raised issues of human rights, judicial reform, and treatment of dissidents.151
Several major steps backwards were taken by the government in 2000-2001, the
th25 anniversary of Vietnam’s unification. Concerns were raised by Commissioner for 
External Relations Chris Patten in a meeting with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister in 
July 2001. Individual EU states also expressed their concerns, eg the Swedish Foreign 
Minister with CPV General Secretary Nong Due Manh, over human rights and greater 
freedom of the press, during a visit in Hanoi that same month.152 He even broached the 
topic of a multiparty system. After an EC meeting in Hanoi in November, an EC 
spokesman said that Vietnam had made some progress on human rights conditions but 
still had a long way to go. Meanwhile several EU statesmen became the subject of some
147 For critical analyses o f the EU’s human rights effectiveness in its common foreign policy and 
development cooperation activities, see respectively articles by Andrew Clapham (Ch. 19) and Bruno 
Simma et al (Ch. 18) in Alston 99.
148 Andres Krab-Johansen, “Human Rights in Danish Development Aid”, in Human Rights in Developing 
Countries 1995, The Hague: Kluwer Law/Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1996, pp. 15-28.
149 Maria Lundberg, “Vietnam”, in Human Rights in Developing Countries 1997, Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p.328. (pp.321-376)
150 AI 2000:261.
151 HRW 2000:219.
152 HRW 2002:258, 2001:230.
242
Europeanization & French Policy in East Asia Six / Vietnam
controversy after visiting dissidents in Vietnam. Lars Rise of the Norwegian opposition 
Christian People’s Party was detained and deported from Vietnam after visiting several 
dissidents. In June, Italian MEP Olivier Dupuis was expelled after he tried to stage a 
sit-in at the monastery where Thich Quang Do, a celebrated dissident, lived under house 
arrest.153
The EU is Vietnam’s second largest aid donor and has considerable potential 
leverage over the Vietnamese government. In July 2001, the EP adopted an emergency 
resolution on religious freedom in Vietnam and denounced the persecution of several 
religious leaders and ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands. Yet in East Asia, the 
Commission considers that only extremely authoritarian and anti-democratic countries 
such as Myanmar are deemed as “regimes whose behaviour towards their own people 
makes engagement impossible for us.”154
In their defence of curtailing individual liberties, the Vietnamese regime 
emphasizes its success in spectacularly improving economic and social rights over the 
last decade- a similar line of argument adopted by the authoritarian governments of 
ASEAN (eg. Malaysia and Singapore) in the ‘Asian values’ debate. EU governments 
find it difficult to criticize Vietnam on human rights grounds because of the success of 
Vietnam’s economic transformation, which has lifted the country from abject poverty in 
the 1970s and 1980s to satisfying basic economic and social rights in the 1990s.155
Overall Trends
At the end of the 1990s, the EU Member States and the Commission have not 
been able to coordinate their human rights policies towards Vietnam, despite calls from 
pressures groups, the EP and NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch to pressure the Vietnamese government for its human rights abuses. The Nordic 
countries (chiefly Denmark and Sweden, which together give more ODA than France) 
are the only ones to have picked up the human rights cause in Vietnam, and they have 
stressed to the Vietnamese that human rights improvements are tied to their aid 
programmes.
153 HRW 2002:264.
154 Patten 2000.
155 Interview with Mark McLachlan, British Embassy Deputy Chief o f Mission, Hanoi, 21 January 2003.
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Grid 6.3 European Human Rights Positions in Vietnam, 1985-2001
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a Mitterrand-Dumas policy throughout the 1980s critical of Vietnam’s human rights record and 
occupation of Cambodia, many demonstrations in Paris criticizing Vietnamese government and the 
tragedy of the “boat people”.
b June 1993 protests involving 40,000 Buddhists in Hue, the largest popular demonstration in Vietnam 
since 1975, spark off demonstrations in Paris during PM Vo Van Kiet’s visit. French government calls 
for greater religious freedom.
cGerman EU Presidency warns Vietnam against backtracking on human rights at Donor conference in 
Haiphong, amidst signs of human rights degradation and increased controls coinciding with the 25th 
anniversary o f Vietnam’s unification.
In the late 1990s and after 2000, French human rights and even anti-Hanoi Viet 
kieu organizations have lost much of their fervour and reason to criticise Hanoi since it 
has performed so well in achieving economic growth and general welfare. Some would 
argue that Vietnam has done very well in some aspects of human rights. It is highly 
regarded for the protection of children’s and women’s rights, as well as for its record on 
economic and education rights.156 Many overseas Vietnamese, including those who fled 
after the fall of Saigon in 1975, are returning to Vietnam to take part in its economic 
boom.157
Conclusions
The EU’s impact on French policy in Vietnam is minimal. Political elites still 
cling to a notion of relations priviligiees with Vietnam and can demonstrate that France 
gains economic and political benefits from these close political ties. Half a century after 
Dien Bien Phu and 30 years after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords that ended America’s 
Vietnam War and devastated South Vietnam’s independence, the psychological trauma
156 Christie and Roy 2001:122. The rate of Vietnamese women’s participation in national politics ranks 
among the highest of any nation in the world. See United Nations, The World’s Women 2000: Trends 
and Statistics, New York, 2000, pp. 165.
157 Christie and Roy 2001:121.
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of French decolonisation in Asia has all but become a forgotten footnote in French 
history. France is again investing considerable political and economic resources on 
Vietnam as a strategic base for larger French political, economic and strategic interests 
in East Asia. France promotes itself as Vietnam’s best friend in the West and 
unapologetically uses the EU and multilateral frameworks such as ASEM and the 
ASEAN-EU to pursue national goals. Although French policy makers accept that 
France is unable to play an independent role in Indochina as it did from 1979 up to
| fO
1991, France makes generous investments in the promotion of the French language 
and culture in a country where hardly 1% of the population speaks French. They target 
specific sectors of a rapidly growing population where English has become the 
dominant foreign language not only in the universities, but also in Vietnam’s dealings 
with its neighbours in ASEAN, in business, and with the wider world.
The weight of history, the large Overseas Vietnamese community in France, and 
a sentimental nostalgia for French Indochina make Vietnam a special priority case for 
French foreign policy, on a level similar to, though not as intimate or complex as French 
relations with the far more francophone Maghreb countries.159 This sort of “privileged 
relationship” in Southeast Asia is of course, not unique to France. Britain maintains a 
nominal defence arrangement with Malaysia and Singapore (which includes Australia 
and New Zealand), and a strong economic presence in Hong Kong and Brunei. Portugal 
has maintained close links with Timorese leaders (then exiles) and supported an 
independent East Timor since the island territory’s invasion and annexation by 
Indonesia in 1975. If a “special relationship” must involve reciprocal and long-term 
commitment and feelings of close affinity between both governments and populations, 
then France-Vietnam relations fall short of this definition chiefly because close relations 
were confined to the political-diplomatic sphere, lasted only some 10 years (1979- 
1989), and were driven by one side (the French). The utility of France to Vietnam has 
diminished after the Paris Peace Accords, and especially after its diplomatic isolation
158 Interview with Sylvie Bermann, Director of Quai d’Orsay PESC Directorate, September 1999. 
Bermann opined that the French position on Cambodia at the Paris Peace conference in 1991 was “one o f  
the last occasions” France took an important international position without consulting its EU partners.
159 Unlike Indochina’s status as French a colony, Algeria was absorbed as a French departement and mass 
migration was encouraged. At the end of the Algerian War in 1962, over a million white French settlers 
(pieds noirs) had to be repatriated to mainland France. The size o f the Franco-Algerian population, 
estimated at 2 million, is about six times that o f the Franco-Vietnamese. Chirac’s visit to Algiers in March 
2003 was the first state visit by a serving French president since Algeria’s independence and the cheering 
welcome o f half a million people that greeted him was described by Le Monde, 3 March 2003, as 
“triumphal”.
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was broken in 1995 when it joined ASEAN and established full diplomatic relations 
with the United States. In this regard, France has to compete in Vietnam with much 
stronger economic partners (Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc), and entities 
with far great political-strategic importance to Vietnam (ASEAN, China, the US, 
Japan). From Vietnam’s perspective, its partenaires priviligies are its largest trading, 
investment and strategic partners in the region, chiefly Japan, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan.160
As seen in Part I, Europeanization is very weak in the economic sector. French 
polices in Vietnam are formulated with very little reference to common EU goals and 
objectives. France has not sought to “Europeanize” its close relationship with Vietnam, 
preferring to build “privileged relations” with Vietnam and its other two ex-colonies in 
Southeast Asia. French commercial interests still try to maintain privileged relations in 
Vietnam in the belief that this would help them vis-a-vis Japanese, Asian, American and 
other European rivals. In contrast to other Asian countries where Germany is usually 
the dominant EU trading partner and the UK is the largest investor, France in Indochina 
is not only the largest European, but the largest Western source of trade, aid and 
investments. The only economic activities which are Europeanised are those under 
Community competences (eg WTO negotiations for Vietnam’s entry and EU 
Cooperation Agreements).
French aid and investments are predominantly channelled to Vietnam on a 
unilateral level and aimed at achieving French national goals, with little or no EU 
involvement except in the case of giving Vietnam access to cooperation agreements 
under the EC-ASEAN framework or preferred access for Vietnamese goods to the EU 
market.
As seen in Part II, the EU’s five major objectives in East Asia- engaging Asia 
politically and in security; strengthening trade and investment; poverty reduction; 
human rights and the promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law;
160 OxfordAnalytica, “Vietnam: Economic Orientation”, 17 February 1993. The Vietnamese even invited 
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew to act as Vietnam’s economic adviser.
161 See Gill Bates and J.N. Mak (eds), “A de facto arms trade register for South-East Asia, 1975-96”, in 
Arms Transparency and Security in Southeast Asia, SIPRI Research Report No. 13, 1997, pp. 101-140; and 
Russ Swinnerton, “The strategic environment and arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia”, SIPRI Research 
Report No. 13, p. 35.
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and strengthening mutual awareness162; are all goals that fit in with French objectives in 
Vietnam. Vietnam is however, not a priority country in the EU’s economic or political 
objectives in East Asia and is not even specifically mentioned in the Commission’s 
2001 strategy paper. The EC’s 2002-2006 Country Strategy Paper focuses on 
development cooperation activities and makes no reference to Vietnam’s strategic 
relevance in the region or political importance to the EU. In this regard, French efforts 
balance the predominantly aid and development cooperation aims of the EU towards 
Vietnam. Communications with the leadership in Vietnam (as well as in Laos and 
Cambodia) remain open and familiar, even during times of crisis and international 
isolation. Most of the CPV Politburo members are Soviet-trained (some senior cadres 
were trained in the old East Germany). The French hope that their targeted aid in higher 
education and reforms of the state (especially judicial reforms) will in time produce a 
small corps of French-speaking evolues. The plethora of new fora in which France and 
Vietnam dialogue (ASEM, ASEAN-EU meetings, etc) reinforce the strong bilateral 
dialogue, Viet kieu and Francophonie links that the two countries already enjoy. The 
record of recent years, however, shows France preferring that national to the EU option. 
In the security-strategic field, it has been encouraged by its position as a major supplier 
to the four main powers in ASEAN: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and 
important inroads made in terms of defence links with, and high-technology transfer to, 
Taiwan and Singapore.163
As argued in the third part of this chapter, the human rights issue has been 
stymied by France’s “constructive engagement” with Vietnam. As a Pillar II issue, any 
major human rights position on Vietnam has to be decided by consensus between the 
Member States. An important difference between the EU’s engagement policy with 
Vietnam and its confrontational policy towards Burma (both ASEAN member states 
cited by NGOs as among the most repressive states in the world) can be traced to the 
success of a major EU Member State in leading the issue and making its national policy 
common EU policy (in both cases led by its ex-colonial power). Also, Vietnam gets 
away with it both because there is no charismatic opposition figure akin to Burma’s 
Aung San Suu Kyi, and because compared to the 1970s, Vietnam has been making
162 COM(2001)469 final, p.3 and Conclusions.
163 Swinnerton, “The strategic environment and arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia”, p. 35.
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steady relative progress and has succeeded in raising the living standards of its people 
(and thus meeting economic and social rights) under doi moi.
French efforts since the 1980s in making a political and economic rentree in 
Vietnam can be considered a qualified success. Over the 1990s, the evidence for 
converging French and EU interests and policies in Vietnam is weak. Convergence was 
strongest when there were external demands for a strong and united EU presence, eg in 
ASEM, in order to counter-balance a perceived excess of US (and growing Chinese) 
influence in the region in the evolving post-Cold War situation in Southeast Asia. 
Second, French and other European foreign-policy making elites were also beginning to 
view the region through more long-term and common lenses. French diplomats 
recognize that France does not have the means to play an appreciable role unilaterally in 
East Asia as the region is too large, too diverse and too far away. Asia continues to be a 
“second-priority” zone to French interests, albeit with Vietnam singled out as a first- 
priority country. Third and related to the point about limited French national capacity, 
the dynamism introduced to EU-East Asia relations under the umbrella of ASEM - one 
of the great achievements of French diplomacy in Asia in the 1990s - was realized only 
through the EU.
Vietnam’s impressive growth rates in the 1990s and its large population of 80 
million make it one of the star economic performers in a Southeast Asia beset by 
economic woes since 1997. in the context of a fast growing Vietnamese economy 
averaging 7-8% per annum between 1986 and 1997, French trade and aid with respect 
to Vietnam are likely to become increasingly framed in the multilateral contexts of the 
ASEAN-EC dialogue and ASEM. If Vietnam does become an economic power like the 
NIEs and an important player in ASEAN, then the vested interests of individual EU 
member states and the EU as a whole in Vietnam would rise. This happened with Japan 
in the 1970s and China in the 1980s. Intra-EU conflict and the need to coordinate 
policy would then be correspondingly greater. In such a context, France will have to 
work within a more Europeanised policy-making sphere, that is, within a framework 
whereby France can leverage on the larger material and political resources afforded by 
the European Union.
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion
Asia in French Foreign Policy
If one of the major and consistent themes of postwar French policy -  especially 
since De Gaulle - has been to reclaim the country’s rank as a great power with a mission 
of projecting specific values, then East Asia with its huge and growing populations, 
rising powers and dynamic economies is one of the areas in which a French absence 
could not be permitted.1 Yet half a century after Dien Bien Phu ignominiously ended 
French colonialism in East Asia, the region remains one in which the French presence is 
weak. Despite bold presidential declarations by De Gaulle in Phnom Penh (1966) and 
Chirac in Singapore (1996), comprehensive bilateral agreements with Japan (1996) and 
China (1997), the French economic, political and cultural presence in Asia still pales in 
comparison to that of the US and the regional powers China, Japan and even Australia.2 
Among the EU countries, Germany and Britain have been far more successful in their 
trade and investment relations with the East Asian economies, with France maintaining 
a lead (albeit diminishing) only in the three small Indochinese economies.
East Asia remains outside the three “circles of priority” of French foreign policy. 
While for Britain the myth of the Commonwealth, the US and Europe represented from 
Churchill onwards Britain’s foreign policy priorities, France identified Europe, the 
Atlantic Alliance and the “Fra«cop/z0rae-Africa-Mediterranean” group (in which 
France’s “Arab policy” and Franqafrique policy operate) as its postwar priorities.3 In 
the 1990s, France’s Asia policy ceased to be what Godement criticized as a “zigzag 
policy”.4 This involved a certain amount of change of direction as priorities varied and 
Asia grew in importance on the radar of French diplomacy.
1 Marie-Christine Kessler and Fr6d6ric Charillon, “France: un ‘rang’ & r^inventer”, in Fr^ddric Charillon 
(ed.), Les Politiques Etrangeres: Ruptures et Continuites, Paris: La Documentation Franpaise, 2001, 
pp. 101-131; Charillon, “Peut-il encore y avoir une politique etrangdre frangaise?”, Politique Etrangere 
4/2002, hiver 2002, pp.915-929; Roy C. MacRidis, “France: the Quest for Rank”, in Foreign Policy in 
World Politics, 8th ed., Englewoods Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992, pp.32-67.
2 Herve Dejean de la Batie, Oil va I'Asie en 2002?, May 2002, on IFRI’s Centre Asie website, 
http://www.ifri.org/f7Centre%20asie/articlesA accessed 9 May 2002.
3 Kessler and Charillon, pp. 113-124.
4 Godement, “Une politique fran^aise pour l’Asie-Pacifique?”, pp.964-966.
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France is unable, by its own national efforts, to come anywhere close to 
matching the great powers in the region. For example, the United States is preponderant 
as a top investor and trading partner of all the dynamic East Asian economies from 
Japan to Singapore. Its military-industrial complex is committed to the region through a 
network of bilateral security alliances (intensified and widened following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001) and a permanent military presence of over 100,000 
soldiers stationed in the region.5 It is also a “soft power” attracting the best students to 
US universities and where English-speaking elites are engaged through APEC. After 
the neglect of earlier decades, French governments in the 1990s actively built ties with 
countries in the region both bilaterally and multilaterally (primarily via the EU).
The dominant scholarship, portraying French foreign policy as nationalistic and 
independent, seems to be in need of extensive qualification, if not revision.6 This 
scholarship, embodied by Stanley Hoffmann since the 1960s, argues that French policy 
remains fundamentally driven by national interests, albeit interests packaged as being 
good for Europe as a whole. If there is any “Europeanization” taking place, it is limited 
only to the bottom-up variety, ie. the second-dimension “National Projection” (chapter 
two) process that seeks to export French preferences and policies onto a European 
platform. In other words, instead of converging towards a real European policy that 
expresses EU-wide goals, aspirations and objectives, any “European policy” promoted 
by France would essentially be an attempt to present the wolf of French interests in a 
European sheep’s clothing.
This perspective of France as an ambitious master of Realpolitik finds echoes in 
academic analyses and political declarations alike, that France should lead in deciding 
what is “good” for Europe and that France essentially seeks to dominate, if not 
“Gallicise” European Foreign policy.7 De Gaulle noted to his junior minister Alain 
Peyrefitte in 1962:
5 Dejean de la Batie, Ou va I ’Asie en 2002?, pp. 11-12.
6 See Stanley Hoffmann’s “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case o f Western 
Europe”, Dcedalus, Summer 1966; “Conclusions”, in Ross, Hoffman and Malzacher (eds), The Mitterrand 
Experiment, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987; “The European Community and 1992”, Foreign Affairs 68/4 
(Fall 1992); “La France dans le Monde 1979-2000”, Politique Etrangere, 2/2000, pp.307-317; also 
Alistair Cole, French Politics and Society, London: Prentice Hall, 1998, p.260.
7 Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, France in the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1998; 
Anand Menon, “France and the IGC o f 1996”, in Journal o f European Public Policy 3/2 (June 1996), 
pp.231-252.
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What is the purpose of Europe? It should be to allow us to escape the 
domination of the Americans and the Russians. The six of us ought to be able to 
do just as well as either of the superpowers. And if France so orders matters to 
be the first among the Six, an aim which is within our reach, she can work this 
lever of Archimedes, and draw her partners after her. Europe is the means for 
France to regain the stature she has lost since Waterloo, as the first among the 
world’s nations.8
“Europe” as a foreign policy instrument fits the National Projection meaning of 
Europeanization examined in chapter two. Admittedly, this bottom-up projection of 
national policy onto a multilateral institutional framework proved effective in the 
French use of the EU to amplify its influence in East Asia. All three case studies 
illustrated the utility of the EU as a “power multiplier” for France. Mitterrand and 
Dumas used the institutions of the EC to augment French national preferences, eg. in 
formulating collective EC sanctions on China in 1989, and in opening EU markets to 
Vietnam after 1991. French governments also used the EC as a cover for protectionist 
measures against Japan through the 1980s.
But the EC/EU did not provide France only with a convenient diplomatic shield 
or amplifier in its national policies in East Asia. The establishment of CFSP in 1991 
intensified expectations of common European action, intensified policy coordination 
and favoured trends and procedures of convergence. Throughout the 1990s, French 
policies have had to be coordinated with collective Commission-defined Country and 
Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs) for Asia in 1994, 1995 and 2001. On a country- 
specific level, French political and human rights objectives had to interact with EU 
CSPs for Japan (1991 and 1995), China (1995, 1998 and 2001) and Vietnam (2001), 
while economic exchanges with China and Vietnam after their respective openings in 
1978 and 1986, were facilitated by Trade and Cooperation Agreements the Commission 
negotiated. French policies have also been influenced by other EU Member States as 
well as other actors in the region (both internal and external): Germany’s 1993 Asian 
Policy and “silent diplomacy” with regard to human rights in China in the early 1990s; 
UK-Japan rapprochement from the late 1980s; the intimate US-Japan political-security- 
economic relationship; and the strong economic and cultural presence of the Asian 
NIEs, Japan and ASEAN in Vietnam following the latter’s opening in 1986.
8 Alain Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle, Paris: Editions de Fallois/Fayard, 1994, p.59 as cited in Meny and 
Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe, 3rd ed., Oxford UP, 1998, p. 369.
251
Europeanization and French Policy in East Asia Conclusion
France’s Asia Policy - what kind of Europeanization?
In the late 1990s, Quai d’Orsay officials could justifiably claim to have 
“Europeanised” a bilateral political dialogue with China by exporting outwards and 
upwards French models of regular high-level political contacts with Chinese leaders.9 
After Chirac’s May 1997 state visit, France called on the EU to engage in a dialogue 
with China rather than confront it over human rights (Chapter 4). The upgrading of 
France-China political dialogue, set out in the 1997 France-China joint declaration, 
provided a model for the EU-China dialogue.10 The 1996 Chirac-Hashimoto “20 
Actions pour Fan 2000” agreement provided a blueprint for the Commission’s own 
2001 Action Plan, while France’s consistent engagement with the Vietnamese regime in 
Hanoi since 1975 and throughout the 1980s was upgraded to the European level when 
the EU signed a TCA with Vietnam in 1995. “Europeanization” in France’s political 
relations with East Asian countries could thus be interpreted as a bottom-up process of 
France projecting its preferences upwards.
While there is good evidence to support claims of French agency in the EU’s 
Asia policy, and success in exporting its preferences in East Asia to the European level,
I would argue that French policy in East Asia has in effect undergone significant 
comergence with the policies of other EU Member States and the Commission (the first 
dimension of Europeanization) and even some convergence of interests and identity (the 
third dimension) as laid out in chapter two.
First, French influence and presence in East Asia had been on a steady decline 
after 1954.11 Militarily, the French were absent except for a dispersed presence on the 
peripheries of the region: in the South Indian Ocean (Mayotte, Reunion) and the South 
Pacific (New Caledonia). The French economic presence in Pacific Asia in the 1980s
9 See Herve de la Batie, La politique chinoise de VUnion europeenne: en progres, mais peut mieux faire, 
on IFRI’s Centre Asie website, http://www.ifri.org/FCentre%20asie/articles/hdb-ue-chine.htm. pp. 1-26, 
accessed 9 May 2002.
10 The EU-China dialogue was upgraded to annual Commission Presidency level summits in March 1998 
- Jacques Santer’s October 1998 visit to China was the first by a Commission President since Jacques 
Delors in 1986.
II France tried to retain as much influence as possible in Indochina after the 1954 Geneva Agreements., 
which recognized the independence o f Laos and Cambodia within the French Union and permitted the 
continuation o f  75,000 French Expeditionary Force troops in South Vietnam until Vietnam-wide elections 
scheduled for 1965. Military pacts with Laos and Cambodia allowed the continued presence of French 
bases in Laos and military advisers in Cambodia. However, the escalation o f the Algerian War and US 
pressure rapidly whittled the French presence by 1960. See Frey, 2000: 20-34.
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was so small that French leaders had to resort to grands contrats to boost statistics on
12French commercial and investment exchanges with the region. Politically, France 
tried to be present in the “grandes negotiations politiques” in the region, and there 
France met some success with its role in the negotiations for US withdrawal from South 
Vietnam in 1973, and Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia in 1991.
Second, the EU’s role and presence in East Asia has grown, in contrast to the 
diminishing profiles of individual Member States and ex-colonial powers in the region. 
From 1991, France was unable to act as a national actor in its own right (witness its 
failure, along with Britain, to win a seat in the ASEAN Regional Forum). It had to 
work through the European Union in the ARF, in ASEM, and in the EU’s dialogues 
with ASEAN, Japan and China. The last European colonies in East Asia were returned 
to China in 1997 (Hong Kong) and 1999 (Macao).
The first two factors are related because the EU is progressively acting as a 
parallel (and sometimes substitute) actor alongside (and sometimes in the place of) 
Member States in the region. Europeanization has thus affected foreign policy 
autonomy. The EU’s China human rights policy at the UNCHR from 1998 could be 
interpreted as a “levelling down” from the perspective of the more hardline states 
(Denmark, Netherlands, UK), a “drastic self-imposed reduction of sovereignty for those
1 3states that might choose to table or co-sponsor a resolution.” It also committed the 
more accommodating “airbus group” (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) to voting against a 
no-action motion. But Europeanization also increased state autonomy by empowering 
states to pursue policies they could not engage in without the institutional protection 
offered by EU structures. In 1989, the EC-12 converged their policies and responded 
to the Tiananmen massacre with a collective sanctions policy as “Europe”. European 
governments had few policy alternatives in the face of outrage in their domestic 
constituencies, and were willing to risk Beijing’s displeasure because they found 
strength behind an institutional edifice. 14 The Mitterrand-Dumas approach was to use 
the EC-12 and collective sanctions to express French outrage at the Chinese authorities. 
By committing the member states to a collective and individual sanctions policy on
12 Domenach, “La Politique fran^aise au miroir de l’Asie”, in La Serre, Leruez and Wallace (eds), Les 
politiques etr anger es de la France et de la Grande Bretagne depuis 1945, Paris, 1990, p.242.
13 Clapham, “The EU’s Human Rights Common Policy”, p.647.
14 See Peter Ferdinand, “Economic and Diplomatic Interactions between the EU and China”, p.31.
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China, the EC served as an “umbrella to reduce the costs of individual sanctions, 
promote credibility and reduce the likelihood of cheating.”15
Trade
From the case studies of China, Vietnam and Japan presented in the preceding 
three chapters, top-down Europeanization has been clearest in the area of trade. The 
Commission took the lead in initiating and negotiating a Common Commercial Policy 
with East Asian countries, ranging from car import agreements with Japan (1991) to 
Trade and Cooperation Agreements (with China in 1978 and 1985; with Vietnam in 
1995) to WTO accession agreements (with China in May 2000). Informed by the ascent 
of economic liberal thinking within the EC with the 1986 Single European Act, French 
foreign economic relations were obliged to adapt to new rules. The Commission’s role 
was key in 1991 in imposing liberal policies on the Member States, effectively opened 
the Single Market to Japanese competition in previously nationally-negotiated protected 
sectors such as VCRs and cars. “Europe” was necessary as an external force to change 
ingrained French economic habits and reflexes.
Of course, French economic positions are not influenced only from above by the 
Commission. There is a great deal of sideways policy learning from other Member 
States, notably from Britain and Germany.16 The economic weakness of France in Asia 
vis-a-vis not only the US and Japan, but also relative to Germany and Britain, was 
addressed only from the late 1980s. Under Chirac’s presidency, French trade policies 
continued moving towards collaboration and the promotion of French exports to Asia in 
tandem with European efforts. The dominant strategy continues to be politically 
motivated grands contrats involving high-value sales such as Airbuses and metro 
systems to China and Singapore, high-speed trains to South Korea, Mirage fighters to 
Taiwan, and military systems to these same countries. But France has also had to work 
through the EU, the Commission and private enterprises in order to encourage French 
SMEs -  the weakest sector of the French economic presence in East Asia -  to go to the 
region.
15 Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1992.
16 Jack Hayward and Jacques Leruez, “Nationalism and the Economy”, in La Serre et al (eds), French and 
British Policies in Transition: The Challenge o f  Adjustment, London: RIIA, 1990, pp.64-95 and 
Christoph Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris face a Pekin (1989-1997): Vers une Strategic commune?”, in 
Politique Etrangere 1/99, 1999, pp.91-106.
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Edged on by policy-learning Europeanization from other EU states, France 
emulated Britain’s cooperative attitude towards the deft japonais, and Germany’s 
pragmatic attitude on delinking trade from human rights in relations with China. If 
France did not always change its attitude or ingrained definitions of its national interests 
(third-dimension Europeanization), it often saw the value of compromise (first- 
dimension Europeanization) and cooperation in promoting collective European interests 
as another means to the same end.
Political Relations
Before 1989, Asia was a very low priority in French foreign policy, which was
i n
concerned mainly with the Cold War, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa. 
China was an exception under de Gaulle when France became the first major western 
country to exchange Ambassadors with China, and had provided its good offices in the 
US-China rapprochement between Kissinger/Nixon and Zhou Enlai/Mao. Asia (and 
China in particular) became important to Gaullist foreign policy when it complemented 
the French desire to regain a role in world affairs independent of the superpowers after 
the triple humiliations of Dien Bien Phu (1954), Suez (1956) and Algeria (1954-62).18 
By the early-1970s however, France had become a normal country with no special 
political, and still less economic privileges in China.19 France had been useful to China 
in the mid-1960s after its break with Moscow, and growing diplomatic isolation by the 
US as a result of the escalating war in Vietnam. But by 1975, China had recognised the 
EC (the first communist country to do so), and established diplomatic relations with all 
the major Western countries. Forced by its size to envisage its future within a wider 
European framework, French relations with China in the 1970s and 1980s were eclipsed 
by the US-China rapprochement, China’s growing international integration and even 
China’s dealings with the EC. The 1989 Tiananmen massacre and French arms sales to 
Taiwan resulted in a period of bilateral acrimony, and France was obliged to turn to 
multilateral structure such as the G7 and the OECD - but primarily the EU - to manage 
its disagreements with China.
17 Domenach ,“La Politique franfaise au miroir de l’Asie”, pp.228-244.
18 Grosser, Affaires Exterieures: La Politique de la France 1944-1989, ch.4-5.
19 See Domenach, “Sino-French Relations: a French View”, in Hsueh Chun-Tu (ed), China’s Foreign 
Relations: New Perspectives, New York: Praeger, 1982, pp.87-98.
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The development of common objectives and a common European political 
agenda in relations with significant and powerful external actors such as China and 
Japan could only come about with the gradual convergence of national objectives and 
policies, first between the EC-9 under EPC, then the EU-12/15 under the CFSP. Such a 
convergence of political objectives is evident in the EU’s dialogues with China. Chapter 
4 showed how the European consensus on “constructive engagement” with China in 
1995 had evolved after two decades of EC-China relations. This consensus was rooted 
in Germany’s initial pragmatic post-Tiananmen policy from 1992, and British and 
French policy emulation after 1993. It resulted in the first comprehensive EU strategy 
papers regarding China - the 1994 “New Asia Strategy” and the 1995 “Long-term 
policy for China-Europe Relations” which outlined a new European political agenda.
Towards Japan, stubborn French resistance in 1989-91 to developing closer 
political ties in the absence of balanced trade relations gave way, under the general 
consensus among other EU Member States and the Commission, to the view that a 
comprehensive dialogue with Japan was necessary in the post-Cold War world. Only in 
Vietnam was France a leading and consistent actor in initiating EU policies towards an 
Asian country. France used its influence as a leading member of other organisations, 
eg. the IMF, Francophonie and the UNSC to broker a peace in Cambodia and between 
Vietnam and its neighbours in 1991. With Vietnam, France pursues a “special 
relationship” with an ex-colony. Very positively regarded today, not only through 
rose-tinted lenses of nostalgia and sentiment as a member of the Francophonie (hence 
within the three “circles of priority” in French foreign policy) and with the humiliation 
of Dien Bien Phu half a century ago all but forgotten, Vietnam is also seen as a future 
economic tiger and strategic player in Southeast Asia and within ASEAN. Yet the 
utility of France to Vietnam and the unusually close relations in 1979-1991 rapidly 
diminished after the Paris Peace Accords, and especially after 1995 when Vietnam 
joined ASEAN and established full diplomatic relations with the US. In this regard, 
France can only compete with the major economic players (Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan), and strategic players (the US and China) in Vietnam by acting 
through the EU.
256
Europeanization and French Policy in East Asia Conclusion
Human Rights
France is a relative newcomer to the pursuit of human rights in foreign policy. 
During the Cold War, French leaders turned a blind eye to gross human rights violations 
occurring in the Communist bloc countries. Vietnam (where a large overseas 
Vietnamese community agitated for French government criticisms, if not action against 
Hanoi) was a noteworthy exception that proved the rule. Left-wing French intellectuals, 
enamoured by Marxist, Leninist and Maoist ideas for more just and egalitarian societies, 
were often silent on China’s human rights atrocities during the Cultural Revolution and 
the Great Leap Forward.20 This is in part a reflection of the “general will” Rousseauian 
tradition in France, and the relative weakness of the liberal individualist tradition in
9 1French foreign policy.
Tiananmen was the immediate and singular post-Cold War event that triggered a 
more pronounced and coherent French human rights policy. This was however more an 
emotional reaction than a reasoned, purposeful policy to promote human rights in China 
or indeed anywhere in East Asia or the wider world. Faced with the strong backlash 
from China in 1991-92, and against the backdrop of Germany and the UK continuing 
business-as-usual with China22, a modus vivendi balancing political, economic, human 
rights and security interests has been worked out since the normalisation of Franco- 
Chinese relations in 1994. The Europeanization of French human rights policy appears 
to have occurred in tandem with this understanding. In fact, France broke ranks in 1997 
and the EU had then to reach a new compromise position on its human rights policy in 
China
From the mid-1990s, a new turn in French human rights policy occurred with 
the French emphasis on “constructive dialogue”, including with repressive communist 
regimes such as those of China and Vietnam (chapters 4 and 6). While this approach 
may be criticised as an instrumental policy for French economic gains, it is nonetheless
20 See Domenach 82; Jean-Fran^ois Revel, La Grande Parade: Essai sur la survie de I ’utopie socialiste, 
Paris: Plon, 2000; Stephane Courtois et al, Le livre noir du communisme, Paris: Laffont, 1997.
21 In contrast, the Anglo-American tradition has stressed the rights o f  political and civil liberties in society 
as well as in international relations. See David Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics, 1983, p.95 
and Forsythe, “American Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality”, Universal Human 
Rights 2/3, July-September 1980, pp.35-54.
22 Britain (unlike France in 1991 or Denmark in 1997) was not singled out for retaliation, but British 
losses in trade with China on account of wrangling over Hong Kong in 1992-96, was estimated at £1-2 
billion. Craddock 99:281.
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clear that it represents an original and significant departure from the Dutch, Nordic and 
US human rights approaches which tend to be more principled but also more didactic. 
At a conference on democratisation in Warsaw in June 2000, Vedrine criticised 
“Westerners” who considered democratisation a “religion” and that it was sufficient to 
“convert people”. 23
Such a pragmatic approach to human right issues has allowed for cooperation 
activities and policy coordination with like-minded powers, especially Japan (chapter 
5), the major trading power and aid donor in the region. It has also allowed, in contrast 
to Mitterrand’s and Dumas’ principled stances on human rights in Vietnam, for high- 
level dialogues free from controversy with Vietnamese leaders in the Chirac presidency, 
with EU actors (apart from the Parliament) taking the cue from France in turning a blind 
eye to violations of political and religious rights in Vietnam.
Convergence vs. the logic of diversity
A key question raised in chapter one concerned whether Europeanization would 
lead to a convergence of the EU member states’ foreign policy trajectories and an 
emergence of shared notions of European interests. In the three case studies, there is 
remarkable evidence of French objectives converging with EU-wide perceptions and 
interests of East Asia.
Several factors have contributed towards this Europeanization of French policies 
in East Asia. First, there were external expectations that Europe could and should 
become a powerful unitary actor in world politics. China had in the 1970s and 1980s 
urged greater European integration as a counter-balance within NATO to Soviet 
expansionism and aggressive policies towards China. Japan in 1991 sought an 
enhanced EC-Japan political dialogue as it searched for its own post-Cold War role and 
manoeuvring room as a key member of the West, and a global economic power and 
Asian power in its own right.
Second, the EU provided a means for France to re-engage in East Asia. After its 
effective expulsion from the region following its defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954,
23 Kessler and Charillon, “France: un ‘rang’ k reinventer”, p.l 11 (fn.39)
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France had made several short-lived attempts (eg. in 1966 under De Gaulle, in 1981 
under Mitterrand) to return as a player in the politics and economics of the region. But 
France failed to be recognised as a serious alternative to the United States or the Soviet 
Union by the main actors sur place -  China, Japan and ASEAN. France was 
temporarily in the spotlight when it offered its good offices in the resolution of the 
Second and Third Indochina Wars (1964-73 and 1978-1991). However, it was through 
the vehicle of the Asia-Europe Meeting, launched in 1996 and effectively a summit 
meeting of EU and East Asian leaders, that France was able to re-engage in East Asia 
with all the countries in the region, in a forum that included political, economic and 
security discussions.
Related to the EU as a means or cover for French re-engagement in East Asia is 
the utility of the CFSP in affording a “politics of scale” to support French interests.24 
Under the “European” umbrella, France could play a key role in the 1993 and 1997 
elections-monitoring in Cambodia, backed by the EU’s financial wherewithal and 
protected from accusations of neo-colonialism through actions taken under EU and UN 
auspices. France could credibly claim that it was a significant player in the region. This 
rested not only on its UNSC status and hence formal role in contact groups/fora like 
KEDO, UNTAC and UNTAET. By acting as an agent of European foreign policy 
(many of these large operations were not confined to CFSP, but required Pillar I 
resources and member states’ contributions, eg. peace-keeping forces) it could claim 
more credit for its dual national/European roles in Cambodia, East Timor, and 
discussions on North Korea.
Third, there is a great deal of bilateral, trilateral and other sub-EU levels of 
policy coordination and learning taking place with regard to East Asia. We saw in 
chapter 4 the policy convergence and coordination that took root in the intensive 
coordination and policy transfer between France and Germany on China. France 
succeeded in projecting its high-profile political dialogue with China into EU policy in 
1998. Germany succeeded in exporting its pragmatic economics-based policy towards 
China to the EU in 1994, and confirmed it in 1995. Elite socialisation and a culture of 
consultation and consensus are discernible from the Commission’s 1994 and 1995
24 Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions o f  the European Community: the Politics o f  Scale, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1989.
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strategy papers. The papers are remarkable for the way in which they have incorporated 
ideas from the national diplomacies in Bonn, Paris, London and Brussels on 
comprehensive relations with China. In both cases, France and Germany initially 
worked unilaterally then enlisted the other country’s support to change established EU 
policy. In seeking to Europeanise their national approaches, they needed support from 
powerful allies. For Germany, the task of achieving EU recognition of Asia’s economic 
importance to EU trade took two years of quiet diplomacy, from 1992 to the 
Commission’s NAS paper in 1994. French efforts to upgrade political dialogue with 
China required four years (from France-China normalization in 1994) and a crisis at the 
53rd UNCHR in 1997, to spur the EU states into working out a comprehensive EU 
strategy in 1998, the Comprehensive Partnership paper.
Socialisation is also evident in that the frequent contacts and consultations 
between EU officials and national diplomacies on East Asia resulted in a European 
consensus on the need to fully “engage” China. Another example showing this process 
at work is the rapidity in which ASEM was launched. It took just 17 months, from its 
inception in Paris in October 1994, through the idea’s inscription onto the EU agenda in 
the July 1995 strategy paper, to its launch in March 1996. Although the idea was 
broached by the Singapore Prime Minster in Paris (to Mitterrand and Balladur) in 1994, 
it quickly became a French “European initiative” to engage East Asia at summit level in 
the Brussels circuit.
Of course, these convergence processes are not irreversible or pre-determined. 
French foreign policy seems to have resisted being locked into a fixed path of identity 
and policy convergence. On China, France was one of the chief culprits in the intra-EU 
competition after 1990 that resulted in the rapid unravelling of EU cooperation on the 
Madrid sanctions. It was the leading defector in 1997 when French interests in 
improving political and commercial relations with China over-rode the common 
UNCHR approach to human rights. Identity Europeanization remains elusive in all 
three case studies. French policy is often contrasted to that of Germany, supposedly the
25 Interview with Simon Nuttall, former Director for Far East (1988-95), European Commission External 
Relations Directorate-General (DG 1), in London, 12 March 2003. See also Council for Asia-Europe 
Relations, The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia-Europe Cooperation: CAEC Task Force 
Reports, Tokyo and London : CAEC, 1997, pp.3-30.
2 60
Europeanization and French Policy in East Asia Conclusion
• 9 f \model of a “Europeanised” state with a European identity . Yet even Germany showed 
a clear preference for national interest over agreed EU policy in its recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991.27 National interests, as defined by incumbent 
national elites, still play a decisive role in national foreign policy-making. But while 
national elites may resist the institutionalisation of EU practices and a reflex of working 
for the collective interest, changes in the international context, venues of decision­
making (increasingly oriented towards Brussels) have incrementally altered even the 
definition of what constitutes the “European” or the “national” interest.
Commercial Policy is a prime example of this shift. The Commission’s 1991 
“Car deal” with Japan undertook to dimantle over 10 years quotas for Japanese car 
imports in the protected markets of France, Italy and Spain. France shares with other EU 
member states the same interests of improving access to Chinese markets and entrusted 
the Commission to take the lead in multilateral negotiations with China, both for EC- 
China trade and for China’s WTO accession. Economic convergence is not limited to 
top-down processes proceeding from the Commission. The successful national policies 
of other member states are often copied. Britain’s success in attracting Japanese FDI, 
and Germany’s export success in China are two examples of policies emulated by 
French governments.
Despite the convergence in trade and political relations, France tries to keep a 
privileged political and cultural position for itself in Vietnam, regularly to enunciate 
preferences for an anti-hegemonic world order in its joint political declarations with 
China, and to upgrade previously neglected and acrimonious bilateral ties with Japan. 
Yet at the same time France publicly subscribes to common EU positions and common 
objectives as embodied in the Commission’s strategy papers towards these three and 
other countries in East Asia. Here the limit on Europeanization is the French state’s 
self-perception of its role in the EU and in the world. Even the most ardent advocates of 
CFSP coordination admit that ingrained national perception and foreign policy histories
26 See Klaus H. Goetz, “Integration policy in a Europeanized State: Germany and the Intergovernmental 
Conference”, Journal o f European Public Policy (JEPP), 3/1, March 1996, pp.23-44 and Martin 
Marcussen et al, “Constructing Europe? The Evolution o f French, British and German Nation State 
Identities”, in JEPP 6/4, Special Issue 1999, pp.614-633.
27 Reinhardt Rummel, “Germany’s Role in the CFSP: ‘Normalitat or ‘Sonderweg’?”, in Christopher Hill 
(ed), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1996, p.62.
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will not easily give way to “European” interests. France has been singled out as one 
of a few “uncooperative” Member States, recalcitrantly refusing to give up their
9Qnational foreign policy independence to support common European actions. In Asia, a 
Gaullist President making the first French presidential visit to Beijing in 14 years 
(Chirac in 1997) was unlikely to adhere to the EU’s common UNCHR position. In a 
situation of incompatible state and European interests, powerful states such as France 
are likely to defect from EU policies which have limited effects on the target actor’s 
behaviour. France remains one of the few countries in the EU willing and able to
*1 A
pursue an independent course of action, and to try to bring the EU along with it. 
French governments try to use EU institutions as a “power multiplier” rather than 
“influence reducer”31 to pursue their national interests. Although EU membership has 
meant that the chief “international and institutional context” in which national interests
A
are defined and redefined is the EU, France is different from most other EU states in 
that it can still exert an independent influence apart from the EU. More importantly, it 
has to adapt its foreign policy as a state with special international responsibilities and a 
great power role. It is a permanent member of the Security Council, a nuclear power, 
and de facto head of the Francophonie. Its historical ties with the Indochinese 
countries, despite the continual marginalisation and diminution of French-speaking 
elites in Vietnam since 1954, and Cambodia and Laos since 1975, are tinged by 
nostalgia and sentimentality which incorporate these states into one of the three inner 
circles of French foreign policy.
Theories of rational-choice institutionalism admit that “institutions make a 
significant difference in conjunction with power realities.”33 States may however 
withdraw from multilateral cooperation if the benefits accruing from cooperation do not 
compensate the costs incurred. Such a conception will lead us to think that CFSP 
actions have continually to contend with intergovernmental bargaining, coordination 
and the constant threat of collapse as the costs to each member state are variable. But 
the nature of even CFSP, one of the most inter-governmental of EU institutions, has
28 Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis, London: Macmillan Press, 1998.
29 Hill 98:37
30 Stanley Hoffmann, “La France dans le Monde 1979-2000”, Politique Etrangere 2/2000, 2000:307-317.
31 Hubert Vedrine, “De l’utilite de la France”, Politique Internationale, 78, winter 1997-98, p.41.
32 W. Sandholtz, “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht” International Organization Vol. 
47, Winter 1993, p.3.
33 Keohane and Martin, “The Promise o f Institutionalist Theory”, p.42.
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over the last 30 years moved a long way from its original anti-communautaire approach 
towards a reflexe communautaire,34 It is not just another rational-choice institution, but 
has become a critical sociological force and venue that shapes perceptions, structures 
policy choices, and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while 
constraining others.
France and the EU as a whole share the same economic and political interests in 
East Asia. Although the means and preferred methods may have sometimes differed 
quite dramatically, French national objectives largely coincided with EU objectives in 
East Asia during the 1990s. First, France, the Commission, and Member States such as 
Germany, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands were keen on engaging the economic 
opportunities offered by East Asia, until 1997 the most economically dynamic region in 
the world. This economic imperative was made clear in the Commission’s 1994 New 
Asia Strategy paper and reaffirmed in the slew of strategy papers concerning individual 
states (China, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc.) between 1995 and 1999. Second, The 
leaders of EU Member States were becoming convinced of the need for Europe to be 
politically and strategically engaged in East Asia, both in multilateral fora such as 
ASEM, as well as bilateral dialogues between individual East Asian and EU countries. 
Third, human rights were being championed by several EU Member States through EU 
structures. The Commission, the Parliament and several EU Presidencies (notably the 
Dutch and Danish) also took the initiative in the post-Cold War, post-Tiananmen era to 
champion human rights and attach political conditionalities in their aid and relations 
with East Asian countries. These three sets of objectives were shared by practically all 
EU member states. It was the French approach to East Asia, and the priority of 
objectives France applied to East Asia, which varied from the EU mainstream, not the 
objectives themselves.
If the EU did not exist, the incentives for France to seek compromises or 
regional allies to narrow conflicts of interests between itself and other European states, 
would have been far weaker. French governments unconstrained by the institionalised 
concertation of the Community and the CFSP, could be expected to have been even 
more aggressive in their pragmatic pursuit of grands contrats in the region. In the
34 Jakob 0hrgaard, “Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political 
Cooperation and the Dynamics o f Intergovernmental Integration”, Millennium 26/1, 1997.
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ferocious competition for a share in the dynamic East Asian markets in the 1990s (in 
trade, armaments, investments, services and intellectual property), the 1997 French 
defection from the common position on human rights in China would more likely have 
been the norm than the exception.
Despite habits of cooperation, consultation and coordination on the EU’s policy 
in the region being relatively new and not well established, the findings in this thesis 
suggest that policy convergence with other EU states and the Commission, and even a 
degree of identity reconstruction has occurred in France’s East Asia policy. Clearly, 
France adapted its economic strategy from 1991 (with regard to Japan) and from 1993, 
to China and the greater East Asia region based on the lessons learnt from initiatives 
launched by Germany, Britain and the Commission. Its volatile political relations with 
China (diplomatic “freeze” in 1989-1994) and Japan (confrontations over trade up to 
1991 and nuclear tests in 1995) were moderated by interactions and the need for 
cooperation in the contexts of other “clubs”: the UN Security Council, G7/G8, and 
OECD. Significantly, the new or intensified EU-level engagements in the 1990s: the 
EU-Japan and EU-China summits, KEDO, the ASEAN-EU Post-ministerial 
conferences, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Europe Meeting, have given 
France a plethora of fora in which to engage the giants of Asia in ways which it could 
otherwise not have achieved on a national basis.
Towards a more "European ” French policy?
The EU was valuable in enabling a legitimate form of post-war return for France 
in Africa and (especially) Asia, where at least until the 1980s, the withdrawal or 
expulsion of the European powers was an overwhelming tendency in international 
relations. France in many ways still prefers an EU with weak institutions. However, 
French foreign policy after de Gaulle has clearly become less nationalist and more 
“European”. This development is partially explained by constructivist accounts of the 
impact of EU norms and values and the internalisation of Community interests among 
foreign policy elites. A notion of collective European interests increasingly informs and 
shapes “national interests” and preferences. The discourse on French foreign policy and 
the “national interest” has been infused with the notion of EU interests and common
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European goals.35 In 1997 for example, France defended its defection from the common 
EU position at the UNCHR in the name of serving larger, long-term European interests 
of promoting democratic change in China, arguing that dialogue would be the best 
means to this shared goal.
One could take the cynical view that France uses the discourse of European 
interests as a post hoc justification for pursuing selfish national objectives, and that 
these interests are intrinsically inimical to common EU policies. Certainly, France is a 
long way from consistently according priority to the “European interest” -  a concept 
even more inchoate and elusive than the “national interest” and likely to become 
murkier with EU enlargement -  over national goals, foreign policy traditions and 
histories, as some European-idealists envision.37
Nevertheless, an undeniable shift in mentality towards incorporating notions of 
the collective European good into the Gaullist “France first” foreign policy is taking 
place. Much of this shift is related to the obsession with “national decline” and attempts 
to shore up France’s position in the world through Europe. Even in security policy, 
that other bastion of Gaullist sovereignty, notions o f ‘autonomy’ and ‘independence’ are
■JQ
set largely in a European rather than a national context. French co-leadership with 
Britain since end-1998 towards a joint European defence capability40 is symptomatic of 
the French preference for collective EU initiatives, even in sensitive areas impinging on 
national sovereignty and security.
In many regions of the world, distinctly “national” French policies have 
gradually been eroded, moderated or negotiated to more “European” and multilateral 
policies. This may not always result in a consensus of all EU member states, as the 
divisions over the 2002-3 Iraq war showed. However, France is eager to present a 
united front of at least a coalition of like-minded EU states (with France at the centre)
35 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe, 1997.
36 See for example, Eberhard Sandschneider’s conclusion in “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the 
States o f Europe”, in China Quarterly, No. 169, March 2002, pp.42-44; and Jan Zielonka, Explaining 
Euro-Paralysis, London: Macmillan Press, 1998.
37 Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis.
38 Pascal Boniface, La France est-elle encore une grande puissance?, Paris: Presses de SciencesPo, 1998.
39 Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea o f  France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 182.
40 Stanley Hoffmann, “Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?”, JCMS, 38/2, 2000, pp. 189-98.
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on all major foreign policy issues. From the French “Arab policy”, a more general EU 
“Mediterranean policy” and an EU  approach to the Middle East Peace Process has 
evolved since the First EPC statement on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1980 Venice 
Declaration, and the 1991 Madrid Conference. From the Frangafrique myth of France 
as an African power with a special responsibility as the “gendarme of Africa”, there is a 
move away towards more policy coordination with Britain, even Japan, the US, and of 
course with the EU.41
In East Asia, the utility and impact of EU institutions on French foreign policy 
behaviour is more significant than is commonly imagined or admitted. French analysts 
recognise that Paris does not have the means to make a noteworthy difference in this 
huge and diverse region dominated by the US, China and Japan, and beset by major 
economic, political and security instability in recent years.42 The most important 
avenue open to France to make an impact of some significance, is the European Union. 
The effects of participation in EFP offers notable evidence of the creeping influence of 
EU membership on national foreign policies, even that of France. For French policy­
makers, the objective conditions of France’s weak economic and political position in 
East Asia, as well as its near-absence in military terms, low expatriate and diplomatic 
visibility in East Asia until the 1990s, were all too evident. Their initiatives and 
achievements during the second Mitterrand and first Chirac presidencies have been 
forged on the anvil of “Europe”. The French may still retain a Gaullist relic in pursuing 
grandiose “declaratory diplomacy”, eg. in their discourse on multipolarity and anti-US 
hegemony in their relations with China. They continue to work extensively on a 
bilateral level with Vietnam (in aid, cultural cooperation, education, development 
projects to preserve “special relations”) in parallel with, and often duplicating collective 
European policies. But they are all too aware that the French rentree in East Asia was 
set in European terms, with all the attendant EU structures, actors, benefits and 
restrictions entailed.
41 Kessler and Charillon 2001:119-125; Rachel Utley, “'Not to do less but to do better...’: French military 
policy in Africa”, International Affairs 78/1, 2002, pp.129-146; Dosenrode and Stubjaer, The European 
Union and the Middle East, 2001.
42 See Valerie Niquet (ed), “Asie: equilibres incertains”, La Revue Internationale et Strategique 44, hiver 
2001 - 2 .
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EU TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS 1999 (Mio euro)
IM P O R T S  E X P O R T S  O M P O R T S + E X P O R T S I
Rank
_
Partners Values % Rank Partners
■ • . ■ : Values % Rank Partners Values %
WORLD* 772.086 100,0 WORLD* 758.342 100,0 WORLD* 1.530.428 100,0
1 U SA 158.708 20,6 1 USA 182.530 24,1 1 USA 341.238 22,3
2 Japan 70.231 9,1 2 Switzerlant 62.525 8,2 2 Switzerlant 115.371 7,5
3 Switzerlant 52.846 6,8 3 Japan 35.314 4,7 3 Japan 105.545 6,9
4 China 49.476 6,4 4 Poland 28.871 3,8 4 China 68.773 4,5
5 Norway 28.924 3,7 5 Norway 23.146 3,1 5 Norway 52.070 3,4
6 Russia 25 .904 3,4 6 Turkey 20.515 2 ,7 6 Poland 46.384 3,0
7 Taiwan 19.940 2,6 7 China 19.297 2,5 7 Russia 40.610 2 ,7
8 South Korc 17.950 2,3 8 Hungary 18.611 2,5 8 Hungary 35.949 2,3
9 Poland 17.513 2,3 9 Czech Rep 18.286 2,4 9 Turkey 35.544 2,3
10 Hungary 17.338 2,2 10 Canada 16.605 2,2 10 Czech Rep 35.089 2,3
11 Czech Rep 16.803 2,2 11 Hong Konc 15.623 2,1 11 Taiwan 31.761 2,1
12 Turkey 15.029 1,9 12 Russia 14.706 1,9 12 Canada 30.057 2,0
13 Canada 13.452 1,7 13 Brazil 14.194 1,9 13 South Korc 29 .375 1,9
14 M alaysia 13.060 1,7 14 Australia 13.740 1,8 14 Brazil 27 .109 1,8
15 Brazil 12.915 1,7 15 Israel 12.771 1,7 15 Hong Konc 26.222 1,7
16 Singapore 12.737 1,6 16 Singapore 11.825 1,6 16 Singapore 24.562 1,6
17 South Afric 10.798 1,4 17 Taiwan 11.821 1,6 17 South Afric 20 .650 1,3
18 Hong Konc 10.598 1,4 18 South Korc 11.425 1,5 18 Australia 20 .617 1,3
19 Thailand 10.035 1,3 19 Mexico 10.386 1,4 19 Israel 20.382 1,3
20 India 10.005 1,3 20 India 10.268 1,4 20 India 20.274 1,3
IM P O R T S
GEOPOLITICAL GROUPINGS
E XP O R TS (IM P O R T S + E X P O R T S )
Rank Partners Values % Rank Partners Values % Rank Partners Values %
WORLD* 772.086 100,0 WORLD* 758.342 100,0 WORLD* 1.530.428 100,0
(a) NAFTA 176.833 22,9 (a) NAFTA 209.521 27,6 (a) N AFTA 386.354 25,2
(b) AM LAT 36.391 4,7 (b) AMLAT 45.583 6,0 (b) AM LAT 81.974 5,4
(c) C EE C 92.261 11,9 (c) C EEC 118.094 15,6 (c) C EE C 210.356 13,7
(d) C IS 31.893 4,1 (d) C IS 20.884 2,8 (d) C IS 52 .777 3,4
(e) M ED 47.076 6,1 (e) M ED 69.053 9,1 (e) M ED 116.129 7,6
(f) A .ASEM 191.299 24,8 (f) A .ASEM 96.800 12,8 (f) A .ASEM 288 .099 18,8
(a) USA, Canada, Mexico
(b) 20 pays de I'Amerique Latine
(c) Pologne, Hongrie, Roumanie, Bulgarie, Slovenie, Estonie, Lituanie, Lettonie, R. Tcheque,
Slovaquie, Malta, Cyprus, Turkye
(d) Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russie, Georgie, Armenie, Azerbaidjan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Ouzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kirghizsthan
(e) Malte, Jordanie, Turquie, Maroc, Algerie, Tunisie, Egypte, Chypre, Liban, Syrie, Israel, Gaza et Jericho
(f) Thailande, Indonesie, Malaysie, Brunei, Singapour, Philippines, Chine, Coree du Sud, Japon,
Viet-nam,Laos, Myanmar
Source: EUROSTAT (COMEXT)
Brussels, 12 April 2000 
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EU TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS 2001 (Mio euro)
IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS+EXPORTS
Rank. Partners Mio euro
%
World* Rank. Partners Mio euro % World* Rank. Partners Mio euro
%
World*
World* 1.027.955 100,0 World* 982.570 100,0 World* 2.010.525 100,0
1 USA 195.627 19,0 1 USA 239.902 24,4 1 USA 435.530 21,7
2 Japan 76.308 7,4 2 Switzerland 74.760 7,6 2 Switzerland 135.546 6,7
3 China 75.914 7,4 3 Japan 44.920 4,6 3 Japan 121.228 6,0
4 Switzerland 60.786 5,9 4 Poland 35.681 3,6 4 China 106.012 5,3
5 Russia 47.686 4,6 5 China 30.099 3,1 5 Russia 75.647 3.8
6 Norway 45.113 4,4 6 Russia 27.961 2.8 6 Nonway 71.268 3,5
7 Poland 26.623 2,6 7 Czech Rep. 27.674 2,8 7 Poland 62.304 3,1
8 Czech Rep. 25.136 2,4 8 Norway 26.154 2,7 8 Czech Rep. 52.810 2,6
9 Hungary 24.817 2,4 9 Hungary 23.878 2,4 9 Hungary 48.695 2,4
10 Taiwan 24.174 2,4 10 Canada 21.939 2,2 10 Turkey 40.483 2,0
11 South Korea 21.596 2,1 11 Hong Kong 21.533 2,2 11 Canada 39.932 2,0
12 Turkey 20.217 2,0 12 Turkey 20.266 2,1 12 Taiwan 37.437 1,9
13 Brazil 18.321 1.8 13 Brazil 18.313 1.9 13 South Korea 37.183 1.8
14 Canada 17.993 1,8 14 South Korea 15.587 1,6 14 Brazil 36.634 1.8
15 Algeria 16.034 1,6 15 Australia 15.531 1,6 15 Hong Kong 31.803 1,6
16 South Africa 16.018 1,6 16 Mexico 15.034 1.5 16 Singapore 28.530 1,4
17 Malaysia 15.770 1,5 17 Singapore 14.604 1,5 17 South Africa 28.510 1,4
18 Singapore 13.926 1,4 18 Israel 14.449 1,5 18 Saudi Arabia 26.315 1,3
19 Saudi Arabia 13.085 1,3 19 U.A.Emirates 13.781 1,4 19 India 25.521 1,3
20 India 12.911 1.3 20 Taiwan 13.264 1,3 20 Malaysia 25.086 1,2
IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS+EXPORTS
Partners Mio euro
%
World* Partners Mio euro % World* Partners Mio euro
%
World*
World* 1.027.955 100,0 World* 982.570 100,0 World* 2.010.525 100,0
(a) NAFTA 221.001 21,5 0 ) NAFTA 276.875 28,2 (a) NAFTA 497.877 24,8
(b) AMLAT 49.940 4,9 (b) AMLAT 56.984 5,8 (b) AMLAT 106.924 5,3
(c) Candidates 134.087 13,0 (c) Candidates 152.812 15,6 (c) Candidates 286.900 14,3
(d) EFTA 108.533 10,6 (d) EFTA 103.301 10.5 (d) EFTA 211.834 10,5
(e) MED 68.109 6,6 (e) MED 77.042 7,8 (e) MED 145.151 7,2
(f) ASEAN 66.231 6,4 (f) ASEAN 42.732 4,3 (0 ASEAN 108.963 5,4
(g) Andean Group | 8.547 0,8 (g) Andean Group 7.765 0,8 (g) Andean Group 16.313 0,8
(a) USA, Canada, Mexico.
(b) 20 Latin American Countries
(c) Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Rep.,
Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey.
(d) Iceland, Nonway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein.
(e) Malta, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Gaza and Jericho.
(f) Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar.
(g) Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
Brussels, January 2003
Source: EUROSTAT (COMEXT) DG TRADE A2/CG/SG/WB
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